Since the ratification of the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea), both nations have engaged broadly in bilateral trade, student exchanges, and common enterprises in science and environmental monitoring. Moreover, tourism between the two countries is brisk, and marriage between Japanese and South Koreans is commonplace. The countries have engaged in regular Track 1, 2, and 3 meetings while their democracies solidified and prospered. In 2015, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the treaty, Japan and South Korea signed a historic agreement to resolve the comfort women issue “finally and irreversibly.” By most indicators, Japan and South Korea are politically, economically, and culturally interdependent. Yet, the strength of the relationship has regularly been tested by disputes over Japan's colonial history and subsequent inability to mend relations with its neighbors.
Despite the 2015 agreement, however, Japan and South Korea remain hamstrung by divided public sentiment on war memory and reconciliation; many Koreans believe Japan has not sufficiently apologized and many Japanese suffer from “apology fatigue.” According to the 2018 Genron NPO Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll, the majority of Koreans and Japanese have a negative opinion of each other, with 69.3 percent of Japanese respondents citing “South Korea continues to criticize Japan on historical issues” and 70 percent of Korean respondents citing “Japan has not properly reflected on its history of invading South Korea” as the source of their animosity (Genron NPO 2018).Footnote 1 The most extreme elements on the issue in South Korea believe Japan has not apologized at all and revisionists in Japan whitewash the nation's colonial history. Both groups have a noticeable presence in domestic politics.
The durability of anti-reconciliation forces is perplexing given that the countries signed a normalization treaty, Japan has issued multiple apologies, and noncooperation is not within their strategic interests. Scholars have spent much time elucidating why the history issue has remained an obstacle and have proposed concessions that each side should consider but have paid less attention to the reconciliation process and to why previous treaties have failed to stick after they were reached.
Hence, this article engages this puzzle by addressing the question of why successful high-level negotiations between Japan and South Korea have failed to convince the respective publics that historical matters have been addressed adequately. Treaties ideally “settle” the history question so countries can cooperate under new conditions. I contend that although the 1965 treaty prevented conflict escalation and laid the groundwork for economic cooperation, it did not resolve the “history question” because it is perceived to be illegitimate.
Specifically, the 1965 treaty lacked legitimacy because it was forced through by Korean President Park Chung-hee, an authoritarian leader who was later assassinated. When the treaty was signed, the power disparity between Japan and South Korea was great, providing the perpetrator leverage over the victim. Since Park was primarily focused on securing capital to jumpstart South Korea's economy, he silenced opposition forces, imposed martial law to suppress anti-government protests, and forced through a nontransparent and vaguely worded treaty. Subsequent agreements have sought to address the weaknesses of the original treaty but have failed to sustain positive relations due to poor strategic bargaining.
Strategic missteps have plagued the reconciliation process. Since 1965, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has engaged in several unilateral apologies without engaging the Government of South Korea (GOK) or the victims, thus not addressing the legitimacy problem of the original treaty. Moreover, treaties and agreements have not been designed to address backtracking from either side. Governments craft agreements on behalf of their constituents, but members of the public, and especially the victims, have a significant influence on the durability of those agreements. Aligning government, group, and individual interests within and between countries is difficult, especially when distrust has increased due to backtracking. The failure of previous apologies to settle the history problem makes leaders reluctant to revisit past issues and leads them to believe the other side is not negotiating in good faith. In sum, illegitimate treaties create conditions that are not conducive to eventual reconciliation and forgiveness, which requires prolonged, transparent, and victim-centered engagement with the consequences of conflict.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I illustrate the importance of reconciliation and why the growing chasm of public opinion is harmful to Japan and South Korea. Second, I examine arguments in the literature on why reconciliation has been so difficult. Third, I analyze the historical contexts of how previous agreements and apologies were issued and why they have been ineffective. And fourth, I offer suggestions for how to craft an enduring peace agreement.
The Importance of Reconciliation
In recent years, increased attention has been given to the normative dimension of reconciliation. Reconciliation is necessary for building confidence and trust, creating empathy, and even preventing conflict (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse Reference Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse2003). Although there is not a one-size-fits-all reconciliation model, the process usually includes healing, justice (retributive and restorative), truth-telling, and reparations (Bloomfield et al. Reference Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse2003). In addition to achieving justice for the victims, reconciliation also helps states avoid the consequences of noncooperation.
Transitional justice literature provides much of the theoretical underpinnings of postwar reconciliation. Daniel Philpott (Reference Philpott2009, 390) argues that “reconciliation, both as process and an end state, is itself a concept of justice.” To achieve such justice, a post-conflict state should seek to restore laws, rights, and institutions and redress sufferings. Taking into account power discrepancies between victim and perpetrator, Roman David and Susanne Choi (Reference David and Choi2009, 161) suggest that instead of “‘getting even’ in relation to the suffering, victims and perpetrators may ‘get equal’” by “(1) reparations that empower victims through financial compensation, truth telling, and social acknowledgement; (2) retribution that inflicts punishments on the perpetrators; and (3) reconciliation that renews civic relationship between victims and perpetrators through personal contact, apology, and forgiveness.” Hence, reconciliation requires not only the “speech acts” of victims and perpetrators, but also “other acts of concrete restorative justice” to give the process long-term credibility (Shriver Reference Shriver and Rothstein1999, 218).
Such methods have been effective at bringing some forms of justice to victims, but a systematic application to the Japan-South Korea case may not be possible. First, transitional justice theory has mainly focused on post-intrastate war and therefore emphasizes addressing the grievances of vulnerable groups within a state. Second, many of the tools are designed for use soon after a conflict. In Japan and South Korea, most of the perpetrators and victims are no longer living. Third, compensation, purging, and criminal prosecution were attempted to varying degrees and have lost their effectiveness over time.
Since the comfort women issue—which refers to the fact that, according to some estimates, the GOJ forced tens of thousands of women into sexual slavery—became public knowledge in the late 1980s, Japan and South Korea have pursued truth-telling, reparations, apology, and acceptance. However, dissatisfaction with the process and its results have led both sides to pursue more destructive methods of reconciliation. Over the past decade, Japan and South Korea have engaged in an expensive and embarrassing public relations battle. Each government has been increasingly willing to debate the comfort women issue at the international level, drumming up nationalistic, and often misinformed, support from the general population. This has fueled other bilateral clashes, such as the controversy over ownership of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. Both sides have sought to strengthen their claims by lining up support from foreign powers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2013). Such strategies fail to reconcile differences, as Japan and South Korea speak past one another and are likely to anger the other side. They are also unlikely to garner support from the international community, as these issues are complex and context-driven; how colonial history is addressed may be significant to domestic constituents but trivial to outsiders thousands of miles away. Moreover, until one side “wins,” both countries risk losing prestige as embarrassing history is publicized at the international level. For example, as Korean interest groups were pressuring Prime Minister Abe Shinzō to issue an apology during his April 2015 visit to the United States, the Japanese government mobilized former Minnesota Senator Norm Coleman to front the organization Voices of Vietnam, which called for South Korea to apologize to the thousands of Vietnamese comfort women (Kingston Reference Kingston2015). Abe unceremoniously began his first term weathering the political backlash of House Resolution 121, which criticized Japan's response to the comfort women issue. Abe's response not only hurt Japan's standing with the United States, but also further damaged its international image (Morris-Suzuki Reference Morris-Suzuki2007a). Not only do these political games achieve little for either side, but also it is a grave injustice to the comfort women whose suffering has been used for political purposes.
The Consequences of Failed Reconciliation
The animosity between Japan and South Korea also risks weakening relations with their most important ally, the United States. Although the US position on history disputes is one of neutrality, top officials have become more willing to criticize allies for failing to curb the most extreme voices on both sides. In 2015, Under Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman remarked, “[N]ationalist feelings can still be exploited, and it's not hard for a political leader anywhere to earn cheap applause by vilifying a former enemy. But such provocations produce paralysis, not progress.… [W]e don't have to look far for a cautionary tale of a country that has allowed itself to be trapped by its own history” (Sherman Reference Sherman2015). Sherman's assessment led to a backlash in South Korea for what was seen as an embarrassing criticism from an ally (Kang 2015). Similarly, after Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, the US Embassy in Tokyo released a statement expressing “disappointment that Japan's leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan's neighbors” (Oshima Reference Oshima2013). Every time the United States has commented on disputes, Japan and South Korea question the strength of their alliances and each side wastes precious resources exercising damage control.
The increasing willingness of the United States to intervene is reflective of a growing concern over encroachment on its foreign policy by special interests. According to Kent Calder (Reference Calder2014), Japan and South Korea have the most registered foreign lobbyists in the United States, at thirty-four and twenty-four firms, respectively. The Japanese and Korean governments hope that millions of lobbying dollars will deepen “local understanding of their country's economic and political circumstances as well as its policy priorities” (92). The lobby efforts have brought East Asian regional issues into US domestic politics. For example, South Korea has helped finance the construction of comfort women statues in Glendale, New Jersey, and San Francisco, leading to tensions within those communities and drawing the ire of local politicians (Levine Reference Levine2013). These outside interest groups have also sought to influence the content of textbooks in US classrooms. In one case, where the Korean American community, supported by resources from the South Korean government, pushed for Virginia textbooks to use the term “East Sea” in addition to “Sea of Japan,” Japan mobilized its ambassador, several lobbyists, and the business community to pressure state politicians (Vozzella Reference Vozzella2014).
The tension between the two sides also impacts the ability of the United States to maneuver in East Asia. In April 2014, President Barack Obama added Seoul to his Asia trip to avoid “potential fallout over tensions in the region” (E. Kim Reference Kim2014). The United States did not want to signal to South Korea that it was secondary to Japan, fearing that it would push the ally closer to China. As a result, “Obama's visit to Korea was more about delivering a message of commitment and friendship rather than seeking deliverables” (E. Kim Reference Kim2014). Since the United States expends resources maintaining, as opposed to strengthening, relations among its allies, the alliances are not operating at peak efficiency.
Without a firm agreement and reconciliation, positive relations rely on the personalities and agendas of leaders. During Kim Dae-jung's presidency in the 2000s, which analysts viewed as a high point in Japan-South Korea relations (Er Reference Er2002), economic and political cooperation increased significantly, with the countries even co-hosting the World Cup. Yet, the fierce competition between the two countries to see who would go further in the tournament revealed the deep animosity that plagues the relationship and the precariousness of good times. During this period, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō fulfilled a campaign promise and visited the Yasukuni Shrine, adding a new dimension to the history problem. Following Koizumi's 2001 visit, Kim remarked, “[T]o our disappointment, however, some people in Japan are attempting to distort history, casting dark clouds over Korea-Japan relations again” (Japan Times 2001). Moreover, Kim's rapprochement with Japan was also largely fueled by strategic interest, the North Korean problem. Without the North Korean threat, South Korea would not have been so invested in the relationship, and the coveted US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance would be little more than a pipedream. In 2018, President Moon Jae-in fulfilled his promise to revisit the 2015 agreement and improve relations with North Korea, both of which further strained Japan-South Korea relations. Reconciliation allows for relations to remain steady regardless of who is in power, especially since the history issue has been used as a political tool.
Without a comprehensive, future-oriented agreement, neither side will achieve what it desires. South Korea desires a genuine apology extended directly to the comfort women, and its current strategy of securing piecemeal concessions through shaming may not achieve justice for the victims within their lifetime. For Japan, an ironclad reconciliation agreement will allow it to better manage disputes that have continually resurfaced for over five decades. For example, in 2012, the Supreme Court of Korea ordered Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel Corporations to compensate victims of forced labor (S. Kim Reference Kim2015). And in 2014, the Shanghai Maritime Court seized a Mitsui OSK Lines ship over a prewar debt (Hornby and Soble Reference Hornby and Soble2014). As additional data is unearthed over time, such as the first known video footage of comfort women, discovered in 2017 (Yonhap 2017), it will become increasingly clear that Japan is more liable than believed by Japanese politicians. It is within Japan's interest to work closely with South Korea in unraveling, contextualizing, and constructing a shared narrative of its war crimes. If future generations in Japan and South Korea are not to be defined by aggression and victimhood, a more comprehensive agreement must be secured.
Overcoming Identity
The rich literature examining the troubled process of reconciliation between Japan and South Korea reveals the durability of the history problem. Utilizing public opinion polls and in-depth interviews, Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder (Reference Glosserman and Snyder2015) find that national identity, partly built on differing interpretations of history, shapes foreign policy and has made it difficult for the sides to find common ground.
Park Cheol Hee (Reference Hasegawa and Togo2008, 191–92) contends that negative perceptions of Japanese are a primordial element of Korean identity, one that is intrinsically linked to its colonial past. Japan, on the other hand, has sought to move past its colonial history, focusing on its democracy, “peace constitution,” contributions to the international community, and economic growth. Kim Mikyoung (Reference Rinnert, Farouk and Inoue2010) has attributed these differing attitudes toward history to the Japanese “hollow center” and Korean “han.” The Japanese “hollow center” is a cultural characteristic that allows for flexibility and compromise, whereas the Korean “han” creates “resentment towards inflicted injustice.” “Han” is “acutely aware of power relations between self and the other, and it holds the self accountable for a slight in its honor at the hands of the more powerful” (148). Robert Kelly (Reference Kelly2014) has argued that anti-Japanese sentiments are as political as they are ideational, hypothesizing that such attitudes may be due to newer generations of Koreans trying to break free of the nation's past and the desire to construct a Korean identity. Catherine Lu (Reference Lu2008, 369) has found that feelings of shame and guilt are a “double-edged sword” that can provoke “defensive, reactionary, and violent political responses” and not always lead to positive transformations. Arguments illustrating the primordial nature of the animosity between Japan and South Korea provide insight on the enduringness of the history problem and the role of humiliation and honor, but do not account for why relations ebb and flow. Both states have been able to achieve politically costly and comprehensive treaties and agreements, suggesting that the history problem can be overcome, at least momentarily.
A more pressing question raised by identity-based arguments is whether reconciliation is possible at all. Seventy-five years of identity politics may yield little room for negotiation. Nevertheless, scholars believe that a trilateral “grand bargain” cultivated by the United States is at least desirable, although difficult (Glosserman and Snyder Reference Glosserman and Snyder2015). To achieve reconciliation, Jennifer Lind (Reference Lind2009b) suggests that Japan should avoid denying its past and focus on its postwar identity, while its victims should avoid the need to constantly shame Japan. In examining the Sino-Japanese case, Karl Gustafsson (Reference Gustafsson2015) argues for strategic shaming, by which victim states do not deny the former aggressors’ new identity but use the new identity to force compliance. Specifically, Gustafsson contends that “China and other states might be able to make Japan more consistently contrite, however, by combining praise with a strategy that highlights identity-behavior disconnect while avoiding denial of Japan's self-identity” (321). This strategy creates equity in the reconciliation process: the victim receives an apology and reparations, while not denying the former aggressors’ new identity for domestic political gain. Yet, such strategies are difficult to implement, as they require the victim to praise the aggressor. According to the 2018 Genron NPO poll, 45.1 percent of Korean respondents perceive Japan's sociopolitical system as militaristic; this is higher than other categorizations, such as nationalist (39.6 percent) and ethnic nationalistic (35.1 percent). Of the respondents, 8.2 percent perceived Japan's political system as pacifist and 28.4 percent as democratic (Genron NPO 2018). With such a gap between positive and negative perceptions of Japan's postwar identity, it is unlikely that South Korea will unilaterally change its approach towards Japan. Moreover, although these strategies highlight the need to extend an olive branch to the other side, there also needs to be a discussion of the bargaining process, communication between stakeholders, and how to prevent backtracking. Due to the immense distrust between Japan and South Korea, unilateral positive gestures by either side are unlikely to be received as intended.
Missing Pieces of the Reconciliation Puzzle
One reason why these previous agreements have not had a lasting impact is that many Koreans do not believe that Japanese apologies are sincere. Lind (Reference Lind2008) argues that after apologies, there would be strong political backlash among conservatives in Japan, making Koreans question if Japan was genuinely sorry at all. Sung Pyo Hong (Reference Hong2016, 59) builds on this argument and contends that Japanese were never truly sorry for their actions, but instead “Japan's apologies were largely motivated by party-politics competition” and Japan “used apologies as a symbolic measure when setting its future grand strategies.” Louis Kriesberg (Reference Kriesberg2003) concludes that reconciliation ultimately requires forgiveness, but forgiveness requires the recognition of the humanity of the victim and the perpetrators. For many Koreans, sincerity is the litmus test for whether Japan has acknowledged South Korea's suffering and the humanity of the victims.
However, sincerity alone is not a very useful measure of a good apology. First, Koreans have argued the Murayama Statement is a “good” apology, only to later claim that it does not go far enough, suggesting that sincerity needs to be supplemented with satisfactory tangible gains. Second, while some Japanese leaders have shown contrition, others have downplayed the impact of Japan's colonialism. How is one to assess Japanese sincerity when there is a myriad of interpretations and feelings concerning World War II, especially over time? The strength of an agreement cannot be found in its sincerity, but in the terms that force each side to stick to the reconciliation process. Long-term reconciliation becomes more likely when states can build upon previous agreements instead of starting from scratch with each new generation. Third, it is highly unlikely to have a single view of history in Japan or South Korea. Roman David (Reference David2016) argues that collective memory in South Korea is influenced by traditionalist views of colonialism and contemporary reactions to Japanese apologies, with stark variance among age groups. Kim Mikyoung's (2014, 88) interviews of visitors to the comfort women statues found that the message of the comfort women statues “varies according to the meanings viewers bring to it, which in turn change with changing times.” And a 2015 SBS Poll (Cha Hyuna 2016) and a Redian Poll (Yoo 2016) found that younger Koreans were more likely to oppose the 2015 deal than Koreans over the age of fifty. In other words, there is not a clear idea of what is an acceptable apology.
Legal scholars such as Eric Yamamoto and Sara Lee (Reference Yamamoto and Lee2012) have proposed the US-Hawaii and US-Japanese Americans reparations cases as models for Japan-South Korea reconciliation. However, these cases do not translate well because they do not consider the power differences between stakeholders. In both US reparations cases, the government legally owed reparations to its citizens, whereas the legality of reparations is still disputed in the Japan-South Korea case. More importantly, as US citizens, Hawaiians and Japanese Americans had little power to negotiate with the US government. In 1965, South Korea lacked such negotiating power, and thus a treaty was possible. However, since the deal is believed to be illegitimate, especially now that South Korea has much more economic and political power, it is unlikely Koreans would just accept whatever Japan gives them.
This rich literature has contributed to an improved understanding of the roots of distrust but has not illustrated why treaties and apologies have not led to better relations. The Japan-South Korea reconciliation process has been flawed because Koreans believe the original 1965 agreement is illegitimate and subsequent positive signals have been high-cost unilateral actions with little guarantee of a payoff. Unilateral tit-for-tat and graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT) strategies have failed because the other side has few incentives to concede; past treaties and agreements lack punishment mechanisms to prevent both countries from exploiting ambiguous language for political gain. Recognition of the importance of identity is an essential first step in the reconciliation process, but to complete the process, an agreement must decrease the costs of issuing and accepting an apology and increase the costs of reversing course.
A Flawed Reconciliation Process
The Japan-South Korea reconciliation process is perplexing because it has increased even though most Japanese and Koreans did not experience the occupation and several treaties and agreements have been signed. How were Japan and South Korea able to reach agreements despite the many obstacles? Moreover, once agreements were reached, why did they fail to settle the history problem? Much attention has been paid to the barriers to cooperation, but scant attention has been paid to the weaknesses of past agreements, treaties, and statements.
The 1965 treaty laid the groundwork for avoiding conflict but did not reconcile differing interpretations of history. As a result, the treaty achieved temporary peace, but was doomed to fail when the context changed. Japan settled most of its wartime accounts in the Treaty of San Francisco, where Japan accepted judgments by various courts. Japan paid several of the occupied countries, including Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam, a total of over $1 billion. As South Korea was not a signatory state of the treaty, Japan had to settle with South Korea in a separate agreement. The 1965 treaty and related agreements regarding reparations and property were the culmination of fourteen years of contentious negotiations. In the settlement, Japan recognized South Korea as the sole “Korea,” renounced its assets on the Korean peninsula, and provided $800 million in aid, which consisted of “a) an outright grant of $300 million, to be distributed over a 10-year period; b) a $200 million loan to be distributed over a ten-year period and repaid over twenty years at 3.5 percent interest; c) $300 million in private credits over ten years from Japanese banks and financial institutions” (S. Kim Reference Kim2015; Manyin Reference Manyin2001; World and Japan Database Project 1965). With the funds, South Korea “devoted most of Japan's assistance for economic development plans, including the establishment of POSCO and the Gyeongbu Expressway. The government paid 300,000 won per death in compensating victims of forced labor between 1975 and 1977” (Do 2015). Although the treaties addressed many of the core issues stemming from Japanese occupation, they did not settle the history problem because future generations could go back and criticize the 1965 agreements. The criticisms stem from flaws in treaty texts, treaty legitimacy deficits, and errors in the negotiation process.
Flaws in Text
Due to the treaties’ vagueness and controversial approval, there was ground for future disputes. Treaties are commonly unambitious agreements because more controversial, and usually, deep-seated issues, are tabled for another time. The treaties did not make clear if the settlements were grant aid from Japan or reparations for colonization. Both sides debate the purpose of the funds, and Japanese feel like they do not receive enough credit for their role in the Korean economic miracle. Because the grant aid was not explicitly linked to Japan's moral and legal responsibilities, it allowed Japan to focus on South Korea's development after 1965 over the lack of development due to colonization. In a sense, conservative Japanese leaders are claiming South Korea's economic miracle as repayment for colonization. Such an interpretation is not supported anywhere in the text of any of the treaties and only further humiliates South Korea by downplaying its remarkable recovery.
Language explicitly stating the Japanese government's responsibility is also lacking in subsequent apologies. In a highly detailed analysis of the 1984 Hirohito apology, 1990 Akihito apology, and 1990 Kaifu apology during the Roh Tae-woo presidency, Jane W. Yamazaki (Reference Yamazaki2004) finds that interstate and intrastate debates over language led to vague apologies that did not pin down Japan's responsibility for its colonial rule of Korea. In the apologies, the phrases “brief period,” “period in the past,” and “unfortunate past” create the impression that Japan's actions were an anomaly in an unspecified time.
Vague language was also a weakness of the 2015 comfort women agreement, particularly in regard to the status of a comfort women statue erected by Korean NGOs in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, the disbursement of funds for supporting comfort women, and evidence of sincerity. The agreement states:
The Government of the ROK acknowledges the fact that the Government of Japan is concerned about the statue built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul from the viewpoint of preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, and will strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organizations about possible ways of addressing this issue. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a)
The Japan side walked away from the agreement assuming the statue would be removed, but the agreement does not state how and when. Following the announcement, there was strong public backlash in South Korea regarding this condition, especially given that comfort women were not consulted during negotiations. In a survey of South Koreans, 35.6 percent of respondents were content with the agreement (Korea Daily 2016). Another survey found that 58.2 percent believed the deal was not final and 76.6 percent believed Abe's apology was not genuine (Korea Daily 2016). Additionally, 74.4 percent of Korean respondents did not support moving the statue (Korea Daily 2016). The statue has yet to be removed, and Japan is beginning to question if South Korea will meet its end of the bargain. South Korea can claim it technically does not need to remove the statue; there just needs to be an attempt. Moreover, the agreement states:
The Government of Japan has been sincerely dealing with this issue. Building on such experience, the Government of Japan will now take measures to heal psychological wounds of all former comfort women through its budget. To be more specific, it has been decided that the Government of the ROK establish a foundation for the purpose of providing support for the former comfort women, that its funds be contributed by the Government of Japan as a one-time contribution through its budget, and that projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women be carried out under the cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the ROK. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a)
Although the GOJ has a much more direct role in administering these funds in comparison to the 1994 Asian Women's Fund, the agreement does not stipulate when the funds would be dispersed. Japan believed the statue would be removed first, whereas South Korea believed that part of the agreement was an ongoing process. As a result, the entirety of funds has not been released. The delay in fully implementing the deal has resulted in a third problem, backtracking. The agreement also states:
The Government of the ROK, together with the Government of Japan, will refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations, on the premise that the Government of Japan will steadily implement the measures it announced. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a)
Following the agreement, Japan and South Korea disputed the acceptability of a comfort women statue outside the Japanese Consulate in Busan. Many Japanese believe the statue betrays the spirit of the agreement, whereas many Koreans believe Japan has not taken enough action to indicate remorse. For many in South Korea, the 2015 agreement, like the 1965 treaty, lacks legitimacy because they interpret Japanese pressure as trying to extract more from the Koreans than what is fair.
Legitimacy Deficits
The treaties were not transparently negotiated. Victor Cha (Reference Cha1996, 20) contends that the initial impetus of the 1965 treaty was US pressure, which was motivated by concerns about the regional power balance. The treaty was extremely unpopular in South Korea and contested in Japan. It was signed in secret and forced through the legislature via the authoritarian power of the Park regime. There have been several consequences of the turbulent process. For decades, the public did not know how the final settlement was agreed upon. It was not until 2005, when declassified documents were released in South Korea, that it was known that Japan did offer compensation for the victims (Chosun ilbo 2005). Park opted instead to utilize the settlement to develop the economy, which did help Koreans generally. The GOK did not start to adequately compensate the victims of Japanese colonial rule by establishing a committee of officials and experts until long after the 1965 treaty. Since mistrust of Japan is high in South Korea, when Japan argues that all issues concerning its colonial history had been settled, few Koreans would agree.
Moreover, the deal was signed by an authoritarian leader, whose legacy is increasingly questioned in South Korea. For many older Koreans, Park is a national hero because of his role in the nation's economic development, which was spurred by Japanese Official Development Assistance. The democratization of South Korea since his assassination has allowed for the emergence of NGOs and a public that are more willing to criticize Park and the reconciliation process. His authoritarian rule has tarnished his legacy for many younger Koreans. Park is perceived to be overly close to Japan, himself commissioned in the Manchukuo Imperial Army. This pro-Japan legacy has plagued even his daughter, former president Park Geun-hye, who was severely criticized for the 2015 comfort women deal and was impeached in December 2016 for corruption.
The elder Park promoted the 1965 deal as reparations for Japanese colonial rule, a sentiment that has not held in public opinion in the present day. A 2013 Pew survey found that 98 percent of Koreans do not believe Japan has sufficiently apologized for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s (Drake Reference Drake2015). This high percentage suggests that most Koreans do not believe Japan's aid (a function of the agreement) is an adequate apology. From Japan's perspective, South Korea either does not understand or refuses to credit the normalization treaty's vital role in the country's economic growth. For example, a Dong-A ilbo survey found that “89 percent of respondents think that Japan should readjust its position on wartime reparation.” The widespread belief is that “Japan has refused to pay damages to individuals such as ‘comfort women’ and forced laborers, saying it settled those issues on a government-to-government basis in the form of economic cooperation under the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty” (Do 2015).
At the time of the 1965 settlement, the issues of “comfort women” and forced laborers were not known. The treaty stipulated that new issues would be addressed bilaterally. In 1994, Japan unilaterally established the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), a public-private organization that provided compensation ($18,000) and an apology letter signed by the Japanese prime minister and the president of the AWF. Over the lifetime of the fund, four different prime ministers signed apology letters to the victims who chose to accept them (Takekawa Reference Takekawa and Mikyoung2016, 84). The AWF was not without controversy, as it was operated by private citizen volunteers and overseen by the government. As a result, many Koreans did not believe the AWF represented an official state apology. Sixty-one Korean women accepted the offer, but many declined because they believed it was inadequate or because they faced significant domestic backlash if they accepted.
Most importantly, past treaties have lacked legitimacy because the voices of the victims were missing during the negotiation process. Former comfort woman Lee Yong-soo questioned the loyalty of the GOK for not informing the comfort women of the 2015 agreement negotiations ahead of time (Kim Kyu-nam, Park, and Kim Reference Kim Kyu-nam and Gi-sung2015). A 2016 Korea Gallup poll found that 54 percent of Korean respondents believed the 2015 agreement was wrong, and of that group, 34 percent believed it was due to a lack of representation of comfort women (Korea Gallup 2016). Millions of Koreans suffered under Japanese colonialism, and it is the norm for governments to negotiate on behalf of a population. However, the participation of the victims can provide treaty legitimacy because victim-centered reconciliation helps cultivate a shared recognition of humanity. Utilizing the “needs-based” model of reconciliation, Nurit Shnabel and Arie Nadler (Reference Shnabel and Nadler2015) argue that victims seek agency, or the ability to influence outcomes, and perpetrators seek recognition for their moral-social identity. In this model, a successful exchange of empowerment, through “expressing respect” for “achievements and abilities” for example, can help promote reconciliation (478). Comfort women lacked agency at the very onset of the crimes committed and continue to lack agency because their voices have been marginalized in the postwar period (Morris-Suzuki Reference Morris-Suzuki2006, Reference Morris-Suzuki2015). The 1965 treaty did not mention comfort women because the issue was not publicly known, but the lack of engagement with the comfort women in the 1993 Kono Statement and the 2015 agreement, which specifically deal with the issue, is especially glaring. The 2017 task force review of the 2015 agreement commissioned by the Moon government argued that a “victim-centered approach” that was necessary for “restoring the victims’ honor and dignity and healing their psychological wounds in a ‘perpetrator vs. victim’ framework lies at the very heart of resolving the comfort women issue” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2017). The remaining twenty-three comfort women (as of February 2019) and forced laborers must be at the negotiating table to ensure any agreement would receive their final blessing. Following the 2015 deal, former comfort women Lee Ok-sun and Kang Il-chul spoke against the agreement and declared it “invalid,” saying that the “government sold out the comfort women to receive money” (Bae 2016; Jung 2017). The comfort women should have the freedom to accept or reject a deal while being protected from criticism by their governments. As of 2017, thirty-six out of the forty-seven surviving victims and sixty-eight out of the one hundred ninety-nine deceased victims’ families had received or expressed their intent to receive funds from the Japan-funded and Korea-run organization established in the 2015 deal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2017, 12). Moving forward, further consultation with the remaining victims should be pursued to arrive at an acceptable outcome.
Process Errors
Furthermore, the treaty was negotiated between two unequal states—at the time of negotiation, Japan was much stronger. Now that South Korea is a wealthier country, people can look back and argue that Japan forced South Korea into an unfair deal, a general feeling they have as a former colonial state. A Kyunghyang shinmum (2015) editorial that surveyed Korean legal experts concluded that the 1965 treaty was “the key factor that left a deep mark.” The uneven power dynamic erodes the legitimacy of the treaty because it suggests to Koreans that they had little choice in the final settlement. In 1965, Japan's GDP was thirty times greater than that of South Korea, and per capita GDP was ten times greater ($12,595 versus $1,169) (World Bank 2015). To present-day Koreans, the 1965 treaty was one of convenience and did not necessarily secure Japanese contrition or justice. Jungdaehyup, a comfort women interest group, has argued that “the Japanese government uses the 1965 peace treaty as a trump card against every request for compensation and apology for victims” (Lee 2015). Now that South Korea is much closer to Japan in terms of economic power, it can highlight the vagueness of the 1965 treaty to extract further concessions. According to a February 2014 Asahi shimbun poll, 95 percent of Koreans polled believe Japan still owes official compensation to the comfort women, a stark contrast to the 26 percent of Japanese who believe the same (Mansfield Foundation 2014). The sentiment of unfairness has lingered and can be seen in the 2015 deal, where polls and media highlighted how South Korea was defeated again.
Following the agreement, Korean editorials lamented that the deal was a “complete loss,” a “complete diplomatic defeat,” and “humiliating” (Gil 2016; Jang 2016). This language highlights the importance of apologizing without further humiliating the victim. South Korea suffers not only from the initial colonization but also from Japanese politicians continuing to highlight power differences by pushing uneven deals. A Joongang Daily Poll found that 47.9 percent of respondents opposed the deal (47.6 percent supported), but 74.4 percent of respondents disagreed with Japan's demand for the Korean government to remove the comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul (Sohn 2016). This is in sharp contrast with an NHK Poll that found that 64 percent of Japanese viewed the deal favorably (Cho 2016). The power discrepancy is also a reason why the oft-cited Germany-France reconciliation process would prove to be a poor model, because they have historically been equal powers and their postwar European context was much different than the East Asia context.
Past agreements also lacked a neutral third-party mediator. The United States did play an important role as a backroom facilitator in the 1965 and 2015 agreements but did not work with both nations simultaneously at the negotiation table. A neutral mediator may have been able to help promote cooperation and prevent cheating. One of the most significant problems since the 1965 treaty was signed is Japanese politicians’ tendency to routinely backtrack from previous apologies (Dudden Reference Dudden2008). Consequently, one Korean politician remarked, “The Japanese government has made verbal apologies but has not fundamentally acknowledged the illegal and criminal nature of its colonial rule over Korea” (S. Kim Reference Kim2015). The 2017 task force report argued that the term “irreversibly” in the 2015 agreement was not intended to refer to the agreement itself, but Japanese apologies. Park's Presidential Office concluded that it could apply to both, which led to protests in Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2017, 15). For South Korea to be bound to accepting an apology, Japan needs to be bound to its apologies.
Several follow-up apologies and statements have been issued that address the weaknesses of the 1965 treaty. Yet, this approach highlights a problem that has defined the entire reconciliation process: a lack of a coherent long-term strategy. Apologies have been unilateral, ad hoc, and unambitious. Several of the apologies were in fact not apologies, but statements of general contrition in a broader speech, such as the fiftieth, sixtieth, and seventieth end-of-war anniversary speeches. This was especially problematic in the seventieth anniversary speech, where Abe prefaced his acknowledgment of South Korea's suffering with a long passage explaining Japan's reasons for going to war.
South Korea has relied on the strategy of pressuring Japan to include apologies in anniversary statements and important speeches. For example, when Abe delivered a speech to a joint session of the US Congress in 2015, South Korea expected an apology. When Abe's speech was not to their satisfaction, Koreans felt that they did not receive US support (Chang 2015). But, Abe's trip to the United States had nothing to do with South Korea. Actual apologies, such as the Kono Statement and the Murayama Statement, have also had less impact than purported. Both statements ambiguously addressed Japan's war responsibilities and have been questioned numerous times by prominent Japanese politicians. Unilateral apologies are problematic because they incur costs with little guarantee of a payoff. In other words, the apologizer can only hope the victim interprets the apology correctly and accepts it. Given decades of poor Japan-South Korea relations, this is unlikely. Consequently, Japan has become increasingly unwilling to issue apologies for fear that they will not improve relations.
Lastly, unilateral apologies do not follow a roadmap toward reconciliation; they are statements contingent on unforeseen developments. New apologies do not build upon previous agreements, and there are no mechanisms to prevent future actors from violating past apologies. Japan has taken a strategy akin to throwing darts against the wall when pressured, hoping that they may one day hit the bullseye and settle the history issue once and for all.
Recommendations for Mediation
Reconciliation is difficult because negotiators are afraid of taking the initiative in reconciliation efforts; voters, highly mobilized nationalistic groups, and the press raise the costs of giving and accepting apologies. To overcome this dilemma, a coherent long-term strategy aided by a neutral third-party mediator can change the costs of cooperation.
A neutral third party, or an influential ally such as the United States, can play an important mediating role in ensuring that an agreement is transparent and has appropriate confidence-building measures (CBMs) to decrease cheating and increase trust. CBMs are “military reassurance steps” that constrain a nation's military power, increase transparency, and demonstrate benign intentions, among other trust-building signals (Midford Reference Midford2008). CBMs are designed to reduce mistrust and hostilities between states and have been successfully implemented by international organizations such as ASEAN. In the context of the reconciliation process, CBMs increase the costs of reneging on previous agreements and decrease the costs of entering agreements and, thus, improve the likelihood that each party will continue to work towards reconciliation. Over time, CBMs allow states to operate from a starting position of cooperation and be better prepared to temper crises.
South Korea does not want to concede all future reparations only to see Japanese politicians backtrack. New developments, such as the discovery of new data concerning comfort women, may warrant revisiting agreements. Japan does not want to issue another apology and pay reparations only to have South Korea ask for more. For example, the GOK has dissolved the Japanese-funded comfort women foundation after having distributed approximately half of the funds given by Japan to comfort women and their families. The GOK intends to keep the remaining $5 million but has criticized Japan for not adequately compensating the victims. In February 2019, National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang called on Emperor Akihito to personally apologize to the comfort women, claiming that “one word [sorry] will resolve matters once and for all” (Mainichi shimbun 2019). Following protests from the GOJ, Moon called Japan a “brazen thief” for demanding an apology. As Abe lamented in his speech marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II, no nation should be a prisoner to actions of the past in perpetuity. A reconciliation agreement should be transparently negotiated and must include blunt language that clearly establishes Japan's war guilt and South Korea's acceptance of the apology and commitment to an eventual final settlement. A US-led fact-finding mission would be a valuable first step to alleviating concerns among Japanese and Koreans about the politicizing of history.
A Korean editorial once argued, “Japan has made, retracted and apologized for such outrageous statements so often that we can hardly distinguish what reflects Japan's true intentions” (Lind Reference Lind2009a, 538). To ensure a party does not backtrack, an agreement should include language that can be used against the “cheating state.” The Murayama Statement was significant not only in that Japan acknowledged its wrongdoings, but also because it included the statement “It is imperative for us Japanese to look squarely to our history with the peoples of neighboring Asia and elsewhere. Only with a solid basis of mutual understanding and confidence that can be built through overcoming the pain on both sides, can we and the peoples of neighboring countries together clear up the future of Asia-Pacific” (Murayama Reference Murayama1994; emphasis added). When Japanese leaders have taken actions against the spirit of this statement, both South Korea and China have used that language to shame Japan into complying with its previous apology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2018). A similar statement can be included in a future agreement to prevent backtracking. Additional penalties can include canceling cultural and student exchanges, international shaming, and limited economic pressure. A third-party mediator, such as the United States, can help ensure that these stipulations are negotiated fairly by offering insight and a neutral location to meet. The United States can also help give the reconciliation agreement legitimacy by suggesting concessions that may favor one side or the other.
Additionally, backtracking may occur when new information arises. Kriesberg (Reference Kriesberg2003, 328) argues that “in order to avoid undermining progress toward a stable mutually acceptable accommodation, legitimate channels for modifying and improving terms of an agreement are helpful.” The United States can mobilize special envoys to Japan and South Korea during times of crisis, such as the discovery of controversial historical data or backtracking by one of the stakeholders. By acting quickly during troubled times, the United States signals to Japan and South Korea that it is a concerned and responsible ally.
In addition to including punishment mechanisms, reconciliation should be future-oriented while highlighting positive developments between the two states in the past. There has been meaningful city-level cooperation, such as the Hiroshima Peace Museum's support of an atomic-bomb museum in southern Hapcheon County in South Korea (Japan Times 2015). In 2015 alone, Japan and South Korea hosted over 410 events under the theme “Let's Open a New Future Together” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea 2015). If each side remains committed to the agreement, then future benefits can kick in, such as Korean support for Japan's UN Security Council seat. Japan can construct its own monuments and peace museums memorializing the victims of war. Peace museums can foster conflict resolution (Apsel Reference Apsel2016) and provide victims a lasting voice, embed the comfort women issue in broader human rights discussions, and educate future generations. This approach provides each side agency to avoid shaming while engaging the atrocities of the past. Moreover, the United States can promote trilateral projects that improve societal relations, such as academic exchanges, sports competitions, and business and scientific cooperation.
While keeping an eye towards the future, both states should routinely acknowledge the many agreements and apologies in the past to highlight the decades-long reconciliation process. According to a 2010 joint NHK/KBS opinion poll (Kono and Hara Reference Kono and Hara2011), 37 percent of Korean respondents “don't know much” and 7 percent “know nothing” of Japanese prime ministers expressing remorse and apologies regarding Japan's colonial rule over the Korean peninsula, yet 89 percent of respondents believed historical awareness was important. Alongside the 1965 treaty, an official apology was given and agreements on fisheries, the treatment of Koreans residing in Japan, and property and claims were also agreed upon. The 1990 apologies were also supplemented by the GOJ relaxing restrictions on Koreans residing in Japan, the establishment of an a-bomb fund for hibakusha living in Korea, the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans to Korea, and the release of eight Koreans serving long-term prison sentences for spying (Yamazaki Reference Yamazaki2004, 163). The 1994 Asian Women's Fund was bookended by the 1993 Kono Statement and the 1995 Murayama Statement. A future agreement should highlight the many apologies given and not be prefaced with lengthy explanations of why Japan went to war, a common trait in Japanese apologies and anniversary statements. Top-down approaches provide reconciliation with legalistic legitimacy, but the bottom-up approach involving nongovernment actors would give the process societal legitimacy.
A future agreement must include relevant stakeholders, not just government elites. Wu and Yang (Reference Wu and Yang2016, 658) argue that reconciliation can go from shallow to deep, and Japan and South Korea are still in the shallow phase because “the transition from shallow reconciliation to deep reconciliation is a complex process that involves at least two dimensions of change: one dimension is the expansion of mutual understanding of historical issues from political elites to society, and the other dimension is that the relationship is upgraded from one characterized by discrete gestures to one based on institutionalized mutual understanding and affections.” Thus far, apologies and agreements have been negotiated by the Japanese and Korean governments without the consultation of civil society. As a result, although the governments can achieve an agreement, they face significant backlash from the public, thus eroding any desired forward momentum in relations. Yangmo Ku (Reference Ku2014, 260) has found that transnational activists were able to have a positive effect on the history issue because their lobbying lowered adoption of controversial historical textbooks, a frequent sore point between the countries. International activist groups played a critical role in the dissemination of information, persuasion and pressure, and networking with the media and other nations. In Japan, the Left has pressured the government with its antimilitarism agenda, which includes emphasizing Japan's wrongdoing and remorse (Berger Reference Berger2012). Positive information dissemination by civil society is critical to the durability of an agreement. SBS and TBS polls immediately after the deal faced significant public criticism as biased and inaccurate because they were generally positive.
Both governments should take into consideration the role of the media in how the reconciliation process is proliferated in society. According to Shunichi Takekawa (Reference Takekawa and Mikyoung2016, 79), “major newspapers in Japan have been active participants in the politicization of war memory.” Takekawa argues the major Japanese newspapers have had differing interpretations of the admittedly convoluted history. Yet, when there is broad agreement on the importance of a statement, there can be much progress in relations. After the 1992 Kiichi Miyazawa apology, “all five of the newspapers basically accepted the need for Japan's apologies on the comfort women issue in their editorials” (82). Tessa Morris-Suzuki's (Reference Morris-Suzuki2007b, 186) review of a Yomiuri shimbun series discussing war responsibility argued that although there were limitations to the project, “extending public debate in Japan about the question of war responsibility” was a valuable contribution. War memory is contested because it is complex, and the media can play a role in cultivating conditions where honest engagement with history is possible. Negative framing can undo all the work of an agreement. The 1984 and 1990 apologies did little to appease Koreans because the Korean media failed to provide context on Japan's domestic debate on the constitutionality of an emperor's apology, did not focus on the more robust Kaifu apology, and actively questioned the sincerity of the apologies (Yamazaki Reference Yamazaki2004).
Ultimately, reconciliation requires both sides to face the history squarely; Japan must acknowledge its colonialism and South Korea must acknowledge what Japan has done thus far. Therefore, an agreement should have language that references previous agreements while looking forward. A new treaty should be multi-stepped with built-in language indicating that the issue will be revisited in the future. For example, a deal can provide a timeline where each side will honor the previous commitment and add more cooperation activities. This will help decrease the chance of cheating in the short- to mid-term because both sides are expected to go back to the negotiating table. More importantly, it shows that Japan is committed to reconciliation and will not use apologies to prevent South Korea from seeking justice and reconciliation.
Therefore, education is critical to ensuring that agreements stick. Both sides are likely to dispute the history of the colonial era, but the actions taken by each side since are simple facts. The fact that deals have not stuck does not mean that each side has not made politically costly gestures to try to resolve the history issue. Education of both sides should allow for open discussion of previous agreements, what they accomplished, and what more needs to be done. For Japan, it means acknowledging that past deals have been inadequate due to the haphazard approach to facing history squarely. For South Korea, it means admitting that Japan has provided aid, issued apologies, and sought to cooperate. Education would ultimately serve the broader need for a genuine understanding of the role of governments and institutions in the systemic abuse of women in international relations (Soh Reference Soh2008). The comfort women issue is a human rights concern that goes beyond this bilateral relationship and the colonial period because its legacy has endured and metastasized into new problems in the present day (Moon Reference Moon1997).
Such an approach is sure to rile hardcore conservatives, who will seek to undermine the deal. However, instead of attempting to create a perfect deal that will settle the issue once and for all, a reconciliation agreement should assume that backtracking is likely and be designed to weather times of disputes and allow for further negotiation. This approach would be a combination of tit-for-tat and GRIT strategies where each state continues to make positive gestures to the other side but can enact modest punishments if the other side cheats.
Conclusion
In 2012, the South Korean government canceled the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement at the last minute due to domestic political pressure. An information-sharing agreement was signed eventually, but not before three years and precious time and resources were squandered. Neither side could reap any political benefits from an important security agreement. This episode encapsulates the Japan-South Korea relationship; cooperation makes sense, but the history does not allow it to be appreciated.
Unlike in 1965, today Japan and South Korea are relatively similar in political strength and are robust democracies. The leadership will have to listen to the public but must be able to confront spoilers and treat reconciliation as an ongoing process with a long history and a challenging future. However, if a framework for rewarding cooperation and punishing cheating is in place, cooler heads should prevail. Between April 2014 and December 2015, Japan and South Korea met about a dozen times and were able to come to an agreement concerning “comfort women,” as flawed as it is. Future agreements should build upon the positive developments that did result from the agreement. Japan acknowledged the government's involvement in the “comfort women” system without a qualifier, and Prime Minister Abe expressed his “most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a). The United States enthusiastically supported the agreement and can play a role in assisting its allies in the reconciliation process going forward. Ralph Cossa has argued that, “as an ally and trusted friend of both Japan and South Korea, the United States is well situated to play the mediator role, assuming both sides ask for the intervention—the first rule of preventive diplomacy is that outside assistance is voluntarily sought and accepted” (Cossa Reference Cossa2012). Enthusiasm for the 2015 agreement has decreased in Japan and South Korea, demonstrating the weaknesses of the reconciliation process and the need for action.
It appears that 2020 may be the next best chance for cooperation, because Japan will host the Olympics, the international community will celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II, and there will be the possibility of political change in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. A clean slate and an international spotlight on the region will provide a valuable opportunity for all parties to affirm human rights and highlight the importance of trilateral cooperation.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for the opportunity to present earlier versions of this paper at the Social Science Research Confab at Pomona College, the West Coast IR Conference at USC, the ISA International Conference at the University of Hong Kong, the World Congress for Korean Politics and Society at Yonsei University, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation US-Japan Fellowship Conference hosted by Pacific Forum. I am also grateful to Audrey Jang, my Summer Undergraduate Research Program research assistant at Pomona College; Alex Chun; and Kathy Chun for their research assistance. Lastly, I am grateful to Heather Williams, Wilfred Wan, Saori Katada, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on the paper.
