That the exercising of autonomy while performing our daily activities at times leads to undesirable consequences and, thereby, proves itself to be unhealthy for our individual good is a fact long recognized in the liberal tradition. But to suggest that such an innocuous fact should make us suspect our ability to have free choices and force us to resort to some aggressive paternalistic measures is to endorse a position that would raise the eyebrows of many. To my surprise, this is exactly what Sarah Conly has done in her book Against Autonomy. Conly contends that human beings are so often irrational in their everyday decision-making that their ability to make independent choices and selections sometimes undercuts the very achievement of their desired goals. Thus, to ensure a better life it is important that the state steps into people’s lives and paternalistically prevents them from doing certain things. But, given the significance of the value of liberty and autonomy in human life, this seems to be an extremely challenging claim to uphold. Conly takes up this task quite courageously and aptly argues for it by targeting the hollowness of the idea of autonomy and its proximal views on human agency.
Drawing resources from behavioural economics and social psychology, Conly aims to look for an alternative picture of individual agency which would stand opposite to the standard picture prevalent in most of our contemporary moral philosophical explanations. Conly contends that this standard picture is incapable of recognizing the true nature of human psychology, for human beings are not always rationally competent in judging what is good for them. We tend to indulge in many practices and habits, like smoking, riding bikes without helmets, taking drugs, eating unhealthy food, and so on, despite having proper education and reliable information. Our practical experiences suggest that most of these practices cannot even be restricted through the soft interventional approaches of liberalism, wherein we endorse measures like statutory warnings, levying fines, incentivization, etc. The ineffectiveness of these paternalistic measures suggests that we extend the interventional boundary, on more or less the same moral grounds, and take recourse to a strong coercive policy whereby we can ban certain things like trans-fats, tobacco smoking, and the like with strict laws and legislations. And this must be acceptable to us because the cost we incur from our errors of judgment in these cases is much higher than the alleged ideological and psychological costs of coercion. Moreover, it is never a disrespectful thing to accurately estimate our inabilities and to provide effective solutions to them (9).
This simple but extremely provocative argument has been passionately defended by Conly in seven tightly knit chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage by citing some empirical examples of our irrational decision-making. It then examines the ineffective responses coming from the approaches of liberalism and libertarian paternalism (the view that defends the manipulation of people’s “choice architecture”) and shows why coercive paternalism seems to be a better alternative for overcoming our everyday problems. Chapter 2 deals with the much-celebrated Millian doctrine of individuality and critiques it as an overestimation of human psychological strength. Chapter 3 takes up the issue of the psychological costs of alienation and inauthenticity and analyses their plausible risks and commensurate bearableness. In Chapters 4 and 5, Conly critically dismisses the possibility of political threats being found in a paternalistic society, such as the danger of entrusting too much power to the state, the imposition of values onto citizens, the loss of privacy at the hands of the bureaucracy, and so on. Chapter 6 is devoted to an explanation of the actual application of paternalistic laws, with a special focus on the issues of health care. In Chapter 7, she concludes by reiterating her stance with a critical eye on the cases of private affairs, like marriage, career selection, etc. wherein paternalistic interventions do not necessarily work out for the best for the individuals concerned.
Conly believes that the well-being of a human life does not depend on any high-level abstraction of freedom, autonomy or other relevant values; rather, it depends on an analysis of cost-benefit paternalistic therapy to our perennial everyday life problems. However, she is also well aware that her position would be untenable if she completely failed to negotiate with the idea of autonomy while pursuing the case of welfarism. Thus, by embracing a view of ‘paternalism of means,’ as opposed to ‘paternalism of ends,’ Conly categorically rejects the possibility of perfectionism, which requires us to live life according to the whims and fancies of the state. She contends that her account of paternalism would not approve of any official view of ‘good life’ promoted by the state. Rather, it would ask the state to effectively prevent us from choosing means that defeat our ends, protecting us against our cognitive errors and deficiencies, while being respectful to the judgments of our desired ends.
But one might question whether there can really be any well-carved-out demarcation between ends and means so that we can ensure that we do not end up on a slippery slope whereby the state imposes foreign values onto its citizens while trying to help them with their means. Conly’s reply to the misuse of paternalistic regulations is a frustrating one. She suggests that misuse and abuse can happen with any policy decisions (taxation, public education and the like), if there are flaws in their legislation and execution. But one may wonder whether such a response has any meaning and why a similar response could not also be offered for the agendas of the next big intruder—the moral chauvinist?
Besides, there are certain other issues, such as the portrayal of a very subdued human agency, the over-moralization of our everyday affairs, and uncritical presuppositions regarding our political establishments, which raise deep theoretical concerns about Conly’s position. Notwithstanding these, the book is considerably successful in articulating its basic thesis. The most laudable part is that it has cogently brought to our notice the most exciting and benign parts of the paternalist thesis. I am sure the book will attract the attention of policy-makers, political theorists and applied ethicists, among many others.
