“It's very rare to get something with a provenance, with an actual collection name. Usually it's entirely anonymous, especially in the London and New York trade. Just objects for sale in a shop …” (p. 32). To anyone with an interest in the antiquities market, this Melbourne dealer's view is unsurprising. More surprising, perhaps, is the dealer's willingness to even discuss the issue of provenance and the extent to which the antiquities market is awash with unprovenanced illicit antiquities. Essentially, Simon Mackenzie's work is about provenance. He sets out to answer the question, “How should we regulate the antiquities market so as most appropriately to address the issue of looted antiquities in that market?” (p. 1). The first step in answering this question is to understand how the market actually functions. And what better way than to ask market participants themselves. Mackenzie does so through interviews with dealers, collectors, auction house representatives, and museum curators; and the work is substantially based around an analysis of these interviews. The extensive use of quotes allows readers a glimpse into the secretive and exclusive world of the antiquities market and lays bare the prevailing attitude of the interviewees, providing a rich (and dare I say, even entertaining) dialogue throughout the work.
The survey and interviews undertaken by the author with market participants seek to identify not only actual market practices but, more importantly, the attitudes of participants to both legal and ethical issues associated with the antiquities market, particularly the thorny issue of determining the provenance of antiquities entering the market. From the interviews a number of important facets of the market in antiquities are revealed. Although the market has changed over the past 30 years, the historical perspective of a free market unencumbered by many legal restraints continues to affect market participants' attitudes and interpretations of legal concepts, such as what constitutes an illicit antiquity. It would also appear that provenance usually is not a particularly important commodity in the art market unless associated with a particularly notable collection or individual, and the market functions with very little verification of provenance details. On the question of determining provenance before purchasing an antiquity, attitudes are to a degree consistent, reflected best in the simple response that “at present there is no law that demands that there is absolute proof as to where something absolutely comes from” (Hong Kong auction house, p. 256). And so dealers respond: “But I will not refuse to buy something just because it doesn't have provenance” (London dealer, p. 28); “If somebody walks in and offers me a great treasure (unprovenanced), I'll probably get tempted … especially if it's not too expensive” (Bangkok dealer, p. 26). The difficulty in determining provenance is not an issue related only to shady deals, however, but appears to be a practice pervasive in the art market. A Melbourne dealer, for example, when asked whether he requests provenance details when purchasing an antiquity responded, “We don't provide that information to our customers, so I don't expect it from whoever I buy it from. Basically I think it's the way the antiques trade works” (p. 32). Given the difficulties in determining provenance, and the willingness of dealers to risk purchasing illicit antiquities, due diligence in determining provenance often is a process of vetting the sellers by exception. So, in the words of one London dealer, “I like to believe that most people are straight and that you shouldn't be required to prove that you are. That somebody should be required to prove that you aren't” (p. 27). A laudable-sounding philosophy that rather suits the dealer's purchasing potential but does nothing for the protection of antiquities! The process of vetting sellers only when suspicious circumstances arise is variable and reveals some inconsistencies between what dealers say and what they actually do. For example, when addressing the issue of being offered an unprovenanced antiquity for sale, one London dealer at first stated, “If it is someone you are not 100% satisfied is 100% trustworthy, you probably don't do business with them at all.” The dealer then goes on to discuss in some detail that his priority is to have some proof of purchase, particularly when dealing with those sellers who only deal in cash, to the extent that he once had a seller followed and had their sale secretly photographed to ensure that he had some proof of purchase from that seller. As Mackenzie notes, this is hardly consistent with his assertion that he only purchases from sellers he is 100% confident in, and the purchasing process “sounds more akin to a drug deal than an open market sale” (p. 31).
Interview responses clearly evinced a willingness to purchase unprovenanced antiquities. The most interesting quotes were those in which market participants attempted to justify this behavior. A common justification was simply that to maintain a competitive advantage, dealers could not reveal the source of their purchases. A London dealer put it quite succinctly by saying, “If I blab too much about where they came from you can be pretty bloody sure that somebody else will be in there trying to get the rest of it” (p. 48). In a similar vein, some dealers' justifications for not revealing a provenance was the need to respect the seller's right to remain anonymous; this was the case, for example, when landed aristocrats wished to avoid publicity when selling off their inheritance. Although a usual justification was simply that there was so much unprovenanced licit material in the market that it was impossible to distinguish between licit and illicit material that it was not worth worrying about, the most disturbing justification raised was in relation to the entrance into the market of chance finds. Many dealers regarded themselves as saving material that had been found purely by chance by some local peasant and often failed to make any connection between market demand and the resulting supply. More importantly, some dealers chose not to view such chance finds as illicit material, irrespective of what the source state laws had to say on the matter. One London dealer declared,
I think when they [source governments] say that things that they don't even know exist are theirs, you know things so far undiscovered, that seems to me not an easy thing to claim. And you very easily get confused between real theft and that kind of theft…. I mean I think to take something from an archaeological dig falls within a completely different category than a farmer who happens to be digging and finds something in a field. (p. 57)
Although some dealers chose to apply their own rather than the source state's interpretation of stolen or illicit to justify their behavior, some also chose to avoid any moral wrongdoing, such as a New York dealer declaring, “They take it out. We don't take it out. They smuggle it. We don't smuggle it” (p. 54).
Although reading market participants' views on these pertinent issues relating to the market for illicit antiquities is revealing and insightful, they have a much more important purpose for Mackenzie. That is, by relying on criminological, sociological, and psychological theory, he set out to explain how market participants behave as they do and how to best regulate the market in view of this identified behavioral theory. By the application of various criminological theories to the responses of market participants interviewed, Mackenzie develops a balance sheet approach to decision making in the market. The practical balance sheet, for example, balances the pleasures and pains of a decision to purchase and includes consideration of possible legal consequences. For the most part, market participants have little regard for the legal consequences because they do not expect these to arise because of poor detection and enforcement mechanisms. The analysis of interview data illustrates that most market participants were clearly aware of the cause-and-effect relationship between demand and supply of illicit antiquities; but most tried to defend their position in the market and avoid any legal or moral condemnation of their conduct, often by taking an unsubstantiated narrow definition of concepts such as illicit, looting, and criminal behavior.
The moral balance sheet simply requires the decision maker to determine whether the decision can be morally justified. This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mackenzie's analysis because it places what any reader interested in the antiquities market already knows about market participants' attitudes into a coherent systematic theory, which ultimately reveals many of the flaws in arguments currently circling the market. From the interviews Mackenzie is able to summarize the market participants' responses to the question of the entry into the market of illicit antiquities into two broad categories: arguments that classify the market as a good and worthwhile endeavor and arguments that regard any who would restrict the market as bad. The former includes arguments that the market is a mechanism that provides for international cultural education; enables long-term protection for culture; enables chance finds to be preserved; and provides local impoverished populations with income. Many market participants reverted to what Mackenzie terms condemnation of the condemners, by attacking those who would restrict the market, such as archaeologists and source state governments. Arguments in this vein would be particularly predictable to anyone with a cursory knowledge of the illicit trade in antiquities and are shown in this study to be particularly weak. The attack on archaeologists includes the allegation that they, too, cause destruction; are trying to create a monopoly for themselves; are inadequately funded and therefore unable to provide sufficient protection for finds and sites; and do not have any regard for the aesthetic qualities of cultural heritage objects. Source states are commonly attacked for not protecting their own cultural heritage, particularly because of corruption and their inability to enforce what is seen as draconian retentionist laws. Reliance on arguments that condemn the condemners or perceive the market as good allows market participants to believe that the moral balance sheet justifies the purchase of a possibly illicit antiquity. However, Mackenzie then goes on to explain how these arguments are nothing more than illogical psychological fronts, or forms of self-brainwashing used to make decision making easier for market participants.
The development of a behavioral theory that explains why market participants behave as they do, and is shown to be indefensible, relies on a rather limited survey of 29 interviewees participating; this from an initial contact list of 160. Of these 29 interviewees, 18 were dealers, 2 collectors, and 1 a representative of an auction house (the remainder were archaeologists, museums professionals, and 2 lawyers). However, what might initially be regarded as a rather small sample is arguably quite a successful sample in light of the sensitivity of the questions being asked, exemplified in a response to a request for an interview that simply stated, “I must turn down your offer of interview because traditionally we as antique dealers are not very keen on expressing our views on this sensitive issue” (p. 258). It is not at all surprising that the author had difficulty in finding participants; a range of excuses were received for not participating, from simply denying that the interview would produce any beneficial result because the dealer did not deal in illicit antiquities to referral to a dealer's association code of ethics for an official view on the issue. Although this limited sample cannot be said to represent any one group within the antiquities market, the fact that a portion of the market behaves as Mackenzie illustrates is sufficient to use as a basis for analysis and a proposition for the regulation of the market.
The solution proposed by Mackenzie, very briefly, calls for a system of market regulation that requires provenance details and a system of registration of market participants and recording of transactions, coupled with increased civil and criminal penalties related to transgression of the regulatory system. The solution clearly follows from the analysis of the market participants' behavior and would, in an ideal world, have an immediate beneficial effect; but it does require action of market states. As such, it is an unlikely immediate solution, but one that might be aimed for and achieved in small steps. Mackenzie declines to discuss the proposed regulatory system in any detail, setting out only its broad principles. This is an unfortunate omission because the interview data itself would suggest that the devil is in the details. Nevertheless, the solution is broadly well argued and sustainable on the basis of the behavioral theory Mackenzie constructs.
For readers well versed in the arguments for and against the market in antiquities and the problems of illicit trafficking, the interview data is revealing but not surprising. The contribution that Mackenzie makes very well is the analysis of these arguments and behaviors within a structured behavioral theory that exposes these as indefensible; and it is a welcome addition to the body of works that seek to educate and alleviate the scourge of illicit antiquities.
