The diverse representational substrates of the mind

Guided by this reasoning, we have explicated a pluralistic, constructivist account of mental representation, in which sensorimotor and amodal representations co-exist (Gilead, Trope, & Liberman, Reference Gilead, Trope and Liberman2020b). Our model is pluralistic because it suggests representations form a hierarchy from the concrete to the abstract that can be parsed into concrete modality-specific or iconic representations; multimodal or indexical representations; and abstract categorical or symbolic representations. The model is constructivist because it suggests that the act of forming novel representations – that is, abstraction – designates distinct, multidimensional entities as functionally identical; as such, abstraction forces us to choose a dimension along which stimuli are deemed similar (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, Reference Medin, Goldstone and Gentner1993).

We proposed that the dimensions we choose from when forming abstractions take their place in our mind via three routes: they can be innate, giving rise to what we termed iconic abstractions; they can be discovered based on statistical learning, giving rise to indexical abstractions; or can be passed on by social interaction, giving rise to symbolic abstractions.

What links the acts of separation?

Our model can be used to analyze L&S's theory. They argue that “sensorimotor experience of cleansing involves separating one physical entity from another. This experiential basis can ground mental separation of one psychological entity from another.” Thus, in their view, a mental linkage is created between the concrete act of handwashing, and more abstract acts of separating ideas.

The suggestion that such a linkage exists is an interesting and plausible hypothesis. However, there is room for further analysis of the possible ontogeny of this purported linkage. Different conclusions of this discussion suggest different mechanistic explanations.

Indexical underpinning

The linkage may be an indexical relation, namely, the result of repeated associations between experiences of physical and non-physical separation.

However, as suggested by the constructivist perspective, events can be interpreted in numerous ways, by focusing on different dimensions of the experience. Modern associationist models of learning have begun to acknowledge that in order to learn that event A (e.g., red light) and B (e.g., shock) co-occur, these events need to be consistently construed as such (i.e., as “red light” rather than “light” or “heat”), a process termed “situation recognition” (e.g., Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, Reference Redish, Jensen, Johnson and Kurth-Nelson2007).

Is it indeed the case that acts of handwashing correlate with an experience consistently construed as “mental separation”? Does this interpretation indeed exist “out there” in the world, patiently waiting to be discovered by a statistician-child? We think that it is important to keep in mind that “a separation act” is a potentially idiosyncratic choice of how to construe cleansing (which can be viewed in innumerable other ways; e.g., as the annihilation of dirt, dilution, transformation, and so on).

Iconic underpinning

The linkage may be a necessity borne out of the fundamental, potentially innate dimensional structure of the mind (i.e., that this is a manifestation of an iconic relation). Specifically, it is possible that the world of a newborn child is comprised of such primitives as proximity/separateness and purity/toxicity – and that both mental and physical objects are embedded within such a multidimensional mental space.

This exact possibility has been raised in the psychoanalytic writings of Klein (Reference Klein1952). Klein imagines the mind of a newborn child as a place where toxic and nourishing elements are separated via procedures such as “splitting.” The consequences of splitting (e.g., lack of integration of aspects of the self, cognitive rigidity) resemble those posited by the “separation” processes hypothesized by L&S.

Symbolic underpinning

The linkage may emerge from the construals prevalent in one's culture. Namely, contrary to L&S's suggestion, this mapping may be an example of a symbolic relation representation.

Specifically, cleansing can be seen as an instantiation of the linguistically-based category separate (of dirt from one's body); the act of compartmentalizing aspects of the self can be seen as an instantiation of the linguistically-based category separate (one idea from another); and the possibility of viewing the two acts as similar in that respect, may be introduced into people's minds via the process of symbolic interaction with other people (e.g., by being exposed to abstract conceptual metaphors denoting this relation). According to our model, such a mapping will be subserved by frontotemporal regions implicated in symbolic thought and will not be observed among individuals who were not exposed to this conceptual metaphor.

Embodiment or symbolization?

If we adopt the view that cleansing effects are the result of symbolic cognition, their “embodiment” may be viewed differently. Instead of viewing abstract meanings as emerging from concrete physical acts of cleansing, this physical act may be appended with pre-existing, symbolic meaning (Freud, Reference Freud1955; Reuven, Liberman, & Dar, Reference Reuven, Liberman and Dar2014).

Whenever abstract ideas are transmuted into vivid symbols, they are imbued with a sense of additional importance. For example, the Jewish ritual of taking a live chicken and rotating it around one's head in order to be absolved of one's sins, seems to have some profound effect on the believer, that outstrips merely reciting a silent prayer.

Such symbolization signals commitment to an idea (e.g., Henrich, Reference Henrich2016); it makes it an observable reality that can be socially shared, and thus, gain the epistemic gravity of a “shared reality” (e.g., Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009); it also transforms an ephemeral idea that can be quickly washed away by ensuing thoughts – into a vivid placeholder that would remain “out there” after the thoughts (and even the mind that formed them) disappear.