— On July 8, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (“Our Lady”), which consolidated two Ninth Circuit cases.Footnote 1 The cases concerned allegations of employment discrimination by teachers working in two Catholic elementary schools in Los Angeles. The religious institutions each claimed immunity from employment anti-discrimination requirements given the non-secular nature of the school and the important religious functions of the employees. Invoking the “ministerial exception” to state interference in employment relationships of religious institutions, each school moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case against it. The Ninth Circuit rejected the motion and the application of a religious exemption in both cases. In this decision, written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court overturned both Ninth Circuit rulings.
The Court’s decision in Our Lady delineated a broad understanding of the “ministerial exception,” originally established in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.Footnote 2 The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit’s narrow application of the Hosanna-Tabor factors as misguided and reaffirmed its commitment not to impose a “rigid formula” in determining whether an employee qualifies as a minister.Footnote 3 Instead, adopting a functional interpretation of the exception, the Court held that the religious nature of the employment barred the Court from adjudicating the teachers’ discrimination claims.Footnote 4 This broad functional interpretation opens the door to greater immunity for religious institutions in anti-discrimination and civil rights actions.
I. THE CASES
In Our Lady, the Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in two separate employment discrimination cases against Catholic elementary schools.Footnote 5 The first case concerned Agnes Morrissey-Berru, a primary school teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School (“OLG”) in Los Angeles.Footnote 6 Morrissey-Berru worked at OLG as a lay teacher who taught all subjects to her students, including religion.Footnote 7 Morrissey-Berru’s training included a bachelor’s degree in English Language Arts, a minor in secondary education, and religious education courses required by OLG of all teachers.Footnote 8
Over the course of her employment,Footnote 9 Morrissey-Berru entered into yearly contractual agreements with OLG, which included the school’s mission statement to “develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community,” and instructed teachers to perform their duties with this “overriding commitment.”Footnote 10 The employment agreement required Morrissey-Berru to “model and promote” the Catholic faith while teaching and to participate in liturgical activities.Footnote 11 Morrissey-Berru also received a faculty handbook listing similar requirements that teachers instruct and abide by Catholic morals.Footnote 12 Additionally, the employment agreement stated that teachers may be terminated for cause for failing to carry out such duties or for “conduct that brings discredit upon the School or the Roman Catholic Church.”Footnote 13 Morrissey-Berru’s employment was reviewed annually by the pastor of the parish, and she, like all teachers in the Archdiocese, was “considered a catechist.”Footnote 14
Morrissey-Berru performed her duties by providing religious instruction to her students, preparing her students for participation in Mass, and praying with her students.Footnote 15 Morrissey-Berru testified that she was committed to providing a faith-based education.Footnote 16
In 2014, Morrissey-Berru was moved from her full-time position with OLG to a part-time position, which Morrissey-Berru considered a demotion.Footnote 17 In 2015, OLG declined to renew her contract entirely.Footnote 18 Morrissey-Berru subsequently filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and, with their approval, a suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.Footnote 19
Morrissey-Berru’s claim asserted that OLG had demoted her to a part-time position and then refused to renew her contract the following year in order to replace Morrissey-Berru with a younger teacher, in violation of the anti-discrimination statute.Footnote 20 Conversely, OLG claimed its decision was due to classroom performance.Footnote 21 OLG moved for summary judgment due to the ministerial exception, which the lower court granted.Footnote 22 This decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, which evaluated the case under the Hosanna-Tabor framework and concluded that Morrissey-Berru’s religious duties alone were not sufficient to fall within the “ministerial exception.”Footnote 23 OLG filed a petition for certiorari and the Court granted review on December 18, 2019.Footnote 24
The second case considered by the Court similarly concerned a lay elementary school teacher suing for employment discrimination. The late Kristen BielFootnote 25 worked for over a year as a teacher at St. James School (“St. James”), another Catholic primary school in Los Angeles.Footnote 26 Like Morrissey-Berru, Biel taught all subjects to her students, including religion.Footnote 27 Biel’s educational training included a bachelor’s degree in liberal studies and a teaching credential.Footnote 28 Biel attended a religious conference at St. James that trained teachers to incorporate religion into the classroom.Footnote 29 Biel was Catholic.Footnote 30
Biel’s employment agreement also asserted the school’s religious mission and a requirement that teachers uphold the mission and model the Catholic faith.Footnote 31 Biel complied with these requirements by teaching church doctrines, worshipping with her students, and preparing her students for Mass.Footnote 32 Biel was evaluated on her fulfillment of the school’s religious mission by St. James’ principal, a Catholic nun.Footnote 33
After one year at St. James, Biel’s employment contract was not renewed.Footnote 34 Biel filed charges with the EEOC and brought a suit for discrimination, claiming that St. James refused to renew Biel’s contract because she had requested a leave of absence due to a breast cancer diagnosis and a need for treatment.Footnote 35 The school asserted that the decision was solely based on Biel’s performance,Footnote 36 though the Ninth Circuit noted a positive performance evaluation Biel received prior to disclosing her illness.Footnote 37 St. James obtained summary judgment under the ministerial exception, but the decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit and a petition for rehearing was unsuccessful.Footnote 38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated Biel’s case with Morrissey-Berru’s.Footnote 39
II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The ministerial exception was originally established in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.Footnote 40 In that case, the Court considered whether governmental regulation of the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers violates the First Amendment.Footnote 41 The Court asserted that imposing an unwanted minister on a religious institution infringes upon the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith through its appointments.Footnote 42 Additionally, the Court stated that the power to determine its own ministers is essential to the Establishment Clause, which “prohibits government involvement in ecclesiastical decisions.”Footnote 43 Justice Alito therefore opened Our Lady with the assertion that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect the right of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”Footnote 44
However, while the Court had established that religious institutions are granted a ministerial exception in the governing of certain employee’s relationships with the institution, whether an individual is considered a minister was unclear. Thus, in Our Lady, the Court was confronted with the question of whether Morrissey-Berru and Biel (“respondents”) were in fact ministers of the Catholic Church and therefore barred from seeking adjudication of their employment discrimination claims.Footnote 45 The Court held that respondents were ministers and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s narrow application of the exception.Footnote 46
III. PREVIOUS APPLICATION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Court considered whether Cheryl Perich, a teacher at a Lutheran elementary school fell under the ministerial exception to regulation of employment relationships in anti-discrimination claims.Footnote 47 The Court used four circumstances to reach its determination: (1) the formal title given to Perich by the institution, (2) the training and formal process of commissioning supporting that title, (3) whether Perich “held herself out as a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service,” and (4) whether Perich’s job duties reflected a role in carrying out the message of the religious institution.Footnote 48
Given that Perich held the title of “Minister of Religion,” which reflected a significant degree of religious training, held herself out as a minister by accepting a formal call to service, and performed job duties that reflected a role in conveying the Church’s mission, Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception.Footnote 49
In Our Lady, respondents argued that their positions were distinct from Perich’s because neither respondent held a formal title, exhibited the same degree of training as Perich, or held themselves out as a religious leader.Footnote 50 Respondents asserted that the ministerial exception was meant to be applied using the formal Hosanna-Tabor factors as a framework to assess the ministerial status and the final question of whether an employee’s job duties constituted an important religious function to provide flexibility in the framework.Footnote 51 Noting the importance of both the First Amendment and anti-discrimination laws,Footnote 52 respondents requested the Court maintain the “formal indicia” to maintain accountability and transparency, and ensure that the First Amendment is not used as a shield to avoid important anti-discrimination requirements.Footnote 53
In the cases below, the Ninth Circuit applied the Hosanna-Tabor factors in such manner, assessing each factor, and reasoned that Morrissey-Berru and Biel were not performing such essential functions that they should be deemed ministers of the Church.Footnote 54 In Biel v. St. James School, the Ninth Circuit noted that an interpretation of the ministerial exception which considers any school employee who teaches religion to be a minister would ignore the underlying constitutional and policy considerations of Hosanna-Tabor. Footnote 55 “Such a rule would render most of the analysis in Hosanna-Tabor irrelevant. It would base the exception on a single aspect of the employee’s role rather than on a holistic examination of her training, duties, title, and the extent to which she is tasked with transmitting religious ideas.”Footnote 56
Additionally, when considering Biel’s case, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII each contain provisions allowing for religious preference in employing individuals, safeguarding religious freedom in hiring.Footnote 57 The court explained that these protections further support a narrow application of the Hosanna-Tabor holding, given that religious entities have statutory protections within anti-discrimination laws.Footnote 58
IV. THE COURT’S APPLICATION
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and held the Hosanna-Tabor requirements were flexible and were not to be considered as “checklist items to be assessed and weighed.”Footnote 59 In contrast to the formalistic assessment, the Court articulated a broad, functional approach, calling on courts “to take all relevant circumstances into account and to determine whether each particular position implicated the fundamental purpose of the exception.”Footnote 60 The Court explained that the circumstances used in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant considerations because of their relationship to Perich’s role in carrying out the Church’s mission, but, these factors were not meant to be requirements for all other cases.Footnote 61
Fundamentally, the Court stated that, “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”Footnote 62 The Court asserted the First Amendment protects a religious institution’s “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central message.”Footnote 63 The Court then stated that the core mission of religious schools is to indoctrinate students in the religion and train them to live according to the faith.Footnote 64 Thus, the Court held that as teachers who educated students in religious matters and had instructions to carry out the schools’ missions, Morrissey-Berru and Biel each qualified under the ministerial exemption.Footnote 65 The Court further added that “a religious institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of religion in question is important,”Footnote 66 and “judges have no warrant to second-guess [the] judgment” of religious institutions in whether the individual has sufficient religious trainingFootnote 67 or is considered to be a practicing member or co-religionist of the faith.Footnote 68 Finally, the Court rejected the exceptions for religious hiring in the ADA and Title VII as inadequate protection to an institution’s ability to dismiss ministers for failing to perform essential functions of the faith.Footnote 69
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This new, broader application of the Hosanna-Tabor factors opens the door to greater immunity for religious institutions in anti-discrimination and civil rights actions. The Court declined to apply a multifactor assessment to determine whether a person’s religious function is of such a degree that they are considered a minister of the religion, above and beyond a lay member of the faith.Footnote 70 Instead, the Court essentially held that so long as an institution proclaims a religious mission in its employee contract and faculty handbook, it may be exempt from any applicable anti-discrimination employment requirements.Footnote 71 It is by this reasoning that two elementary school teachers, who spent most of their time teaching non-secular subjects, did not view themselves as ministers, and held no formal title to indicate such position and commitment, were denied access to justice when they alleged discrimination on the bases of age and disability.
Respondents articulated the consequences of such a broad interpretation of the ministerial exception in their arguments, explaining that basing the exception on whether an employee performs an important religious function could extend the application to millions of other people, given the sincerely held belief of many religious organizations that all employees embody, teach, and promote the faith.Footnote 72 Thus, this ministerial exception could be applied to counselors at religious summer camps, nurses in Catholic hospitals, and receptionists at a religious organization, and could lead to serious civil rights violations with no remedy for those affected.Footnote 73
If the Court continues to expand religious exemptions in this broad manner, such employees could be stripped of their governmental protections due to their status as ministers—without notice that their employer is exempt from basic anti-discrimination protections and even if they are not a practicing member of the faith.
Thus, Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Ginsburg, dissented to this opinion, asserting that “the [ministerial] exception’s stark departure from antidiscrimination law” was meant to be narrowly applied.Footnote 74 The dissent emphasized that the ministerial exception is a potent, broad exception that gives religious organizations license to discriminate on the “basis of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits protected by law.”Footnote 75 This is an incredible license meant to protect essential religious leadership rather than all who enter into an agreement with a religious employer.
By construing this judge-made law in such a broad manner, the Court is sanctioning the potential subjection of thousands of teachers, and possibly millions of others, to “discrimination without recourse.”Footnote 76 With this decision, individuals who face discrimination in a religious workplace have been abandoned by the courts and made subject to arbitrary treatment and potential animus. While religious freedom is fundamental to our society, it should not be used as a shield to inoculate religious institutions from upholding fundamental human rights wholly unrelated to the performance of religious activities. A teacher alleged she was fired for having cancer and another on account of her age—they should have had their day in court.
