Scholars invested in the enterprise of Putinology, or the analysis of Putin and his motivations, have cast him in different and often widely divergent roles. Alternatively, he's a spy, a killer, a kleptocrat, a genius, or a nothing. By extension, Russia is seen as a rising power, an aging empire, a petrostate, and an oligarchy. In Putinomics, Chris Miller focuses on a less explored side of the President—Putin as policy maker—and the ways in which his policies have helped the Kremlin maintain power at home and deploy it abroad. In sum, not only does Putinomics have a coherent logic, it has also been largely successful in achieving the Kremlin's goals. This narrative is significant not only in that it counters the more dominant narrative of an ailing, capriciously-run economy, but also that it gives us tools by which to analyze the conditions under which growth-producing policies have predominated and when they have taken a backseat to preserving central authority.

Miller presents Putinomics as a coherent, strategic, and successful response to the 1990s, when financial instability, budget deficits, and a weak state diminished Russian authority, both at home and abroad. Putin's priorities are to maintain power, expand Russian influence, and develop Russia's economy at home. In pursuit of these priorities, the Kremlin has implemented three strategies: strengthening central authority, discouraging popular discontent by focusing on low unemployment and adequate pensions, and relying on the private sector to improve efficiency as long as it does not threaten the stability of the state or the social contract between the state and the citizenry. Thus, while corruption, cronyism and overdependence on oil are endemic problems, the Kremlin nonetheless also succeeded in implementing many difficult policies that went against certain elite interests—such as tax reform, budget rebalancing, and debt reduction—that ultimately brought macroeconomic stability. Nor are all sectors of the economy prey to the whimsy of the Kremlin; while some state-owned enterprises related to the energy sector are used primarily as political tools, market incentives prevail in other sectors of the economy, which are less closely tied to Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Miller notes, however, strategies that had worked well to stabilize Russia in the first decade of the twenty-first century will not ensure Russia's continued economic growth. Necessary reforms, such as improving regulatory frameworks to attract foreign investment, or fostering a broader respect for the rule of law, undermine the interests of the elite-driven elements of his power base. Furthermore, the drop in oil prices, coupled with the costs of Putin's annexation of Crimea, have threatened the Kremlin's abilities to promise low unemployment and steady pensions, which shore up other elements of his base. The best Russia can hope for is continued stagnation, rather than growth. But Russia will remain relatively stable.

This book was an engrossing read. In easily readable and digestible prose, Miller covers a broad swathe of Russia's post-Soviet economic trajectory, from the dislocation of the Yeltsin era to more recent events such as the Sochi Olympics and the annexation of Crimea. Yet within this broad story, Miller also makes time and space for interesting comparisons, explaining not just variations between sectors of the economy, but why and how these variations unfold. Miller also tells familiar stories from different angles, highlighting different aspects of the battle between Mikhail Khodorkovskii and the Kremlin, for example, and explores interesting outliers, such as the foreign investment friendly district of Kaluga, to underscore the variation within rather than uniformity of the Russian economy. Finally, the value of this book is in the reframing of Russia's economic policy under President Putin as a relatively well-thought-out success. It is rare to wish that a book were longer, but the postscript could easily have been expanded into a more analytical closing chapter. The financial crisis of 2008, as well as the growing reliance on cronies to centralize power, seem to have stymied the Kremlin's, or perhaps the technocrats’ abilities to respond with further needed economic reforms. Further analysis from Miller would be welcome here. How flexible is Putinomics in the face of changing circumstances at home and abroad? It seems that the actors that helped further Putin's overarching goal of strengthening centralized authority in order to exert influence at home and abroad are now obstacles to implementing the types of economic policies that would create the kind of growth needed to fuel that power. Is Putinomics inherently brittle, and can it withstand a change in leadership if Putin steps down in 2024? Nonetheless, Putinomics is essential reading for anyone seeking not only an understanding, but an underlying logic to what can often seem like the black box of policy making in the Kremlin.