The basic argument of this book, stated on p. 5, is that two main factors make for contestation among China's ethnic minorities, both of them external. One is comparisons with people of the same ethnic group outside China, essentially whether the group sees an “achievable better alternative” in terms of living standards, political and cultural expression, and similar factors. The other is whether it gets “substantial external support” for political mobilization. The author takes up five ethnic groups, the Uyghurs, Chinese Koreans, Mongolians, Dai and Tibetans. He concludes that only the Uyghurs and Tibetans satisfy both these conditions and that is the main reason why they are the only ethnic minorities to have caused major trouble to the Chinese state.

This seems to me a very important hypothesis. This is because Chinese authorities have overwhelmingly blamed disturbances among the Tibetans (especially March 2008) and Uyghurs (above all July 2009) on external incitement, whereas Western journalists and scholars have tended strongly to pin responsibility on the Chinese authorities themselves, charging that these mobilizers are merely reacting against repression and discrimination. It is important to note that Enze Han's hypothesis refers to the big picture, or long term, rather than to specific incidents, but of course it has implications for the aforementioned sets of disturbances.

The author has sustained his hypothesis well. One could ask what are alternative explanations why one ethnic group should carry out political mobilization on behalf of its identity, but not another. Candidates include historical antecedents, serious oppression, poverty or major differences in culture. It seems to me that Enze Han gives good coverage of all of these potential factors behind contestation.

The chapter on the Uyghurs shows an excellent and well-based knowledge of how political mobilization has operated among this Turkic ethnic minority, based in China's north-western region of Xinjiang. I happen to agree with his statement that “Today, Xinjiang is perhaps the region in China where interethnic relations are the tensest of all” (p. 41). He has a good deal of material about repression in Xinjiang, but still argues, in line with his hypothesis, that what marks the Uyghurs out from other ethnic groups is comparisons between Uyghur life and political expression inside China and outside, and external support for political action. In cataloguing numerous examples of outside support over the 20th and 21st centuries, he makes out a very strong case for externally derived impact on internal Xinjiang developments.

The Koreans in China, mainly Jilin Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, the Dai of Yunnan and the Mongols, based in Inner Mongolia, have not attracted nearly as much interest as the Uyghurs, because they have not caused China much trouble. Han finds that Koreans feel their position is much inferior to the South Koreans who have visited their region since the 1980s. The Mongols of China may see a better political and cultural alternative in Mongolia, but enjoy a better economic livelihood. For the Dai external comparisons largely favour China. In none of these cases is there any substantial support from outside.

The chapter on the “International dimension of the Tibet question” discusses the historical status of Tibet in a balanced way. However, I would have liked more consideration of the historical positions distinguishing what China officially terms the “Tibet Autonomous Region” (TAR) and the Dalai Lama's “Tibet,” which includes not only the TAR but all other Tibetan areas of China. The status of the TAR within China is far more contested internationally than that of the other Tibetan areas of China. The author is very clear that political mobilization in Tibet owes much not only to better political and other alternatives for Tibetans outside China but to external support as well. On pp. 144–45 the author details external factors in the 2008 “protest movements” in Tibet without covering the internal. This could be controversial because the emphasis on external factors is in line with China's official view and at odds with the more usual Western attention to internal repressive Chinese policies as causes of the protests. However, the chapter's title suggests a specific focus on the “international dimension” and this would justify the author's approach.

Enze Han is himself Han by ethnicity but works in London. His sources include a very wide range of secondary scholarly literature in English and some in Chinese. He has also carried out fieldwork in the relevant minority areas from 2006 to 2008, gathering information and insights through such methods as interviews and collecting official documents. I found his use of sources thoughtful and critical and, though I would have preferred a bit more detail in terms of how he carried out interviews and gained access to official documents, I was generally impressed with his methodology.

Overall, the author makes his case convincingly and in considerable detail. The fact that his argument about external comparisons and support is so important makes this a timely book. It will be welcomed by scholars and observers of China's ethnicity and political mobilization among them, including people in various disciplines, such as ethnology and politics. The author writes well in a clear and accessible style that avoids the denseness found in some academic work. In general, he adopts a balanced approach that takes account of various conflicting viewpoints. This is a valuable addition to the literature in a field that has more than its fair share of controversies, and I recommend it strongly.