These are cruel times indeed for the subfield of political theory, the discipline of political science, and liberal arts education generally speaking. The current economic crisis has reduced the political theory job market to a trickle, and the few available positions require applicants with a multiplicity of specialties that would confound the most “MacGyver” of candidates. Although federal funding for political science research through the National Science Foundation survived recent threats of elimination, the onslaught will surely continue. Even the value of a liberal arts education has been reexamined in light of alarming unemployment rates among young recent college graduates.
Thus it is fitting that major figures in political thought such as J. G. A. Pocock provide potent reminders of the significance and ongoing relevance of the field. Cambridge University Press has published a comprehensive volume of essays written by Pocock that are no longer available in print. The volume is divided into two parts, the first entitled “Political Thought as History,” the second, “History as Political Thought.” Pocock includes an “intermezzo” essay on Quentin Skinner for good measure. In the first part of the book, several essays organized chronologically provide a guide to Pocock's method of historical analysis and his “theories of how language is organized in history in terms intended to produce … an experimental politics of language” as “a multiplicity of language acts performed by language users in historical contexts” (ix, viii). The second part, also organized chronologically, includes essays that elaborate on Pocock's theory of “historiography,” which he defines as “first, a way in which the political society furnishes one more way in which it can be thought about,” and, “second, a way of thinking about a society by narrating it in the multiple contexts of historical circumstance and change” (ix). Together the essays provide a rich foundation upon which Pocock's well-known works The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, The Machiavellian Moment, and Barbarism and Religion are founded. Readers are provided with a surprisingly intimate portrait of a thoroughly examined life well lived. The opportunity to step back from his larger and not uncontroversial works, to see the evolution of Pocock's method and theory, and to study the ways in which he reflects on his own actions and those of other historians and considers the interrelation between history and political societies is welcome in such trying times. Although the contentious relation between Pocock and members of the Cambridge School, on one hand, and many Straussians and followers of Allan Bloom, on the other, simmers under the surface of this book, these epic struggles and the often cantankerous exchanges between Pocock and his critics—and even well-meaning interpreters—play a relatively minor role in the work. Readers can return to and reconsider the fundamental premises that underlie these controversies and ongoing debates.
In the first essay, “The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Inquiry,” Pocock explains that the historian's task is to reconstruct the process of abstract thought by major thinkers “in order to show what manner of world they lived in and why they behaved in it as they did” (9). Pocock admits that the difference between political philosophy and history almost always disappears as a result of this process of “historical reconstruction” because in his view philosophers cannot and should never attempt to reconstruct abstract thought without taking into account the context in which it emerges—or, in the words of his detractors, by “historicizing” philosophy. Instead, philosophers should appreciate the “intention” of political philosophers “of bringing political experience under their control and explaining it by their means” (15). On this view, the difference between history and philosophy is a matter of degree: like the historian, the philosopher begins with a study of the multiple origins of the abstract thought, but unlike the historian, the philosopher concludes by speculating on the abstract rational system constructed by a given thinker.
Pocock is well aware of the apparent circularity of his method, widely noted by his detractors. He acknowledges the “fallacies which are committed when historians, assuming that political thought must be the ‘reflection’ of a social structure or political situation, construct a model of that structure or situation and proceed to explain the thought as in accordance with the model, though often unable to offer more than a vague congruency or parallelism in support of their claims” (17). Resisting the temptation to “search for underlying assumptions of the utmost theoretical generality on which all the varying languages in use” are based, Pocock instead urges the philosopher to try to determine with as much precision as possible the “tradition of discourse” from which a theoretical argument arises. The danger of the former option, for Pocock, is the lack of “independent verification” of these assumptions. Pocock's proposed solution is a dissatisfying compromise that leaves the fundamental circularity of his approach essentially intact and fails to distinguish adequately the enterprises of philosophy and history. The sort of “independent verification” sought by Pocock, but whose plausibility he seriously questions, can be found in the enduring questions that animate all political philosophy, namely, those concerning human nature, the good life, and the proper end of political affairs. A basic recognition that there are such enduring questions could serve as a useful complement to Pocock's method by providing an important corrective to its apparent circularity. Pocock admits that “the questions with which political philosophers come to deal may perhaps be perennial,” but he again insists that “we need critical means of determining when to say [this] and when not” (52). How exactly this might be done remains unclear, perhaps suggesting an opening for political philosophers who exert good-faith efforts to gain a greater understanding of these enduring questions.
The possibility that such good-faith political philosophers could exist is temporarily eclipsed in Pocock's essay “Political Ideas as Historical Events,” a response to a paper presented by Allan Bloom. Deploring the “Straussian philosopher's strange blend of innocence and esoteric initiation,” Pocock insists that “the political philosopher of today is an intensely historical animal, conscious of inhabiting history even when she rejects it and bound to include historical statements among those which she makes and implies.” He declares that “we have to seek means of making the intensification of historical understanding part of the philosophical enterprise itself, without encouraging it to take over the enterprise as a whole” (54). Pocock's withering portrayal of the Straussian philosopher, referred to as “Ego,” who seeks to interpret philosopher “Alter,” contains enough truth to make reflective students of Strauss and Bloom wince, but again he does not offer adequate guidance on precisely how the philosophers can differentiate themselves from historians.
The brazenness of this attack is counterbalanced by Pocock's comparatively modest autobiographical essay “Working on Ideas in Time,” where he describes his personal journey as a historian and even details his method of writing, including the use of particular pens (blue ink) and paper (soft), and his use of continuous transcription to immerse himself in the writing style or “discourses” used by a given source. This method allows the various discourses from which a given author draws to emerge, which in turn are assembled and carefully described by the perceptive historian. Pocock's insistence on extensive and painstaking research is an important and sobering reminder of how challenging his methodology really is.
Other essays in the first part of the volume elaborate on Pocock's theory of language as an exercise of power (“The Reconstruction of Discourse”) that is represented in various “layers” (“The Concept of a Language”) and changes in unpredictable ways over time (“Texts as Events”). The essays on history as historiography, which comprise the second half of the volume, display Pocock's adaptability as a historian. He engages in intensive self-reflection on his own enterprise and that of other historians as they shape the very identities of the cultures they inhabit and study. The connections Pocock draws between history, citizenship, and identity offer promising new directions of further research into the power of “storytelling” and “mythmaking.”
Those who are not enamored of the notion that political philosophy can be reduced to the ability to draw from multiple discourses that can be interpreted in multiple and unpredictable ways will not be swayed by Pocock's approach. It should be noted, however, that Pocock's and Strauss's theories are equally dissatisfying in their respective treatments of some essential questions. Is theoretical innovation merely the ability to synthesize different languages in a temporarily novel way, as it is for Pocock? Or is innovation achieved by a gifted few who, like supernatural beings, somehow manage to break completely free from their surroundings and create a novel worldview? Surely, the truth lies somewhere in between. Perhaps political philosophers could be more honest and self-reflective in their own work, more mindful of historical contingencies, and more straightforward about their own preferences. Perhaps political philosophy should consider more seriously the connections between its own work, the tasks of citizenship, and the formation of civic identity. Examples of political philosophers “going public” could well stretch beyond writing occasional op-eds or burrowing in obscure government agencies or think-tanks. And yet, political philosophy should never lose sight of the eternal questions that animate the ongoing conversation among the greatest thinkers on the Isles of the Blessed.
