This book is the fourth volume of the history of the Bank of England, from its foundation in 1694 to the very recent past. Forrest Capie follows in the footsteps of John Clapham, Richard Sayers, and John Fforde, with the bank returning to a policy of commissioning a distinguished economic and financial historian to write its history—John Fforde was a former executive director of the Bank of England. As in previous installments, there is a little overlap between the end of one volume and the beginning of the other. In this case, as Capie states in his preface, this is because Fforde, whose story ended in 1958, “chose a sometimes narrow focus in his book and some topics merited further development.” The finishing date of 1979, while dictated by the 30 years rule on the opening of archives, corresponds to a turning point in the history of both the Bank of England and the British economy.
The book is an impressive achievement—in terms of both quantity and quality. Capie clearly defines what the history of the Bank of England is and what it is not.
He is primarily concerned with the bank itself, with, as he puts it “what the bank did, how it did it, if possible…why it did it the way it did it.” These principles apply to the history of any financial or nonfinancial institution. But of course a modern central bank is no ordinary institution. Writing its history requires the striking of the right balance between its “internal” and its “external history”—the matters of public policy with which it has been involved. Forrest Capie entirely succeeds in doing this. He does not write a monetary history of the period under review, and yet deals a lot with monetary issues; and these issues are discussed from a historian's, not an economist's perspective, even though great economic expertise is used in the analysis. Pride of place is given to the actors: even more than the previous volumes, this is a history of their everyday decisions, and of the discussions, both within the bank and between the bank and the Treasury, leading to these decisions.
This chronological account is organized around five broad themes. One is exchange rate policy, dominated by the series of sterling crises culminating with the devaluation of 1967 but continuing after Bretton Woods and the advent of floating exchange rates, and the connected problem of sterling balances. And a second is monetary policy, with debates focusing around the instruments of such policy, especially at the time and in the aftermath of the Radcliffe Committee inquiry. These two related themes make up the bulk of the book, with nine out of sixteen chapters. Two other important themes, especially in the light of the current financial situation, are each allocated one chapter: financial crises, with a major banking crisis—the secondary banking crisis—breaking out in Britain after decades of stability; and banking supervision, a then new issue emerging in the wake of the secondary banking crisis, European harmonization, and international cooperation. Two other chapters are devoted to miscellaneous issues, such as the bank's internal organisation, including its personnel and, especially, its leadership—the four governors active during this period (Cobbold, Cromer, O'Brien, and Richardson), of course, but also the executive directors and other senior officials who played a leading part in the story; the bank and the City of London, and the bank and industrial finance. In addition, the book opens with a very useful introductory chapter (on the ups and down of British economy, in particular the intractable problem of inflation, and the prevailing theoretical tools), followed by another on the situation of the bank in the 1950s; and ends with an epilogue on the bank's restructuring of 1980, allegedly the most radical since its foundation in 1694.
This was thus an eventful period in the bank's history. It was also a difficult period —because of the comparatively disappointing performance of the British economy; because of the recurring sterling crises; and because of the challenges posed by a rapidly changing environment, whether the declining importance of Britain in the world or, perhaps even more importantly, new trends in economic theory and their implications for monetary policy. Most of the themes dealt with in the book have obviously already been, and are still being debated at great length—as witnessed, for example, by Catherine Schenk's recent book (The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International Currency, 1945–1992. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and the renewed interest in the secondary banking crisis and the origins of the Basle Accord. However, focusing on the Bank of England offers a new perspective. One of the most interesting features of the book is the discussion of the role played by economic theory in the bank's policymaking—its near absence at the opening of the period, the recruitment of trained economists, such as Kit McMahon or Jeremy Morse, the rising influence of economic advisers, such as Charles Goodhart, the apprenticeship of monetary policy, the struggle between Keynesianism and monetarism.
With nearly 900 pages, the book is long. Too long– Possibly, especially as only 35 pages are taken up by the bibliography and the index—there are no appendices. The trend has been for major institutions to have their history recounted in weighty volumes. There are some good reasons for this: the wealth of details brings them to life and can be used for future reference. However, there is also a case for more synthesis and greater readability—not in terms of clarity and quality of style, the book cannot be faulted in that respect, but of the time required for absorbing such material. For the book is certainly worth reading from cover to cover. It is an essential contribution to financial history, written with consummate skill, and dealing with a period, as well as a country and an institution, coming to the forefront of historical research in order to understand the transformation of the financial world in the late twentieth century and, ultimately, the financial debacle of 2007–2008.
