He said that men wish to be serious but they do not understand how to be so. Between their acts and their ceremonies lies the world and in this world the storms blow and the trees twist in the wind and all the animals that God made go to and fro yet this world men do not see. They see the acts of their own hands or they see that which they name and call out to one another but the world is invisible to them.
— Cormac McCarthy, The CrossingActs and Facts
“In the beginning was the act.”Footnote 1 Thus (Goethe’s) Faust’s revision of John 1:1 — “In the beginning was the word” —, itself a gloss on the all-time No. 1 1:1. An identically numbered proposition well known in philosophical circles, the 1:1 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus echoes Faust: “The world is the totality of facts. …”Footnote 2 Are Wittgenstein’s words, like Goethe’s and John’s, chosen with an eye on Holy Writ? By tacking the amplifying assertion that the world is “not [the totality] of things”Footnote 3 onto the quoted part of Tractatus 1:1, Wittgenstein might be poking fun at Genesis 1:1. But the swipe at the Bible (if that is what it is) for raising things up over facts is a mere debating point. Had Wittgenstein offered an amplifying 1.101 — “Am Anfang bildete Gott Tatsachen, nicht Sachen” — he would have laid himself open to mockery. If the position is that thing-making supervenes on fact-making (and we do speak in English of “creating facts”), what would prevent philosophical defenders of the biblical creation account from helping themselves to the analysis in spelling out in full ontological mode what chapter-and-verse describes God as doing in the beginning?
Although an irony relevant to the central objective of this discussion arises from the contact between Tractatus 1:1 and Goethe’s version of (ultimately) Genesis 1:1, Wittgenstein’s work is mentioned primarily as a representative of ontological realism. The objective referred to is an interpretive one: to clarify the influential anti-realist position that its propounder, Immanuel Kant, baptizes “transcendental idealism.”
The formulations of the Tractatus, put forward in the frame of what its creator conceives as realism, echo a text that is strongly redolent of the contrary. In replacing John’s Greek “logos” with German “Tat,” Goethe (or, if you prefer, his creation Faust) is playing up the activity that got things going — a primordial doing at the root of being. Since “Tat” is a nominalization of the German verb meaning “to do,” Goethe is going with the Teutonic flow, in which flow Wittgenstein himself was an expert navigator.Footnote 4 The English “fact” has a similar process-based etymology, though the lack of a “tuen” to its “Tat” obscures this from the sight of those not fitted out with scholarly spectacles.Footnote 5 Because the connection with the verb “faire” is plain, “fait,” the French word meaning “fact,” displays the derivation to the naked Gallic eye. In Latin, whence the English and French words come, facts and acts are transparently linked. Consider the exculpatory principle of law “non est factum.” This means: “The accused didn’t do the deed.”
The irony is hard to miss. The ontological language of the Tractatus goes against the position of the author of the Tractatus that the world itself parses at the deepest level into (atomic) facts — “Tatsachen” in Wittgenstein’s German.Footnote 6 Obviously, Wittgenstein’s fastidiousness regarding language only heats up the irony.
With the idea that there would be no facts but for the activities of those who come to factual awareness, we arrive at Kant’s door. Consider this characteristic formulation: “all combination — be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts — is an act of the understanding” (B130).Footnote 7 The words are quite reminiscent in content of Goethe’s words. Like Faust, Kant is saying that the objects of cognition are the products of an activity. Sachen, to convert it into Wittgensteinian coin, are the products of tuen. Though the remarkably versatile Goethe was active in philosophy, it is not however to his writings that appeal will be made for present purposes. The more venerable of the other two exotic texts to which I referred is the one that I shall enlist to the interpretive task. The story of the beginning in the BibleFootnote 8 is, I will show, informed by a subtle view about the nature and structure of being, a view that has profound Kantian affinities. It is via a recuperation of the ontological teachings of the biblical narrative of ultimate beginnings that the central objective will be reached.
In adulthood, Kant officially changed his Christian name from “Emanuel” to “Immanuel.” An act of filial impiety? Whatever Kant thought of his parents, the primary motive was to adjust the spelling of the baptismal moniker to the Messiah’s appellation as in Luther’s Bible.Footnote 9 Since undermining the cognitive bona fides of traditional religious tenets and assertions is one of the main negative objectives of the “critical” writings — the transcendent is demoted to a regulative role — the change, slight though it was, comes across as an act of religious impiety, a very provocative one at that. What Kant is giving to the world, the auto‑baptized Immanuel trumpets in the preface of the Prolegomena, is “a perfectly new science, of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which [is] unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use.”Footnote 10 (After reading this, one half expects Kant to point out that his surname is a tetragrammaton!) If, as I say, Holy Writ can be enlisted to illuminate the central tenet of Kant’s putatively redemptive metaphysical Bible, a second irony comes to light. Kant fits perfectly into the “novum” slot of Augustine’s epigram about the two biblical Testaments: “In vetere novum latet.”Footnote 11
In a fashion that diminishes this irony, light shines both ways. From the interpretive interplay between the Critique and the Bible we get a better sense of what Kant is categorically denying when he denies categorically that our experience is of unvarnished reality, and we also see that even in its own terms the Bible could have been less oblique in the account of creation. To be more specific: study of the interplay imparts a better sense of the meaning of Kant’s claim that all unity found in experience is based in apperception, and also has power to indicate that the Bible’s postulation of a transcendent God is importantly misleading with respect to its view of reality. Had the Bible rejected Kant, we could then have spoken of an irony in its regard. But, as we shall see, the Bible is in its central thrust quite Kantian, and clarifyingly so.
Antecedent Doubts Allayed
The announced enterprise beds together quite unlikely fellows. It will be useful to address a few background doubts that I can anticipate about the need for, or the wisdom of, putting them on the same sheets.
“To interpret transcendental idealism, why, except perhaps to smooth the wrinkles from a construal already hammered out, consult extra-Kantian writings?” Certainly, Kant’s expositions are the primary data and the necessary starting point. But the fact is that over two hundred years of dissecting the “critical” corpus (as bodies of philosophy go, quite a large one) have generated little convergence among the surgeons on the doctrine’s anatomy. Such being the case, it takes a very brave interpreter to declare that “Kant’s transcendental idealism should emerge as the straightforward inevitable upshot of the very arguments Kant gave in the Aesthetic and the Antinomies.”Footnote 12
“Interpreters who tackle Kant’s transcendental idealism regularly exit the covers of the ‘critical’ texts and factor in Descartes, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, and so forth, do they not? This does not even take a lot of initiative on their part, since, to give a pair of representative instances, Kant himself credits Hume with having supplied a crucial rise-and-shine and, by way of setting himself apart, he characterises positions of Cartesian stripe (the dominant early modern positions) as amalgams of transcendental realism and empirical idealism.” The truth of the matter is that attention to the mentioned interrelations hasn’t decisively enhanced our understanding of Kant.Footnote 13Internal reasons exist for advance skepticism about the prospects along the dialectical route. Since Kant’s own descriptions of his predecessors largely control the treatment,Footnote 14 it is inaccurate to characterize interpreters, who as the question indicates are accepting Kant’s invitation, as “exiting” the Kantian sphere when they visit Ulm, London, Leipzig, Edinburgh, etc.Footnote 15 Indeed, those with independent scholarly interests in Descartes, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, etc., frequently complain that Kant’s portraits give poor likenesses.Footnote 16 Also, Kant’s claim of epochal originality clashes with the idea that what he offers is just an untried permutation of extant options. I quote again: “… a science…for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use.”
Transcendental idealism is very tough on the interpretive nutcracker. Disagreement among experts is not, as it is in the case of, say, Plato, or Descartes, about whether the philosopher’s views are defensible. The very identity of the views is the chief subject of debate. Why is that? Neutral observers will speculate. Perhaps the textual exposition is poorly synchronized with the doctrinal content. Kant might for instance be waging local battles that no longer speak to us. Perhaps the doctrine has something to do with its time, and hence slips through the abstract net of philosophical analysis.
The non-philosophical possibility cannot be waved off on the grounds that Kant stands as a paradigm among philosophers. In advancing the hybrid category of the synthetic a priori, Kant is rocking the metaphilosophical boat. More generally, and as any practitioner will know, philosophers’ claims, except when of the “bachelors are unmarried males” variety, almost never (if true) have the same status as that of logical laws. But though these things are so, we all have a rough-and-ready sense of when a discussion belongs in a historical outlet rather than on the pages of a journal of philosophy. Leaving the metaphilosophy to the specialists, I proceed on the assumption that Kant should be ceded to the history-sensitive student of the Enlightenment only after avenues that philosophers are comfortable travelling prove to be dead ends. I believe that there is a philosophical avenue to pay dirt that interpreters of Kant have not travelled. They have not — and here I endorse the first speculation — because Kant’s exposition puts them on the wrong track.
Matthew 7:16: “By their fruits you shall know them.” While the value of enlisting the Bible to get a bead on Kant’s position will ultimately be determined by the interpretive bounty, there is in fact a ground internal to the “critical” texts for those seeking to figure out Kant’s idealism to look in the direction of a document having the interests that the Bible does “in the beginning.” I will elaborate after I conclude the Q & A session by responding to a final preliminary doubt.
“No one would say that the biblical position itself is clear. Isn’t it an exercise in futility to appeal to obscurior to clarify obscurum?” It is. The reverse appeal can, however, bear fruit, and is on occasion a reasonable course. Difficulties with the Bible’s ontological teachings stem, I submit, from two sources. Formally, the Bible is a story or narrative. It is not a philosophical exposition. Substantively, the Bible does not keep as separate as it should the accounts of Genesis 1 and Genesis 2.Footnote 17 Neither of these sources of difficulty, we shall see, is so severe as to baffle scholarship for the duration. As to the claim about the Bible’s “Eureka” effect on the understanding of transcendental idealism, the chief point is this: Kant himself tells us what things‑in‑themselves are not. He does not tell us what they are. Once the biblical position is massaged into a philosophical form, and once the relations between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 are set straight, positive sense is made of both sides of Kant’s appearances/things‑in‑themselves contrast.
Kant on Experience: The Problem
Why is it natural for interpreters of Kant to look in the direction of (a book like) the Bible? It is, because of an anthropological slant in Kant’s writings. Kant lectured extensively on anthropological matters early in his career, and returned to them late in his career.Footnote 18 That Kant continually employs anthropological language in the texts of his philosophical maturity, the “critical” texts, stands as evidence that his core philosophical activity is informed by a focused interest in what is distinctive to men and women, not by a purely abstract interest in issues of cognition and reality. To be sure, the evidence by itself is circumstantial. Pressed to think about it further, most interpreters of transcendental idealism would I am sure say that the not infrequent use of the qualifier “human” and of the noun “man” in the Critique hide no interpretive secret. “Needless to say,” these interpreters would proceed, “Kant had no other subjects of cognitive experience to examine or reflect upon than men and women. So no one is likely to be misled by Kant’s claims to the effect that he is dealing with human cognition.” This response is not a silly one. Kant’s use of an anthropological vocabulary in his mature period could be a carry-over from his early lecturing. It could be. But is it?
A first point in defense of the negative answer is the following. It is equally the case that the structures of reasoning are not exemplified anywhere else than in the human realm. Despite that, no logician would characterize his or her analyses as concerned with human logic. It would be as if Archimedes had said that he discovered the principles of displacement of water by the human body, or Newton had declared that he figured out the universal principle of attraction of apples and the Earth. It’s hard to believe that either of these giants would have said such things except as a joke.
Clearly, however, the parallel between the two cases is illusory. Even a logician who in a casual moment voices the claim that his or her concern is with the structures of human reasoning would never say that there are (other) beings whose (valid) reasoning violates those structures. But Kant does not treat our modes of cognition as contrastless. “Does not,” in fact, is understating it. Kant enunciates a contrast at the very start of the main body of the Critique, which he would not do unless he thinks the contrast of great moment. The way the contrast is stated is, I shall now argue, revealing. What it reveals is a serious problem.
Here are the beginning three sentences of §1 of the Critique, the opening of the “First Part” of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic:
In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to an object, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. (A19/B34)
Kant is addressing himself analytically in these sentences to the cognitive grasp of an object. He is not making what he regards as philosophically novel claims. All he is doing is setting out an anatomization, a classificatory sectioning, of what taking an object up into experience involves.
Kant explains that he will apply the term “intuition” when the cognitive grasp of the object is im‑mediate.Footnote 19 As this implies, Kant holds there to be a different kind of grasp of an object — a mediate one. Once we get past the unfamiliar language, we do not find what Kant is saying to be in the least controversial. His im‑mediate/mediate distinction is the standard one between picking an object out in a general way by offering conditions that it (alone) satisfies (“the smartest person in the room”), and picking an object out by pointing to it (“Albert”). In the latter case, the (post-Kantian) logico-linguistic representation would employ a singular term; in the former, only a (quantified) variable. So the intuitional or immediate form of cognition is the form whose logico-linguistic expression involves singular terms, while the non-intuitional or mediate form involves general terms and bound variables. Symbolically expressed, it’s roughly the difference between “(∃x)F(x)” and “a.”
So far, plain sailing. Beyond the analytic accounting the difficulties mount up, both from an interpretive viewpoint and philosophically. I shall now apply the microscope to the progression in the excerpt, annotating in the process what magnification brings into view.
The first sentence is formulated impersonally: a completely general reference is made — “in whatever manner and by whatever means” — to modes of knowledge involving objects. No mention of who or what might know objects in those ways. [Annotation: Nothing remarkable here. It’s just an articulate description. Qua analytic specification, it is not intended to get down to cases.] The second sentence employs the first-person plural pronoun. [Annotation: One might have thought that that to which the pronoun is in apposition would be specified before the pronoun is used, the other order being suitable when a writer is striving for effect, e.g., to put the reader into a state of suspense. In any case, could the phrase “to us” not have been suppressed without affecting the analytic meaning?] In the third sentence a common noun, “man,” appears. [Annotation: Shouldn’t “man” have been used in place of “us” in the second sentence? Shouldn’t “us” have been used in place of “man” in the third?]
The progression is this: We pass from the fully general to the indefinitely specific to the fully specific.
In trying to spell out what Kant is saying, the chief issue is whether the indefinitely specific, the hinge between the fully general and the fully specific, goes with the fully general or with the fully specific. Conceptually considered, is the move in the direction of greater specificity from the fully general, as per the order of sentences, or is it the reverse, an abstraction from the fully specific?
Kant could be saying that when we (human beings) grasp an object intuitionally, the object is given to us, but that this is not the only way in which an object can be taken up im‑mediately into distinctively cognitive awareness. The position would be this: given‑ness is not a necessary condition for im‑mediacy. Alternatively, Kant could be taking the line that in all cases of im‑mediate cognition the object must be given, but that men and women only get the given passively, by being affected. The position would be this: passivity is not a necessary condition for im‑mediacy. I believe that Kant is, objectionably, saying both these things. He has, as I shall now explain, a strong internal motive for formulating what he has in mind indeterminately as between the options. That motive is the defense of transcendental idealism.
Kant wants a contrast between factual experience as we know it and other modes of object-cognition. The only way in which he can fill in the contrast — “fill in” in the sense of supplying a model, not just dreaming up a classificatory label — is by calling on a mode in which the object is given actively, this being the mode that philosophers of the Cartesian tradition ascribe to God.Footnote 20 Kant has to feel uneasy about making theoretical use of the divine model, since the Critique’s Dialectic argues along a wide front that the idea of God is a façon de parler. If the idea of a (superior) alternative is merely regulative, it would constitute a serious problem should the contrast have a vital bearing on transcendental idealism. So (I conjecture) Kant, at some level aware of the problem, proceeds to speak in the second sentence of cognition “for us,” but does so without going all the way to the passivity that features our de facto mode of basic factual experience. In effect, Kant splits the difference between active given‑ness (which is a divine prerogative, and is problematic for him) and passive given‑ness (which is the lot of men and women, and which is not enough for his purposes).
“How does the active differ from the non-passive? Doesn’t ‘active’ mean ‘non‑passive’?” As I see it, the two are identical, and the identity, which strands Kant in a distinction without a difference, precipitates a shift of interpretive focus from the analytic (“What is Kant saying?”) to the diagnostic (“Why does Kant say what he says?”).
While active given‑ness is genuinely active, it is given‑ness only in a courtesy sense. God makes, he does not get. That being so, to God the world is not in any intelligible sense given. (When you give yourself a gift, as when you scratch your nose, you are in part passive. You both affect and are affected. Qua actively intellectual, God is in no wise affected.) Kant therefore needs non-passive given‑ness — the idea that objects not of our making get into consciousness otherwise than through a receptive faculty like the senses — for cashing the claim that our way of grasping objects, passive given‑ness, is not contrastless. In short: Kant can make some sense of the first and the third, but not the second. But the first cannot serve as a proper contrast for the third. Kant needs the second.
Kant does not want to treat what the first sentence in the excerpt says as a product of abstraction from what is said by the third. At any rate, on the assumption that Kant desires to avoid doing so, we get a non-literary explanation of the precedence of the general “to us” to the specific “to man.” That “to us” comes before makes it seem as if our case is a specification of a more general structure, rather than that the less specific one is just a vaguer or coarser-grained articulation of the more specific one. But the second comes from nothing, not from something. And philosophy cannot be based on nothing.
The net result is that the analysis of cognition looks non-anthropological. It looks as if the cognitive structures, in this respect like logical structures, are not inextricably bound up with men and women. And this is important to Kant because he thinks that to make sense of the idea of things‑in‑themselves he must offer a mode of cognition appropriate to representing them adequately.Footnote 21 This, I say, is how things look. It is not, however, how they are.
Ontology, Not Epistemology
Taken as it comes, Kant’s account is, theoretically speaking, in a deficit position. The generality for which Kant strives in his anatomy of cognition is only abstractive. He does not have any serviceable idea of cognitive im‑mediacy common to different sorts of object-experience, i.e., sorts exemplified (or even exemplifiable) by beings some of which are not humans. The classificatory scheme would however be non-abstractive only if it were true that such an idea were in his possession. As it is, what he says about im‑mediacy outside the human case is much like someone’s saying that people can be square, not only geometrical figures.
Plainly, appeal to a person characterized as “a square” cannot enlarge the geometer’s understanding of quadrilaterals. Just so, the case of God can’t, if it is reached by abstraction, be recruited to clarify transcendental idealism. It is correct to say that God’s grasp is not mediate (this is what Wittgenstein in his later period calls a grammatical claim). But the assertion that God’s grasp is im‑mediate is wordplay. The world is not in any intelligible sense given to God, either mediately or im‑mediately. Realism requires that one’s grasp be synchronized with the facts. Where the facts have no independence at all, any more than a rabbit conjured out of an empty hat has independence of the magician’s “Abracadabra,” continued talk of synchronization between subject and object is figurative.
If we are to make conceptual sense of the thinking behind transcendental idealism we cannot therefore, in order to get at the world as it is in itself, appeal to (the idea of) a mode of cognition different from ours. We must proceed in an ontological vein, not an epistemological one. True, the ontological proposition that the world as it is in itself, X, is a world different in character from the world as we grasp it, Y, is an uninformative statement of inequality. Y we know. X is specifiable only by negating Y. Since the negation of a something may be a nothing, it may yet turn out that X = 0. But having said that Y is the world of human beings, I am, albeit unspecifically, giving distinctive ontological content to X. X = the world of sub-human things; of plants, animals, etc., the constituents (if I may anticipate) of the Bible’s first five and a half days of creation. So the inequality is not stated as an axiom, and the task is to defend the inequality consistently with the falsity of X = 0.Footnote 22
Dispensing with the cognition-theoretic approach to the world as it is in itself requires two substantial shifts of approach on the part of those aiming to interpret Kant. Despite the surface appearance of Kant’s analysis of human cognition, the analysis is an analysis of human cognition, not the investigation of ideas about the structure of experience that, in modified form, just happen to have application to what goes on with men and women. The human case must therefore be taken as the basic analysandum, not just one of a broader spectrum of cases. That is the first shift. It follows that the anthropological colouring of Kant’s analysis is more than ornamental. Kant is not dealing with men and women at least or at most. He is dealing with men and women full stop. Not that an interpretively pertinent contrast for the human case, a contrast needed to give content to transcendental idealism, is lacking. But the non-human is located among real things, not in the sphere of notional entities like angels and God. “To man at least” is misleading in this connection too, for again suggesting a limitation. That is the second shift. Again, Kant’s core thinking turns out to be anthropological. It very much focuses on men and women. It very much begins with an account of the beings that we are. So much so that it would sow confusion even to say “beings of the sort that we are.” Kant’s core thinking does not treat men and women as falling short of something else that is superior because it is free of what are perceived as human limitations. That thinking therefore dispenses with science fiction fantasies or (what comes to much the same) counterfactuals cashable only in theological terms. The only extra-human is the (quite real) non-human and sub-human. Accordingly, idealism is a position about what our cognition is, not a position about what our cognition is not, viz., God-like. The key phrase here is “to man at least.” Although it is plain that underpinning Kant’s use of the phrase is the thought that there is better, I am suggesting that the thought is theoretically nugatory. To understand the Kantian position aright, it is of the first importance to correct Kant on this point.
Kant’s position is an idealism that places human-sized consciousness (as opposed to a supra-human consciousness, as in Berkeley) at the center of things. Consciousness of a human dimension being the measure, it is natural for those who approach Kant to expect a treatment of certain invariant characteristics of creatures such as we (men and women, persons) and what follows from them — a pure anthropology. The Critique seems to disappoint the thought. But, as I said, Kant’s language points in the anthropological direction, and close analysis brings out problems in the exposition as it stands. Kant himself said on one occasion that the three core philosophical questions, the moral question about our duties, the epistemological question about our knowledge, and the eschatological question of human destiny, reduce to one: “What is Man?”Footnote 23 This is precisely the question that those interested in the logos of anthropoi would ask.
Here is a rough parallel of the lie of the land from outside philosophy. In Freudian psychoanalysis, the Oedipus Complex is central. The human psyche bears the imprint of the three-act Oedipal drama. Freud is also, however, a naturalist. Men and women are just parts of Nature. The question arises: do sub-human things, parts of nature too, pass through the phases of the Complex on the road to adulthood? Freud’s answer is negative. But this indicates that his thinking is less natural than Darwin’s. It is not true for Freud, as it is for Darwin, that the human case is just more of the same. Freud’s position is, then, a kind of empirical metaphysics.Footnote 24 He is singling the human case out at the start. It is not accidental that this case is his starting point, as it is not Darwin’s. At any rate, had Freud begun with a more general account of psychology and reached the Oedipal structure by forward stages from it, some sharp break would had to have occurred en route.
The parallel can be taken a step farther, and, for those who know their Scripture, the additional step begins to reverberate with Genesis. The social world (that is, the community of individuals, individuals living interactively together at peace) is quite different for humans than it is for sub-humans. For instance, the idea of incest as a negative does not apply in the latter. This distinction is coarsely parallel to that between how things are in themselves, and how they are to us. Animals (sub-human ones, that is) are not criticized for licking their privates in public.Footnote 25
The Bible’s Philosophical Anthropology
Our exploration now has the right form. Kant says that the world as we experience it has its basic character due to the nature of our experience. So the world in itself is different from the world as we experience it. In the first creation story in Genesis, the story of Genesis 1, the world exists for five and a half days without men and women. So the world, prior to the afternoon of day six, is the world as it is in itself. To put it more accurately: if the advent of men and women introduces something unprecedented, then the world as it is in itself does not involve anything essentially linked to the novelty. What can we extract from the text to fill this in? The first place to look is at how the biblical narrative distinguishes men and women from the rest.
The Bible draws the distinction in several ways. The best known way is also the first way. Men and women, the Bible famously says, are made “in [God’s] image, according to [God’s] likeness” (1:26). Given current attitudes towards the Bible, it is not surprising that secular readers, confronted with this formulation, head for the exits.Footnote 26 But the reaction is hasty. For, as I shall now explain, the theological form of 1:26 is conceptually otiose.
Immediately after asserting the claim of God-likeness, the text makes a point that for its truth stands in no need of eschatological backing. Men and women are said to have “dominion over … all the … animals of the earth” (ibid.). Obviously, the claim that men and women stand in a domineering relation to the rest, and that they are not dominated as they dominate, is comprehensible independently of the biblical assertion that for their position men and women are beholden to God.Footnote 27 The idea of domination is a complex one. It stands in need of analysis. Still, the idea is a normal part of the secular conceptual repertoire. There is indeed no question but that the possession of a domineering nature by humans is understood prior to the representation of such a nature as God‑given. If Genesis had told of God bestowing dominion to trees over the other plants and animals, the text would never have been taken seriously. It would have been blown off as froth not because we men and women would feel ourselves slighted (we are not slighted by not having been given wings to fly), but because what it states would justifiably be seen as cartoonish. In mentioning God, Genesis is not accounting for (what is perceived to be) our difference. It is exploiting a prior and independent (and prima facie accurate) sense thereof. This implies that a book with the Bible’s contents is unlikely to have been produced (except as creedal fiction like Lord of the Rings) at a time when men and women had insufficient capacity to tame the environment in the more basic of the wide range of ways in which we harness it to our needs; insufficient capacity to neutralize the standing threat of predating beasts and to ensure a regular food supply without need for arduous seasonal migrations. If our domineering nature is comprehended independently of the reference to God, why is God referred to? Part of the answer is that the capacity to dominate is felt to distinguish men and women more strongly from all else that inhabits the world.Footnote 28 To say that God bestows the capacity is not to say where the capacity comes from. It is to say that the capacity is not just more of, not reducible to, what other creatures possess. The other part of the answer is that books with contents like the Bible’s and intended to do what the Bible is intended to do typically had a cast of higher characters. Even the core philosophical canon supplies central instances of the phenomenon from a much later age. Consider how Descartes, whose writings are biblical for philosophers, characterizes men and women as “something intermediate between God and nothingness.” And, of course, Descartes argues for the distinction between men and women and other creatures (we have minds, they don’t) without essential appeal to God’s nature.Footnote 29
Despite the language, the Bible’s assertion of God-likeness, then, is not a priori problematic (to non-believers). The operative content is that men and women differ from the rest in a manner that qualitatively outstrips the manner in which other elements differ pair-wise from each other. The idea of an asymmetrical sort of domination is part of the basis. The other biblical manner of distinguishing men and women is a second part, which I will come to presently. The Bible, then, is engaging in abstract or philosophical, sc., conceptual, anthropology.
To sum up. The assertion that men and women alone are made in God’s image and likeness is the Bible’s way of saying that we are very different from the rest. With the claim of difference most of us would concur whether or not we adhere to Scripture.Footnote 30 Even men and women who never heard of the Bible would I daresay agree. In fact, the biblical claim that we are like God can be cashed so as to expunge all reference to the transcendent. In the biblical story God creates the world. God controls it. To say that we are God-like is to say that we have some of that sort of control.Footnote 31 And, arguably, we do. We do, I mean, whether or not God presides over the universe. We build houses. We build cities. And we destroy them too. No other natural being does anything of the kind.
Approached without preconceptions about the presence of a non-negotiable eschatological agenda, it turns out that in the part of it that I have been looking at the Bible is fairly straightforwardly anthropological, empirically so.Footnote 32 The treatment of men and women is not essentially dependent for its meaning on an appeal to the transcendent. It does not of course follow that the Bible’s account of what is distinctive of men and women is correct. But any view might be wrong. And the fact is that the Bible’s account, right or wrong, is considerably deeper and more acute than Aristotle’s. At any rate, in characterising men and women as zooi politikoi, Aristotle gives sufficient evidence of operating much farther from bedrock than Moses does.
That best known episode in the prehistorical annals of men and women — the story of disobedience in the Garden of Eden — contains the Bible’s second way of distinguishing our kind. Again, only men and women disobey. They alone, then, are targets of the curse that God enunciates. It would require a great deal of innocence on the part of a reader to congratulate the sub-human creatures for being so dutiful. God, in the narrative, does not in the first place issue the prohibition about eating from the tree of knowledge to them. The monitory finger is wagged only at the creatures fashioned in his image and likeness. Plainly, then, the distinctive capacity of men and women to disobey is recognized prior to the telling of the story; it is a presupposition of the story’s making sense. So what I said earlier applies again, mutatis mutandis. If in the Genesis narrative God had warned lions against eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or threatened the sun with extinguishment should it deviate from its orbit, the text could not have been taken seriously.
As in the case of domination, this distinction is conceptually independent of theology. What the biblical issue of knowledge is remains to be seen. But if the capacity to know of which the Bible speaks is, or depends on, the capacity to deal cognitively with the world, most of us would forthwith say that even more than the capacity for dominating it is a key distinguisher of human beings.
I begin to wind this section down with a more general point. The way men and women are set apart in Genesis systematically tracks the way God is portrayed. (i) We are said, alone among creatures, to have dominion. That, grammatically, is what God, known in Latin as “Dominus,” has. (ii) Men and women, again uniquely among creatures, acquire knowledge of good and bad. This is knowledge that God possesses from the start. The reaction of “good” at each phase of creation, a reaction expressed as early as the second verse,Footnote 33 would otherwise be like the purr of as cat, no more than a contented sigh. (Doubts about the claim that God possesses the knowledge are stilled by Genesis 3:22. Reacting to the eating of the forbidden fruit, God asserts that “the man has become like one of us, knowing good and bad.”)Footnote 34 (iii) On the basis that “likeness” names a reflexive relation, we could for the sake of rounding out the list say that by virtue of being like himself God compares with men and women who share his likeness. No characteristic that God (distinctively) possesses is lacked by men and women. God, we may infer, is modelled on us, as we independently think of ourselves, not vice versa. It follows that though the vestments are theological, the way the Bible distinguishes does not have an ineluctably theological basis.
We are now in possession of enough in the way of material and structure to mount the final an assault on transcendental idealism. Preparatorily, let me blueprint the linkage to Kant.
Once we understand what the Bible is doing, we understand this. The Bible is doing what our examination of the excerpt from the Critique indicated that Kant, for his philosophy’s sake, better be doing. The Bible is proceeding anthropologically. Men and women are what they are. There is no advance assumption that they are subsumed by a wider class. That the Bible distinguishes men and women by appealing to God is simply its way of stressing how distinctive they are. The contrast between men and women and something else is therefore lateral or downwards: men and women differ from the other elements of the creation. It is not the case that men and women are contrasted with God. God, rather, is an upwards reflection of men and women, as they (or those behind the writings) understand themselves. So the two approaches are isomorphic. The question is whether the content of the biblical account can be used to illuminate the murk of transcendental idealism.
In the Beginning Were the Words: “Cow,” “Bear,” etc.
In Genesis 2, one of the earliest biblical acts of the man is to give names to the animals. At this juncture in the narrative, God is trying to determine which kind of thing would be a suitable partner for the man. (Dolly has not yet been cloned.) Attentive readers can anticipate where the story is going, since what happens in Genesis 2 mirrors what happens in Genesis 1. Just as, in Genesis 1, God had created something in his, God’s, image and likeness, so the man will need something like himself. And just as this creation came after the creation of non-human things, and the giving of names, so it is with the creation of woman.Footnote 35
Since God calls upon the man to give names in the frame of an effort to overcome his solitary status, the name-giving, as a way of determining whether this or that is suitable for company or companionship, means at least this: conceptual incorporation into a world in which the namer is at home.Footnote 36 To be nameable is to have a common denominator with the namer’s capacities of understanding. The giving-of-names is a reduction of the world to, or a processing of the world in, a form that is intellectually assimilable. The idea of a helper and partner is the idea of affinity. It’s the idea of someone who fits with us and together with whom we can work. The names are like a net. The question is: Which fish will be caught by it, which slip through?
What names does the man give? The Bible does not say. Not a single species name is given. This is puzzling. To me it seems to call for explanation, which I take as a sign that it is deliberate. At any rate, through the absence I come to the crucial issue of how Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 are related.
I am aligning Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 with, respectively, Kant’s things‑in‑themselves and appearances. Kant of course holds that in regard to the character of things in themselves we are reduced, cognitively speaking, to inarticulateness or silence. But Genesis 1 says quite a bit about the (sub-human) world that God makes. The simple reaction is that the descriptions of Genesis 1 are retroactivated from Genesis 2. The same principle applies here as I employed above. What is true of God prefigures (and is in fact modelled on) what is (thought to be) true of men and women. God’s giving names in Genesis 1 (e.g., “God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night” [1:5]; “God called the dome Sky” [1:8]) is a backwards use and upwards projection of the capacity for giving names that men and women recognize themselves as having, the capacity that they come to exercise in Genesis 2.
A more subtle reaction is possible. Observe that no species names like “cow,” “bear,” and “eagle” are spelled out in Genesis 1. That being so, might the message not be that we should not apply our zoological vocabulary to the world as described in that chapter?
And more subtlety yet is possible. As mentioned above, in Genesis 2 the man is said, entirely generally, to have given names “to all cattle, and to the birds of the air, and to every animal of the field” (2:20). No specific animal names are given. So the same absence is found here as we find in Genesis 1. Now it cannot be that the names that the man gives in Genesis 2 aren’t from a set that includes “cow,” “bear,” “eagle,” and so forth. Wouldn’t it have been natural, even good narrative practice, to specify one or two? Some might say that the list is obvious. I offer another explanation. Had the names been used in Genesis 2, the reader would certainly have applied them to Genesis 1. That is: if Genesis 2 had said that the man named this creature “bear,” that one “eagle,” the reader would certainly have said that what God created during the fifth day and the first part of the sixth day in Genesis 1 were eagles, bears, and so forth. Could it not therefore be that the names are deliberately withheld in Genesis 2 not in order to save writing materials but by way of putting a brake on the assumption that the same language applies in Genesis 1? This is, as I say, a subtle reading. But prolonged exposure to the text has instilled in me a belief that the writers’ subtlety is more than equal to the suggestion.Footnote 37, Footnote 38
Whichever of the readings one goes with, simple or subtle, the basic textual datum remains. We do not have different vocabularies for the two chapters. This does not fit with the alignment of Genesis 1 with Kant’s realm of things‑in‑themselves. In order to establish my thesis, I must therefore deal with it.
But there is in fact a distinction, and the distinction is the key to unlocking the Bible’s position. The distinction, though not at all arcane, is rarely remarked. In speaking of living things, including human beings, Genesis 1 speaks of species. God, in Genesis 1, creates “humankind” (1:26, 27), a species among the various species brought into being. All the pronouns used to refer to men and women are plural. The imperatives are addressed to the first-person plural. (The first-person singular and the first-person plural are different in Hebrew, like “you” and “youse” in New York City; “you” and “you-all” in Texas.) Genesis 2, by contrast, speaks of particulars: “[T]he Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life” (2:7).Footnote 39 A particular man is fashioned, and (then) a particular women, both over-and-against the rest of creation, which serves only as backdrop. What follows Genesis 2, which begins our story, is a veritable Doomsday Book: an expanding cast of particular men and women.
Let me link up the distinction with the earlier discussion of the distinctive features of men and women, enlarging in the process on the issue of disobedience.
The two features are these: Men and women dominate. Men and women disobey. What is the case when neither of these is present? Or, phrasing it philosophically: what is the basic precondition for disobedience and what is the basic precondition for domination, and what is the case when the preconditions do not obtain?
The key to answering is a further contrast between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2. In Genesis 1, God’s creative acts are all followed by the reaction “good.” “Bad” is not enunciated until Genesis 2. The term is used first when the tree of knowledge is mentioned. Since men and women are created in Genesis 1, the question arises: is badness part of their lives? Most readers will qualify the negative: “Not yet.” But to react thus is to ignore the other contrast between the two creation stories — the contrast between the species and particular men and women.
In the biblical frame, “Badness is not a feature of the lives of men and women” is ambiguous, since the construal of “men and women” varies accordingly as we are in the field of Genesis 1 or of Genesis 2. Is badness not present in the lives of the men and women the species, or is it not present in the lives of men and women the particulars? Those who put the Bible together know that Genesis 2 follows Genesis 1. So at the stage of Genesis 1 they know that badness will very soon be associated with men and women. This, however, does not remove the ambiguity. The point is that if we think on the level of the species, there is no bad. So it is not the case that all that is needed for bad to worm its way into the condition of Genesis 1’s humankind is for more time to pass. It is not the case, that is, that bad is germinally present in Genesis 1. So when God reacts exclusively with “good” to what transpires in Genesis 1, the adjective has to be understood as contrastless. A substantial change is needed in the nature of the constituents of the human compartment of being before “good” is a part of “good‑and‑bad.” Let me explain with an example designed to show that our thinking on the species level is conceptually incommensurate with our thinking on the level of particulars.
Some years back the caribou herd of Wood Buffalo National Park, a protected natural habitat straddling the Province of Alberta and the Northwest Territories, was under pressure. The wildlife e cologists determined that a reduction of the numbers was needed to return the herd to health. Park rangers, equipped with high-powered rifles, were dispatched, and duly culled 30% of the animals, with the desired effect. Imagine, by parity, recommending a cull of 30% of the men and women in the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh on the grounds that the thinning will benefit the population. Arguably, the human numbers on Earth are excessive. Nonetheless, before seriously considering such a policy for the planet as a whole, we would first entertain the idea of colonizing Mars.
Why the difference? The difference is rooted in our thinking of the human case as involving particular men and women. Each counts. But this is just what is sentimental in the animal case. The unit is the herd, or (if one is thinking in global terms) the species. Which explains the problem with species labels in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2.
The example of the caribou is not in complete synchrony with Genesis 1. The maladjustment is exploitable to clarify the position.
In a world in which human voices are raised against much less, one fully expects to hear that human voices were raised against the caribou cull. Indeed they were. But Wood Buffalo National Park is not a natural environment, and the problem with the herd might trace back to human interference (the herd has increased because of the absence of natural predators; the herd has sickened because the animals are prevented from moving freely) so perhaps the voices should not be dismissed as the rantings of sentimentalists and/or tree huggers. This signposts the real position. In the natural world, apart from specifically human intervention, nothing that happens is objectionable. Should some species squeeze out some other species, that is perfectly “good.” It is indeed what happens through the evolutionary process. Indeed (to give a very punchy non-biological example) should a comet smash into the Earth, extinguishing life as we know it, even causing the Earth to explode and cease to be as a planet, that too would qualify as “good.” For that is what comets do, and that is how planets react when they do it. Indeed, the comet too would be destroyed by the collision. Its life orbiting in the solar system would be at an end.Footnote 40
The description of the world of Genesis 1 as contrastlessly “good” is a characteristically philosophical description. The claim is that the world is a world in which “good-and-bad” does not apply. The pity we feel for an antelope as it is brought down by a lion is anthropomorphic. We think of the specific animals as we think of ourselves. We imagine ourselves in their positions. But the death of the antelope is beneficial both for the antelope (i.e., the herd, or the species) and for the lion (i.e., the pride, or the species), as would indeed be the escape of the antelope and the lion’s going hungry. In both cases a weaker or less fit member is eliminated and/or a more robust or fitter one in a position to propagate further. As this indicates, good-and-bad enters only when we think in terms of particulars. It is only if we do so that the good of lion (or: the good of the antelope) is the bad of the antelope (or: the bad of the lion). As it is, it’s all good.Footnote 41
The contrast between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 is not at all arcane. Why then is it so generally overlooked? Aside from the fact that the Genesis 1 text telegraphs what is to come in Genesis 2, it is overlooked, I would conjecture, because most people would as a matter of course take species to be nothing but collections of individuals. The thought is that Genesis 1 speaks collectively of individuals, not that it speaks of a different ontological unit. The Bible does not, however, stop with the species. A deeper contrast (granting that species just are collections of particulars) is between systems and collections. Genesis 1 starts out with pairs: heavens-and-Earth; dark‑and-light; wet‑and-dry. This is not the bugbear of binarism that postmodern theorists descry and decry. In fact, it is exactly the opposite — an acknowledgement that sharp distinctions are not natural. It is the recognition of system. There can be no creation of heavens without the creation of what is under the heavens, just as there can be no head of a coin without a tail. And it is immediately acknowledged that the world’s system-like character involves interfaces where the various more organized pockets that make it up mix and mingle. For God in each case has to do more distinguishing. The wet impinges on the dry, giving the moist. The upper impinges on the lower, as when mists shroud the ground. The light shades into darkness, at crepuscule.
What I said about interactions between species applies even more clearly to intra-systemic changes.
One salient exception exists to our thinking of animals in group terms. But it is clear from our overall practice that the way we think about pets is a borrowed way. In regard to pets — sometimes in regard to domestic animals, if but a few are scratching around the back yard or browsing in the adjacent field — our thinking is driven by sentiment, as is a child’s in regard to a stuffed teddy bear. To them we extend what applies primarily to and among ourselves. That is: we apply to them the arithmetic that we apply to ourselves qua particulars, an arithmetic that does not apply in the case of species, as the example of the caribou indicates. (The survival of 70% of the caribou is success. A 30% infant mortality rate is a disaster.) When the beloved Spot dies, the owners often enough go out and get another dog. Often enough to be revealing about what is happening here, one of the same breed is sought. Not infrequently, the name of the first one is reused. The death of a child is nothing like that. The reuse of the name for another child within the same family would be unusual. Many would regard it as heartless; an attempt to pretend that the first did not die. In the case of pets, in short, the individuals are treated, albeit only up to a point, as particulars.
The Bible even uses this kind of case. Examine the treatment of men and women at the start of Genesis 2, prior to the disobedience in the garden. They are described much as domestic animals would be described. Indeed, it’s hard not to think that the descriptions are deliberately adjusted to a knowledge of domestic animals. The man and the woman are the few creatures scratching around in God’s garden. Like oxen and horses, the man and the woman have a job of work to do, viz., tilling and keeping the garden, in which job they are presumably instructed and trained, and they are fed and looked after so long as they do the job. In this way the Bible supplies a granular account of the emergence of (full) particulars. We go from the system to the species to the semi-particular to the fully particular. To its credit, the Bible does not give names until the last stage, the woman being the first to be supplied a given name: “Eve.” The account is not conceptual. But it welcomes conceptual treatment, the rudiments of which I am working to supply.
The Darwinian position is sometimes criticized by pointing to large gaps in the fossil record. This, with respect to the evolutionary explanation of the advent of human beings, is the problem of the missing link. The Bible supplies a conceptual bridge between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2. It gives an intermediate case: a link between nature and men and women. It gives pets and pet-like items.
That death enters in Genesis 2 is then perfectly comprehensible. Only particulars can die. A system with interchanges of energy, a system where it’s all good, contains no death. All it has is constant recycling. Death in Genesis 1 is typified by the passage of night into day. In this transition there is no ground for mourning. So when God links the eating of the tree of knowledge of good and bad to death, he is not punishing the man and the woman, He is stating a conceptual truth. When their particularity is fully in place, they will be subject to the angel of death.
It’s a tight conceptual network. “Bad” is absent from Genesis 1 because the world of Genesis 1 is a system. In that world there are no (basic) particulars. So it’s not possible to speak intelligibly of p1’s gaining at the expense of p2. Good-and‑bad has possible application, then, only in a world that has the ontological character of the world created in Genesis 2. By the same token, the relationship of domination requires particulars. Within a system, it is impossible to speak literally of dominance and subordination. All one has are exchanges. The day does not overpower or get the better of the night at dawn, or vice versa at dusk. In species terms alone, it is impossible to take literally the claim that the lion dominates the antelope. The interaction between the species is to the benefit of both. Think of a system that is artifactual, e.g., an automobile. Do the brake pads, which wear out over time due to friction, suffer for the good of the frame? Such talk makes no sense.Footnote 42
“What about the fact that men and women frequently are harmed by Nature? Doesn’t that show that men and women are dominated by Nature, and hence do not have an asymmetrical dominion to the rest?” This mistakes the point about domination for a generalization, when it has a conceptual character.
A volcano erupts and forces most of the human inhabitants of the island of Montserrat to flee, never again to take up residence there. Loosed by an undersea quake, a tsunami causes a quarter million human deaths along the shores of the Indian Ocean. (I’ve picked out cataclysms. The results could also be positive for men and women. A summer with lots of sun results in the selling of many shells by the seashore. The Boxing Day tsunami might in a few years return the beaches in Thailand to an earlier pristine state, resulting in greater economic prosperity in the region than before, etc. For seeming to speak of co-operation, such examples are, however, less effective.) The philosophical point is that men and women are of a type that alone can dominate. The concept of domination does not apply to what a volcano or a tsunami does vis‑à‑vis an island or the shoreline of a body of water. So the truth of the claim that men and woman are dominators is not inconsistent with the fact that Nature on occasion crushes them. When God “gives” dominion to men and women, he is not ensuring that no person succumb to natural forces. He is not even guaranteeing that the human race won’t be exterminated by some fast-mutating virus. These are distinct possibilities. If that comet were to collide with the Earth, the few survivors could not point to the devastation and impugn the veracity of the Bible’s description of us as non-dominated dominators.Footnote 43 The point is that men and women relate to Nature as parts of Nature do not relate to other parts. Why is that? Only particulars can dominate (or be dominated). When one is dealing with a system, talk of domination cannot be taken literally. The honeybee takes pollen from the flower and makes honey. The flower transmits its genetic material via the bee to other flowers. Who or what is using whom or what? To make a judgment asymmetrically is to describe matters from an arbitrarily designated point. In the bee+flower+pollen+honey ensemble, no position is privileged.
Pre-Adamic Language
Our language does not apply in Genesis 1. It is first spoken in Genesis 2. A different language is needed for the world of Genesis 1. Or, putting it ontologically: the world of Genesis 1 is not accurately represented by the language of Genesis 2. How is all this disposed in respect of Kant?
The ontological lynchpin is the idea of particularity. It is this that is absent from Genesis 1. The basic particular in the story is God. When God breathes life into the first man, in Genesis 2, what he is imparting to the element of Nature is the life of a particular. Now men and women are not parts of a system, as is the humanity of Genesis 1. (In this respect, Genesis 1, once the forward reference to Genesis 2, is removed, is not inconsistent with Darwin.) So men and women are in fact the basic particulars. This follows from the secularist reading of the early chapters of Genesis, which I have defended, on which what is said of God is an upwards reflection of what is true of men and women. Let me change lexical horses in mid-stream, and refer to particulars as substances. Men and women, then, are the basic substances. The momentous implication is that all other substances are made so by men and women. Their substantiality is derivative upon that of men and women. The story of naming in Genesis 2 carries that message. It’s not that God wants men and women to participate, as a parent might have a child help with washing the car or mowing the lawn. It’s that the decisions made are not available to God (as presiding over the world of Genesis 1). They are (to use a favourite Kantian word) original decisions. It follows that “all combination — be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts — is an act of the understanding” (B130). That is: the substantiality of the world of men and women is imposed by men and women. What happens here is analogous to what men and women do (on a much lower level) when they make an animal into a pet, thereby particularizing it.
Observe that Kant’s talk of “combination” is now not contrastless. It’s not that without human cognitive activity there is no structure, only the featureless chaos that the Bible calls “tohu va’vohu.” It’s that absent human activity there is absent the unity of particulars. Nature does exist apart from human consciousness. But the character of this natural world, this world as it is in itself, differs from the character of (as we may say) the natural world from the cognitive standpoint of particular men and women. Kant, then, is in disagreement with Berkeley; and so is the Bible. The divine consciousness of Genesis 1 does not sustain the world of Genesis 2 in the absence of men and women. There is no tree in the quad in Genesis 1; and not just because a quad is a human artifact. A tree only exists in a cultivated place like a garden!
The rest follows, though not without labour: if the categories of causality and reciprocity are at the heart of our understanding, then, since these categories apply to particulars, they too are implicated. To be sure, Genesis 2 doesn’t speak in such terms. The Bible doesn’t speak in such terms. But, as we have seen, the notion of the human particular in the Bible induces asymmetries: life‑and‑death; domination‑and‑subordination. All this is missing from the world of Genesis 1. That world is void of particulars. But all this is central to Kant’s analysis of experience in the Critique.
The unity of apperception is then original. And it is the source of all unity — meaning unity of particulars. “This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity” (B131). Aristotle characterized ontologically basic things (by which he meant irreducible particulars) as substances. The word “substance,” both in Latin and in Aristotle’s Greek, from which the Latin semantically derives, means “that which stands under.” But by remarkable coincidence, “that which stands under,” or “under-standing,” also names a cognitive condition. The homonymy (if that is what it is) turns out to be, if Kant is right, a deep metaphysical synonymy, one that the Bible accepts too. Without (human) understanding, there is no substance. The Bible agrees. Without the man and the woman of Genesis 1, there are in the creation no particulars.
I offered two ironies at the outset. Here is a further ironic reversal regarding Wittgenstein.
In the section of the Tractatus governed by 5, Wittgenstein indicates that the subject does not enter into the cognitive nexus in a fashion that influences the word‑world, sc., the representational, linkage The subject mirrors the world, but does not (any more than a mirror does) affect its nature.
5.542 But it is clear that “A believes that p”, “A thinks p”, and “A says p”, are of the form “‘p’ says p”: and here we have no co‑ordination of a fact and an object, but a co‑ordination of facts by means of a co‑ordination of their objects.
This view is opposed to Kant’s, and to that of Genesis 2. If not for human cognitive intervention, according to Kant; if not for Adam’s giving-of-names, according to the Bible; the truths of experience would not be. The implication is that the world of the Tractatus, for having no input from the subject, is devoid of particulars. Since, for Wittgenstein, names are the basic links to the world, it follows that if there are any facts, there is only one, a world fact, since the system as a whole is the only available nominatum.Footnote 44 This is the position of Genesis 1. The Tractatus is, then, the theory of representation of the world of Genesis 1. Its language is pre-Adamic.
So the biblical-sounding Tractatus 7 — “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” — boomerangs. For speakers of the Tractarian language, it is the world of Genesis 2, the Kantian realm of appearances, our world, of which we must be silent.
In a humorous piece penned at a time when the influence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was near its apogee, the writer and playwright Michael Frayn sends up the Philosophical Investigations. He offers “a previously unpublished fragment,” viz., sections 694‑708.Footnote 45 Here is the final entry:
708. If a lion could speak, it would not understand itself.
The Wittgenstein of the Investigations might well have agreed. Our language would make no sense to whatever it is in the world that answers to the common noun “lion.”
Interpreting Transcendental Idealism
Here are four conditions that those who address themselves interpretively to the Kantian doctrine standardly verbalized thus — “the objects of experience are appearances, not things‑in‑themselves” — strive to meet. (Even interpreters who endorse readings that violate the conditions would I am sure grant that they would satisfy them if they could but find that they cannot.) Condition 1: Talk of things‑in‑themselves must not turn out to be a different way of talking about the selfsame things spoken of when appearances are referred to. Condition 2: It has to be in consequence of some essential feature that they possess that objects, as we experience them in sensory mode, are not things‑in‑themselves. Condition 3: Space and time, substance and causality, must be located on the appearance side of the inequality “appearances ≠ things‑in‑themselves.” Condition 4: Things‑in‑themselves must somehow underpin the appearances; the distinction, that is, unlike that between numbers and enumerated things, must not be a distinction between the concrete and the abstract. What we have learned from the Bible supplies the wherewithal for working out a reading of Kant that stands a good chance of coming as close as any to satisfying them all. The shift of center of Kantian gravity from cognition-theory to anthropology also furnishes a basis for a more unified treatment of the various aspects of Kant’s versatile oeuvre.
