I. WELLMAN'S THEORY

Like most theories of political obligation, Wellman's account is made up of a descriptive part and a normative one. The former consists of three claims:

1. (1) States provide vitally important benefits;

2. (2) These benefits could not be secured in the absence of states;

3. (3) States can provide such benefits without imposing unreasonable costs upon their citizens.Footnote ³

None of these claims has gone unchallenged in the debate about political obligation,Footnote ⁴ but I will not say much about them because I agree to a great extent with the way they are defended by Wellman.Footnote ⁵

The vitally important benefits in question are those produced by states performing their legislative, executive, and judicial functions. These kinds of benefit, according to Wellman, can be supplied only by an organization able uniformly to coerce everyone within its territorial boundaries. Private protection organizations would not be able to do that because they would not garner universal subscription. So they would lack “the authority to definitively establish a common set of rules, to effectively and uniformly enforce these rules, and to impartially adjudicate potential conflicts under these rules.”Footnote ⁶

If anything, according to Wellman, private organizations are likely to magnify these conflicts, because the very logic of this kind of organization is to protect its own clients rather than to ensure a just resolution of conflicts. For this reason they would do nothing but reproduce on a larger scale the conflicts between their clients.Footnote ⁷

Claim 3 is probably the most controversial of the three. Wellman admits that states demand from their citizens substantial sacrifices, but he claims that once we consider the great benefits that citizens receive, it will be clear that the costs that states impose upon them are not unreasonably great.Footnote ⁸

The normative part of Wellman's account consists of two principles: the samaritan principle and the principle of fairness. He needs them both because his justification of political obligation is in two stages: first he gives a justification of state legitimacy, that is, of why it is permissible for states to coerce their citizens; then he gives a justification of political obligation in its strictest sense, that is, of citizens' duty to comply with the laws of the state.Footnote ⁹ The samaritan principle by itself is sufficient to justify the former but not the latter.

Consider the problem of state legitimacy first. According to the samaritan principle, we are morally permitted to do what is necessary to rescue someone from serious peril if in doing so we do not impose unreasonable costs on others. Even if the principle has been rejected by some,Footnote ¹⁰ I think that it is not particularly controversial, as we can see in Wellman's example: suppose that Amy has a seizure and can be saved only if Beth takes her immediately to the nearest hospital. Suppose also that the only car in the vicinity is Cathy's car, but Cathy is not around. Is Beth justified in commandeering Cathy's car to drive Amy to the hospital? Given the extreme circumstances, most of us would probably admit that she is. “[T]he fact that Amy's life hangs in the balance gives Beth's mission an urgency that outweighs Cathy's normally decisive dominion over her self-regarding affairs.”Footnote ¹¹

According to Wellman, a “state's nonconsensual coercion of its citizens is morally analogous to Beth's nonconsensual borrowing of Cathy's car insofar as each is necessary ‘to prevent extremely unhappy occurrences.’”Footnote ¹² States are ultimately permitted to coerce me because this is the only way to save my compatriots from the perils of a lawless environment and this coercion is not unreasonably costly to me.

This is the reason why it is so important for Wellman's theory that both claims 2 and 3 are fulfilled. If it were possible to take Amy to the hospital in some other way (e.g., by taxi), it would not be permissible for Beth to commandeer Cathy's car. And if saving Amy would require some more costly action (e.g., chopping off one of Cathy's arms), Beth would not be permitted to do it, even if this were the only way to save Amy. For the same reasons, if the state's existence were not the only way to save my compatriots from the perils of a lawless environment or if the state could accomplish this only by imposing an unreasonable cost upon me, it would not be permitted to coerce me.Footnote ¹³

So far the samaritan principle has been used by Wellman in order to justify state legitimacy. But since without citizens' compliance states would not be able to perform those functions that are required to eliminate the perils of the state of nature, it is clear that the samaritan principle plays a major role also in justifying the duty to obey the state.

If perils for others can explain why I may possibly be coerced to help them, they can also explain why I have an obligation to assist others if it is not unreasonable costly. This is confirmed once again by Beth's example: most of us would admit not only that Beth may permissibly commandeer Cathy's car but also that Cathy has a moral duty to lend her car in that particular situation. For the same reasons, those very perils for our compatriots that justify the legitimacy of state coercion also justify our duty to support the action of the state by obeying its laws:

Hence the samaritan principle clearly has both a “permissive part” and a “requiring part.”Footnote ¹⁵ The former is meant to explain why we can legitimately be coerced by the state in order to rescue others from the perils of the state of nature (when such coercion is not unreasonably costly). The latter states that we have a natural moral duty to rescue those who are in serious danger (if this is not unreasonably costly for us), and is meant to answer the question of political obligation in its strictest sense (i.e., of the duty to obey the state).Footnote ¹⁶

Now, the problem is that while the permissive part of the principle is sufficient to justify state legitimacy, the requiring part is not sufficient to justify political obligation. First, even if we grant that the only way to discharge our samaritan duty is by supporting and complying with our own states, we should notice that what is necessary to ensure the state's existence is collective obedience to the law rather than obedience by every particular individual. For it is clearly false that if I did not obey the laws of my state, we would return to the perilous circumstances of the state of nature. Whether I obey or disobey the law typically makes no difference to the existence of the state and hence to its capacity to rescue others from the perils of the state of nature.

This is the reason why, in order to ground a duty to obey the law for each citizen, the samaritan principle needs to be supplemented by the principle of fairness.Footnote ¹⁷ Since states are nothing more than the “coerced coordination” of individuals composing them,Footnote ¹⁸ and the fewer individuals who comply with state demands the more burdensome these demands will be, Wellman argues that fairness requires that everyone should do their part in supporting the state's action by obeying its laws.Footnote ¹⁹

However, it is controversial in the first place that the only way to discharge our samaritan duties is actually by obeying our own states, and Wellman's argument so far does not suffice to show that this is the case. Samaritan duties, like all natural duties, hold for persons generally, as opposed to specific groups. So the question is: Why should we fulfill our natural duty to aid others generally by obeying the law of our own state? It seems that we might fulfill our natural duty to help others as well by supporting:

In fact, once we adopt the samaritan theory, these seem to be something more than mere possibilities. Given that, for example, people living in the Third World are usually in more serious need than needy Italians, it seems that I should be required by the samaritan principle to withhold my taxes and send the equivalent amount of money to some of the poorest states in the Third World or maybe to famine-relief associations operating in those areas.

Wellman's theory, like all theories of political obligation based on natural duties, seems to encounter problems in accounting for what John Simmons famously called the “particularity requirement,” that is, in accounting for the fact that we must discharge our natural duty by supporting and complying with our own state in particular.Footnote ²⁰

Wellman's answer to this problem is that the only way to eliminate the kind of instability which is characteristic of lawless environments is through the action of territorially defined states. But none of these states would be able to perform its functions if it were not able to coerce everyone living within its boundaries. This is the reason why I (as well as those living in the same territory where I live) should support my state by obeying its laws rather than adopt any of the three mentioned alternatives:

Again, the fact that “general compliance” is required in order to solve the coordination problem does not entail that “each of us” has a duty to comply with the laws of our state. Even if states are justified in coercing their constituents because this is the only way to eliminate perils caused by political instability, obedience by every particular individual is still not necessary to achieve this result. If I stopped obeying my state and started to discharge my samaritan duties by supporting some other state or institution, this would not affect the capacity of my state to solve the coordination problem.

However, I would be able to enjoy this discretion only because enough of my fellow citizens kept on obeying the laws of my state. If everyone were given the option of deciding how to discharge her own samaritan duties, the state would not be able to solve the coordination problem. So once again the samaritan account needs to be supplemented by the principle of fairness: since my enjoying such a discretion depends upon the denial of the same discretion to others, I could enjoy it only by free-riding on other citizens' obedience. But fairness clearly prohibits this kind of behavior; hence Wellman can conclude that no one is free to enjoy such a discretion:Footnote ²²

II. AN OBJECTION TO WELLMAN

Let us grant for now that Wellman is successful in showing why his theory requires us to fulfil our samaritan duty by obeying the laws of our own state rather than in any other possible way. I agree that this would be enough to account for the particularity requirement as it has been formulated by Simmons. But I think that an adequate formulation of this requirement should lead us to pay attention not only to that bond that ties us especially to our state (as in Simmons's formulation)Footnote ²⁴ but also to that bond that ties our state especially to us.

I think that Wellman's theory can account for the former but not for the latter. The reason it is unable to do this is that the state's nonconsensual coercion of its citizens is not “morally analogous” to Beth's nonconsensual borrowing of Cathy's car. And the reason the two things are not morally analogous is that while Beth's action can actually be grounded in a natural duty to aid others, the state's coercion cannot.

To see what I mean, let us start by considering Beth's example in a slightly modified version. Suppose that both Amy and Diana have a seizure and need to be taken by Beth to the nearest hospital. Suppose that Cathy's car is really small and can carry only one passenger beside the driver. Suppose that Beth is a doctor and realizes that Diana is in worse condition than Amy. Of course, in the case of Amy, too, “the sooner the better,”Footnote ²⁵ but she will survive anyway; while Diana, if not taken immediately to the hospital, is certainly going to die.

I think that in this case the samaritan duty requires Beth to take Diana to the hospital rather than Amy. For, all things being equal, we have a stronger samaritan duty to help X rather than Y if X is in a worse situation than YFootnote ²⁶ (provided that Y's condition is over a certain threshold). Now, if the state's coercion of its citizens were justified by the same kind of duty, we should expect our states to give precedence in their actions of helping the needy to those in worse condition (provided that the situation of the needy in “better condition” is over a certain threshold).Footnote ²⁷ But this is not what we actually expect from them. What we expect is that each state will pay special attention to its own citizens.

For example, we take it for granted that Italy should pay more attention to those of the needy who are Italian (Italian needy), even if as a matter of fact most of them are in much less parlous condition than the needy in the Third World. But if we really believed that state legitimacy were grounded in a natural duty to help others, then we should believe that Italy ought to be equally concerned about helping both Italian needy and the needy living in the Third World and hence believe that Italy ought to help those among them who are in more danger.

Wellman is certainly right in pointing out that most of the perils that our states are meant to save us from are those of lawlessness and lack of coordination. These problems can be resolved only through a coercive imposition of an authoritative set of rules, and obviously Italy lacks the authority to impose such a set of rules in the Third World; therefore Italy cannot rescue people living in the Third World from these kinds of peril. But not all the perils afflicting the needy in the Third World are of this nature. At least some of these perils are due not to lack of coordination but to famine or diseases. Thus, if state legitimacy were really justified by the principle of samaritanism (that is by a natural moral duty, owed by all individuals to all individuals, to perform easy rescues of those in serious peril), we should expect Italy to pay the same attention in its redistributive policies to Italians and to the needy in the Third World.

It is important not to misunderstand the focus of my objection. My objection here is not that the samaritan theory should require Italians to support some state in the Third World rather than Italy. Since, according to Wellman, the coordination problem can be solved only locally through the action of territorially defined states, and states could not perform their functions if they were not able to coerce everyone living within their boundaries, the samaritan theory cannot require Italians to withdraw their support from Italy, because this would put Italians back into the state of nature.Footnote ²⁸

My objection here is rather about what Italy should do once its existence is ensured by Italian citizens' support. Italy's capacity to rescue people from the perils of a lawless environment is necessarily limited to those living within its territory, but its capacity to rescue people from famine and disease is not limited in the same way. In principle it is not limited in any way, and the samaritan theory is not able to put any constraint on possible beneficiaries of Italian redistributive policies. So there seems to be no reason for Italy to pay special attention to the Italian needy with regard to such policies.

I think that Wellman's theory is able to answer the particularity objection as it is formulated by Simmons because it is plausible to maintain that the best way for Italy to rescue people generally (as opposed to people belonging to specific groups) from the perils of lawlessness and lack of coordination is to ensure stability within its boundaries. And hence it is plausible to claim that the best thing that Italians can do in order to rescue others generally from these kinds of danger is to obey their own state.

What seems highly implausible is to claim that the best way for Italy to rescue people generally from problems due to lack of resources is to limit its redistributive policies just to its own citizens. This seems not to be the case, since most Italian needy, while facing a life of hardship and privation, are in a clearly less dangerous situation than those starving and dying every day of diseases in the Third World. And clearly the conditions of the needy in the Third World would be far better if states like Italy paid them the same attention that they currently pay their own citizens. Still, there seems to be nothing strange in claiming that each state should care especially about its own citizens. This is what states are usually supposed to do.

In order to have a clearer picture of this point, let us once again rewrite Wellman's example. Suppose that both Amy and Diana have a seizure and need to be taken to the nearest hospital. Suppose that Cathy's car can carry only one passenger. Suppose that Beth is a doctor and realizes that Diana is in worse condition than Amy, but Amy is Beth's daughter. Beth has no doubts and takes Amy rather than Diana to the hospital.

Usually states act like Beth does in this third version of the example. Moreover, we commonly believe that they are perfectly justified in acting like this, as we probably believe that Beth is justified in acting as she does. But clearly Beth here is not acting out of a natural duty to aid others but rather out of a duty deriving from a special relation. The problem that an adequate theory of political obligation should solve is precisely to specify the nature of this special relation.Footnote ²⁹

Probably Italy should spend more than it currently does for the needy in the Third World; still, most of us would find it odd to claim that Italy should pay exactly the same attention (e.g., by spending the same amount of money) to them and to the Italian needy. An adequate theory of state legitimacy and political obligation should account for this or alternatively explicitly reject this assumption, which seems to be widely shared.

That very bond that ties us especially to our state also ties our state especially to us, but the principle of samaritanism cannot account for that. As I will make clear, this is the reason why the principle is able to ground neither state legitimacy nor political obligation as we normally understand them.

III. FIRST REPLY BY WELLMAN

Recall the core of my objection to Wellman thus for: the samaritan theory might be able to offer a justification for the fact that Italy is legitimated in coercing Italians as well as the fact that Italians should obey Italian laws and support Italy (rather than any other state). But it is not able to account for the fact that in its redistributive policies Italy should be more concerned about the Italian needy than about the needy in the Third World.

In some of his articles Wellman mentions, without discussing it in detail, this kind of problem. In this section and in the next one I consider and try to reject two strategies that he believes are sufficient to answer my objection.

First he argues that “[t]he samaritan model does recognize an important difference between compatriots and foreigners . . . because the former contribute to one's own political benefits whereas the foreigners do not.”Footnote ³⁰

Remember that the samaritan duty is a duty of easy rescue: we have a duty to help people in need only if we can do this without unreasonable cost. Now, in supporting our state, we help our compatriots but we also receive the great benefits of political stability.Footnote ³¹ So it is less costly for us to help our fellow citizens than to help foreigners, because “the reasonableness of the chores we must perform is measured in terms of the burdens we endure minus the benefits we receive.”Footnote ³²

I think this argument is unconvincing. Italy, like any other state, supplies two main sorts of benefits to its citizens: those connected with political stability (security, order, etc.) and those connected with redistributive policies. While all Italian citizens benefit from political stability, redistributive policies are meant to benefit only (or at least mostly) the Italian needy once political security is ensured. But once political stability is ensured, Italian contributors who are not in need do not get any relevant benefits from the fact that Italy's redistributive resources are employed to help Italian rather than foreign needy.

In what sense, according to Wellman, would limiting these policies to the Italian needy contribute to all Italians' benefit? Once Italy is supported by its citizens and is able to provide them with that political stability which makes the cost of such support not unreasonable, there seems to be nothing that Italian citizens would gain just from the fact that Italy's redistributive resources are limited to the Italian needy. And so there is no reason available within the samaritan theory to conclude that Italy should give precedence to the Italian needy if the needy in the Third World are in worse condition (and if the conditions of the Italian needy are over a certain threshold).Footnote ³³

Wellman's error is in counting the benefits of political stability twice, making them depend in part on employing redistributive resources to help the Italian needy. True, if the conditions of the Italian needy were bad enough, then not including them among the beneficiaries of Italian redistributive policies might endanger political stability. But this is not the case considered in my objection. Italy should certainly devote to the Italian needy all the resources that are necessary to ensure political stability. The problem at stake is, rather, how to employ those redistributive resources that are available once that political stability is ensured.

It is clearly not true that the only way for Italy to maintain political stability is to devote all (or almost all) of its redistributive resources to the Italian needy. Still, we believe that Italy should give precedence to its citizens, even if failing to do so would not endanger its political stability. So the point raised by my objection is not whether Italians should pay a higher price to support the needy in the Third World rather than the Italian needy, but rather whether (once political stability is not in doubt) the Italian needy have any special claim to Italian redistributive resources.

Italy has these resources thanks to Italian contributors, but however Italy spends them, this will not affect Italian contributors, since they were ready to pay that cost in order to discharge their samaritan duty.Footnote ³⁴ For these reasons I think we can conclude, contra Wellman, that helping foreigners is not necessarily more costly than helping compatriots. I try below to strengthen my case by arguing that my objection holds even if helping foreigners were more costly, provided that it is not too costly.

The first thing to notice here is that the existence of a samaritan duty for X to save Y depends on two conditions:

1. (1) Y must be in danger;

2. (2) X can save Y without unreasonable cost.Footnote ³⁵

Both conditions need to be satisfied in order to have a samaritan duty; but what happens when more than one person is a possible beneficiary of someone's samaritan duty? It seems that the only way to choose which person to help is to consider how dangerous their respective situations are and how costly helping each of them would be.

Suppose that X can save either Y or Z (and they are both perfect strangers to her). The cost involved in saving them is the same, but Y is in more serious danger than Z. Clearly, in this case X should save Y.Footnote ³⁶ Suppose now that Y and Z are in the same kind of danger, but for X it would be more costly to save Y (even if in neither case would the cost be unreasonable). Probably here it would not be quite right to say that X has a “stronger” duty to save Z; still, we would probably agree that if X were ready to save Z, asking her to save Y rather than Z would be to ask X to do “something more” than her strict duty. Furthermore, if X saved neither of them, she would probably be more condemnable for failing to save Z than for failing to save Y.

In these two cases it seems to be clear enough what X should do. It becomes more difficult to decide what she should do when neither the dangers for Y and Z nor the costs involved in saving them are exactly the same. In such cases it seems reasonable to say that X should take into account the trade-off between the perils of Y's and Z's respective situations and the costs of saving them. So if Y is in a much more dangerous situation than Z, X will probably have a stronger duty to save Y even if it would be slightly more costly than to save Z.Footnote ³⁷

Now, if this is how the samaritan principle should be applied, and if Italians' duty to support their state were rooted in such a principle, it would not be unrealistic to claim that Italy should be more concerned about the needy in the Third World rather than about Italian ones, even if supporting those in the Third World were more costly (provided that it were not too costly to count as a samaritan duty).Footnote ³⁸

IV. SECOND REPLY BY WELLMAN

Another way in which Wellman tries to deal with the objection that I am considering is by supplementing his theory with three further considerations that, according to him, will allow the samaritan theory to account for states' special redistributive responsibilities toward their own citizens:

In particular, Wellman argues that it is possible to justify our special commitment to our compatriots—and hence our more robust redistributive responsibilities to them—by considering:

1. (1) The importance of effective (as opposed to formal) rights;

2. (2) The importance of relational equality;

3. (3) The social nature of consumption.Footnote ⁴⁰

I will now examine these considerations in turn.

V. CAN SAMARITANISM JUSTIFY A MINIMAL STATE?

Wellman admits that “it is not obvious that a samaritan approach leaves room for a state to redistribute more funds to its own citizens than it does to equally needy foreigners;”Footnote ⁵³ but he thinks that this redistributive function can be justified at a second stage by supplementing the samaritan principle with other kind of values, principles, and considerations.

In the previous section I argue that none of the considerations adduced by Wellman in the second stage of his argument can account for those special redistributive responsibilities that states are usually supposed to have towards their own citizens. And I doubt that any consideration able to do that can be found in his account. The problem here is that only associative or transactional accounts of political obligation (i.e., those accounts that ground political obligation respectively in certain roles that we occupy and in certain kinds of interaction)Footnote ⁵⁴ seem able to generate principles strong enough to account for special redistributive responsibilities to one's compatriots. Weaker considerations, like those proposed by Wellman, will not do the trick because every time that the foreigners' situation is sufficiently worse than one's compatriots', the samaritan principle will trump these considerations and require that help be given to the former rather than the latter.

Moreover, even if we agree with Wellman that we should give priority to eliminating inequalities existing within a society rather than those existing between different societies, this is not enough to conclude that we should give priority to eliminating inequalities within our own society.

Wellman seems not to pay enough attention to the fact that in using Italian redistributive resources to help the needy in the Third World, Italy would be redressing not only those inequalities that exist between Italians and people living in the Third World but also those inequalities that exist between fellow citizens of the states in the Third World. Therefore, if inequalities between fellow citizens of these states are more severe than inequalities existing between Italians, Wellman's argument will justify Italy in giving precedence to the former. Alternately, if inequalities between fellow citizens of states in the Third World and inequalities between Italians are similar, Wellman's argument is not able to justify giving precedence to the latter.Footnote ⁵⁵

If I am right so far, Wellman could ostensibly try to defend his theory as a justification of only a minimal “night-watcher” state whose functions are limited to solving the coordination problem and ensuring political stability.Footnote ⁵⁶ Wellman claims that he is ready to do that once it is clear that “our choices are restricted to either settling for the samaritan view, which cannot explain every special political obligation pretheoretically thought to exist, or enduring philosophical anarchism.”Footnote ⁵⁷ But is this option really available to him?

I do not think so. If we accept (as Wellman asks us to do) that states can legitimately coerce us insofar as this allows us to discharge our samaritan duties, and if we accept (as I think it is reasonable to do) that some limited redistributive policies would allow us to discharge such duties (by allowing us to rescue people in need at no unreasonable cost), we cannot but conclude that states are justified in coercing us in order to pursue these redistributive policies.

The problem for the samaritan theory is not that it cannot justify redistributive policies but rather that it cannot justify special redistributive policies; that is, it cannot justify a state limiting such policies to (or at least favoring to a great extent) its own citizens over foreigners. So Wellman cannot defend his theory simply by excluding from it the state's redistributive function. What he should do is either reject the idea that these policies should favor the state's own citizens or give us a justification for such limitation.

Consider again my second reformulation of Beth' s example, in which Beth has to choose whether to take to the hospital a stranger at risk of death or her daughter, who faces a less serious risk. Some moral theories would probably claim that in such a case Beth is morally justified in giving precedence to her daughter. If so, they should give us a justification for this claim (for example by resting it on the special relationship existing between Beth and her daughter). Alternatively it might be argued that Beth should be impartial and rescue the stranger (this is what some versions of utilitarianism, for example, might claim). What would not be acceptable is a theory that because of its inability to account for the fact that Beth should give precedence to her daughter, would conclude that Beth has no duty to save either of the people in danger. But a move of exactly the same kind is involved in Wellman's suggestion that if his theory is unable to justify special redistributive policies, it should be adopted as a defense of a minimal night-watcher state, as if the samaritan duty to perform easy rescues through redistribution of resources could cease to exist just because we do not know how to limit it to benefiting our fellow citizens.

If we accept the samaritan theory, and if we agree that supporting some redistributive policies by the state would not be too costly to count as a samaritan duty, we should conclude that states are justified in coercing us in order to pursue such policies. This conclusion cannot be affected by the fact that the samaritan theory is not able to account for the common intuition that states should favor their own citizens over foreigners. Who should benefit from these policies has nothing to do with these policies being justified according to the samaritan principle.

VI. POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE SAMARITAN PRINCIPLE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS

If the objection that I raise in the previous section works, then Wellman cannot exclude redistributive policies from his theory and adopt the latter as a justification only of a minimal state, for having such policies seems to follow from a coherent application of the samaritan principle. The problem for the samaritan theory, however, is how to account for the widespread idea that those policies should be limited to the state's own citizens. As we see in section V, none of the considerations adduced by Wellman in order to do that seem to work.

What I am interested in considering now is whether Wellman could try to account for this idea by adopting some other kind of consideration. I will argue that he cannot do this either. For the main problem for his theory is not that the samaritan principle might come into conflict with considerations external to the theory, considerations that Wellman might adopt at a second stage of his argument in order to justify states' special redistributive responsibilities. The main problem is that the samaritan principle on some occasions might come into conflict with the principle of fairness, which plays a fundamental role in Wellman's theory, insofar as it enables the theory to justify a duty for every citizen to obey the state.

As we see in section I, it is because of considerations of fairness that I am required to do my part in supporting my state by obeying its laws even when I know that my compliance in particular will make no difference to its capacity to perform its functions.Footnote ⁵⁸ But what happens when these considerations of fairness come into conflict with the samaritan principle? Consider the following case: I know for sure that if I evade my taxes and send my money to the Third World, I will not threaten the existence of Italy as a state;Footnote ⁵⁹ besides, I am pretty sure that by doing so, I would save more people in danger than by paying my taxes (since I know that most of Italy's redistributive resources are employed to help the Italian needy, who are generally in better condition than those in the Third World). Should I obey the law and pay my taxes in this case?

True, if I send my money to the needy in the Third World rather than using it to pay taxes (when most Italians pay their taxes), I would be free-riding on other Italians' compliance with Italian laws, since I would be able to enjoy such a discretion only because other Italians do pay their taxes; but should not my free-riding be accepted by Wellman insofar as it is justified by the samaritan principle, which constitutes the main justification for my duty to obey Italian laws? And should not the same decision be made by other Italians, provided that they are sure that their number is not big enough to put in question Italy's existence as a state?Footnote ⁶⁰

Wellman might reject this conclusion by recalling the impossibility of establishing what level of noncompliance a state can tolerate (as a matter of fact, this would render the coordination problem much more complicated to solve). However, if this is the only reason to reject such a conclusion, then Wellman's theory would not be able to give a justification for my individual duty to obey the law. Italians would be collectively obligated to obey, but if I were sure that Italy's existence was not at risk and I knew a way to evade taxes, I would have a moral duty to do that and send my money to the Third World rather than support my state by paying them.

To this objection Wellman might answer that fairness is not “merely added to samaritanism” but rather “necessary for samaritanism to obtain” in the context of political obligation.Footnote ⁶¹ But in what sense is it necessary? Fairness can be said to be “necessary for samaritanism to obtain” if by refusing to do my part I put into question the existence of the state and hence its capacity to rescue others from the perils of the state of nature. But once the existence of the state is out of doubt and I know for sure that my disobedience will not make any difference, it seems that fairness is no longer necessary for samaritanism to obtain. It would be only for reasons of fairness that I would be required to do my part, but this, as I argue above, could turn out to be in conflict with what is required by samaritanism.

What options are available to Wellman at this point? He could answer the objection raised by my example in two ways. The first option is to claim that in the case that I present above, I do not have any duty to support my state by paying my taxes but I should rather discharge my samaritan duty by sending my money to the Third World. Notice that this would be to claim that for each citizen the duty to obey the law is conditional on her obedience being necessary for the existence of the state. So those citizens whose disobedience would not put the existence of the state in jeopardy would not have a duty to obey the law. This would be a peculiar conception of the duty to obey the state: a duty that is valid only for some citizens and on some occasions. What Wellman is trying to justify is rather the traditional duty to obey the state: a duty that, even if prima facie, is always valid for every citizen.

Alternatively, Wellman can claim that I have a duty to pay my taxes even when I know that by evading them and sending my money to the Third World, I would save a larger number of people in danger, and even if I am sure that this would not make any difference to the existence of Italy as a state: when samaritanism and fairness come into conflict with each other, the latter should trump the former. But notice that in that case, what justifies my obedience would not be samaritanism but rather fairness. If this were Wellman's answer, he would be abandoning the samaritan theory and adopting a fair-play theory of political obligation.Footnote ⁶²