Frances Rosenbluth and Michael Thies pool insights from diverse social science disciplines in their new book on state–society relations in Japan. The titular “Transformation” refers to the transition from personalistic, pro-business governance to programmatic, consumer-friendly politics after electoral reform in the 1990s. Their theoretical arguments draw heavily on the rationalist literature on political institutions and the varieties-of-capitalism approach to economic organization. Most of the empirics come from the synthesis of an eclectic range of preexisting research. The book's strength is its clear but controversial argument regarding the causal influence of electoral systems on policy outcomes, making it valuable to scholars interested in Japanese politics and a stimulating text for advanced comparative politics courses.
The main independent variable in the authors' analysis is the 1994 switch from a multimember district, single nontransferable vote (MMD-SNTV) electoral formula to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Under SNTV, copartisan candidates frequently competed head-to-head in the same district. The long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) averted destructive vote poaching through product differentiation: Instead of championing a common party label, candidates established personal support networks and specialized in distinct policy areas. Ties to business groups were particularly important, because personalistic networks were expensive to maintain. In exchange for campaign contributions, the LDP offered subsidies, tax breaks, and trade protections to forge a stable, clientelistic machine.
By contrast, the authors argue, MMM has promoted programmatic, majoritarian governments. Empirically, we now see a two-bloc system headlined by the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Because copartisans no longer compete within the same district, product differentiation via personalism has given way to party-centered foreign and domestic policy platforms. Rosenbluth and Thies further posit that new public subventions to political parties have made clientelistic campaign donations less valuable, while the reapportionment of seats has shifted the median voter toward urban consumers.
This political shift has had profound effects on the structure of the Japanese economy. With reduced government protection of unprofitable businesses, the institutional complementarities that characterized industrial relations have unraveled, moving Japan toward a more neoliberal economy. Lifetime employment has given way to performance-based contracts, the social-welfare net has become more porous, and cross-firm alliances have become looser.
It is important to note that the book's narrative—MMD-SNTV abetted clientelism while MMM has encouraged programmatic policies—is not much in dispute among Japan scholars. Indeed, reformers in the 1980s and 1990s used this very logic in urging electoral reform. So what is new in Rosenbluth and Thies's analysis?
The authors do a number of things exceedingly well. First, they take historical circumstances and exogenous pressures seriously. They note that the resilience of the LDP–business-sector coalition was a function of the postwar industrial structure (cf. Chapter 4), but that decades of economic growth and globalization planted the seeds of political transition. When foreign markets began to balk at Japanese mercantilism in the 1980s, an irreconcilable rift formed between exporters that feared retaliatory tariffs and nontraded sectors that could not survive in liberalized markets. Because the SNTV system still incentivized personalistic campaigns, however, LDP politicians doubled down on clientelism to offset declining urban support. This ultimately ensnared many legislators in corruption scandals and prompted public calls for political reform.
Second, the authors draw attention to the regulatory favors, not redistributive pork barreling, that fueled Japanese clientelism (p. 76). Their case is somewhat overstated: Although the LDP ran budget surpluses until the 1970s, politically motivated public works became more commonplace as economic growth slowed (e.g., see Gregory Noble, “The Decline of Particularism in Japanese Politics,” Journal of East Asian Studies 10 [2010]: 239–73). However, both fiscal redistribution and protectionist regulation did begin to decline after electoral reform, as the authors' theory predicts. The focus on regulatory favors that do not show up on budget-line items is a valuable corrective to typical descriptions of clientelism.
Third, the authors contend that Japan's vaunted socioeconomic egalitarianism was a side effect of protectionist business politics (p. 84). Referencing research in the varieties-of-capitalism tradition, Rosenbluth and Thies argue that Japanese social insurance was designed to help firms address the chronic shortage of high-quality workers. In order to encourage employees to acquire firm-specific skills, myriad private and public benefits—salaries, pensions, retirement bonuses—were linked to length of service. At the same time, unprofitable sectors and their employees were kept afloat by protectionist regulations. Health insurance was universal but cheap, because firms fought to keep costs low and women served as unpaid social-care providers in the home. Indeed, the professional and social plight of women is a repeated motif in the book and sheds much-needed light on the gender biases of LDP clientelism.
From an analytical perspective, however, two larger points deserve further scrutiny. First, complex phenomena like clientelism are not likely caused by one institutional feature. Ethan Scheiner's Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State (2006), for example, argues that clientelistic incentives were molded by the high degree of fiscal centralization, which made local governments dependent on budgetary redistribution. Rosenbluth and Thies note recent efforts at administrative decentralization (p. 148), but these reforms are still ongoing and not universally accepted by national politicians, suggesting the possible persistence of redistributive politics. At the same time, while the Lower House has become more majoritarian, the powerful Upper House remains proportional and still favors rural districts, complicating bicameral compromises. We must also keep in mind that two decades of economic uncertainty have fundamentally altered voter preferences about public policy and state–society relations. Public disapproval of clientelism, independent of or interacted with electoral reform, may also be incentivizing politicians towards programmatic competition.
Second, the authors conclude that Japan is moving toward a UK-style political equilibrium, with strong party discipline, stable voter partisanship, and frequent alternations in power (p. 179). While I agree that Japan is “moving toward” programmatic politics, it is not a foregone conclusion that Japan will ever “become like” the UK. A key hurdle is the lack of strong party identification among Japanese voters. While party affiliation has (newly) become a significant predictor of candidate victory (Steven Reed, Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies, “Party-Centered, More Volatile: New Ballgame in Politics,” The Oriental Economist [October 2009]: 8–9), this could be caused by the growing salience of party leaders, not partisanship per se. Leader-centered campaigns are consistent with the “presidentialization” or “Americanization” of parliamentary elections around the world, enabled by improving media technology and the growing primacy of television news (e.g., see Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, eds., The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, 2005). In Japan, leader popularity is much more volatile than party affinity, making it an unreliable foundation for stable party competition. Indeed, unpopular leaders are constantly at risk of being jettisoned by their own members of parliament; Japan has had six new prime ministers between 2005 and 2012. At the same time, the parties themselves have been in flux, as evinced by continuing cases of legislative party switching.
It is difficult to make an accurate forecast of the pace and nature of political change, and Japan has certainly seen its share of electoral shocks, most recently the DPJ's landslide victory in 2009. The authors include an addendum on the DPJ's ascent, arguing that it demonstrates the growing importance of programmatic appeals to swing voters over personalistic networks among core voters. I believe this to be a fair interpretation, and more significantly, it speaks to the book's strength: underscoring the relationship between institutional variables and (expected) political equilibria. An excellent companion reading is Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen's The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP (2011), which draws on historical institutionalism to contend that many institutional features of LDP rule—factonalism, personalism—persist because transitions between two equilibria are rarely linear.
