Over the years, modern financial markets have faced many seemingly disparate financial crises. These crises can all be traced back to the use of leverage and limited liquidity. While Long Term Capital Management, Solomon Brothers, and the hedge funds run by George Soros and Julian Robertson all faced what appeared on the surface to be unique challenges and untimely downturns, fundamentally each of these collapses can be traced to liquidity and leverage. This is the thesis of Richard Bookstaber's new book. Many of the tales have been told and retold, but Bookstaber, who has devoted the past two decades assessing risk for a variety of firms, has a unique perspective on what precipitated these collapses. Writers such as Michael Lewis and Roger Lowenstein attribute many of the problems experienced by Solomon and its offshoot, LTCM, to the personalities and egos involved. By contrast, Bookstaber contends that investments in limited liquidity markets and the increased use of leverage are instead responsible for these collapses, so the risk protocols at Solomon were the culprits, not John Gutfruend and John Meriwether.
The most interesting portion of Bookstaber's book is the discussion of complexity theory and complex systems as they relate to financial crises. Because modern financial systems are highly complex and tightly coupled, the time to respond to a changing environment is often cut to zero, as was the case in the 1987 crash. Furthermore, regulations multiply existing complexity because they often create a positive feedback loop. For instance, Bookstaber cites the case of the Asian currency crisis where margin calls led to forced sales and drove prices down; the subsequent decline in value of existing investments let to further margin calls, until there was no longer enough liquidity to meet demand.
The implication of his thesis is that increased creativity in financial markets and the subsequent rise of complex financial instruments has led us to a world dominated by risks we cannot see ex ante. Simply put, the new complexity attributable to sophisticated financial instruments means that we know less about the risks we are taking than ever before, and as such, we are subject to drastically different swings in markets. In addition, investors trying to improve returns through illiquid markets and leverage have magnified this effect. The author cites Amaranth and Barings Bank, but his observations are even more relevant today in the wake of the meltdown of sub-prime mortgages. Ex post, the risks seem extremely obvious, but ex ante, most bankers had no idea how inaccurate their risk metrics were.
Bookstaber recommends simpler financial instruments and decreased leverage as the most actionable solutions for limiting exposure to financial market catastrophe. These simple recommendations provide a strong guideline for how institutional investors should look at the universe of alternative investments, though creative products are likely to make money in the short run. Bookstaber suggests that market blowups with their subsequent fallout will continue unless market complexity is reduced.
