II. The problem of beginning

It seems clear that, with the insertion of an essay entitled ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’ between the introduction to the Science of Logic and the main body of the text itself, Hegel takes the issue of where one ought to begin such a project seriously.Footnote ⁵ The essay, at least in its second edition, begins with a statement of a problem:

I will refer to this as the ‘problem of beginning’. Upon a first reading its meaning is not clear, but what is clear is that three and a half pages later a solution has been found: ‘The beginning is therefore pure being’ (WL: 48/21:56). The rest of the essay is made up of clarificatory material on what is involved in thinking, and beginning with the concept of pure being, after which the main body of the text does indeed begin with this concept, with Hegel satisfied that he has justified this beginning in such a way that the derivation of the categories which follows from it can proceed on the basis of a beginning which has overcome the problem in question.

Whatever has taken place then, between the statement of the problem of beginning and its solution, must be taken by Hegel to have launched his scientific account of the fundamental categories of thought in a rigorous manner, so that the beginning can play its part in contributing to a logical project which can ‘demonstrate the necessity of its content’, or which is not open to the kind of sceptical objection that I mentioned earlier: an objection to the effect that if the beginning is unjustified or arbitrary, then what follows from it cannot lay claim to the status of a scientific investigation.Footnote ⁷

Before proceeding to an interpretation of the nature of this problem, I will make one brief, clarificatory point. The problem of beginning as I understand it here is not the problem of the relation of the first categories of the logic: being, nothing and becoming. This issue is often discussed in terms of the ‘beginning’ of Hegel's Logic, for example in Henrich (Reference Henrich1971: 75–84) or Pippin (Reference Pippin2019: 195–210).Footnote ⁸ The relationship between this issue and the problem of beginning is a straightforward one. The problem of beginning comes before the issue of how to understand the dialectic of being, nothing and becoming. Hegel's proposed solution to the problem of beginning is supposed to justify beginning the Logic with the concept of pure being. After this has been achieved, one can then look at the manner in which this concept gives rise to and relates to the concepts of nothing and becoming. With that noted, I can turn back to the problem of beginning and attempt to provide a compelling interpretation of the passage.

The primary difficulty we face in grasping Hegel's problem of beginning is to understand what Hegel means by asserting first the necessity, and then the impossibility of beginning either with something immediate or with something mediated. I shall attempt to clarify the meaning of the problem before turning to Hegel's proposed solution.

The first thing to notice when reading the passage in question is that Hegel is giving voice to the problem in such a way that clearly renders it irresolvable:

1. (P1) One must either begin with something immediate or with something mediated.

2. (P2) One cannot begin with something immediate.

3. (P3) One cannot begin with something mediated.

4. (C) Therefore beginning is impossible.Footnote ⁹

There is nothing unusual about posing a problem in this way before going on to present a solution, usually either by challenging a crucial inference or by rejecting a premise. And this is clearly an impasse Hegel thinks he has a way out of. This is made evident simply by the fact that the book which opens with the statement of this problem does not end straight away once the apparent impossibility of beginning has been stated.

The issue we face is that Hegel does not do a great deal straight away to make explicit the meaning of the terms utilized in the expression of the problem. He says that ‘it is easy to show’ that one cannot begin with something immediate or with something mediated, but he does not make it clear why this is the case. If we are to understand Hegel's proposed solution to this problem, we need to do more to understand the problem itself.

The manner in which I propose to go about clarifying the nature of the problem is to examine the relevant passages from the remainder of ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’, especially those following shortly after the expression of the problem. In particular, I will concentrate on Hegel's usage of ‘immediacy’ and ‘mediation’ in this context. Admittedly, this material deals with Hegel's solution to the problem, but it also sheds some light on the meaning of the problem itself. Those elements of the material which pertain specifically to the solution to the problem in question I will ignore until section III.

We find in this material that Hegel does explore the two possibilities mentioned in his expression of the problem of beginning. First Hegel suggests that a ‘beginning is logical in that it is to be made in […] pure knowledge; it is thereby mediated’ (WL: 46/21:54). He elaborates:

Leaving aside for now the meaning of terms such as ‘pure knowledge’ or ‘the science of spirit in its appearance’, this tells us clearly what is involved in beginning with something mediated: to begin with something mediated is to begin with a result. In other words, it is to begin with something supported by some argument, which it accordingly presupposes. Here ‘to presuppose’ does not imply an illegitimate assumption, but the legitimate sense in which a conclusion presupposes the argument which supports it, or perhaps even demonstrates its necessity. The motivation for beginning with something mediated is therefore clear. We have already seen that Hegel believes that philosophical logic must ‘demonstrate the necessity of its content’, and applied to the beginning this appears to imply that we should begin with something which is supported by or presupposes an argument which does exactly this.

The question now becomes why such a beginning must ‘run into its rebuttal’. I think that the answer to this is precisely that we are concerned with beginning. Because of this, the validity of the purported supporting presuppositions in question cannot be taken for granted. Since they precede the inquiry, they are not themselves candidates for justification. Hegel makes this clear when he distinguishes logic from other sciences by appeal to the notion that only other sciences are entitled ‘to apply presupposed forms of definitions and the like without further ado […] in order to establish their general concepts and fundamental determinations’ (WL: 23/21:27). Logic is not permitted to make use of such practices. The support offered by what it is that a mediated beginning presupposes is therefore nullified, so that the necessity of the beginning in question has not been demonstrated after all. This is to render the proposed beginning effectively arbitrary, despite its apparent support. In so far as it is arbitrary, its necessity has no more been demonstrated than that of an opposing candidate for the beginning. In this sense, it can run into its rebuttal.Footnote ¹⁰

Next, Hegel suggests that,

This clarifies the matter. In the context of the problem of beginning, ‘immediacy’ implies making no presuppositions, or presuppositionlessness. The motivation for this idea is also fairly straightforward. If depending upon presuppositions at the beginning is to render the beginning problematically dependent upon material which is taken for granted, then perhaps it is better to begin without any presuppositions at all.Footnote ¹¹

Why should this approach run into its rebuttal? The answer, I think, is quite clear. Such an approach may avoid a problematic dependence upon presuppositions, but to describe a beginning as presuppositionless is in fact just another way of saying that it is a beginning which has nothing supporting it, or nothing in its favour. Hegel makes this clear when he rejects the possibility of beginning from some definition, suggesting that this amounts to beginning from something ‘determined only arbitrarily. In this method of beginning science […] no mention is made of the need to demonstrate the necessity of its subject matter, and hence the necessity of the science itself’ (WL: 29/21:33). Beginning with something immediate, or without presuppositions, is just as arbitrary as beginning with something mediated, or supported by presuppositions. Indeed, Hegel explicitly states in the passage above that a presuppositionless beginning can be viewed as arbitrary. As such, it has nothing to recommend it over any other beginning, and is therefore immediately open to rebuttal.

We can now see exactly why, in the context of beginning either with something mediated or with something immediate, ‘it is easy to show that it can be neither one nor the other’. The problem of beginning is a problem about arbitrariness. If we begin with something mediated then we rely problematically on unexamined presuppositions, which undermines the attempt to render that beginning non-arbitrary by relying on the support of those presuppositions. If, on the other hand, we begin with something immediate, or presuppositionless, then the beginning is straightforwardly arbitrary. In both cases, it seems that no good answer is available to a sceptical interlocutor who asks, ‘Why should I not begin with something else?’

With the nature of the problem of beginning clarified, I shall now turn to exploring the nature of Hegel's solution to the problem.

III. The solution to the problem of beginning

Hegel's response to the problem of beginning is not to abandon hope of beginning his deduction of logical categories in a rigorous or scientific manner. Nor is it to settle on one side of the dilemma he has constructed between beginning with something immediate or with something mediated, and to attempt to overcome the charge of arbitrariness encountered there.

Instead, Hegel proceeds by calling into question one of the premises in his presentation of the problem of beginning. The position Hegel is challenging is the one that supposes that the ‘or’ in ‘The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate’ must be understood exclusively. Hegel says of immediacy and mediation, ‘that both these determinations prove to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them nothing real’ (WL: 46/21:54). This claim has broader philosophical implications, but here we should focus only on the solution to the problem at hand. The form of that solution has now become clear: ‘It looks as though you must begin exclusively either with mediation or immediacy’, I take Hegel to be saying, ‘but if that is the case then beginning is impossible. If, however, we give up this presumption concerning the exclusivity of mediation and immediacy and instead examine the possibility of beginning with some thought which can be characterized in terms of both of these elements, it may be that we can begin in a scientifically rigorous manner after all’.

Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning, then, consists in locating a beginning for logic which is both immediate and mediated, or a beginning which is presuppositionless and which presupposes something which renders it non-arbitrary. Crucially, it will be the coincidence of these two determinations that enables each to overcome the problematically arbitrary status of the other.

Hegel's claim is therefore the following: for a beginning to be truly non-arbitrary, it must presuppose something or be mediated by something that renders it non-arbitrary, but in such a way that this presupposition or mediation does not undermine or clash with the status of the beginning as at the same time presuppositionless or immediate, and, it must be presuppositionless or immediate, but in such a way that this presuppositionless or immediate status does not undermine or clash with the element of mediation or presuppositions rendering the beginning non-arbitrary. This claim expresses the criteria that Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning must satisfy.

What follows the statement rejecting the opposition of mediation and immediacy in the Logic is an attempt on Hegel's part to spell out how this move renders possible a beginning for thought which is non-arbitrary, and therefore a candidate for beginning his deduction of the categories of thought in a rigorous manner, in so far as it is not open to sceptical objection. He identifies and describes the two determinations, first mediation and then immediacy, and explains that their coincidence yields the first category proper of the Logic, that of pure being.Footnote ¹²

The rejection of the exclusive opposition between mediation and immediacy on Hegel's part must be a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving the problem of beginning. If it were sufficient, this would imply that any thought which exhibited both of these determinations would be an acceptable place to begin. Since Hegel clearly thinks that in some sense the two are present in every concept, but the Logic begins specifically with the concept of pure being, there must be something in particular about the accounts of mediation and immediacy which coincide in the concept of pure being which solves the problem of beginning.

The questions that must now be answered in order to render Hegel's solution intelligible are as follows: (i) What is the element of immediacy? (ii) What is the element of mediation? (iii) How do they coincide in such a way as to eliminate the problems which occur when beginning with either alone? The bare bones of this solution, one can hypothesize, will be that the mediated element in the beginning remedies or alleviates the arbitrariness of the element of immediacy taken alone, while the element of immediacy does the same for the arbitrariness threatened by the element of mediation. We can suppose that in such a situation, because the thought in question does not have the character of a problematic arbitrariness, it will not ‘run into its rebuttal’. Instead, Hegel can assert the concept of pure being with security and his Logic can begin in a scientifically rigorous fashion.

I shall start with the first two questions. As previously stated, Hegel proceeds to identify the two elements of mediation and immediacy, and to argue that they coincide in the concept of pure being. Here is an abridged excerpt of that material, with the discussion of the element of mediation indicated with a [1], and the discussion of the element of immediacy indicated with a [2]:

As I explained in section II, Hegel associates mediation in this context with an argument, the content of which is presupposed in order to justify the beginning of the logical project, and immediacy with the notion of presuppositionlessness. The passage just quoted enables us to identify these elements. In brief, the element of immediacy, or presuppositionlessness, is identified as ‘pure knowledge’ or ‘empty thinking’, while the element of mediation, or the argument which the beginning is to presuppose, is identified with the critical interrogation of ordinary consciousness which Hegel undertakes in his Phenomenology of Spirit. I will elaborate on these in turn.

By its very nature, it is difficult to say much about the element of immediacy in the beginning. In addition, we should be cautious about referring to other instances of Hegel's use of the term ‘immediacy’ for clarification, as no other use of the term on Hegel's part appears to signify genuine ‘presuppositionlessness’, since every other concept examined in the Logic presupposes, at the very least, the logical development which precedes it. It is clear then that the immediacy at the beginning of the Logic is a special case.

The first striking term used in the description of immediacy in the context of the beginning of the Logic is that of purity. The element of immediacy is described as the ‘result’ of a mediation, or the point at which it is called ‘pure knowledge’. As Hegel puts it, ‘Pure knowledge […] has sublated every reference to an other and to mediation; it is without distinctions and as thus distinctionless ceases to be knowledge; what we have before us is simple immediacy’ (WL: 47/21:55). This emphasis on purity is not surprising, as we know that the concept that is to be thought at the beginning is that of ‘pure being’. A lengthy discussion of this concept goes beyond what I want to achieve here, but we should notice that Hegel suggests that it is a concept which has no content (WL: 49/21:58). Hegel writes, later in ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’, ‘[T]he beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy; and therefore as being, as complete emptiness’ (WL: 52/21:62). This characterization of the concept which the element of immediacy grasps as ‘empty’ is reiterated in the discussion of pure being proper, where Hegel uses the term ‘empty thinking’ (WL: 59/21:69).

This description of ‘pure knowledge’ as a kind of ‘empty thinking’ connects it to two other important terms shared by the characterization of the element of immediacy. The first is that what is at stake in the element of immediacy is the idea of considering ‘thinking as such’, and the second is that this has the character of something ‘simple’. It seems that what Hegel has in mind is the idea of a purely reflexive thought, a thought where we simply think thought itself, but without characterizing it in any way, or without that thought having any content at all, beyond the simple understanding that thought is occurring.Footnote ¹⁴ As Hegel puts it more fully, the thought which he identifies as that of the element of immediacy ‘is pure indeterminateness and emptiness […]. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking’ (WL: 59/21:69).

What is important here is that we acknowledge that Hegel's claim is that, although this immediacy is the result of some mediation, in being empty, pure or simple, it makes no reference to the mediation which demonstrates its necessity, or which it presupposes. Hegel clearly thinks that this entitles him to characterize the element of immediacy as ‘presuppositionless’. Analysing this claim about how it is that this element of immediacy can retain its presuppositionless status while presupposing some mediation which necessitates it, and therefore crucially renders it non-arbitrary, must wait until the element of mediation has been examined.

Potentially problematic in the context of Hegel's account of the element of immediacy, however, is the acknowledgment on his part of the possibility of arbitrariness. As he says, the element of immediacy amounts to a resolve ‘which can also be viewed as arbitrary’ that we propose to consider thought as such. This seems problematic, given that I have argued that Hegel's approach to the problem of beginning is motivated by the attempt to avoid arbitrariness. I think that there are two possible ways to render this passage unproblematic. The first is to notice that it sounds as though what is being described as arbitrary is not the thought, but the resolve on our part to think. If this is the case then there is no problem, because why one has decided to pursue some line of questioning should have no bearing on the justificatory status of what is thought.

If, however, one were not to accept this, and to insist that the element of immediacy itself is being characterized as potentially arbitrary, then it seems that this could be read in such a way that it supports my interpretation, rather than undermining it. Hegel says only that the element of immediacy ‘can’ be considered arbitrary. I would suggest that this ‘can’ indicates the two possibilities for considering the problem of beginning. If one has retained the exclusive opposition between immediacy and mediation and attempts to begin simply with the immediacy of empty thinking, then it will be problematically arbitrary. If, however, one gives up the assumption of that exclusive opposition, and engages in the immediacy of empty thinking on the basis of a mediation which necessitates it and coincides with it, then the charge of arbitrariness will not apply.

At this point I should identify the element of mediation. This is more straightforward than attempting to grasp the notion of empty thinking, as Hegel is quite explicit. The element of mediation is identified with the critical investigation of consciousness carried out in the Phenomenology of Spirit. A lengthy investigation of the Phenomenology cannot be accomplished here, but from the perspective of a concern for the problem of beginning, it is clear that the Phenomenology amounts to an argument, the conclusion of which demonstrates the necessity of the beginning of the Logic.Footnote ¹⁵ More specifically, the argument of the Phenomenology begins from an account of consciousness which opposes itself to the idea that a priori thought might provide us with the fundamental categories with which we judge, because it insists that ‘the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous consciousness’ (WL: 47/21:55). The argument of the Phenomenology, regardless of whatever else it might also achieve, has the function of providing ‘liberation from the opposition of consciousness’ (WL: 29/21:33).

The element of mediation, or what the beginning must presuppose if it is to be justified, is the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness by way of the critical interrogation of consciousness undertaken in the Phenomenology. Some indication of how this must occur is required in order to answer the third question relevant to making sense of Hegel's proposed solution to the problem of beginning, to which I now turn.

The third question can be rephrased as follows: How do the elements of mediation and immediacy, or the phenomenological criticism of consciousness and empty thinking, coincide in the concept of pure being in such a way that they overcome the deficiency of beginning merely with something immediate, or merely with something mediated? The rough answer has already been suggested in the examination of the two elements: if the Phenomenology amounts to an argument, its conclusion is the pure knowledge or ‘simple immediacy’ which Hegel calls empty thinking. It is a mediation which results in an immediacy. From the perspective of the beginning of the Logic, the Phenomenology is an argument which is presupposed, and which has presuppositionlessness for its result.

This coincidence of the conclusion of the Phenomenology and the beginning of the Logic prompts the question of the compatibility of the two works, or of how it is that Hegel is able to say both that the beginning of the Logic is presuppositionless, and that it presupposes the work of the Phenomenology. I will attempt to provide a sketch here of how the argument of the Phenomenology and the beginning of the Logic might be thought to be compatible, although a lengthy engagement with the argument-structure of the Phenomenology, required for an in-depth, critical investigation of the compatibility or incompatibility of the two works, cannot be accomplished here.Footnote ¹⁶

As stated above, the Phenomenology of Spirit is an investigation of ordinary or ‘natural consciousness’ (PhG: ¶78), where this refers to a position, or a series of common positions on the relationship between thought and the object of thought, which take as their starting point the prejudice that thought must begin from some empirical or sensuous content, given to it from outside of itself. In so far as Hegel, in his Logic, is attempting to provide an a priori deduction of the basic categories of thought, or a scientific examination of thought by thought itself,Footnote ¹⁷ he therefore encounters this prejudice of natural consciousness's as a position fundamentally opposed to his own. In this sense, he says, ‘the standpoint of consciousness […] counts as the other to science’ (PhG: ¶26).

The argument of the Phenomenology is, accordingly, a critical investigation of the variations of natural consciousness, aimed at validating the self-examination of thought which characterizes the procedure of the Logic. It is, however, an immanent critical investigation, in that the criterion according to which such positions are evaluated is that of consistency between the standard which a given position of natural consciousness affirms as the standard of knowledge, and individual first-order knowledge claims demanded by the objects of knowledge.Footnote ¹⁸ This means that Hegel need not illegitimately presuppose the validity of the position he adopts in his Logic when evaluating natural consciousness in the Phenomenology. As he puts it, ‘concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself […] the only thing that remains to us is purely to look on’ (PhG: ¶85). The argument of the Phenomenology traces the modifications that the positions of natural consciousness must make to themselves in the face of the discovery of internal inconsistencies, with the ultimate result, according to Hegel at least, that the prejudices of natural consciousness are replaced with a position in which thought is able conduct its self-examination along the lines of the investigation of his Science of Logic. In this sense, the argument of the Phenomenology charts the ‘cultivation of consciousness itself into science’ (PhG: ¶78).

This last point indicates the difficulty of rendering the conclusion of the Phenomenology compatible with the beginning of the Logic. The problem can be put in the following way: the conclusion of the Phenomenology, despite being the result of all of the developments of the examination of consciousness in that work, and despite needing to necessitate the beginning of the Logic, seems as though it cannot actually amount to anything that could be considered as a substantive presupposition from the perspective of the beginning of the Logic. Were it to amount to such a presupposition, it would be incompatible with--rather than coincide with--the presuppositionless immediacy of the beginning of that work. If such a conclusion is to be presupposed at the beginning of the Logic, it seems clearly incompatible with the characterization of that beginning as empty, immediate or presuppositionless. Yet one might well think that some sort of substantive presupposition is indeed suggested by the notion of the cultivation of consciousness into science, if this amounts to the replacement of one model of knowledge with another ‘scientific’ one, or if one agrees with readers like Houlgate, who takes the argument of the Phenomenology to result in ‘a determinate conception of being as universal reason’ (Houlgate Reference Houlgate2006: 162).

It seems to me that the only way to overcome this difficulty is to suppose that the trajectory of the argument of the Phenomenology is fundamentally negative in character, so that its conclusion, or the cultivation of its original position into that adopted by Hegel in his Logic, consists neither in the establishment of a rich notion of being, nor in the replacement of one account of knowledge with another, or one set of presuppositions with another, but only in the total removal of the presuppositions of natural consciousness, so that the conclusion of the Phenomenology is no more than the total absence of the presuppositions characteristic of natural consciousness which were encountered along the way. This interpretation of the argument of the Phenomenology has been notably defended by Maker, who claims that the argument of the Phenomenology has just such a ‘radically negative outcome’ (Maker Reference Maker1994: 93). As he puts it:

The virtue of this account is clear: if the Phenomenology does indeed have this negative trajectory, so that its conclusion is the total absence of presuppositions, then this conclusion coincides with the presuppositionless, empty thinking of the beginning of the Logic, while if the conclusion were instead some substantive doctrine about the nature of ‘spirit’ or some set of metaphysical, epistemological or methodological scientific principles, this coincidence would be impossible.

Although I cannot critically evaluate this interpretation of the Phenomenology here, the account given so far of Hegel's approach to solving the problem of beginning lends it some support. We saw earlier that Hegel takes it that the argument of the Phenomenology ‘demonstrates the truth, of the standpoint which is pure knowledge’ (WL: 47/21:54–55). We saw also that the account of pure knowledge at the beginning of the Logic is an account of a thinking without any content, or an empty thinking. At the end of the Phenomenology Hegel refers to the position he arrives at there as ‘absolute knowing’, or ‘the simple unity of knowing’ (PhG: ¶796), noting that what this form of thought produces ‘is science’ (PhG: ¶798). If this mention of ‘science’ is taken, as seems reasonable, to be a reference to Hegel's logical project, then one might suppose, with Maker, that Hegel's ‘absolute knowing’ is identical to his ‘pure knowledge’, and therefore that the Phenomenology does have the kind of ‘radically negative outcome’ that Maker takes it to.

A detailed discussion of Maker's approach to this issue must be accomplished elsewhere.Footnote ¹⁹ What matters here is that, from the perspective of Hegel's statement of the problem of beginning, it looks as though an interpretation of the Phenomenology which takes it to have a radically negative outcome might allow us to overcome the concern about the possible incompatibility of the conclusion of that work with the beginning of the Logic. I note though, that this result turns on the validity of the argument of the Phenomenology, which I cannot assess here.

At this point we have a suggestion as to how the conclusion of the Phenomenology and the beginning of the Logic might be thought to coincide successfully. I think that this allows us in turn to make sense of Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning. The problem, we can recall, was that beginning merely with something immediate, or presuppositionless, looked unjustified because it was to begin simply by asserting something, without supporting it in any way, while beginning with something mediated, or on the basis of something presupposed, looked unjustified because, from the perspective of the beginning, what was presupposed appeared merely to have been taken for granted, and therefore offered no true support.

As well as avoiding the problems which attended either side of the dilemma as it was expressed in the statement of the problem, Hegel's solution must also satisfy the criteria for a solution to the problem of beginning which I set out earlier. Accordingly, I suggest that Hegel's solution should be understood according to the model of the coincidence of the conclusion of the Phenomenology and the beginning of the Logic outlined above. The mediation in question is the argument of the Phenomenology, which, setting out from the presuppositions of natural consciousness and concluding in the total absence of any presuppositions, necessitates the empty thinking, identified as the immediacy in question, of the beginning of the Logic. In this sense the beginning is both mediated and immediate.

On this basis, we can describe the beginning of the Logic as mediated, or as a beginning the necessity of which has been demonstrated by what it presupposes, because this demonstration is the argument of the Phenomenology. This renders the beginning immune to the sceptical charge Hegel levelled at beginning with something merely immediate or presuppositionless, as this beginning is not just an arbitrary assertion: it is supported by the argument that demonstrates its necessity and thus does not straight away run into a rebuttal. And if that argument concludes negatively, in the collapse of the dogmatically held presuppositions of natural consciousness and thus in the coincidence, rather than the clash, of the conclusion of the Phenomenology with the beginning of the Logic, then the mediated status of the beginning does not undermine the immediate status of the beginning.

At the same time, we can describe the beginning of the Logic as immediate, or presuppositionless, because the empty thinking characteristic of the beginning does not refer to the argument which it presupposes. This renders the beginning immune to the charge Hegel levelled at beginning merely with something mediated, or on the basis of something presupposed, as this beginning cannot be said to be taking for granted some substantive result of the prior investigation: because it is merely empty thinking it is taking nothing for granted. Thus it again does not run into a rebuttal. And again because of the coincidence, rather than clash, of the conclusion of the Phenomenology and the beginning of the Logic, this presuppositionlessness, or the immediate status of the beginning, does not undermine the mediated status of the beginning. It should be clear that this satisfies the criteria for a solution to the problem of beginning set out earlier.

In fact, we can notice that this solution, set out at length above, has the following character: it replaces an opposition between two exclusive determinations which appeared to prevent Hegel's logical project from going anywhere. Instead, one determination—mediation—negates itself and results in its opposite—immediacy. The unity of these two determinations, the concept of pure being, solves the problem of their opposition. This solution conforms to Hegel's Encyclopaedia characterization of the ‘moments of every properly logical content’ (EL: §79).Footnote ²⁰ Although Hegel's dialectical or speculative model of demonstration has not been the object of the investigation here, this conformity on behalf of the solution developed above to Hegel's account of demonstration suggests that, by his lights, the solution of the problem of beginning represents an instance where ‘an immanent connection and necessity enters into the content of science’ (EL: §81). This reiterates that its role is one of contributing to securing the scientific status of Hegel's logic.

Having spent some time setting out Hegel's problem of beginning and its solution, I shall now make some remarks concerning alternative characterizations of this material, and attempt to anticipate criticisms that might be made of the interpretation I have provided above.

IV. Alternatives criticized, objections anticipated

It would be a mistake to insist that Hegel attaches no weight to the claim that the beginning of the Logic must be immediate, or presuppositionless, and indeed, it is hard to find a contemporary reader of Hegel who would commit to such a view, however they might seek to interpret Hegel's insistence on this matter.Footnote ²¹ In light of the presentation of the problem of beginning above, however, it should also be apparent that it is unsatisfactory to focus only upon the immediate or presuppositionless status of the beginning of Hegel's Logic.

It seems to me that Houlgate makes the mistake of taking the central challenge of the beginning of the Logic to be only the problem of what constitutes a presuppositionless beginning. As he phrases the challenge:

Houlgate's position is that answering this question with the concept of pure being is enough to provide an adequate beginning for Hegel's logical project. While he is happy to acknowledge that the argument of the Phenomenology might help one in attaining the position whereby one engages in the kind of empty thinking characteristic of the beginning of the Logic, he does not think that this argument is necessary to the validity of the beginning of the Logic, or that without its support the Logic is problematically arbitrary. Instead, he emphasizes that,

This position is difficult to square with the one I have attributed to Hegel. As I have presented it, the problem of beginning takes the form of a dilemma between two problematic alternatives: beginning with something immediate or beginning with something mediated. Neither option appears satisfactory. Hegel's solution relies upon locating a beginning which is both immediate and mediated, and is not vulnerable to sceptical opposition or rebuttal in the way that either of the two alternatives taken alone is. Houlgate, it seems to me, effectively disregards the concern Hegel has expressed about a simply immediate beginning. He takes Hegel to have alighted on one horn of the dilemma—immediacy—and to be defending its adequacy.

Houlgate's defence of a simply immediate or presuppositionless beginning turns on the idea that this is superior to beginning elsewhere precisely because it presupposes less, and is therefore not open to the charge of uncritical dogmatism in the way that any other beginning would be.Footnote ²² But this seems to me simply not to answer the challenge posed to the value of presuppositionlessness in Hegel's problem of beginning: that mere presuppositionlessness is indistinguishable from an unsupported, arbitrary position. To overcome this objection the presuppositionlessness in question must be necessitated by something which it presupposes, not simply be the result of an arbitrary decision, as Houlgate would have it.Footnote ²³

There is another approach which has been taken towards the problematic status of the beginning of Hegel's Logic, and which might be thought to lay claim to making just as good sense of Hegel's remarks to the effect that the beginning must be both mediated and immediate as the account I have developed here. This approach appeals to the idea that the project of the Logic is in some sense a circular one. Shortly after the passages on the problem of the beginning, Hegel writes that ‘Essential to science is not so much that a pure immediacy should be the beginning, but that the whole of the science is in itself a circle in which the first becomes also the last, and the last also the first’ (WL: 49/21:57).

Some have taken this to mean that what secures the beginning of the Logic is the fact that Hegel connects its conclusion to its beginning, claiming as he does that ‘the logic […] has returned in the absolute idea, to this simple unity which is its beginning; the pure immediacy of being’ (WL: 752/12:252). Carlson, for example, understands the passage in which Hegel sets out what I have identified as the problem of beginning as Hegel insisting upon a choice between mediation and immediacy. As he puts it, Hegel ‘chooses immediacy’ and then ‘justifies the choice because what is here presupposed is (much later) proven […]. His philosophy will take us in a circle. If the beginning is also the end, then the beginning is justified’ (Carlson Reference Carlson2007: 26–27). Variants of this kind of claim are given in Rosen (Reference Rosen1992: 39–49) and Kreines (Reference Kreines2015: 241–45).

There are two ways that one might interpret the idea that Hegel relies upon the circular nature of the Logic to secure the beginning. The better one is that Hegel asks us to read the Logic in a provisional manner, putting aside our qualms about the beginning only to have them eventually soothed by the way in which the end of the project secures the beginning and renders it no longer questionable. Unfortunately for this interpretation, the text of the Logic makes it clear that Hegel judges such a procedure to be unacceptable, for he states,

This then cannot be the right way to think about Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning. I cannot discuss his wariness of this procedure at length here, but it seems to relate to his demand for scientific rigour and certainty. Even if he is open to the idea that the derivation of logical categories might be justified by their circularity, he seems to want to avoid opening himself to the possibility that any step in the construction of that circle might be open to sceptical objection. This points us again towards the importance, for Hegel, of the beginning.

The other, worse, way to understand the claim about circularity as it relates to the problem of beginning would be to suppose that Hegel genuinely thinks that it is legitimate to have the beginning depend for its justification upon that which it itself is to play a key role in justifying. This would be to make the Logic viciously circular. We must therefore reject accounts of the beginning of Hegel's Logic which appeal to the circular nature of the work to solve the problem of beginning.

Still, this line of thought is undoubtedly capturing something essential about the procedure of the Logic. Hegel might be taken to suggest, at the end of the work, in claiming that we have once again reached pure immediacy ‘through mediation’ (WL: 752/12:252), although this time the mediation of the project of the Logic itself rather than that of the Phenomenology, that this constitutes an additional demonstration that the beginning must be both mediated and immediate. I must emphasize that while this may be the case (I do not propose to examine this possibility here, as I take it to be unnecessary to the task of presenting Hegel's solution to the problem of beginning), it could only be an additional or supplementary demonstration. It certainly cannot replace the solution set out in section III. There the beginning was mediated by the argument of the Phenomenology, and did not rely upon the material developed over the course of the Logic. But if the rigorous nature of that development, or its scientific status, depends upon the solution to the problem of beginning, as I have suggested that it does, then to have that solution depend in turn upon the development of the Logic can only lead to the kind of problems with circular justification which I have set out above.

The mistake I believe that Carlson and the others are making is to confuse two different points of Hegel's. They are focusing on the fact that Hegel, as we have seen, thinks that the circular structure of the work is ‘essential’ to logic, and supposing that this indicates that it is his solution to the problem of beginning. However, Hegel does not claim that circularity is essential to the beginning of logic. His claim is that it is essential to the science of logic as a whole (presumably to the project of the justification of the set of fundamental categories presented in that work).Footnote ²⁴ Admittedly, Hegel himself does not clearly separate these two issues. Still, while it may very well be that the full import of the Logic can only be understood in a re-reading which takes place from the perspective of its end, and the coincidence of that end with the beginning, this reading only has any force if the first reading can reach that end with certainty.Footnote ²⁵

By way of conclusion I would like to attempt to anticipate potential objections to my presentation of Hegel's engagement with the problem of beginning. The first objection would be to dispute the claim that the concept of pure being occurs as the coincidence of the elements of mediation and immediacy, because Hegel states that pure being is not mediated. So, for example, he writes, in the context of the account of pure being that, ‘the first beginning cannot be anything mediated’ (EL: §86). It is also true that the account of pure being which follows ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’ makes mention only of the immediacy of pure being. This does not, however, detract from the fact that, in that essay, Hegel has described pure being ‘as originating through mediation’ (WL: 47/21:56).

The way to understand Hegel's emphasis only on the immediacy of pure being, then, is to accept that this concept is both mediated and immediate, but to remember that once this has been accepted, in considering the concept of pure being on its own terms, we attend only to its simple immediacy. Hegel makes this clear when he writes that

This fits my presentation of Hegel's solution of the problem of beginning. The beginning must be presuppositionless in such a way that, although it requires some presupposition to render it non-arbitrary, its presuppositionless status undoes the problematic nature of a reliance upon presuppositions. Thus, when considering pure being, we should expect it no longer to refer back to the mediation which it presupposes, and to be considered as a simple immediacy.

A further objection to the idea that the concept of pure being solves the problem of beginning in so far as it is both mediated and immediate might be made by claiming that Hegel disallows such a possibility when he rejects the idea that the beginning could consist ‘in a connection of distinct elements […] [whereby it] therefore contains mediation within itself’ (WL: 52/21:61). He adds,

It might be thought that here Hegel is ruling out the idea that pure being could be the coincidence of mediation and immediacy, especially if, as I have suggested, that coincidence consists in the result of the mediation being identified with the element of immediacy. But as we have seen, this procedure is precisely what he has suggested in his presentation of the solution to the problem of beginning only a few pages earlier in the text.

This passage should be put in context. Here Hegel is explicitly entertaining the notion of beginning not with pure being, but with the analysis of a presupposed ‘representation’ (WL: 51/21:60) of the notion of beginning itself. Hegel rejects this possibility, of a beginning which ‘presupposes that the representation of beginning is known’ (WL: 52/21:61) precisely for the reasons he gives above: that such a representation will always be to some extent complex, or contain connected elements within itself. This then clearly falls short of the simple immediacy Hegel demands for the beginning.

How is it then that the characterization of pure being as both mediated and immediate does not also imply that the concept has a connection within itself, that it is ‘first and other’? The answer to this question must lie in the nature of the genuine coincidence of the elements of mediation and immediacy in the concept of pure being, facilitated by the fact that the conclusion of the mediation is a negative or empty one. The concept of pure being is to be thought of as an immediacy which no longer exhibits any relation to the mediation which gave rise to it. If it is thought that the concept of pure being still cannot admit of such a description, given its ‘purity’, we should remember that Hegel will later claim of the concepts examined in the Logic that ‘every concept is a unity of opposed moments’ (WL: 158/21:180). On pain of contradiction, this must also be true of the concept of pure being.Footnote ²⁶