In his book Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China, Andrew Wedeman takes on the conventional wisdom that corruption necessarily stands in the way of development, brings the economy to a standstill, and depletes a nation's resources. He does not dispute these possibilities that many researchers have shown to come to pass; instead he argues that growing corruption can go hand in hand with economic growth. Corrupt leaders can be party to economic development or even initiators of such reforms. He uses the cases of Equatorial Guinea, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Haiti to demonstrate the former; and those of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea to illustrate the latter. But as the book title suggests, China is the focus. He accepts that growth has occurred in the Chinese economy, and he traces the growth of different forms of corruption as the reform deepens and economic structural changes are being introduced. He shows how corruption took off in the 1980s and plateaued in the last decade. He attributes its abatement to the deliberate efforts of the Communist government to improve the legal system and punish corrupt officials.
Wedeman's opening comments on the negative correlation between corruption and growth are not so much to argue against an accepted truism; rather they are to elicit the readers' curiosity and interests. The book elaborates on the possible complex relationships between corruption and economic growth. Political leaders as perpetrators of corruption can cause havoc in the economy and empty national coffers, but they can also initiate and support economic reforms or funnel their spoils back into the economy in the form of investments. Wedeman underplays the effect of culture on corruption to highlight the role of structure. In the transition from a planned to a market economy in China, perpetrators take advantage of the opportunities presented by economic changes to line their pockets. New forms of corruption emerge as new opportunities emerge in the ever-changing economic organization. Since the economy is growing and political leaders as initiators of reform have an interest in plugging loopholes, corruption does not get out of hand. For corruption to coexist with rapid economic growth, sequencing and government attempts to fight corruption count. And if I may add, the economic growth rate has to surpass the rate of increase in corruption and its collateral damage.
Whether GNP-ism alone can be considered economic growth is debatable; the line between developmental and degenerative corruption is hard to draw, and what constitutes a corruption crisis or corruption under control is even more subject to interpretation given the available murky data. Some may not agree with Wedeman's claim that corruption has leveled off since the mid-1990s. Whichever position one takes, one has to admit that Wedeman has done an excellent task to show readers how he has arrived at his conclusion. He has meticulously combed through national and local statistics and case reports of more than three decades, and guides his readers through his careful data analysis and line of thinking. This exercise makes readers appreciate the difficulties in dredging corruption statistics and interpreting the available data, and perhaps also gives them an opportunity to make their own judgment.
Wedeman found earlier works on corruption wanting. Again one may not necessarily agree with some of his criticisms, but his study certainly adds to the literature in at least two ways. These early studies have focused almost exclusively on China, but Wedeman uses examples from Asia, Africa, and the Americas to make his case and situates the Chinese case in a global context, giving his analysis a comparative perspective. Furthermore, these earlier works necessarily focus on the early period of China's reform, but the situation has changed. Wedeman documents how the nature of corruption has changed from taking advantage of the two-price system in the state and market economy to making the best of the transfer of the right of use of state property into private and corporate hands. Against the backdrop of a booming real estate market, corruption cases involve larger sums and officials of higher ranks.
Anyone interested in corruption in contemporary China should read Wedeman's book because it offers a comprehensive account of the evolution of corruption in the reform era. The book is also useful to anyone with a more general interest in corruption because it dissects corruption and offers a detailed exposé of the different forms of corruption across the globe. And for graduate students or someone interested in pursuing China research on corruption or other related topics, his book offers a template as to how good, solid research is to be carried out.
