INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes have been championed in the context of Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects. This article looks at the practical outcome of claims heard by the Spoliation Advisory Panel (SAP), a process of ADR that was established by the government of the United Kingdom (UK) in 2000. The procedure before the panel is an alternative to litigation rather than a process of litigation; the panel’s recommendations are not legally enforceable, although the claimant is expected to accept them in full in the final settlement of the claim. The respondent museum is under no legal obligation to follow the panel’s recommendations. Therefore, in theory, a claimant could have incurred significant expenditure in commissioning research into his claim, been represented before the panel and successfully convince the panel of his strong moral claim, only for the respondent to refuse to put the panel’s recommendation into effect. This article analyzes the effectiveness of the SAP’s work in overcoming some of the shortcomings of litigation and analyzes the way in which remedies are used to respond to the moral severity of the claim. Often accounts of the panel’s work end with the report and the recommendations made. However, this article also analyzes the way in which the parties have put into effect the SAP’s recommendations and will thus analyze whether claimants have, in practice, encountered problems with the implementation of the panel’s recommended remedy given the absence of any legal sanction for non-compliance with the panel’s recommendations. Suggestions will be put forward as to how the implementation of recommendations might be secured in the future.
The first sections give a brief overview of the way in which restitution is favored as a remedy in narratives about Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects and then highlight the reasons as to why litigation may not be suitable for resolving such disputes. The discussion then turns to advantages of the SAP as a means of resolving disputes, particularly in the context of tackling the varied moral circumstances of cases that might not automatically give rise to the remedy of restitution. The article then analyzes the various structural issues that present potential shortcomings of the panel, particularly in the context of the enforcement of recommendations, and explores whether these present problems in practice for the parties. The article ends with suggestions for future development.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTITUTION AS A REMEDY
Often the narratives surrounding Nazi era dispossessions, and the claims made in the twenty-first century, start with the remedy itself rather than the cause of action since discussions focus on the “restitution” or “return” of objects rather than on the actual claims in respect of Nazi era dispossessions or the Holocaust. It has been said that Holocaust restitution “is about waiting for some recognition, some voucher to validate the misdeeds that have been perpetrated” Footnote 1 and that, where restitution takes place, “the restituted object … allows for the veneration of a culture which tyranny sought to make disappear.’ Footnote 2 Restitution, Thérèse O’Donnell suggests, permits the telling of the narrative. Footnote 3 Restitution does appear, though, to be the remedy of choice; Evelien Campfens observes that restitution “as a remedy in the case of Nazi-looted art seems to be emphasised as the primary way of achieving justice.” Footnote 4 Restitution can also have a profound effect on the relationship between the claimant and the respondent to such an extent that this can affect the perception toward the state that has facilitated the return, such as the UK’s efforts through the establishment of the SAP. For example, it has been argued by the lawyer representing the claimants that the recommendation to return the Benevento Missal Footnote 5 had the effect of changing the perception by the city of Benevento towards the UK “from one of deep hurt, mistrust, even of hate, to one of joyful pleasure and generosity of spirit.” Footnote 6
Restitution strictly means the remedy of returning the object itself to the claimant, Footnote 7 and it will be used in this way during this article. However, it is acknowledged that at times it can be used in a wider sense and “more comprehensively to include the entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices.” Footnote 8 Despite beginning with the remedy of returning the actual object, it can be seen that the panel’s terms of reference envisage a varied range of remedies that can be recommended. Footnote 9 In addition, the panel has in practice, through its use of remedies, accounted for the varying moral strength of the claims that it has heard (discussed below). It therefore seeks to achieve just and fair solutions in accordance with the overall intention of the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art. Footnote 10
LITIGATION AS A FLAWED MEDIUM: INDEPENDENT PANELS AS THE WAY FORWARD
It has been argued that litigation is not always a suitable method for resolving claims with respect to Nazi era dispossessions. Footnote 11 In the UK, most litigation involving Nazi era possessions would be unsuccessful because of the procedural difficulties that may bar an action, specifically the extinction of the original owner’s title by virtue of the statutory limitation period. Footnote 12 However, even in countries where litigation may have a greater chance of success because procedural bars can be overcome, the adversarial nature of litigation can make it a less than perfect avenue for pursuing a claim. This is because of the very emotional and personal stories that often surround the dispossessions and the fact that debating these in an adversarial context can be particularly stressful for the claimants. Additionally, the lengthy and costly nature of litigation can have a prohibitive effect on bringing a claim or encourage people to settle them out of court. It is interesting to note that in the United States where some claims relating to Nazi era dispossessions have been successfully resolved, such resolutions have tended to result from a settlement of the claim rather than from a final judgment on the merits of the case. This can be seen in two well-known situations. First, in her claim against Austria relating to several paintings by Gustav Klimt, Maria Altmann was successful in the US Supreme Court on jurisdictional issues, Footnote 13 but the parties ultimately settled the US litigation of the substantive issue by agreeing to send the matter for determination by binding arbitration in Austria. Footnote 14 The second well-known case involved the Portrait of Wally by Egon Schiele, which was lent by the Leopold Foundation in Austria to New York’s Museum of Modern Art. Again, this was settled out of court, and the remedy was agreed by consensus between the parties. Footnote 15
In the UK, even where there is a desire by a respondent to return objects to their pre-war owners, the law has prevented a wholly ethical approach from being taken where legal barriers exist. This can be seen in the case of AG v Trustees of the British Museum. Footnote 16 Here, despite the strong moral arguments favoring the object’s transfer to the heirs of the pre-war owner, the court was restricted from allowing this return by the museum’s legal structure. Footnote 17 It was therefore not possible to take into account the moral circumstances of the case, or, at least, these could not outweigh the strict legal circumstances. It has only been since the passage of the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act in 2009 that this statutory bar could be overcome when certain conditions are met. Footnote 18 ADR processes therefore allow the sensitivities of the situation to be taken into account as well as the varied circumstances that gave rise to the situation; these might otherwise have been excluded in an entirely law-focused forum such as a court. ADR thus provides an opportunity for the narratives to be more fully heard than in litigation. Furthermore, ADR presents a means of overcoming substantive and procedural issues such as the limitation of statutes, which may have extinguished the claimant’s legal title to the object as well as the evidential barriers of proving the exact circumstances of loss during the confusion of war.
ADVANTAGES OF THE SAP AS A MEANS OF ADR
In practical terms, the SAP has provided a concrete means of overcoming several of the barriers that face claimants who seek to litigate disputes with regard to Nazi era dispossessions in the UK. First, it necessarily overcomes the primary impediment to legal claims relating to Nazi era dispossessions, which are limitation periods. Since the panel is an alternative to litigation, rather than a process of litigation, Footnote 19 no claim is time barred, and although the panel investigates the original legal title of the claimants and the current legal title of the possessor museum, it does not determine these titles. Footnote 20 Therefore, the extinction of the claimant’s legal title has no bearing on the moral considerations of the claim on which the panel focuses its attention. In all successful claims to date, the panel has concluded that the legal title of all claimants, at the least, would have been extinguished following the expiration of the relevant domestic limitation periods from the point in time at which the object was first purchased in the UK or acquired by the possessor museum. Footnote 21
Second, the SAP’s procedures provide a means to overcome one of the primary concerns that statutes of limitation seek to address, which is the problem of evidence. The panel’s terms of reference clearly envisage the difficulties that the passage of time may have on a claimant proving original title to the object. Footnote 22 However, in its reports, the panel has also adopted a holistic approach to other evidential matters, particularly in the context of the circumstances of the loss of the object. Footnote 23 The panel has therefore taken a practical approach that focuses on taking heed of evidence to the contrary, but accepting that there may not always be positive evidence confirming a state of affairs. For example, in some claims, there has been documentary evidence that the object in question was in the original owner’s possession at a point in time before the date of the alleged loss (whether it was a seizure of all his assets or an auction of objects).
However, there may be no evidence to confirm unequivocally that it was in his possession on the date of the loss. In such circumstances, the SAP has accepted what may be considered more contextual evidence about the collecting habits of the original owner, which tends to indicate that he would not have sold the object in the interim. This can be seen in the claim by the Rothberger heirs against the British Museum. Here, evidence from an expert at the British Museum suggested that wealthy European families were unlikely to have sold off their collections, even on the occasion of deaths in the family. Footnote 24 In the claim involving the Feldmann heirs and the British Museum, Dr Feldmann had consigned some of the objects to auction on a previous occasion to defray his financial obligations, but they were returned unsold. The SAP took the view that, while it was possible that he had sold the objects subsequently and before the date of the Gestapo seizure of his property, it was nevertheless unlikely that he had actually sold them since the proceeds of such a sale “would have had no material impact on his financial problems.” Footnote 25
In the British Library/Benevento claim, the SAP found that the claimants’ circumstantial evidence was “sufficiently robust to vindicate their submission” that the manuscript had been spoliated at some point between the bombing of Benevento in 1943 and the recorded purchase from a dealer in 1944 despite the absence of any direct evidence of the manuscript’s presence in the collection immediately before the war. Footnote 26 In this case, the claimant relied on the absence of any evidence that indicated a sale during the period between a publication that included the manuscript in 1914 and 1943 when the town was attacked. Footnote 27 These cases demonstrate the panel taking cognizance of the difficulties encountered with the evidence and giving specific consideration to any “unavoidable gaps or ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the circumstances of the Holocaust era” that is found in the Washington Conference Principles. Footnote 28
Tackling Varied Moral Circumstances
Claims with respect to Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis not only because they involve “specific and identifiable object[s]” but also because the circumstances of the loss may be quite varied and raise different moral issues that need to be addressed individually. Footnote 29 Therefore, the SAP has necessarily grappled with difficult moral issues arising from the circumstances of the individual claims brought in respect of Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects. While there may be instances of direct seizure where there is a strong moral claim on the part of the claimant based on the circumstances of loss, the circumstances in other cases giving rise to the necessary moral strength of the claim have required more consideration since they are not so clear cut. Thus, in all cases where there is evidence of direct seizure by the Nazis, the SAP has concluded that there is a strong moral claim. Footnote 30 There is nothing to suggest that some acts of seizure have been considered any less morally severe than other acts of seizure. In all cases of seizure where the return by the possessor museum has been possible, this is the remedy recommended by the panel. Footnote 31 This falls in line with the principle found in the Council of Europe’s Resolution 1205 that institutions that are in receipt of public funding, which all of the possessor museums featured in SAP reports have been, should return such “looted Jewish cultural property.” Footnote 32
While the Washington Conference Principles and the Resolution 1205 are phrased in terms of “Nazi confiscated art” and “looted Jewish cultural property” respectively and could thus be interpreted as applying only to direct seizure, it is widely accepted that the Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects were not only much more varied than confiscations and lootings, properly so-called, but also extended further. It is clear from the Inter-Allied Declaration of 1943 that the transfers that were to be regarded as invalid included “transfers or dealings [that] have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected.” Footnote 33
One particular category of losses that has been seen in a variety of forms in the SAP’s work has been forced sales. These claims have given rise to a variety of different recommended remedies to reflect what the panel has accepted as being differing levels of moral severity dependent on both the circumstances of the loss as well as any subsequent compensation and the like.
The first type of forced sale is where extortionate tax demands were made to Jewish individuals that had to be paid before they were free to emigrate. In these claims, any money that was received by the claimants tended not to be available to them to spend afterwards. In effect, the claims were made on the basis that the claimants were denied the free right to dispose of their cultural objects. Two claims, both involving the same group of claimants, show that the panel treated this as a sufficiently strong moral claim to justify the return of objects. Footnote 34
The second type of forced sale can be seen in the claims involving the estate of Emma Budge, an American Jew who had a property in Hamburg. On her death, as a result of anti-Semitism, the works of art that formed part of her estate were sold in a manner contrary to the stipulations of her will, and the estate was deprived of the works of art “without receiving fair or any value for them.” Footnote 35 In the Courtauld/Glaser claim, the sale at auction of Curt Glaser’s art collection was said to be in part because of Nazi persecution, which had meant that he had lost his job and his flat, but also was in part due to his desire to start a new life following the death of his wife. It was because of these mixed motives, as well as the fact that he had received a reasonable market price for the objects and his second wife had received post-war compensation from Germany, that a lesser remedy than return was recommended. Footnote 36 Unlike the Ashmolean/Budge claim, it did seem that Glaser was free to use the proceeds of the sale.
The final type of forced sales consists of those that took place not during persecution but, rather, while the owners were fleeing across Europe. This category was clearly envisaged by the Inter-Allied Declaration of 1943, which committed its signatories to setting aside transactions that were even seemingly legal in effect. Footnote 37 The Tate Gallery/Griffier claim involved a sale that took place in Belgium while the claimant’s mother was fleeing from the Nazis through Belgium. Footnote 38 The sale was concluded at a significant undervalue since the evidence presented to the SAP was that the owner had received next to nothing for the objects. Footnote 39 Even though she was able to spend the money that she received from the sale, this was for the necessities of life during her escape. Footnote 40 The second claim that took place in circumstances following escape from persecution was the British Museum/Koch claim in which the claimant’s mother sold various clocks and watches at auction in London. In this case, the sale was considered to be forced since it was undertaken to alleviate the financial difficulties of the family that had resulted when they were fleeing persecution. However, the sale was not considered to be at an undervalue. The panel therefore concluded that the moral strength of the claim was at the lower end of the spectrum and again recommended a commemorative remedy rather than the return of the objects. Footnote 41
The final category of dispossessions that the SAP has dealt with is that of general loss, which probably involves theft during the war. The only claim heard to date is the British Library/Benevento claim in which it was found that, on the balance of probabilities, the missal was lost during the confusion of war rather than by spoliation at the hands of the Nazis. Footnote 42 This claim fell within the panel’s jurisdiction because it was probable that the object had been lost during the requisite timeframe of the Nazi era.
What is clear from the SAP’s reports so far is that the panel needs to be satisfied that there is a moral strength to the circumstances surrounding the object itself. The panel has expressly stated that it will not make a recommendation of return on the basis of the general suffering encountered by a claimant’s family at the hands of the Nazis but that it will only do so based on the actual circumstances of the loss. Footnote 43
STRUCTURAL PROCEDURAL SHORTCOMINGS
Where Nazi era dispossessed objects are in the possession of private collections, rather than those collections established for the public benefit, the SAP has no automatic jurisdiction if a claimant were to attempt to bring a claim. Instead, there needs to be consensus between the parties before the claim can be brought. Footnote 44 So far, no such private claim has been brought before the panel.
A further shortcoming that exists in the SAP’s terms of reference (albeit one that may arise only in limited circumstances) is that once an object ceases to be in the possession of a national museum or a museum established for the benefit of the public, it falls outside the panel’s jurisdiction. This would equally apply whether the object was owned by the museum or on loan to it. This situation has happened in the context of a medieval casket that was on loan to the Victoria and Albert Museum. It was reported that it was seized by police and so ceased to be in the possession of the museum. Consequently, the panel no longer had jurisdiction to hear the claim (which had already been commenced). Footnote 45
The Structural Difficulties with Enforcing Recommendations
It is clear that the ability of the SAP to take into account the various moral nuances of a case’s circumstances and to overcome the legal procedural impediments has a positive effect on the ability of claimants to have claims heard and to receive recommendations. However, from a structural point of view, there is a clear disadvantage to a more informal, non-litigious approach, namely that there is no means of enforcing the panel’s recommendations where the possessor museum refuses to put in place the panel’s recommended remedy. The use of the SAP is unlike other forms of ADR where the parties undertake to accept the determination as the full and final settlement. Footnote 46 Instead, it is clear from the panel’s terms of reference that its recommendations are not legally binding on either of the parties or on the secretary of state. Footnote 47 The only existing concession is that where a respondent does put in place the panel’s recommendation, it is then seemingly protected by virtue of the fact that the claimant is expected to accept the full and final settlement of the claim. Footnote 48 Norman Palmer has suggested that where a claimant accepts the SAP’s recommendation, this acceptance should act as an estoppel against any subsequent claim being brought. Footnote 49 In only one claim to date has the claimant expressed publicly any dissatisfaction with the panel’s recommendation. This was in the claim made by the heirs of Curt Glaser, Footnote 50 in which the panel acknowledged that there was a strength to the moral claim but recommended that the remedy should be the display of an account of the object’s history rather than the return of the object or the payment of an ex gratia sum. Footnote 51
The SAP’s work does not fall neatly into the existing categories of ADR. It has been described as an example of parties making use of a “neutral third-party facilitator,” which is something that can best be termed an “innominate category.” Footnote 52 Nevertheless, similar models have also been used in other European countries, including Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. These panels have heard claims relating to Nazi era dispossessions in a similar manner to the UK panel. The differences in procedure and substantive considerations have been compared by Annemarie Marck and Eelke Muller following the completion of questionnaires by the various panels. Footnote 53 Notable differences include the fact that the Austrian panel can only recommend restitution rather than what Marck and Muller describe as “‘compromising’ solutions,” such as compensation and presumably also the account of an object’s history. Footnote 54 Interestingly, different conclusions were reached in the UK and the Netherlands in claims that involved the same claimants and losses that took place in the same circumstances. Footnote 55
Even where the SAP has recommended the transfer of a cultural object under section 2 of the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009, and the secretary of state has approved this recommendation under this same section, only the governing body of the national museum has the power to transfer the object, and it is not obligated to do so. Of the national museums that were given such a power of transfer, only the trustees of the British Museum have expressly stated their approach to exercising this power. Footnote 56 The British Museum Policy on De-Accession of Registered Objects from the Collection states that even if the SAP recommends return and the secretary of state approves this, the trustees will make their own independent decision. Footnote 57
The policy then goes on to state several factors on which they would normally base their decision. First, the trustees will need to satisfy themselves not only that the claimants have a strong moral claim but also that they have the authority to represent all of the heirs of the original owner. Footnote 58 The second factor is particularly interesting because it effectively restricts the scope of the claims that would be effected through the transfer; return would normally be granted only where the object was lost “as the consequence of wrongful action of the National Socialist Government of Germany or its collaborators in Nazi occupied Europe.” Footnote 59 Consequently, had the Benevento missal remained in the British Museum rather than being transferred to the British Library in 1972, Footnote 60 it is unlikely that it would have been returned to Benevento under the power granted by section 2 of the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009. This declaration by the British Museum trustees of their own restriction of the way in which they can exercise the discretion under section 2 of the 2009 Act seems at odds with one of the conclusions of a recent independent panel review, which stated that it did not recommend any change to the panel’s terms of reference to “require the loss to be more closely linked to the actions of the Nazis or their allies.” Footnote 61
Previous compensation received by the claimant was the third factor that the British Museum trustees consider, such that a return would be unlikely to be put into effect if the claimants were deemed to have received just and fair compensation. Footnote 62 Finally, the trustees also consider a more controversial factor, which is the importance of the object to the museum. Thus, when exercising this power, the trustees must be satisfied that “the transfer of the object represented the best solution to the claim after giving due weight to the importance of the object to the Museum’s collection and circumstances in which the object was acquired by the Museum.” Footnote 63
In this way, the trustees take into account the public benefit derived from the cultural object, something that the SAP has not been prepared to take into account as an operative factor in its decision-making process. Footnote 64 Arguably, there are three aspects to this factor, which can be seen in two claims heard by the panel. First, the issue of the care and stewardship taken of the object while in the national museum’s care; second, the wide audience that an object within such a national collection can reach; and, third, the importance of the object to the museum in terms of its place within the collection as a whole. The first two of these aspects are clear from the panel’s response to arguments put forward in the claim regarding the Beneventan missal by the British Library. Footnote 65 In this case, the British Library suggested that the careful stewardship of the missal by the British Library staff, together with easier access to the missal for the public in a major collection such as the British Library was relevant to the issue of where the public interest should lie in the panel’s decision making. Footnote 66 However, the SAP was not prepared to treat such an issue as a decisive factor since it took the view that were it to take such an approach then this would “almost certainly defeat any claim for restitution against any of the national collections within our remit, and thus frustrate the Panel’s primary role as laid down in our terms of reference.” Footnote 67
Arguments relating to the importance of the object to the collection were advanced by the Tate Gallery in a claim involving a painting entitled Beaching a Boat, Brighton by John Constable. Footnote 68 In this case, the Tate juxtaposed the lack of emotional significance of the painting to the claimants (based on the supposed anomaly of this English painting within a primarily continental European collection and the fact that the claimants had sold some other restituted works) and the importance of the painting to the Tate. Footnote 69 Specifically, the Tate Gallery referred to the importance of the work to the gallery “as the major national repository of Constable’s work” and the fact that the painting was a preparatory sketch for another work in the Tate’s collection (Chain Pier, Brighton). Footnote 70 However, once again, the SAP was unwilling to accept the importance of the object as a “paramount consideration” when making its recommendation, because otherwise “the very principle of restitution of important works would be called into question.” Footnote 71
Overall, the SAP seems to assume that all objects within a national collection are of equal cultural value, as in the Tate Gallery/Constable claim it did not account for particular art historical value that may be achieved by seeing associated objects together. Footnote 72 I have argued elsewhere that the importance of an object to a collection might be relevant as a factor in the context of claims in three narrow circumstances, namely: “(1) where the object is a superlative example of a particular style or period; (2) where it is a unique object; or (3) where the object has a particular connection with other objects within the collection, with thus more context that adds to the value of the object.” Footnote 73
The way in which the SAP has been established as an ADR procedure without any sanction for non-compliance with its recommendations has the potential to dilute its effectiveness as a solution to the problem of Nazi era dispossessions. Furthermore, there is a certain fragility of giving the governing bodies of national museums merely the power to transfer objects rather than making it mandatory. The governing bodies of national museums have only been given a power to transfer because there is strong support for the independence of the governing bodies, free of political control. Footnote 74 This fragility is particularly evident in the context of the British Museum, Footnote 75 although it appears to be the only national museum to have adopted such a restrictive policy in this regard. Nevertheless, successful claimants, in practice, do not appear to have encountered problems with the enforceability of the panel’s recommendations, although, on some occasions, the exact terms of the panel’s recommended remedies have not been followed. These situations will be analyzed later in this article.
There may be a number of different reasons for the general atmosphere of compliance with the SAP’s recommendations. First, some claims are made in an environment of consensus where the respondent is content to return an object if the panel is content to recommend this course of action. In this way, the strength of the claimant’s moral claim is conceded in certain cases, or, in other cases, the factual evidence submitted by the claimants is not disputed by the respondents. Footnote 76 On occasion, the respondent and claimant come to the panel with a preferred solution that they are asking the panel to rubber stamp. This may be to request that an ex gratia payment be made by the government. Footnote 77 Even a wholly consensual claim would still need to be brought before the panel where the favored remedy specifies that a national museum return an object since the power of the museum’s governing body is only engaged following the panel’s recommendation. Footnote 78
Even if a claim is robustly defended by a respondent, but the return is ultimately recommended, there appears to be respect for the recommendations of the panel such that the content of its reports are followed in practice. This may be due in part to the professional commitment demonstrated by many museums to the principles relating to Nazi era dispossessions published by the National Museum Directors’ Conference (NMDC) Footnote 79 and the now disbanded Museums and Galleries Commission (MGC), Footnote 80 which is evident in the acquisition and disposal policies of many museums. Footnote 81
There is an argument for saying that were a respondent museum to fail to put into effect the SAP’s recommended remedy, then it would experience professional embarrassment caused by a failure to uphold the commitments stated in the NMDC or MGC principles. There is strong public support for the resolution of Nazi era claims, which is evident in the media that, when discussing the return of Nazi era cultural objects, uses the terminology of the return to the “rightful owners.” Footnote 82 Furthermore, there is a clear cross-party agreement on the importance of giving effect to the perceived moral obligation to address these historical wrongs that was clearly articulated not only in the Select Committee report of 2000, Footnote 83 and its follow-up report of 2003, Footnote 84 but also in the parliamentary debates on the passing of the bill that ultimately became the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009. In this context, it was described as a “friendly consensus on an important issue.” Footnote 85
In Practice
The discussion now focuses on the extent to which, in practice, the SAP’s recommendations have been followed by the parties. The analysis therefore is functional in order to assess the effectiveness of the panel’s recommendations in giving effect to a resolution of disputes involving Nazi era dispossessed objects. It was noted above how the narratives surrounding the resolution of Nazi era dispossessions of cultural objects have tended to center around the notion of restitution. The panel has a range of remedies that it can recommend, but where there is a strong moral claim, it generally takes the starting point that return would normally be recommended. This is clear from the very first claim brought before the panel, which was with respect to the Griffier painting in the possession of the Tate Gallery. In this case, it stated that “[h]aving upheld the claim in principle, our first option would be to recommend the return of the picture.” Footnote 86 This presumption in favor of the return appears to be based on the “powerful, and to our minds morally preponderant, consideration that those who lost possession of their property as a result of Nazi oppression should be entitled to its return where, as here, any alternative remedy is inappropriate, and so long as there is no legal impediment.” Footnote 87
The SAP appears reluctant to impose conditions on the claimants when recommending the return of a cultural object. For example, in the renewed claim in respect of the Benevento missal, Footnote 88 the panel was unwilling to stipulate, as conditions for transfer, that the British Library’s stewardship of the missal should be recognized and that its loss should be acknowledged even though the panel considered that “such recognition and acknowledgement are due.” Footnote 89 However, more recently, where the panel recommended return in the Tate Gallery/Constable claim, this was subject to the claimants returning to the German state the compensation that had been paid earlier to them to reflect the loss of the painting. Footnote 90 This was presumably to avoid the problems of the claimant being doubly compensated for his loss. Footnote 91 In a claim made against the Victoria and Albert Museum by the executors of Emma Budge, the panel, when recommending the return of three Meissen figures, invited the executors to use their discretion under the terms of the will to donate one of the figures to the Victoria and Albert Museum. Footnote 92 However, this invitation was not acceded to as the figures were returned to the claimants, and all three figures were sold at Bonhams auction house. Footnote 93
Where the SAP has recommended the return of objects, these recommendations have been acceded to, except in the case of a few selected cases, where there were specific reasons for not returning the cultural objects despite the panel’s recommendation. The first of these cases was the Glasgow City Council/Chardin claim, where the terms of the bequest under which the object, as part of the Burrell Collection, had been transferred to Glasgow City Council could not, in the opinion of the legal counsel to the city council, be altered to permit its return. Instead, the council made an ex gratia payment to the claimants. Footnote 94 In a subsequent decision involving the Burrell Collection, the panel made an alternative recommendation to implement were the council once again to receive legal advice that transfer from the collection was not permissible. Footnote 95
In the recent British Library/Biccherna Panel claim, the claimants sought return of the object, but the respondents were of the view that the claimants were prepared to accept an ex gratia payment in lieu of return. In its report, the SAP stated that it had no objection if the claimant agreed to compensation instead of return. Footnote 96 After the report, the British Library board agreed to de-accession the panel, Footnote 97 but the parties then agreed for compensation to be paid. The online collection states that: “The British Library did not contest the claim of the heirs but a mutually agreed sum was arranged between the heirs and the Library to ensure the official ownership was passed to the Library in January 2015.” Footnote 98
In some situations, return has been effected, but then the claimants donate works back to the respondent institution. This can be seen in the claim brought by the Feldmann heirs against the Courtauld Institute of Art, in which the parties had, prior to the submission of the claim to the panel, agreed that the drawings should remain in the Courtauld but wished for the claimants to be paid an ex gratia payment. Footnote 99 Since the payment of this sum was sought from the government, the parties brought the claim before the panel. Despite the parties’ preferred solution, the panel nevertheless recommended return rather than an ex gratia payment because the panel did not consider itself justified in recommending such a payment from the public purse where there would be insufficient public benefit derived from making such a payment because of the relative poor quality of the objects. Footnote 100 The Courtauld de-accessioned the three drawings pursuant to a charity commission order of 3 May 2007. Footnote 101 The heirs then donated one of the three drawings (A Dog Lying Down, which is attributed to Frans Van Mieris, the elder) to the Courtauld as a “symbol of friendship.” Footnote 102
In one claim, the initial recommendation of the SAP was questioned by the respondent when new evidence came to light. In the Tate Gallery/Constable claim, the Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery confirmed at its meeting of 21 May 2014 that it intended to exercise its power to de-accession the painting under section 2 of the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009. Footnote 103 However, new evidence came to light that led to the Tate referring the matter to the secretary of state, who, in turn, asked the panel to reconsider the claim in light of the new evidence. Footnote 104 Following a supplementary report by the panel that recommended return, Footnote 105 the Tate’s Board of Trustees unanimously agreed to follow the recommendation. Footnote 106
The SAP has recommended the payment by the government of an ex gratia payment in only two claims. In both instances, the moral circumstances of the claim would have been sufficiently strong to justify return, but, at the time, the national museums in question were prevented from transferring objects out of their collections even on moral grounds. Footnote 107 In both cases, it appears that the payments were made since this information has been recorded on the online catalogue entries for both objects. Footnote 108 The Feldmann heirs, whose claim against the British Museum was resolved by the payment of an ex gratia payment, have since resolved two further disputes with the British Museum on an informal basis, rather than making a claim to the panel. The claimants were content for the objects to remain in the museum, and the museum then made ex gratia payments to the heirs. Footnote 109
In two cases where the SAP has recommended that the British Museum display an account of an object’s history, this information is also available to view as part of the “Acquisitions Notes” on its online collection. Footnote 110 The Tate Gallery also includes the information relating to the object’s history with the painting by Jan Griffier, View of Hampton Court Palace, on its online collection. Footnote 111 Even though it was reported that the Glaser heirs were not prepared to accept the panel’s recommendation, Footnote 112 the Courtauld Institute of Art does display an account of the disputed objects’ history on the online catalogue entries. Footnote 113 In two recent claims, the panel has concluded that the sales were not forced sales carried out in the context of Nazi persecution, but it has nevertheless suggested that it would be appropriate to include an account of the objects’ history when the objects are displayed. In the case of a claim by the Oppenheimer heirs against Bristol City Council, the panel suggested that “without any obligation on the Council” that it would be “fitting to incorporate into the Painting’s narrative history when display the [claimants’] connection with the Painting.” Footnote 114 In the case of a claim by the Silberberg heirs against the Ashmolean museum, the panel recommended “the display alongside the Work, wherever it is, and in whatever medium, of an account of the history of the Work in the collection of its former owner during the Nazi era, and his tragic fate and that of his wife.” Footnote 115
CONCRETISING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
While the immediate implementation of the SAP’s recommendations might be important for the respondent museum to fulfill its obligations and to avoid the wrath of public opinion, arguably there are situations where, over time, the panel’s recommendations may fail to be implemented in their entirety. For example, where the recommendation is that the museum displays an account of the object’s history next to it when the object is publicly displayed, there may come a point in the future where the object is hung in a new location, but the curator fails to display the account of the object’s history. In such circumstances, it would arguably be difficult to enforce this element of the recommendation in the absence of any legal sanction (although, in many situations, it would probably be resolved by friendly consensus). Elsewhere, it has been argued that a means of addressing this is to recognize some form of moral title that would give the claimant a continuing entitlement to the treatment of the object that has been retained by the museum. Footnote 116 However, this notion of moral title would not have any legal force by itself. Footnote 117
A mechanism for encouraging museums to put in place the recommendations of the SAP might be to make it a requirement of a professional code of ethics, such as the Museums Association Code of Ethics (MACoE) Footnote 118 (or its accompanying guidance) or as part of the Accreditation Scheme run by the Arts Council. While there is no legal sanction for non-compliance with the code and guidance or contravention of the Accreditation Scheme, there are potential implications that can encourage compliance. The first relates to membership, the second to funding, and the third to professional pressure. Each of these will be considered in turn.
Where the Museums Association Disciplinary Committee finds a member guilty of misconduct (or there is an admission of guilt) such as a breach of the code or other guidelines approved by the association, Footnote 119 and it considers the member to be unfit or unsuitable to continue as a member, it can “cancel his or her membership; and if it considers appropriate, direct that the Member may not be re-admitted to membership for such period not exceeding five years as it thinks fit.” Footnote 120 In any other case the Museums Association Disciplinary Committee can either “reprimand” or “severely reprimand” a member who is guilty of misconduct. Footnote 121 This can provide a significant deterrent for others who might otherwise have engaged in similar conduct in the future.
The Museums Association has rarely used the sanction of expulsion since its establishment in 1889 and has only done so in the case of the Derbyshire County Council. Footnote 122 More recently, the Northampton Museums Service was barred from Museums Association membership for five years following the sale of an Egyptian statue of Sekhemka for financially motivated reasons that were in breach of the MACoE. Footnote 123 Two further local authority museums withdrew their membership before having it removed, Footnote 124 when the Museum Association’s Disciplinary Committee found that Bury Council’s decision to sell a painting by Lowry to reduce its financial deficit contravened the code. Footnote 125 As Bury Council had already resigned, the Disciplinary Committee severely reprimanded it, stating that any future application made by Bury to re-join the association would be referred to the Museum Association Council to ensure compliance with the code of ethics. Footnote 126 In September 2013, the Museum Association Ethics Committee recommended that Croydon Council should face disciplinary action over the proposed sale of items from the Riesco collection of Chinese objects. Footnote 127 The Croydon Council resigned from the Museums Association before any disciplinary hearing took place. Footnote 128
The potential negative effects of sanctions can encourage compliance. In addition to the loss of Museum Association, membership in the context of breaches of the code museums may also lose accredited status from the Arts Council. Footnote 129 This happened in the case of Northampton Museums Service, which, following the sale of the Egyptian statue of Sekhemka, was excluded from the scheme and prevented from participation in it for a further five years. Footnote 130 This can also mean loss of access to funding since compliance with the MACoE and/or accreditation will often be a prerequisite of funding. Footnote 131 Given the importance of external sources of funding for museums this potential effect of failure to uphold the principles of the code can provide an important incentive for compliance with the code’s provisions.
What has become apparent, particularly in recent times, is the strong museum sector support for discouraging museums from making financially motivated sales of their accessioned collection. This is particularly evident from the recent statement agreed by, among others, the Arts Council and the Museums Association, which has reconfirmed the position set out in the MACoE and the requirements of the Accreditation Scheme. Footnote 132 Sales motivated by financial reasons that do not follow the relevant procedures in guidelines provided by the Museums Association are considered to unethical and a breach of the public trust. Footnote 133 Consequently, where museums have been found to engage in such behavior, it has led to the disciplinary procedures mentioned above. In the context of Nazi era dispossessions, similar strongly worded support can be seen not only from the museum sector Footnote 134 but also from states through their commitment to international statements of principle such as the Washington Conference Principles and the subsequent declarations. Footnote 135 It is therefore arguable that such support might justify the Museum Association and the Arts Council adopting an approach that follows the recommendations of the panel as a breach of trust, justifying disciplinary procedures and implications for funding in the future.
CONCLUSION
While in structural terms there appears to be a potential for respondents not to follow the recommendations of the SAP because of the absence of any legal sanction for non-compliance, there nevertheless appears to be a respect for the panel’s recommendations in practical terms. The only situations in which the panel’s recommendations have not been followed have been where there has been a legal impediment to returning the object or where the parties have reached a consensus on a financial remedy instead of return. The only claim where transfer to the claimants was delayed is where new evidence came to light that meant that the panel revisited its earlier recommendation (although ultimately leaving it unchanged). The panel, as an alternative to litigation rather than as a process of litigation, has several notable advantages to litigation in that evidential barriers can be surmounted and that it can respond to moral claims that might otherwise not attract a remedy in a variety of different remedial ways. If the panel were to be given legal effect, then this could alter the way in which it handles such claims. One way to give further impetus to museums to follow the panel’s recommendations could be to make compliance with the panel’s recommendations an ethical requirement of the museum professions’ codes of ethics and as a requirement of the Accreditation Scheme. In this way, non-compliance could be met with disciplinary action under the Museum Association’s disciplinary procedure, and the loss of accredited status from the Arts Council would result in loss of funding opportunities.
