Es ist eine solche weiterentwickelte Transzendentalphilosophie, von der aus auch eine neue Weise der »christlichen Philosophie« entwickelt werden kann. Footnote 1
Richard Schaeffler
In short, ‘Christian philosophy’ dies if it repeats, defends, and preserves something acquired that is already known, and remains alive only if it discovers what would remain hidden in philosophy without it. Footnote 2
Jean Luc Marion
1. Introduction
As is well known, the answers to the questions ‘Is there a Christian philosophy?’, ‘What is Christian philosophy?’ and ‘Who is a Christian philosopher?’ have varied throughout the history of thought. If we understand philosophy as thinking without religious faith and without revelation, then Christian philosophy does not exist. However, insofar as thinking and the ‘love of wisdom’ and truth can also take place within the framework of religious faith, then it is legitimate to speak of Christian philosophy. The primary question, then, is how to understand and define philosophy itself. Only by answering this question will we be able to decide and judge whether there is a Christian philosophy.
So, can we consider the thinking of an author who thinks in faith and takes into account his own religious experience to be philosophical? Or must one who wishes to philosophize exclude some of his basic experience and pre-philosophical background? Must one who wants to philosophize renounce some of his beliefs and what he has acquired through tradition, culture, upbringing, reading, and religion? On what criteria do we determine what needs to be given up before we can philosophize? Or is there only one fundamental and decisive criterion and one requirement – is it necessary to give up faith and Christian revelation?
The study will focus on the German philosopher Richard Schaeffler (1926–2019). Schaeffler wanted to create a new transcendental philosophy by developing Kant’s thought and thereby a new form of Christian philosophy – a transcendental Christian philosophy. In his texts he not only sketched the contours of a possible Christian transcendental philosophy, but his philosophy is already just such a philosophy.
Why did Schaeffler choose and prefer transcendental philosophy? There are at least two main reasons. Transcendental theology wanted to solve two tasks in the twentieth century. With regards to theology, it was important that the Christian faith be given a new rational basis in the epoch of the ‘end of metaphysics’. The second task was for the secularized world to understand what we are talking about when we talk about God. Accomplishing these goals, according to Schaeffler, meant at the same time dealing with the new philosophical task of developing a transcendental philosophy and going beyond Kant. Schaeffler thus took up the two original tasks of twentieth-century transcendental theology and attempted to address them. However, this was not possible, he argued, without the creation of a newly developed transcendental philosophy.Footnote 3
From his point of view, transcendental philosophy enquires into the conditions that make it possible for our perception and thinking to encounter objects against which we can critically examine our subjective views and intentions.Footnote 4 According to Schaeffler, therefore, it is not a matter of restitution of ontology, but of understanding experience as a dialogue that can only be conducted with reality because this dialogue deciphered the claim of reality as the present form of a free divine address. In other words: every object of experience and its claim on our intuition (Anschauen) and thinking (Denken) can become a form in which God encounters human beings.Footnote 5
The aim of the study is to answer two questions: How did Schaeffler understand Christian philosophy, and what is specific about his Christian philosophy? In answering these questions, I will briefly compare Richard Schaeffler and Gianni Vattimo, who considered his philosophy to be Christian. The specific character of Christian philosophy – not only of Schaeffler’s – will be highlighted against the background of Vattimo’s philosophy, and the limits and deficiencies of Vattimo’s ‘Christian philosophy’ will be shown against the background of Schaeffler’s thought. It can certainly be argued that the term ‘Christian philosophy’ is problematic, vague, and understood in different senses, as we see in the case of these authors. Nevertheless, I believe that we can also use Schaeffler’s arguments to clarify why Vattimo’s pensiero debole cannot be considered Christian philosophy, even if Vattimo subscribes to it. Both authors are united by the epoch of the ‘end of metaphysics’ and the question of how to talk about God and understand Christianity in this epoch. Despite the common question, the answers differ – one is the Christian philosopher’s answer; the other is not. From my perspective, Schaeffler also undoubtedly contributes to clarifying the questions ‘What is Christian philosophy?’, ‘What is Christian philosophy definitely not and cannot be?’, and ‘Who is a Christian philosopher?’.
This article does not intend to provide a more extensive interpretation and detailed investigation of Schaeffler’s ‘Christian transcendental philosophy’ from which the reader can judge its potential for success. I believe that a more extensive study, a book chapter or a monograph, would be necessary to accomplish this goal.
2. Schaeffler’s understanding of Christian philosophy
According to Schaeffler, the term ‘Christian philosophy’ is suspected of wanting to rob philosophy of its self-determination. Either by forcing philosophy to accept statements of faith as premises, or, conversely, by giving theology the philosophical premises that theology needs for argumentation. The German philosopher thought that a philosophy can be called ‘Christian’ when it fulfils three criteria: 1. when the statements of Christian faith have helped it to find philosophically relevant phenomena, problems, and ways of arguing; 2. when its results can help theology to acquire (gain) a critical self-understanding; and 3. when this philosophy, in the event of a conflict with theology, attempts a dialogue.Footnote 6 It is noteworthy that Schaeffler does not mention in these three criteria of ‘Christian philosophy’ that the Christian philosopher believes in God and has a personal relationship with God. He speaks of this later in his confessio in the text Bin Ich ein christlicher Philosoph? which I will discuss below.
Schaeffler agreed that the contents of faith (Glaubensinhalte) or the truths of faith (Glaubenswahrheiten) cannot be premises in philosophical arguments. They can, however, fulfil the role and function of stellae rectrices – that is, they help to reveal philosophically important aspects of reality and are helpful (guiding) in philosophical questioning and argumentation. He also gives concrete examples – personality, historicity, and human culpability – and in these examples, we can see the influence and importance of the Christian message for European philosophical thought. The stellae rectrices, Leitsterne, or ‘guiding stars’ are comparable to the stars by means of which a mariner navigates – the stars do not prescribe the destination of a voyage; they only help to navigate on the sea. The navigator is free to determine and choose the destination. Therefore, in the context of philosophy, Leitsterne do not predetermine the outcome of philosophical work; the philosopher is only alerted to phenomena and problems he can/should think about, which questions he should not neglect, and possibly which methods he can use.
Kant and Hegel, according to Schaeffler, are examples of philosophers for whom the statements of the Christian faith had the character of Leitsterne, not the character of a premise or presupposition in philosophical argumentation. For Kant, this was primarily the Christian doctrine of the sinner’s justification; for Hegel, the message of the death of Jesus as Tod des Todes. At the same time, their philosophy can be helpful to theology. Schaeffler specified that the term Leitsterne must be understood correctly and precisely, and for this reason he reminded us that both philosophers concentrated on such statements of faith that are central for Christianity (the doctrine of justification, the message of the crucifixion, etc.). From these central, crucial, and fundamental statements they gained the impetus for the novelty of their philosophical thought. At the same time, their philosophy was not only a stimulus for theology but also reason for a new orientation, e.g., in redefining the relationship between knowledge, opinion, and faith.
Understandably, to take theological suggestions means for philosophy to grasp, take up, and interpret the statements of faith philosophically. Schaeffler therefore asks an important question: What if the philosophical interpretation of the Christian message is theologically incorrect and contradicts the faith? He thought that we can only speak of a ‘Christian philosophy’ when it is able, in the event of a controversy with theology, to enter into rational discourse with it. A philosophy that interprets the statements of the Christian faith in a philosophical way is to accept the arguments of theology as an aid to critical self-reflection. The philosopher is to examine whether he has ‘seen the phenomena and problems clearly enough’ and whether his argumentative procedure is adequate to those phenomena.Footnote 7 Thus, philosophy can be considered Christian when the central statements of the Christian faith are stellae rectrices for it and when it can accept critique and help from theology. For this reason, Schaeffler speaks of the mutual Leitstern-Funktion of philosophy and theology, which is an important characteristic of ‘Christian philosophy’.
The fact is that the philosophers, Kant and Hegel, in addition to being inspired by Christianity, interpreted some religious statements in a specific way and did not share the traditional religious interpretation (Kant’s Christology, Hegel’s Geistmetaphysik). From this fact, we can conclude that a philosopher may fail to see or may overlook a phenomenon or a complex of phenomena in its complexity and not accept theological suggestions and criticisms. Be that as it may, as mentioned, philosophy can be considered Christian if it meets all three criteria, which means that it engages in a dialogue with theology and considers theological interpretation as philosophically relevant.
Schaeffler therefore wondered whether a theological critique of Kant’s and Hegel’s thought could serve philosophy like Leitstern, since the theologian is able to draw the philosopher’s attention to a ‘complex of phenomena’ that the philosopher – to his own detriment – does not take into account. For example, it is insufficient if the philosopher understands sin only as a moral condition of an individual, since sin also concerns the sinful world. As long as the philosopher takes this fact into account, he can, according to Schaeffler, recognise ‘traces of this state of the world in many of his own experiences’.Footnote 8 In this way, the philosopher understands and sees that overcoming this condition cannot only happen within the soul, but also in the world. Every Christology – theological and philosophical – is deficient if it cannot interpret (expound) the relation to the world and its history. Schaeffler therefore concludes:
The theological critique of Kant’s philosophical Christology can remind philosophy of its own task, to think the dialectic of the practical use of reason and its resolution through postulates of hope in such a way that both are freed from their individualistic narrow-mindedness and allow their relationship to the world and its history to be recognised.Footnote 9
At the same time, Schaeffler asked a crucial question: Can a critical analysis of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy open the way to a ‘future philosophy’ that will present itself as a ‘Christian philosophy’? In other words: Can the Christian message be the Leitstern for a philosophy that is based on a critique of Kant and Hegel but at the same time develops their philosophy and moves beyond it, transcends it? It is clear, then, that he gives Kant as an example not by accident, but in order to consider a transcendental type of philosophy that will develop Kant’s philosophy in such a way that this philosophy will take into account the biblical message and religious experience and will understand God as liberating. And this philosophy can be regarded as a Christian philosophy.
3. Schaeffler’s own path
In 1995, Austrian philosophy professor Heinrich Schmidinger published a text entitled Christliche Philosophie.Footnote 10 In it, he stated that Schaeffler is an example of a philosopher who repeatedly and explicitly refers to the Judeo-Christian tradition in his publications. Yet Schaeffler does not use the term ‘Christian philosophy’ because he is aware of the problematic character of the term. However, according to Schmidinger, it would not be entirely misguided and erroneous for an interpreter to characterise Schaeffler’s philosophising as Christian philosophising.
In 2004, Schaeffler responded to Schmidinger’s text with the article Bin Ich ein christlicher Philosoph? – he asked himself whether he would consider being a Christian philosopher.Footnote 11 In answering this question, he drew on Franz Brentano’s second and third habilitation theses of 1866:
Philosophia et eos, qui eam principia sua a theologia sumere volunt, et eos rejicere debet, qui, nisi sit supernaturalis revelatio, eam omnem operam perdere contendunt. Nihilominus verum est, sententias in theologia probatas eas esse, quae philosophiae quasi stellae rectrices sint. Footnote 12
Schaeffler begins his answer with a confessiones – he confesses what he believes and what his faith means for him. He believes in one God; he believes in God as a person and in his faithfulness; he believes in Jesus Christ who died and was resurrected from the dead and in the One who can justify the sinner. He believes in the Spirit who ‘makes alive’ and who has spoken through the prophets.
What does faith mean to him and what does he gain through it? First of all, he gains from faith ‘confidence in experience’ – faith is the basis of this confidence. For Schaeffler, faith was the starting point in approaching the world, the source of the courage to surrender and to trust experience, even when it is unpredictable. On the basis of faith, he approaches reality in a specific way: ‘every claim of reality that I experience can be the phenomenal form of the claim that God makes on me’.Footnote 13 He is able to realise a particular experience only when he assumes the claim of reality, responds to that claim and remains open to it in each new life situation. He is aware that his theoretical and practical response (Antwort auf diesen Anspruch) is only provisional, thus remaining open to a change of thinking and new experiences.
Through faith he is aware that the tasks set by reason are greater than the power to accomplish those tasks; this does not mean resignation, however, but a position of ‘staying on the path of truth’, of being faithful to the truth even in the face of failure. In doing so, Schaeffler also believes in God’s faithfulness, in which he finds the basis of his own identity and the continuity of his path (in Vattimo’s words, he can ‘collect’ himself). For Schaeffler, faith is the source of the strength by which he is able to endure the unpredictability of life, change and the events of personal history. Thanks to faith, the world as a whole, his subjectivity, his personal history and the history of which he is a part, do not ‘fall apart’. Faith is the source of hope that, as a sinner in a sinful world, he can find new possibilities for moral action. Faith does not allow one to resign before the demands of reality or to avoid them. It is always important to look for the words with which to speak the truth.
What implications did this belief have for Schaeffler’s philosophy and how did it fulfil the function of stellae rectrices? Faith is not merely a psychological aid to help the individual better understand his roles in life and have the courage to fulfil them. Faith, according to Schaeffler, shows the criteria by which a person can find out, verify, and test whether he has really accomplished these tasks. For only when I have criteria and a measure, can I know whether my theoretical views were right or false and whether my practical actions were wrong or good, moral, or immoral.
A philosophy that seeks these criteria is a theory of experience, asking about the conditions of possibility of experience – it is therefore a transcendental philosophy. The Christian message allows the hearers to name a foundation to which they can confide in a contingent experience; ‘listening to the message of faith becomes a guide to stand on that foundation, which at the same time proves to be the condition for building the context of possible experience’.Footnote 14
In this sense, faith becomes the guiding star for the philosopher questioning the subjective and objective conditions of the possibility of experience. According to Schaeffler, the Christian message is important for philosophy because it reveals something new and relevant for philosophy – we learn essential truths about our experience, its conditions and what attitude the subject must take in order to be able to realise experience. It is clear, then, that from Schaeffler’s point of view the Christian message is crucial precisely for philosophical questions about our experience. How are we to ask the right questions about our experience? How are we to answer these questions correctly? How is experience even possible? What are the conditions of possibility of experience? We can also ask other questions.
To answer these questions properly, according to Schaeffler, is to develop Kant’s philosophy together with its integral part, the doctrine of the postulates of reason. From Kant, the new transcendental philosophy can take the idea that postulatory rational belief is necessary when reason encounters its limits, when it finds no way out, and when it wants to resolve its own dialectic. Schaeffler wanted to develop Kant’s doctrine of the postulates of reason while preserving what is specific to faith and religious experience and what is at the same time significant and relevant to philosophy. Understandably, the question can be asked to what extent the doctrine of the postulates is philosophically relevant, defensible, and sustainable today. Can we claim that it is ‘a concept that is undoubtedly one of the most ambitious metaphysical concepts at present’?Footnote 15 Or is the idea of rational faith and the postulate of God philosophically outdated, obsolete, and unsustainable today? This is a separate problem, however, which I cannot address here, but which undeniably deserves attention and careful consideration.
Schaeffler argued that in the case of Kant and Hegel, ‘Christian philosophy’ had reached a certain stage. He therefore wanted to go with ‘Kant beyond Kant’ in his thinking and spoke of the necessity of a ‘Christian philosophy, which is developed beyond the level reached by Kant and Hegel’.Footnote 16 In this way, he indicates his own philosophical path and sketches some of the contours of such a philosophy: This philosophy will speak of God’s freedom as ‘liberating freedom’, will speak of the verbum externum, and will conceive of a human being as ‘a hearer of the Word’.
4. Specifics of Schaeffler’s Christian philosophy and comparison with Vattimo
In this section, I will focus on the specifics of Schaeffler’s Christian philosophy, comparing it with the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo, who regarded himself as a Christian philosopher. Schaeffler did not engage with Vattimo’s philosophy; he was not even aware of Vattimo’s philosophy, and the reverse is also true. It is not possible to cover all the problems and issues concerning their differences, given the vastness and complexity of these problems. I shall therefore deal only with the criteria of Christian philosophy and the relationship between philosophy, theology, and faith. In doing so, I will attempt to answer the questions posed in the introduction: How did Schaeffler understand Christian philosophy? What is specific about his Christian philosophy? Why did he prefer a transcendental approach?
4.1. Criteria of Christian philosophy
There is undoubtedly a possibility to understand Christian philosophy in different ways, and in this case, we could consider, e.g., KantFootnote 17 or NietzscheFootnote 18 as Christian philosophers. The classification of a particular philosopher as a ‘Christian philosopher’, therefore, depends above all on its definition or on its historical context. If Schaeffler did not claim that theology is the Leitstern for Christian philosophy, the term ‘Christian philosophy’ would be vague, very broad, because the philosophical adoption of religious motifs and the dialogue of philosophy with theology does not imply or guarantee that this philosophy is Christian. I will give an example and compare it with Schaeffler. Gianni Vattimo was strongly inspired by Christianity. He called his philosophy ‘Christian’, but it is fundamentally different from the ‘Christian philosophy’ of, e.g., Marion and Schaeffler.
Vattimo writes that ‘postmodern nihilism is the up-to-date form of Christianity. Therefore, weak thought is the only Christian philosophy on the market. The market, though, doesn’t give a hoot’.Footnote 19 In an interview, Vattimo responded to the question of whether he would describe himself as a Christian philosopher as follows:
I have never had any doubt that the only true Christian philosophy that is genuinely practicable today would be the kind I have elaborated, for a number of reasons that we have already touched upon. ‘Weak thought’ is a secularisation of Christian thought, which it does not relinquish but rather actualises: for this reason, I would define myself in Christian terms today in the sense of someone who has inherited the idea of kenosis, the idea of reducing the violence that is bound up with the claims to objectivity, and above all the idea of charity.Footnote 20
Another of Vattimo’s ideas, corresponding to Schaeffler’s, is remarkable too: ‘my Catholic background and training has always given me an ability to “collect myself”, to avoid getting lost in the most diverse and various kinds of experience’.Footnote 21
Sure, Vattimo may consider himself a Christian philosopher, but in his case, there is a specific understanding of Christian philosophy, Christianity, and reality. Vattimo sets himself apart from the tradition of Augustine, Aquinas, Maritain, or Marion. The biblical texts unquestionably helped him to find philosophically relevant phenomena, a specific way of arguing and interpreting. His philosophy draws heavily on the biblical tradition and can at certain points be inspirational for theology. However, the Italian philosopher does not meet an important criterion for Christian philosophy – theology is not the Leitstern for his philosophy.
Thomas G. Guarino stated:
His religious identity, therefore, despite his continuing fascination with Christianity, is entirely reconceived according to his own philosophical faith, a faith that cannot see the ‘unconditioned’ revealed in historical conditionality. (..) Because of his commitments to Heidegger and Nietzsche, one may legitimately suspect that a theological dialogue with Vattimo simply exemplifies the ancient axiom bibere venenum in auro, drinking poison from a golden cup – which is simply to say that while his work sounds beguilingly Christian, hidden poison lurks beneath the seductive and coquettishly ‘charitable’ message. Even with this said, however, Vattimo’s personal attraction to Christianity cannot be denied. And does he not stand where many men and women of our day stand – but perhaps even closer to Christianity, precisely because he is willing to give Christ some hearing?Footnote 22
Vattimo is and can be understood as an example of a non-Christian philosopher par excellence, as a radical contrast to Schaeffler’s understanding of the Christian philosopher, even if the Italian philosopher is considered a Christian author or a theorist of Christianity, and his contribution to theology or Christian thought is appreciated.Footnote 23 From my point of view, therefore, Vattimo’s philosophy is a unique example of what – from Schaeffler’s point of view – Christian philosophy certainly is not and can never be.
It is not possible to go into Vattimo’s philosophy in detail here, so I will only briefly mention that Vattimo interprets the Judeo-Christian message outside the original religious-theological framework and thus outside the framework of traditionally understood Christian philosophy.Footnote 24 The attitude and position of the Christian philosopher is fundamentally different: Resurrection, redemption, eternal life, hope, and original sin are not for him figments of the imagination, rhetorical ‘figures’ or the content of a message that comes from the past but is without real foundation and support. Schaeffler would certainly never say with Vattimo that ‘when I pray, I know precisely that the words I am using are not intended to convey some literal truth. I pray these words more for the love of a tradition than I do for the love of some mythic reality’.Footnote 25
It can be argued that Schaeffler fulfils the criteria by which he can be considered a Christian philosopher – in addition to the criteria he himself formulated, he also meets the criteria of the aforementioned Heinrich Schmidinger. In a 1995 text, Schmidinger listed three conditions that must be met by Christian philosophy – or more precisely, ‘a theory that is to be called Christian philosophy’.Footnote 26
The first condition is that such a theory must indeed be a philosophy, and anything that does not meet this requirement is either theology or a scientifically incorrect approach. The second condition is that there must be a substantive relationship between philosophy and Christianity in such a theory. If such a relationship does not exist, then the concept contains nothing significant or weighty; it becomes an empty concept. In this case, the term ‘Christian philosophy’ is no more meaningful than, for example, the terms ‘Christian mathematics’, ‘Christian geography’, and so on. According to the third criterion, this theory must deal with problems that directly and immediately concern both philosophy and the Christian religion.Footnote 27 Schaeffler’s thought meets all of these criteria.
However, I take Schaeffler’s criterion to be the key criterion for Christian philosophy – theology is to be the Leitstern for Christian philosophy. For this reason, he considered interrelated issues and posed several questions concerning the relationship between faith, theology, and philosophy. What is the relationship of Christian philosophy to theology? Should theology be the norm for this philosophy?Footnote 28 Does faith need philosophy? What kind of philosophy does faith need? What theology does faith need? What philosophy does theology need?
In particular, the German philosopher asked:
The question: Which philosophy does theology need? is therefore the question: Which philosophy is suitable to show theology ways to fulfil its hermeneutical-critical task? In this context, the question can also be asked: Is transcendental philosophy one of the philosophies suitable for such a service to theology?Footnote 29
4.2. The relationship of philosophy, theology, and faith in Christian philosophy
Schaeffler thought that the path that philosophy must take in order to fulfil its critical-hermeneutical service to faith and theology leads – as already indicated – to the development of Kant’s thought. He outlines the form of a transcendental philosophy out of which Christian philosophy may be developed.
It is such a further developed transcendental philosophy from which a new way of ‘Christian philosophy’ can also be developed. It will be a philosophy that justifies the courage of the subject to expose itself to the claim of being even when this claim constantly breaks the forms of its perception and thinking anew. To put it more succinctly, it will be a philosophy that bases the courage to experience on a hope that, as is always the nature of hope, is as different from the subject’s arrogance as it is from its despair. And it will be a philosophy that finds the justification for such a ‘transcendental’, i.e., experience-enabling hope in the fact that it recognises in the ‘ever greater’ claim of things, (..) the present and appearance form of the Deus semper maior – a God who, to use a word from the hymn of the Old Testament Channah, not only ‘kills’, but thereby ‘makes alive’. (1 Sam 2:6)Footnote 30
The above quotation brings together in a concise yet very concentrated form the main themes, core and ‘optics’ of Schaeffler’s Christian transcendental philosophy: 1. The understanding of the subject who exposes himself to the claim of being and responds to this claim; 2. The understanding of forms of perception and thought that can be ‘broken down’ and re-constituted, shaped; 3. An understanding of a hope that overcomes the subject’s despair and doubt – it is a hope that makes experience possible; and 4. An understanding of a God who can be recognised in our encounter with reality, a God who is animating and liberating, not annihilating.
It is evident that this type of thinking is fundamentally at odds with the supposed ‘Christian philosophy’ of pensiero debole. Schaeffler has often pointed out that philosophers may be convinced that they are talking about the God of faith, but believers do not recognise in Him the God of revelation. This is because the philosopher may lose the context in which (as the only one) one can speak of the God of faith. The German philosopher distinguished between faith, theology, and philosophy and proceeded from the thesis ‘faith thinks and has a proper rationality’. But the fact that faith thinks also implies difficulties, because human thinking is capable of error, and the thinking of faith can go astray. The believer may not realise that his interpretation of reality can become incoherent, and the content he is talking about loses its specifically religious character.
The Bible calls this loss of reference to the object of religious speech (Gegenstandsbezug) kenophonia – the production of empty sound waves, vain words, words into the void. The believer does not notice that everything he says sounds pious and profound, but on closer examination we see he is no longer talking about anything. The above situation is, according to Schaeffler, the point at which the theologian and the philosopher are to be helpful to faith – to give it criteria by which it can see whether it has retained or already lost the specific character of the believer’s thought. Schaeffler adds that ‘the accusation of kenophonia, to which not only philosophical but also theological discourse on God is exposed today, cannot be recognised and, if necessary, rejected without philosophical reflection’.Footnote 31
If we look at Vattimo’s ‘Christian philosophy’ through this optic, then we see that Vattimo has removed himself from the context in which it is possible to speak of the God of faith; his thinking has lost the specificity of the believer’s thinking, and he has committed kenophonia. For these reasons, as a philosopher, he cannot be helpful to faith; ‘Vattimo, however, empties Christianity of its uniqueness, offering religion not a purifying critique’.Footnote 32
It can be argued that a well-developed transcendental philosophy in the form of Christian philosophy can avoid the above-mentioned errors – not only can it help the believing mind to understand its own character more clearly and not lose that character, but it also recognises the importance of enriching faith with reason and reason with faith, so that they do not stand weakened and impoverished in relation to one another, as the encyclical Fides et ratio states.Footnote 33
Bernd Irlenborn points to Schaeffler’s understanding of reason, which I take to be crucial in this context because reason focuses on objectively valid knowledge. This understanding coincides with the encyclical Fides et ratio and differs from the four other understandings of reason.
Firstly, from an unhistorical model of reason; secondly, from Hegel’s absolutisation; thirdly, from a dissolution of reason into mere ‘forms of reasonableness’; fourthly, from the depotentiation of reason into a procedural rationality. The last two understandings are only associated with the idea of a ‘weak reason’, which, as the encyclical rightly emphasises, is of no benefit to either faith or philosophy. Reason is understood both in Schaeffler’s philosophy and in Fides et Ratio as a principle-reflecting instance that is orientated towards what is objectively valid and thereby refers in a regulative way to the unconditional, the unity of truth.Footnote 34
In contrast to the pensiero debole, transcendental philosophy inquiries into the conditions of the possibility of objective validity, and objective validity extends to the realm of religion, faith, and religious experience, too. According to Schaeffler, every kind of experience transforms subjective experiences into contents of objectively valid cognition by assigning the individual contents a place in the ordered context of experience. But each type of experience does this in a specific way. If we ask the question: What is real for us to the extent that it establishes our attachment to reality in general? Then for Vattimo this primary reality is interpretations (present and past, religious, philosophical, scientific, within a certain paradigm), and for Schaeffler it is a reality that – although interpreted – exists independently of us (outside the paradigm and interpretations) and resists misinterpretation. The German philosopher uses the expression Maßgeblichkeitsanspruch der Gegenstände. The expression maßgeblich can be translated into English as directive, determining, leading, significant, hence the term ‘directionality’, which well describes and helps to understand his intention. It is the objects themselves that make the claim to ‘directionality’; they are determinative, independent, self-contained, those that give the measure; they have priority over the claim of the subject, who must not subjectively destroy them.
The question concerning objectively valid knowledge is an important issue in transcendental philosophy, and Christian transcendental philosophy differs radically from ‘weak thought’ on this point. This distinction is crucial, since the two approaches have different understandings of humanity’s relation to reality and to the objects of religious experience, which understandably has implications for determining and defining the relationship between faith, theology, and philosophy.
5. Conclusion
From Schaeffler’s perspective, Christian philosophy is characterised by the convergence and coherence of faith, theology, and philosophy. The Christian philosopher is a hearer of the Word; his listening is denkendes Hören, and he must fulfil three conditions: 1. The statements of the Christian faith have helped him to find philosophically relevant phenomena, problems, and ways of arguing; 2. The results of his philosophy can help theology to acquire a critical self-understanding; and 3. His philosophy attempts a dialogue in the case of conflict with theology and accepts the statements of theology as Leitstern.
Other characteristics of Schaeffler’s transcendental Christian philosophy, based on his reflections and texts, can also be listed. 1. Transcendental Christian philosophy does not involve the dissolution of religion in philosophy or the transformation of religion into philosophy. 2. This philosophy conceives of the world as self-contained; we may say that it is the defender and protector of the claim of reality. 3. It resolutely rejects the claim that ‘the meaning of Christianity as a message of salvation consists above all in dissolving the peremptory claims of reality’, as Vattimo thought.Footnote 35 4. He does not accept the idea that the claim to objectivity is a violence; rather, it is a violence not to respect that claim. 5. In contrast to the pensiero debole, transcendental philosophy investigates the conditions of possibility of objective validity, and objective validity extends to the realm of religion, faith, and religious experience.
Schaeffler, as the author of a new version of transcendental philosophy, renovates and develops Kant’s idea of postulates. The postulated God he speaks of in his philosophical theology is not different from the God of revelation for three reasons: 1. The pre-philosophical starting point of the developed transcendental philosophy is the reading of the Bible and the faith in Revelation; 2. Schaeffler’s transcendental philosophy is ‘in the service’ of faith and theology; and 3. Theology is the Leitstern for this philosophy.
I believe – and I agree with Schaeffler – that a Christian philosophy is possible. It is not a contradictio in adiecto, provided, of course, that we consider it philosophical to accept both the pre-philosophical starting point of faith and the help of theology. Christian philosophy is then ‘philosophizing in faith’. I understand Christian philosophy to be a philosophy of the Word and of the Book – in the sense of being addressed by the Word, receiving the Word, reading the Word and being transformed by the Word. The Christian philosopher is Hörer des Wortes.
It is not possible in this paper to deal with further questions and especially problems concerning Schaeffler’s Christian transcendental philosophy. Among them are, for example, the following: Why is it important from Schaeffler’s point of view to combine a transcendental way of thinking with phenomenology and linguistic analysis? What is the superiority of a transcendental-philosophical talk about God over an analytic one? What is specific to the transcendental-philosophical conception of God? How did Schaeffler reinterpret the proofs of God? Several of these questions have already been answered by other authors.Footnote 36
Finally, one more remark. Schaeffler’s thought opens up a discussion on the possibility of reconstructing not only a new form of Christian transcendental philosophy by developing Kant’s conception, but also the concept of the postulates of reason in the philosophy of religion. In 2012, he argued that by not attempting a critical reception of Kantian arguments, the Church abandons an indispensable tool that offers society a service that only believers can offer. It is ‘a service to subjectivity that still determines the consciousness of contemporaries, (..) but has become uncertain of itself and therefore oscillates between scientific boldness and skeptical despair’.Footnote 37
According to Schaeffler, this threat – the oscillation between boldness and despair – is dangerous for all spheres of social life and therefore urgent to overcome. The solution lies in a new understanding of subjectivity: subjectivity understood as the real and effective expression, image, and manifestation of divine lawmaking.
Thus, postulatory faith proves to be an irrefutable requirement in the current decisive hour of European history. (..) Postulatory faith and the Christian message can interpret each other in this way. And the present crisis of human subjectivity is not only the hour of postulatory faith in God, but also the moment in which Christian faith proves its significance for human beings and their destiny in a new way: it is this faith that promises human beings the acceptance that allows them to accept their mission courageously, but without hubris. Then this faith also becomes the source of salvation again in the moment of crisis of the human being and his subjectivity.Footnote 38
Are we, then, in the hour of the necessity, importance, or inevitability of postulatory faith? Can the concept of postulatory rational faith be reconstructed only within the framework of Christian transcendental philosophy, or are postulates also possible in a non-religious type of thought, even if only as ‘die abgemagerten Postulate eines Vernunftglaubens’ – ‘the emaciated postulates of a rational faith’?Footnote 39 Skinny and poor, but important nonetheless.
Can we conclude and agree with Habermas that Kant’s philosophy of religion, despite its deficiencies, is relevant to the present?
Nevertheless, the constructive intention of Kant’s philosophy of religion still deserves our interest if we want to know what we can learn from the articulating power of world religions for the use of practical reason under conditions of post-metaphysical thinking.Footnote 40
To answer these questions is to go beyond the intent of this article, which has a more modest goal.
Funding statement
This research was funded by Scientific Grant Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Academy of Sciences, grant number VEGA 1/0279/23 How to Think the World? The Limits of Thinking the World in the Philosophy of History (Ako myslieť svet? Limity myslenia sveta vo filozofii dejín.) and by Educational Grant Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic, grant number KEGA 020UKF-4/2023 Innovation of teacher education programmes in Religious Education, Ethics and Citizenship Education with a focus on the competences development.
