As the author says in the introduction, “this not a book about Spain . . . [I]t is a story of political economy and war [in Europe] in the tumultuous 1930s” (p. 2). I would dare to add that it is, above all, a story of an outstanding individual—Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who played several key positions in the German economy in the 1920s and 1930s—and one of his projects, the creation of an informal empire in Spain in the late 1930s.
It is somehow surprising then that half of the introduction, which deals with current political debates and controversies in Spain about her Civil War (e.g., the political use of the past by politicians and individuals), is full of (political) opinions and has nothing to do with the contents of this book (pp. 1–8). The reader learns only on page 9 what this book is about.
Pierpaolo Barbieri wants to demonstrate that Spain is still different, and chapter 1 provides proof of his attempt. Covering many topics, and relying on an outdated bibliography, the author depicts a country on the eve of July 1936 that resembles the one described by Gerald Brenan in Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (1943). It cannot be sustained, for example, that Spanish agriculture “remained trapped in Roman times” and a look at James Simpson's book Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765–1965 (1996) could have allowed the author to draw a different picture (p. 23). Readers can find some really odd references—for example, endnote 49 quotes an early-eighteenth-century book on the arancel—but any academic reference to the tariff policy of Spain in the nineteenth century is missing (p. 268). Finally, the picture of Spanish industry is too simplistic, to say the least—Biscayan metallurgy was not in the hands of foreign firms, and certainly not in the hands of Rio Tinto, for example (p. 24). Readers can skip this chapter and go directly to chapter 2, where the real—and very good—book starts.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the origins of the Civil War in Spain and the military coup of July 1936, written from the perspective of the main international powers at that moment: France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy. Here the author begins to show his command of the international bibliography and of different archival sources, which he continues to do throughout the rest of the book. Barbieri successfully manages to introduce the reader to mid-1930s international relations in Europe.
Chapters 3 to 7 deal with the man who is, beyond any doubt, the protagonist of this book: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht (1877–1970), depicted as “Germany's economic dictator” by the international media and as “Nazi Germany's economic overlord” by Keynes (pp. 76, 249). In chapter 3, Barbieri describes Schacht's academic formation, which included a PhD in economics; his economic ideas and jobs, first in private banking and then, from 1923, as president of Germany's central bank; and his key roles, first in the stabilization of the German mark, later as the main international interlocutor of the Weimar Republic. Chapters 4 and 5 track his rise within the Nazi regime to the position of Economics Minister in 1934. They also trace the genesis of Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War and Schacht's plans to make Spain a sort of “informal colony” of the German empire—and the means he employed, mainly through the creation of private companies such as Compañía Hispano-Marroquí de Transportes (HISMA) and Rohstoffeund-Waren-Einkausfsgesellschaft (ROWAK). In chapters 6 and 7, Barbieri describes the political fight between Schacht and Hermann Göring within the Nazi cabinet that eventually resulted in Schacht's resignation in November 1937 (although he continued as president of the Reichsbank until 1939). The author also outlines the course of German intervention in Spain afterwards.
The final two chapters of the book offer two interesting international comparisons that, in the end, “underscore the uniqueness of the Nazi project on Iberian soil” (p. 198). In chapter 8, Barbieri makes very clear that, contrary to the German intervention in Spain, which was primarily led by economic considerations (outlined by Schacht), Italy's reasons were mainly and foremost political. The author explains how the Franco government greatly benefited from Mussolini's generosity. The last chapter compares Germany's informal empire in Spain with the formal one built in Eastern and Northern Europe during World War II. Here the author emphasizes that the “shadow empire” in Spain continued to play a key role in the German war effort—a role even more important than that of most of the occupied territories. However, it was the beginning of World War II that resulted in the decline of German hegemony in Spain, due partly to inefficient management by the Nazi government of its relationship with Spain (something that was pointed out by Schacht himself to Hitler in 1938) and partly to British and American diplomatic maneuvers to get Spain to side with the Allies. In other words, the final course of events eventually showed that it was Schacht, and not Göring, who was right; this is stressed again in the conclusion. So far, so good—but the author goes on to describe Schacht's project as an avant la lettre version of an “integrated” Europe, a risky anachronism that makes me wonder if the “old wizard” Schacht (as he described himself in his autobiography) has not in fact captivated the author (pp. 15, 255).
Barbieri says that “this study challenges the view that Germany's informal empire in Spain [w]as a mere ‘failure,’” as scholars such as Christian Leitz and Rafael García Pérez have argued (pp. 15, 253). However, after reading this book, I still believe that this is the overall conclusion to be reached and, moreover, that the books of those authors, widely quoted and employed in this book, continue to be the key references on this issue. Nevertheless, Barbieri originally and masterfully shows the political economy of this informal empire in Nazi Germany and the ideological and political battle between the two political figures behind it, Schacht and Göring.
The book is very well written and makes easy reading, always combining details and anecdotes with in-depth analysis of issues such as international relations in the interwar years, German politics in the 1920s and 1930s, and the motivations for German (and Italian) intervention in the Spanish Civil War. With the exception of chapter 1, Barbieri takes an international perspective of all the facts and events analyzed. The book draws on relevant archival sources from Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom and an extensive bibliography in five different languages. However, many Spanish works on issues related in this book are missing, including Elena Martínez's reconstruction of Spanish foreign trade statistics during the Civil War (2006); Pablo Díaz's book Horacio Echevarrieta, 1870–1963: El capitalista republicano (1998), which covers Canaris's activities in Spain since the late 1920s and his links with influential Spanish businessmen; and Jesús Valdaliso's book on the Aznar family, tightly connected with the German interests in Spain, which addresses Göring's unsuccessful attempts to buy new Spanish companies (La familia Aznar y sus negocios, 2006).
Overall, Hitler's Shadow Empire is a good book, although not one of great relevance to business historians—except as a reminder of the importance of outstanding individuals in shaping the rules of the game in which businesses are developed. It does not substantially change our picture of the Spanish Civil War, either. Its main contribution lies in its detailed account of the politics and economics of German intervention in Spain and the fascinating story of the man who planned it.
