China's relations with Angola have been tempestuous. Involvement in Angola stretches back to the 1950s in Beijing's support for the various liberation organizations in the country. Eventually, China maintained ties with all three major organizations to a lesser or greater extent. However, after an Organization of African Unity mission recognized the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) as the legitimate liberation organization in July 1963, Chinese attention largely shifted away from the movement, although China maintained cordial links, exemplified by the then leader's telegram to Mao in 1971 expressing “friendly respect.” Nevertheless, after the coup d’état in Lisbon in 1974 and the outbreak of civil war in Angola, Beijing emerged discredited through ending up on the side of apartheid South Africa and the CIA. The Angolan debacle was an unmitigated disaster for Chinese foreign policy and it was only from 27 September 1982 that Beijing and Luanda recognized each other, with normalization formalized on 12 January 1983.
The book under review examines the extent to which Angolan agency is present in Sino-Angolan relations. Contrary to some of the more simplistic accounts, Corkin shows that Luanda has been relatively competent in profiting from the Chinese connection and has also actively resisted being overly-dependent on China. Obviously, the benefits have accrued to Angola's elites, not the average Angolan, but that is the nature of Angola. This is an important point to make as the “Angola model” (whereby resource-backed financing agreements are entered into with Beijing) has been held up as some sort of template for Africa.
Corkin shows that hard-nosed commercial considerations drive policy and that the Export-Import Bank of China, which supposedly has little regard for risk, is in fact fairly astute in its operations. Connected to this, a popular misconception is that Beijing manages to extract inappropriate advantages in its investment contracts in Africa. Corkin shows that in fact China is been treated in the same way as other investors in Angola. Here the agency of Luanda's elites is clear: many investors are knocking at the door of Angola (Brazilian, American, French, etc.) and this enables the elites to pick and choose. After all, Angola is Africa's second-largest producer of oil and has substantial mineral resources. Although affected by the global economic climate and volatile oil pricing, Angola has recovered swiftly and its fiscal and monetary discipline is improving, with a reduction of its national debt and an increase in social spending in areas such as infrastructure, health and education. Angola is an attractive site for investment and the Chinese by no means have cornered the market.
To prove her thesis vis-à-vis Angolan agency, Corkin examines the credit lines granted by China to demonstrate how Luanda has operated and adapted. Between 2004 and 2010, the Exim Bank proffered a total of US$10.5 billion in oil-backed credit lines to Luanda. These credit lines were aimed purposely towards enabling investment in Angola, whereby Chinese companies were contracted to commence essential projects and were paid by the Exim Bank, which set the contract amount against oil sales to China. The loans were generous when compared to comparative oil-backed financing deals offered by Western banks. Controversially, the loans from the Exim Bank were contractually tied to public tenders for construction and civil engineering agreements as part of Angola's post-war reconstruction efforts, to be awarded to Chinese companies.
It is true that the loans in the beginning lubricated Chinese access to oil in Angola, with Sinopec purchasing a 50 per cent stake in Block 18 for over US$700 million, and this did coincide with the pay-out of the first tranche of the Exim Bank loan. This was however immediately seized on as evidence that China had subverted Western efforts to impose conditionalities on a corrupt and recalcitrant Angolan regime and had somehow “bought” the naïve Angolans, who were now locked into an exploitive relationship benefitting only China.
In fact, as Corkin convincingly demonstrates, the Exim Bank loan did not facilitate any preferential treatment for Chinese oil companies when it came to bidding for fields. Chinese companies do not yet have the technological capacity to develop the deep and ultra-deep blocks in Angolan territorial waters and as a result were side-lined. Rather than sew-up Angola's oil industry, the Exim Bank has only been relatively successful in aiding Chinese construction firms enter the Angolan market. In short, Angolan agency prevailed and when the Chinese could not deliver, Luanda went elsewhere. The idea that Angola is within China's orbit is a myth.
Having said that, and something which understandably is not covered in the book, the future does look more favourable for Chinese interests. Angolan exports to the United States are in rapid decline due to the momentous shale gas/tight oil revolution. In 2012, Angola's oil exports to the States fell by 34 per cent from the previous year. Consequently, Luanda is actively positioning the emerging markets as export destinations to absorb its oil exports. Thus whilst China's interest in Angola may be enlarged, this will be due to initiatives on the part of Luanda. Angolan agency, as the book makes clear, remains paramount and the relationship is driven as much by the Angolan elites as it is by the Chinese.
