THE ETHIOPIANS AND ISLAM

Who are al-Ahbash, what Islam do they represent, and what message does their name symbolize? The people of Ethiopia, al-ḥabasha, or al-aḥbāsh (and also al-ḥubshān, al-ḥubūsh), were known to ancient Arabians as the neighboring Africans across the Red Sea. Because the state of Ethiopia had embraced Christianity nearly three centuries before Muhammad and was involved in Arabian affairs as such, its concept as a Christian, monotheistic “other” was well known to the Prophet and his generation. Indeed Ethiopia was the first foreign-relations case for Islam. It was the land of “the first hijra” in 615–16—the Christian najāshī (negus in Ethiopic, king) gave asylum to practically the entire Islamic community of that time. The righteous Christian Ethiopian king who saved the Muslims, thus, left an enduring message of grace regarding Ethiopia as a land of justice despite its Christianity. A saying attributed to the Prophet ordered believers to “leave the Ethiopians alone as long as they leave you alone” (utrukū al-ḥabasha mā tarakūkum). Conversely, a persistent traditional contention held that somewhat later, in 628, the king himself accepted Islam but that his people refused to follow. This situation left an entirely contradictory interpretation of the Ethiopian Christian “other” as illegitimate. For many, the “islām al-najāshī” legacy meant that Ethiopia was already a Muslim country and, therefore, should be redeemed by Islamic political victory. The notion of Christian Ethiopian illegitimacy was strengthened by the legacy of the pre-Islamic episode of the Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen who tried, in “the Year of the Elephant” (570), to destroy the Kaעba. (The hadith, “The lean-legged Ethiopians, they will [eventually] destroy the Kaעba,”³

Al-ḥabasha, however, also had another significant meaning in the world of Islamic concepts. Although the Ethiopian state was dominated by Christians, a good half of its population was, and still is, Muslim. The term ḥabasha in Arabic was never restricted only to the Christian core of the Horn of Africa, but to its entire population, including the Muslims. It often referred to skin color rather than to religious affiliation.⁵

The dichotomy regarding Ethiopian Muslims was perhaps best reflected in the famous Sunni tradition, “Obey whoever is put in authority over you, even if he be a crop-nosed Ethiopian slave.”¹⁰

The story of the contemporary rivalry between al-Ahbash and the Wahhabiyya has its roots in the Ethiopian town of Harar, the old capital of Islam in the Horn of Africa. Harar's long history itself reflects the dilemmas of Muslims in Ethiopia. On one hand, the walled town was an Islamic emirate that maintained political independence from an obscure beginning in the 10th century until the late 19th century. During those years, Harar was connected in many ways to Arabia and was the center of the Islamic holy-war effort vis-á-vis the Ethiopian Christian state. On the other hand, after its conquest in 1887 by Ethiopia, Harar developed as the model of Islamic integration into all-Ethiopian culture, society, and Christian-dominated politics. In the aftermath of the short Fascist conquest of Ethiopia, 1936–41, Harari society was again split along the lines of these contradictory historical legacies. A group of local leaders, who had been sent by the Italians to make pilgrimage to Mecca and were inspired by Wahhabi influence, attempted throughout 1941–48 to revive Islamic independence from Ethiopia. After a long struggle with the Ethiopian government and its local collaborators, the group was defeated and dispersed.¹¹

The leader of al-Ahbash, Shaykh עAbdalla ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Harari, was his chief rival in 1941–48 in Harar and Ethiopia. Reportedly born in 1910, he received an Islamic education in Ethiopia and grew to be a firm believer in Ethiopian Islamic–Christian coexistence. As such, he became involved in the struggle over Harar during those years. The struggle revolved around two issues, which will be mentioned here only briefly. One was the nature of Islamic education in Harar. In 1941, a group of Harari–Islamic nationalists reestablished the local modern school in the spirit of Wahhabi fundamentalism. A few months later, the Ethiopian authorities closed the school and sent those involved either to prison or into exile. The second was an attempt during 1946–48 to break away from the Christian state. The same Islamic, nationalist circles in Harar organized to collaborate with the then-active Somali nationalist movement to break Harar away from Ethiopia and annex it to Islamic Somalia. They were again exposed by the Ethiopian authorities, and their leaders were punished. In both cases, the defeated group accused Shaykh עAbdalla of being instrumental in helping the Ethiopian establishment. Shaykh עAbdalla and his followers continue to deny any anti-Islamic collaboration and point to the fact that, in 1948, the shaykh himself was suspected by the Ethiopian imperial regime, jailed for a time, and then forced to leave the country. Moreover, he and his followers accuse Shaykh Yusuf עAbd al-Rahman of collaborating with the Ethiopian government. (Shaykh Yusuf was later appointed to supervise the translation of the Qurءan into Amharic.) As this is written, both of these old Habashi scholars are still alive. They continue to trade accusations between Beirut and Medina about these formative events in their lives, and their bitter rivalry splits Muslims in today's Ethiopia.¹²

Of wider, all-Islamic importance is the major Ahbash-Wahhabiyya debate that grew out of this peripheral Ethiopian story. After leaving Ethiopia, Shaykh עAbdalla spent some time in Mecca and Jerusalem in late 1948 and moved to Damascus. In 1950, the shaykh moved to Beirut, where he resides to this day.¹⁴

By 1983 Shaykh עAbdalla had already gained fame as a thinker, an author—he would publish some twenty books—a mufti, and a preacher. His main message remained one that he had brought from Ethiopia and was centrally relevant to Lebanon, that of Islamic–Christian coexistence. He soon won the indirect support of the Lebanese Christian establishment and various Islamic publics. Moreover, his becoming head of the Association coincided with the Syrian takeover of Lebanon. The new Syrian masters of the land, with their secular Arab Baעth doctrine, found the shaykh's Islamic–Christian message compatible with their approach. From that moment on, al-Ahbash entered Lebanese politics. In 1989, it won a seat in the Lebanese parliament for its member, Dr. עAdnan al-Tarabulsi. The unequivocal support of al-Ahbash for the Syrian Baעth party and its collaborators in Lebanon, Christian presidents Ilyas al-Hawari (1989–98) and his successor Emil Lahud (1998–), together with Muslim prime ministers Salim al-Huss and Rafiq al-Hariri (assassinated February 2005), was rewarded by governmental support. The Association flourished in Lebanon. It has issued a monthly, Manar al-Huda, since 1992, and has had its own radio station, Nidaע al-Maעrifa,¹⁶

The worldwide Lebanese diaspora helped the Ahbash to become a transnational association in the 1980s. Its main center in Europe is in Germany,²⁰

The number of Ethiopian members in al-Ahbash is not known, but there are not many. With the exception of the shaykh from Harar, almost the entire movement is composed of Muslims from various other ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. They call themselves the Ahbash partly because of their admiration for their leader. They consider him one of the greatest scholars of Islam and refer to him with such titles as al-imam al-muḥaddith, or muḥaddith al-עasr, namely the leader of hadith scholarship and the hadith scholar of our time. He is also referred to as al-ḥāfiẓ, the keeper of wisdom and scholarship. The shaykh himself takes pride in his all Islamic and allegedly Arab background. His full name, עAbdalla ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Harari al-Shaybi al-עAbdari, alludes to Qurayshi origin. As we will see, he considers Arabism to be a sacred identity and a proper bridge between Muslims and Christians. At the same time, he takes full pride in his Ethiopian-ness. (He returned to Ethiopia three times [1969, 1995, and 2003] and was enthusiastically received by most Ethiopian Muslims.) It is also apparent that his many followers also identify with what Ethiopia symbolizes for the more moderate Muslims. They call themselves al-Ahbash in the hope of enhancing flexible Islam, capable of coexisting with the Christian “other.”

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE AHBASH

In one of his addresses to his followers, Shaykh עAbdalla tried to define the movement's ideology by distinguishing it from its polar opposites:

He selected these figures as ultimate rivals for a reason. Sayyid Qutb was the Egyptian activist and scholar who worked to bridge the Islamic political ideas of the Muslim Brothers with the fundamentals of the Wahhabiyya. Pointing to עAbd al-Wahhab and at Ibn Taymiyya, the founder of and the historical source of inspiration for the Wahhabiyya, was stating the obvious. Ibn Taymiyya, the 14th century scholar, together with the modern Pakistani thinker Abu al-עAla al-Mawdudi—himself inspired by Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhabiyya—provided Sayyid Qutb with the theological legitimacy for turning the Muslim Brothers as of the 1960s into a militant movement, working to purify Islam by undermining non-Islamic, nonfundamentalist regimes.²⁶

Studying Ahbash literature reveals four elements of their Islamic self-identity. One is merely legal, their adherence to the Shafiעi school. Their core ideology lies in combining the theological legacy of the Ashעariyya with some Sufi terminology, and in their contention that they represent ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāעa—the community of orthodox Islamic beliefs—the consensual, central trend in Sunni Islam. This combination in itself is not a theological innovation, and in many ways, al-Ahbash follow the general approach of the great medieval thinker, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111).²⁷

The Sufi element is obvious. Shaykh עAbdalla and the Association are connected to three ṭarīqas: the Rifaעiyya, the Naqshabandiyya, and the Qadiriyya.²⁹

The core of their ideology is not in the legalism of Shafiעiyya nor in the mysticism of Sufism, but rather in the theological principles of Ashעariyya. The early scholar Abu al-Hasan al-Ashעari (born in Basra, died in Baghdad, 874–936) was first a follower of the Muעtazila school of thought, which aspired to base Islam on dialectical rationality borrowed partly from Greek philosophy. The Muעtazila followers were in their time the archrivals of mainstream Sunni orthodoxy, which rejected any such interpretation and any theological rationalization of the given texts. In time, however, al-Ashעari moved halfway and began to preach compromise and moderation. The theological trend he established managed to prevent major schisms and he went on to serve as a mediator and a bridge contributing to stability in the Sunni world. In Shaykh עAbdalla's eyes, al-Ashעari was “the imam of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāעa.” Although al-Ashעari established no legal school, for Shaykh עAbdalla, he was like a founder of a fifth madhhab, a school of moderation and compromise. A group of the Shaykh's followers translated his general approach into a twelve-goal platform. The main ones are as follows.

The key word in most texts produced by the Association and in the Shaykh's speeches is moderation, iעtidāl. The main idea is that al-Ahbash, working in this spirit, are the bridge and the glue essential for the continuity and welfare of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāעa throughout the world. One of the Association's websites answered a question about its methods and how to work for Islamic unity: “By soft words, by middle-way wisdom, by gentle preaching. This is how our journey began…by cooperation and openness…. This is how we became a global association representing Muslims all over the world, giving them safe haven.”³³

The messages of the Ahbash are directed to both Muslims and non-Muslims. The message to Muslims, not surprisingly, is harsher. Despite the motif of moderation, the confrontation with rival wings, especially with the Wahhabiyya, is definitely not conducted only with soft words. The Ahbash often define their Islamic rivals as infidels and exclude them from the community of Islam. They use such rhetoric in their verbal war with practically all organizations of political Islamism and the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran.

On the contrary, the messages directed to non-Muslims, always in the spirit of moderation, convey the idea of universal humanism. The Association's goal in this respect is to serve all mankind, al-bashariyya jamעāء or jamīע al-nās. Non-Muslim minorities within Islamic societies are worthy of full respect by a moderate, flexible Islam. Both state identity and Arabism in the Middle East should be enhanced as common denominators. In their conceptualization of Middle Eastern politics, the Ahbash separate religion and state. They have almost no argument with any regime that does not prevent their activities, and would support anyone, even if leftist–socialist and secular, who would help to combat Islamic radicalism. The Ahbash declare they do not oppose lawful, established governments, and it is not their business to intervene in politics, surely not to change rulers through assassination.³⁴

In Christian–Islamic Lebanon, to reiterate, the Ahbash have implemented most of their ideas. They participate in politics, on both the national and the municipal levels, and do so in full cooperation with the state system. Asked why the Association opened a branch in one of Beirut's mostly Christian neighborhoods, עAdnan al-Tarabulsi replied: “In order to serve all people and enhance good Islamic–Christian coexistence.”³⁵

The message to Western societies, especially to those that host Islamic communities, is also one of cooperation and appeasement. It aims to enhance the image of Islam as a set of moralities, surely not as a militant ideology. Answering a question about their goal in Europe and the United States, the Ahbash Website stated, “Like elsewhere in the world our aim there is to spread religious knowledge among those who suffer from ignorance, and also to warn people of those fanatics who claim to represent Islam but do so in the most negative way.”³⁹

RIVALRY WITH THE WAHHABIYYA

The fundamentals of al-Ahbash differ categorically from those of the Wahhabiyya and of all others who work toward reinstating Islam's political supremacy. The founders of the Wahhabiyya, in their writings—on which we cannot elaborate here—mostly ignored Islam's positive concepts of Ethiopia and Ethiopians. The more the Ahbash gained influence in Lebanon and internationally, especially since the mid-1990s, the more their verbal war with the Wahhabiyya escalated. It had, as mentioned, its personal roots in Ethiopia of the 1940s. It is clear, however, that once Shaykh Yusuf moved to Medina in 1976, he missed no opportunity to fight his archrival with the help of his hosts. He managed to convince the Saudi religious establishment that Shaykh עAbdalla, in collaborating with Haile Selassie's regime, was primarily behind the above-mentioned failure of the Islamic movement, which worked to liberate Harar from the Ethiopian–Christian yoke. The alleged foiling of political Islam in Harar by Shaykh עAbdalla and his associates came to be known as fitnat al-kulūb, “the fraternal strife of the Club.”⁴⁰

In the mid-1980s, the Ahbash began to clash with their Islamic rivals, including Wahhabi and other groups in Lebanon. Although still a marginal movement, it had already drawn the attention of the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia. There is no doubt that Shaykh Yusuf in Medina did his very best to alert his Saudi hosts. In July 1986, Saudi Arabia's chief Islamic jurist, Shaykh עAbd al-עAziz bin עAbdalla bin Baz (d. 1999), issued a fatwa declaring that: “The association of al-Ahbash is a misguided group which is outside ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāעa…No one should rely on their fatwas because they are deviators and their word contradicts the Qurءan and the Sunna. No one should trust them and all should beware of them and of any group identified with them.”⁴³

The ensuing verbal clash was too extensive to describe systematically. In the early 1990s, it was still nonviolent. In November 1992, for example, the Saudi journal al-Muslimun (affiliated with עAbd al-עAziz bin Baz) ran a series of articles on the “Strange Ethiopian” who came alone from Harar and managed to establish a whole new religious community in Lebanon. Al-Muslimun's journalist managed to interview Nizar Halabi and made a central point of the Ahbash attitude toward women. He asked Halabi why they accepted women who did not wear traditional Islamic dress. The answer was that the Ahbash prefer women to be active, they can wear jeans (“like in Ethiopia”), and that the Association took pride in the fact that they encouraged free communication between the sexes.⁴⁴

One of many Wahhabi responses was issued a year later, in 1995. A leader of the Wahhabis in Sidney, Australia, Abu Suhayb עAbd al-עAziz al-Maliki, published a book entitled, The Sublime Sayings in Exposing the Wrongs of the Ahbash Group. One main aim of the book was to expose the Ahbash as collaborators with non-Muslims. No wonder, he wrote, that they were praised by the Christians in Lebanon. They celebrate together with Christians as if they were the same nation. They also share their culture. They cooperated with the Christian “Lebanon's Youth” movement in organizing a “Festival of Joy and Smiles,” he wrote sarcastically, “and a band of al-Ahbash, under the maestro of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāעa, Jamal Shamaעa, played Islamic music on electronic drums, to make it sound western.”⁴⁸

The Wahhabi counterattack is tridimensional. They blame the Ahbash for combining what they consider Sufi polytheism, shirk, with Shiעi covert anti-Sunna tactics. The Wahhabis accuse the Ahbash of endorsing the Shiעites' historical enmity with the Umayyads and add that they do so to cooperate with the Shiעa in combating the Sunna. The Ahbash contention, the Wahhabis say, that they are Ashעaris and thus they represent Sunni consensus, is just a cover for subverting Islam. Shaykh עAbdalla's persistent praise for Arab nationalism would not be accepted by the Wahhabis. The Ahbash are rather the enemies of the Arabs, they say, like the early Shuעubiyya movement, which denied any privileged position of the Arabs. Moreover, Shaykh עAbdalla's claim to a Qurayshi origin is false. He is an Ethiopian and a foreigner.⁵⁰

Wahhabi anti-Ahbash contemporary literature, it should be emphasized, turned only rarely to such ethnic, racial arguments. Just as the supporters of the Ahbash the world over were proud to be named after what symbolized the supraethnic universality of Islam, so their rivals were cautious not to fall publicly into a racial trap. The origin of Shaykh עAbdalla is rarely openly held against him, only hinted at indirectly and subtly. One exception, like this of Fikri Ismaעil, was the famous salafī preacher, the Egyptian Ahmad Shalabi, who explained why the Ahbash were so narrow-minded: “They do not have a wide perspective on Islamic ideas because their leader, עAbdalla al-Habashi, was brought up in Ethiopia, in an environment lacking basic religious scholarship, and it was for that reason that his group developed on the basis of primitive concepts.”⁵¹

The journal of al-Ahbash, Manar al-Huda, is another platform for conveying their messages, including their attacks on the Wahhabis. These attacks became harsher after the assassination of Nizar al-Halabi. The Wahhabis were now referred to as “extremists” and “terrorists.” “We are not prepared to give in to those who only damage Islam with their thoughts and deeds,” ran one piece, “we will not allow them to spread their black, extreme ideas.”⁵⁴

The introduction of the internet added a very vital dimension to this inter-Islamic battle. The Wahhabi–Ahbash debate turned into one of the more heated issues on various Islamic websites. The Ahbash opened their own website, “The Boat of Salvation” (http://www.safeena.org), alluding perhaps to the boat(s?) that carried the first Muslims to their salvation in Ethiopia. Their rivals countered by opening the website http://www.antihabashis.com. In addition to endless variations on the accusations already mentioned, the “anti-habashis,” to add one more example, denounced a statement made by עAdnan al-Tarabulsi that he was ready to make peace with Israel if its conditions met the approval of an Arab consensus. “Better that the Ahbash make peace with other Muslims,” was the response, “before they make peace with the Jews.”⁵⁶

Another website identified with the Wahhabiyya accused the Ahbash of collaborating with the United States against Islam. It reported on an American secret document, which recommended destroying all branches of the Muslim Brothers throughout the Arab world, together with all those who called for a holy war against Israel, and replacing them with branches of al-Ahbash.⁵⁸

POINTS OF THEOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DISPUTES

The contemporary bitter conflict between the Ahbash and the Wahhabiyya is over major, principal issues: the unity (or disunity) of Islam on one hand, and how Muslims should conceive of Christians and Jews on the other. Beyond those concrete accusations and different conceptualizations of the “other,” there is a deeper dispute over the essence of the Islamic “self.” Below, we discuss some of the main points over which these rivals trade arguments in the same spirit of mutual intolerance.