1 Introduction
When we consider how best to characterize the devils and monsters that we encounter in Old English (OE) texts, with a view to developing an understanding of the way in which they were conceived by the Anglo-Saxons, the term supernatural might seem to be an uncontroversial starting point. The devils who feature in OE poems such as Andreas, Elene, Guthlac and Juliana have a tendency to appear from nowhere and disappear just as quickly once it becomes apparent that their attacks on the religious faith of the saintly heroes have failed. Together with their hellish origins, this incorporeal quality signals an otherworldly state of being which seems to resonate strongly with the concept of the supernatural that is represented in modern dictionary definitions. The first sense recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), for instance, defines something supernatural as ‘[b]elonging to a realm or system that transcends nature, as that of divine, magical, or ghostly beings; attributed to or thought to reveal some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature; occult, paranormal’ (OED, supernatural A.1.a).
The situation begins to look somewhat less clear-cut when we consider it from the perspective of OE vocabulary. The OED entry for supernatural notes that the word comes from Middle French supernaturel and its etymon, the post-classical Latin supernaturalis. The first citation the dictionary provides, a reference to þe supernaturel lyȝt ‘the supernatural light’, is from The Orcherd of Syon, a translation of Catherine of Siena's Dialogo, which is tentatively dated to the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Even if we extend the scope of our search to include texts written in Latin, there is no sign of the term before the Middle English (ME) period: the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources (DMLBS) attributes the earliest occurrence of the word, in the adverb form supernaturaliter ‘supernaturally’, to a thirteenth-century letter by Robert Grosseteste, the Bishop of Lincoln. The evidence, then, suggests that this word was not a feature of the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary. Perhaps more to the point, it is not at all clear that any words which were part of the OE lexicon can be identified as equivalent in meaning. The Historical Thesaurus of English (HTE) includes only one OE word in its ‘Supernatural (01.17 aj)’ category: ungecyndelic. Bosworth and Toller's Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (BT) lists three senses for this word: (1) ‘unnatural, not in accordance with the nature of a thing’; (2) ‘not natural, supernatural’; and (3) ‘unnatural, contrary to nature, monstrous’. There is clearly a degree of overlap in these definitions and in most of the twelve contexts in which the word is found in the Dictionary of Old English Corpus (DOEC) ‘unnatural’ seems to be a perfectly appropriate translation, since it refers either to abnormal events or aberrant behaviour. In the Alfredian OE translation of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, for example, the idea that children might conspire against their father is called an ungecyndelic yfel ‘unnatural evil’ (Bo 31.70.22).Footnote 2 This is one of the contexts used to support the third BT sense, in which the term ‘monstrous’ is evidently intended to reflect a notion of serious social or moral deviance. One occasion where something other than ‘unnatural’ might be an appropriate translation is the single context cited under the second BT sense, i.e. ‘not natural, supernatural’. This context occurs in one of the OE versions of the Sunday Letter sermon, as part of a passage describing the various divine punishments that will be visited upon those who refuse to pay their tithes to the church. As well as the hail, thunder and lightning that will blight their crops, they face what is said to be the most terrifying retribution of all: having their towns suddenly burned by an ungecyndelic fyr ‘unnatural/supernatural fire’ (HomU 46 177). In this instance, ‘supernatural’ would seem to be a very appropriate translation, since the divine source of this punishment is consistent with the sense of otherworldliness that is central to the modern conception, as reflected in the OED definition of the term. Even here, however, the ‘unnatural, abnormal’ meaning that fits the various other contexts in which ungecyndelic occurs would certainly not be out of place. Thus, it seems rather unnecessary to postulate a separate meaning just for this one context.
Returning to the issue of how we can best interpret and describe the Anglo-Saxon conception of monsters and devils, it is clear that, far from being straightforward, there are in fact some basic questions that need to be addressed. First of all, taking into account the apparent absence of any equivalent word in OE, is it reasonable and meaningful to use the term supernatural in this context? In other words, is there evidence of a concept at work in OE which is analogous in significant respects to the Modern English notion of the supernatural, despite the fact that there is a lexical gap? If so, what are the characteristics that define the relevant semantic field and what sort of OE lexemes are associated with it?
The remainder of this article focuses on these questions. Using the framework of a prototype model of semantic structure, I shall argue that it is possible to identify a set of traits which together constitute a conceptual category that encompasses Anglo-Saxon monsters and devils. This category is situated within a more general OE concept of ‘the other’, together with closely related notions such as the unfamiliar, the strange and the foreign. Nevertheless, it also exhibits distinctive qualities that are fundamentally similar to those involved in the modern conception of the supernatural. Not only do these similarities justify the application of the term supernatural in an Anglo-Saxon context, but perhaps more importantly they also clarify the ways in which the monsters and devils we are confronted with in OE texts relate both to each other and to human outsiders. Specifically, I suggest that the medieval and modern supernatural concepts both mark what can be considered the ultimate boundary of exclusion, but that there is a fundamental difference between them in that, for the Anglo-Saxons, this boundary was conceptually much ‘closer’ and conceived in less abstract terms. In this respect, it corresponded very closely with the boundary between the relatively cultured world of human settlement and the wilder regions that lay beyond. One very clear sign of this is the fact that – as we shall see – OE monsters, in particular, not only occupied a conceptual space that was similar to that of other more mundane outsiders and enemies, as reflected in the shared vocabulary that was applied to them, but were also associated with the same sort of geographical space. With this in mind, ‘supernatural’ enemies can be seen to play an important role in the way in which the Anglo-Saxons conceived of the world around them and their place within it. As the discussion below will demonstrate, ‘supernatural’ enemies threaten and therefore help to delineate the boundaries of society and, in doing so, support the normative function of the Anglo-Saxons’ sense of place by acting as a challenge or counterexample to the principles of proper behaviour and accepted beliefs from which that civilized space is constructed.
The Anglo-Saxon conception of the excluded space beyond the relative safety of civilization and of the distinctive traits of the supernatural beings that inhabited it will be explored in detail in section 4. Before this, section 2 provides an outline of the main characteristics of the prototype model of semantic structure that will frame the discussion, highlighting how it handles lexical gaps and the way in which it accommodates the blurred boundaries between the supernatural and the related categories of otherness associated with foreigners, exiles and criminals. Section 3 briefly considers some of the key characteristics that differentiate Anglo-Saxon monsters from devils, since this illustrates the basis for the contrast between the modern and medieval concepts of the supernatural which will be central to the discussion in section 4.
2 Prototypes and semantic traits
The traditional, classical approach to the classification of concepts is based on the idea that the categories involved can be clearly differentiated and defined. Under this view, assigning an individual lexeme or a particular sense of a polysemous word to the appropriate category is meant to be a reasonably straightforward process, involving a clear-cut set of necessary and sufficient criteria, in the form of identifiable semantic features or components that characterize the category and that each member of it must therefore possess (see e.g. Lakoff Reference Lakoff1987: 6; Taylor Reference Taylor2003: 27–34; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk Reference Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Geeraerts and Cuyckens2007: 143). Since all members of the category must possess the full set of these defining features, one implication of this approach is that they must also all have equal status: no member can be a clearer or better representative of the category than any other. In practice, being able to identify a collection of semantic features that would apply in this way to all prospective category members is seldom without complications, as Ludwig Wittgenstein famously demonstrated in his discussion of the German word Spiel and the problems involved in establishing a distinctive set of properties that are shared by the diverse range of pursuits we could classify as ‘games’ but that also differentiate them from all other kinds of activities (Lakoff Reference Lakoff1987: 16–17; Taylor Reference Taylor2003: 42–3). Even in cases where identifying the features that determine category membership may seem relatively unproblematic, evidence suggests that constituents are arranged hierarchically, with some being regarded as more representative of the group than others. In the influential experiments conducted by Eleanor Rosch, for instance, participants demonstrated considerable consistency when asked to rate the members of ten sets of concrete nouns – including fruit, birds, furniture and clothing – according to the extent to which they were felt to be good examples of the relevant category (Rosch Reference Rosch1975: 197–9; Taylor Reference Taylor2003: 45–8; Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts2010: 185–6). On the basis of these and other experiments, Rosch developed a prototype approach to categorization. Unlike the classical theory, with its emphasis on the boundaries, the prototype approach focuses attention on those members of the group that are considered most representative. The status that these cases have as the clearest examples of category membership therefore establishes them as reference points against which less representative constituents can be judged (Rosch Reference Rosch, Rosch and Lloyd1978: 35–6; Lakoff Reference Lakoff1987: 41). This gives us the image of the average category as consisting of ‘a dominant core area surrounded by a less salient periphery’ (Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts2010: 188). With distinctions thus being made between more and less typical and prominent members, the notion that categories have internal structure, as well as potentially indistinct boundaries, is another fundamental aspect of the prototype approach that sets it apart from the classical theory. Both the internal arrangement of a category and its relationship with other, bordering categories can be viewed in terms of degrees of similarity and difference: the more prototypical and clear-cut members of a category have more attributes in common with other members of the same category, and fewer in common with members of contrasting categories (Rosch Reference Rosch, Rosch and Lloyd1978: 37).
In the development of Rosch's prototype theory within the context of research in linguistics, and particularly lexical semantics, four related fundamental characteristics, or prototypicality effects, have been identified, which can occur in various permutations and with different degrees of prominence in relation to particular categories and individual lexical items (Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts2010: 187–8). These prototypicality effects arise from the ways in which the basic concepts of non-equality and non-discreteness apply on the extensional level of reference and the intensional level of definition (Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts2010: 188). On the extensional level, these two concepts are the basis for observations about the different degrees of membership and indistinct category boundaries, mentioned above, while on the intensional level they emerge in the fact that a prototypical model involves clusters of overlapping definitions that share different degrees of resemblance and that it lacks the notion of a defining set of necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership that underpins the classical theory (Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts1997: 10–23; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk Reference Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Geeraerts and Cuyckens2007: 145–6; Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts2010: 187–9).
In the interests of characterizing the meanings of the words that will be discussed below in such a way that is compatible with the prototype model outlined above, I shall adopt an approach based on Cruse's (Reference Cruse1986) notion of semantic traits. According to this schema, the meaning of a word can best be characterized through the meanings of other words, with those terms that participate in this kind of paraphrase being classified as semantic traits of the lexeme they help to define (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 16). However, in contrast with the components of other forms of feature analysis – but in line with the absence of definitive sets of necessary and sufficient criteria from the prototype model – no claim is made that these semantic traits are ‘primitive, functionally discrete, universal, or drawn from a finite inventory; nor is it assumed that the meaning of any word can be exhaustively characterized’ (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 22, n. 17). Again in keeping with the prototype model (Geeraerts Reference Geeraerts and Geeraerts2006: 142–3), the semantic trait approach involves a broadly cognitive interpretation of word meaning that encompasses the wider notion of ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge, rather than being restricted to narrower or more formal interpretations of semantics (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 19). Evidence of the appropriate traits is to be sought in the ‘actual and potential contexts’ in which the target lexeme occurs, through a consideration of the relations it contracts with the other items involved in those contexts (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 15–16). A third way in which Cruse's approach is consistent with the prototype model is the fact that consideration of the pertinent contextual relations is said to reveal not only the presence of relevant traits, but also their ‘degrees and modes of participation’ in the meaning of the target lexeme (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 16). This involves attributing the trait with a status that is intended to reflect the extent to which it is a necessary part of the meaning of a lexeme. While pointing out that, in reality, the degrees of necessity form a continuum, Cruse (Reference Cruse1986: 16–19) identifies five discrete statuses for the purposes of classification: criterial, expected, possible, unexpected and excluded. Although this reference to necessity may seem to introduce a clash with the prototype approach, a further characteristic of the semantic trait model prevents any conflict. This is the notion of contextual modulation, according to which the status of any given trait can be promoted or demoted, highlighted or backgrounded, in recognition of the impact that different contexts can have in shaping lexical meaning (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 52–3). In essence this means that, even if a trait is judged to be criterial, and therefore regarded as a necessary element of a word's meaning, this status should be considered a product of one or more of the contexts in which the target lexeme occurs, rather than an inherent and immutable characteristic of the word itself, since in other contexts that criterial trait might be demoted to a more peripheral status.
While a typical analysis involves identifying the cluster of traits that characterize the meaning of one or more words of interest, Cruse (Reference Cruse1986: 147–9) discusses another important possibility when examining the ways in which lexical items combine in hierarchical taxonomies, namely the prospect that a semantic field may contain what he calls ‘covert categories’. These are conceptual categories that can be described and ‘intuitively recognized’, but which lack a lexical label (Cruse Reference Cruse1986: 147). Examples of this kind of lexical gap include the absence in Present-Day English of any superordinate term that relates to uncle and aunt in the same way that parent relates to mother and father (Fischer Reference Fischer, Coleman and Kay2000: 5). As we shall see, this kind of gap may well be relevant to the OE ‘supernatural’ category. Other key points to bear in mind from the outline of the prototype model above are the fact that the types of beings we encounter may differ with respect to how clearly or how well they exemplify the OE notion of the ‘supernatural’, and that we should expect blurred boundaries between this and related categories of otherness. Before turning to look at these issues in detail, the next section considers an important element that distinguishes OE monsters from devils, in order to highlight the significance of some of the semantic traits that will be explored in section 4.
3 The ‘reality’ of monsters
The OED definition of supernatural (A.1.a) quoted in section 1 above reflects the role that knowledge and belief play in the modern concept. The references to ‘scientific understanding’ and ‘the laws of nature’ link the classification of something as supernatural to a lack of comprehension or the absence of an accepted explanation: such phenomena are considered transcendent and otherworldly by virtue of the fact that they are incompatible with the conception of the physical world that is the focus of the natural sciences. For many people, of course, this is essentially the same as asserting that such things simply do not exist. From this perspective, describing something as supernatural is therefore effectively a way of declaring it to be fictional or imaginary. The OED definition alludes to the idea that some people might nevertheless give credence to supernatural phenomena when it refers to these things being ‘attributed to or thought to reveal’ a power that lies beyond the physical world delineated by scientific knowledge. This reflects the way in which the notions of knowledge (or rather a lack of it) and belief intersect in this concept: in the absence of any empirical evidence, accepting the existence of the supernatural is inevitably an act of faith rather than reason, a matter of conviction rather than fact.
As I suggested at the beginning of section 1, this all seems to correspond in a very straightforward manner with the incorporeal nature and hellish origins of the devils presented in OE texts. In contrast, when we consider the characterization of OE monsters, this definition does not seem particularly suitable. To us, a monster like Grendel in Beowulf, with his vast size (ll.1353, 1637b–9, Fulk et al. Reference Fulk, Bjork and Niles2008), glowing eyes (ll.726b–7) and corrosive blood (ll.1615b–17), is as far removed from the real world and the laws of nature as are the devils who harass Guthlac and Juliana, and therefore could be considered just as fantastic, otherworldly and ‘supernatural’. It appears, however, that the Anglo-Saxon view was notably different in at least one respect: there are indications that, for them, not only did monsters exist, but they belonged to the same ‘real’ physical world as humans. We get a hint of this in the contrast between the saints’ battles of faith with incorporeal devils, who vanish when defeated, and Beowulf's very physical clashes with his monstrous enemies, after which Grendel's severed arm and head become trophies (ll.833b–6, 1634b–9) and the corpse of the dragon is seen first as a thing of wonder (ll.3038–46) and then almost as an inconvenience, since it needs to be pushed over the cliff to make way for the building of the hero's burial mound (ll.3131b–3). However, heroic poems that recount stories of a distant, legendary past are not the only texts where we see ‘supernatural’ beings depicted as inhabiting the human world. We also encounter them in texts that describe the contemporary world of the Anglo-Saxons. In an OE version of The Wonders of the East, we hear of a perilous island populated by a multitude of dragons which grow to one hundred and fifty feet in length (Marv 16.1–16.3). A potential reason for risking the peril of such places is suggested by the OE text of the Herbarium Apuleius (or Anglo-Saxon Herbal), which states that the herb dracontea, an effective cure for wæterseocnysse ‘dropsy’ (Lch I (Herb) 184.2), is grown of dracan blode ‘from dragon's blood’ (Lch I (Herb) 184.4). Conversely, other medical remedies highlight the role of monstrous beings as health hazards. Bald's Leechbook and the Lacnunga, for example, include treatments for afflictions caused by elves and dwarves (e.g. Charm 20, Lch II (2) 65.5.3, MCh3, MCh4, Med 3 87.1), creatures whose presence in the Anglo-Saxon landscape also appears to be reflected in place-names such as Eldon Hill in Derbyshire (OE ælf ‘elf’ + dun ‘hill’, Cameron Reference Cameron1959: 160) and Dwariden in West Yorkshire (OE dweorg ‘dwarf’ + dun ‘hill’, Smith Reference Smith1961–3: 223).
In order to accommodate these monsters who belong to the same ‘real’ world as humans, we might consider adopting a broader interpretation of the category that encompasses them and the devils, and, in doing so, abandon the problematic term supernatural. As the OED definition indicates with its allusions to outside forces, the word supernatural is a term of exclusion. Thus the concept could be considered part of a broad field of alien terms that similarly make distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, such as those that denote foreigners, exiles and criminals. The next section will explore the exact nature of this alien trait and its applicability to OE monsters and devils, but first it is worth very briefly considering the representation of monsters in certain prominent Latin works that were influential in the Anglo-Saxon world, in order to get a sense of the broader cultural context in which the OE concepts operated.
During the classical period, monstrum and its near synonyms portentum, prodigium and ostentum were used to designate phenomena that were considered ominous warnings (Friedman Reference Friedman2000: 111). In his Historia naturalis, for example, Pliny mentions the various monstra partus ‘monsters of birth’ (VII.iii.35, Rackham Reference Rackham1942) that foreshadowed the Marsian War (91–88 BC), such as the snake that was born to a maidservant. In the Christian era, the status of monsters took on a new significance, as the Church Fathers sought to reconcile the notion of unnatural life with the existence of an infallible God. In De Civitate Dei, for instance, Augustine concludes that if monstrous races exist, they must be rational humanoids with souls (XVI.8, Sanford and Green Reference Sanford and Green1965, Friedman Reference Friedman2000: 90–3). To explain God's creation of beings that might otherwise be considered unnatural, he draws on the portentous aspect of monstra and appeals to the limits of human knowledge. Humans cannot comprehend the whole of creation and therefore it is foolish to suppose that God has made a mistake. Rather, by acting as reminders that God works to His own hidden design, the purpose of extraordinary and remote monstrous races may be to allay the doubts that arise when people are faced with the instances of congenital deformity that were also designated monstra (XVI.8, Sanford and Green Reference Sanford and Green1965).
A slightly different view of monsters emerges from a consideration of the Anglo-Latin Liber monstrorum de diversis generibus ‘Book of monsters of various kinds’, which has been dated to the seventh or eighth century (Lapidge Reference Lapidge1982: 164–5). In the main prologue, the author professes to be responding to a request for information about those things which evoke maximum formidinis terrorem ‘greatest terror of fear’ (Orchard Reference Orchard2003: 254–5). It is notable that, in contrast to the interpretations of Pliny and Augustine, there is no mention here of the portentous aspect of monstrosity, with terror instead being the focus. In the body of the text we see this, for example, in the description of the chimera as a bestiam triplicis monstruosa corporis foeditate terribilem ‘terrible beast of triple body with monstrous hideousness’ (II.11, Orchard Reference Orchard2003: 294–5). Elsewhere, terror is evoked in conjunction with the idea that the author is introducing the reader to a remote and unfamiliar world of alien creatures. The prologue of Book II, for example, sets out its interest in quidquid in terris aut in gurgite in horrendi corporis ignota et metuenda reperitur forma ‘whatever is found on land or in the sea of unknown and fearsome form of terrible bodily appearance’ (Orchard Reference Orchard2003: 288–9). Comparing the concept of monstrosity found in the Liber monstrorum with that developed by Pliny, Augustine and others, then, the former can be considered a somewhat harsher image (Friedman Reference Friedman2000: 149–53, Orchard Reference Orchard2003: 89–90). The alien trait is the focal point in both cases, but in the earlier texts this is bound up in the monster's role as an omen or sign, while in the Liber monstrorum the terror they provoke is a more significant complement. As we shall see in the next section, the combination of alien and terror is far more prominent in OE contexts.
4 The boundaries of nature and the borders of society
This section explores the nature and significance of the alien trait as it applies to the OE monster and devil categories, arguing that it is indeed a central element in their conception. Its pivotal role explains and is reflected in the close connection that exists, in terms of both shared lexical items and traits, between these beings and those who represent other subcategories of the wider alien field. However, I shall also suggest that in the case of the monster and devil categories, alien intersects with other equally significant traits. Moreover, the core concept formed by the combination of these traits is similar in certain key respects to the present-day notion of the supernatural, and therefore this term can reasonably be applied to an Anglo-Saxon context, providing that the ways in which the medieval and modern ideas differ are clearly understood.
As noted in section 3 above, the OED definition of the word situates supernatural as a term of exclusion. In its references to scientific understanding and the laws of nature, it also reflects the fact that the crucial distinction between supernatural and other terms of exclusion is that it places the boundary between the included and the excluded at a greater conceptual distance. The supernatural space is defined against and demarcates the physical world of the natural sciences. As suggested in section 3, this means that, from a modern perspective, the term supernatural can be said to signify something that is excluded on the basis that it is ‘unreal’, either in the sense that it is fictional, fantastic, imaginary or illusory, or in the sense that accepting its existence is understood to be a matter of faith. When visualizing the conceptual relationship between different terms of exclusion, then, we can think of supernatural as representing the last in a series of ever more distant boundaries that begin with the individual and gradually spread outwards, in terms of both conceptual and geographical space, to incorporate groups such as family, friends, community, nation, culture and even ‘reality’. Standing at the extreme edge of human understanding, the supernatural boundary and notions of what kind of phenomena lie in the excluded space beyond it participate in a normative process of defining and shaping that understanding by challenging the community's sense of place, with respect to the way in which they conceive of themselves as humans and relate to the world around them. This, it seems to me, is where the similarity between the modern and medieval conception of monsters and devils lies, and therefore what justifies the use of the term supernatural in the Anglo-Saxon context.
With this approach to this notion in mind, the principal difference between the modern and medieval perspectives on it is that, for the Anglo-Saxons, this ultimate, defining boundary seems to have been conceptually much ‘closer’, or more immediate, and conceived in less abstract terms. Specifically, it appears to have coincided more closely with the basic boundary between the included space of society and the excluded alien space beyond. This division corresponds closely to the distinction made by anthropologists between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’. In essence, this distinction is concerned with the opposition between the order of the human world, which is reflected in its formative principles, conventions and traditions, and the disorder that appears, in comparison, to characterize what lies outside that world, in the wild regions beyond the borders of human settlement (Lévi-Strauss Reference Lévi-Strauss, Bell, von Sturmer and Needham1969: xxix–xxx, 3–11; Keesing & Strathern Reference Keesing and Strathern1998: 14–25).
Consequently, when we look at the ways in which the monstrous and diabolical enemies of the Anglo-Saxons are described, we see that they share a number of the characteristics – and terms – associated with other inhabitants of the unruly, uncultured alien space, but that in their case there is a clear sense that these qualities are taken to extremes. Thus, references in OE texts to the alien aspect of monsters and devils are commonly accompanied by terms that introduce a sense of the extraordinary, often with some mention also of the astonishment this elicits in the humans who encounter them. In Beowulf, for example, the poet describes the mere as ælwihta eard ‘home of alien-creatures’ (1500a). Unsurprisingly, the element el- ‘foreign, strange, from elsewhere’ (DOE) appears in other OE lexemes that also involve the alien trait, such as elland ‘foreign country, exile’ (DOE), elþeod ‘foreign nation, exile’ (DOE) and elþeodignes ‘travel or residence abroad, exile’ (DOE). In the Beowulf context, however, there is clearly something particularly remarkable about these ‘foreigners’. Nine lines after referring to the inhabitants of the mere as ælwihta, the poet explains that Beowulf was unable to stop Grendel's mother from dragging him into her lair because so many of these wundra ‘wonders’ (1509b) were swarming around him. Previously, some of these wondrous creatures had been described in more detail, including the sellice sædracan ‘strange sea-dragons’ (1426a). A similar combination of traits was also present when Hroðgar first told Beowulf about the mere and the Danes’ earlier sightings of Grendel and his mother. The king recalled that his people had seen two ellorgæstas ‘alien spirits’ (1349a) on the moors, one of whom on weres wæstmum wræclastas træd, næfne he wæs mara þonne ænig man oðer ‘trod the paths of exile in the forms of a man, except he was larger than any other man’ (1352–3). This reference to the ‘paths of exile’ emphasizes the fact that Grendel belongs to the same excluded alien space as other outcasts, while the allusion to his superlative size and the unnerving vagueness of the statement that he had the ‘forms of a man’ clearly indicate that, unlike others who may be encountered there, he is no ordinary exile.
In the Latin works mentioned in section 3, we saw that alien beings could be portents, heralding war or other misfortunes. There is little evidence of this in OE texts. The only unequivocal example is that of the fiery dragons of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, whose appearance as one of the reðe forebecna ‘dire foretokens’ (ChronD 793.1) seen over the skies of Northumbria in 793 was followed by a great famine and the destruction of the church on Lindisfarne (ChronD 793.4). There are far more examples in OE of monsters whose extraordinary and alien characteristics are supplemented by a sense of the terror they inspire, and often by an indication of the active threat they pose, as was the case with the monstra of the Anglo-Latin Liber monstrorum. For example, when Beowulf kills one of the sellice sædracan ‘strange sea-dragons’ (1426a) at the mere, it is referred to as both a wundorlic wægbora ‘wondrous wave-roamer’ (1440a) and a gryrelicne gist ‘terrifying stranger’ (1441a). Similarly, Hroðgar's reference to Grendel and his mother as ellorgæstas ‘alien spirits’ (1349a) is preceded by his declaration that she is a wælgæst wæfre ‘restless murderous spirit’ (1331a) and, like her son, a mihtig manscaða ‘mighty wicked ravager’ (1339a) who has invaded the social space of the Danish hall. In the other contexts in which ellorgast appears, these traits are also present. As Grendel begins to falter in his fight with Beowulf, the poet describes him using a number of relevant terms in succession: cwealmcuma ‘murderous visitor’ (792a), synsceaþa ‘wicked ravager’ (801b), ellorgast ‘alien spirit’ (807b) and atol aglæca ‘terrible fierce assailant’ (816a). Even in death, the extraordinary and hazardous nature of this alien being is highlighted, as we see when Beowulf decapitates Grendel's corpse and then watches as the blade of his sword dissolves because wæs þæt blod to þæs hat, ættren ellorgæst se þær inne swealt ‘the blood was too hot, the alien spirit who died there too poisonous’ (1616b–17). Unsurprisingly, the combination of the alien, extraordinary, terrible and threatening is also a characteristic of devil contexts. The Guthlac-poet, for example, describes the host of devils who bregdon ‘terrorized’ (564a, Muir Reference Muir2000) the saint and carried him to the gates of hell as bolgenmode wraðe wræcmæcgas ‘enraged hostile outcasts’ (558a; see also 231b, 263a). The narrator in the tenth Advent Lyric of Christ A also uses wræcmæcgas when referring to devils as wræcmæcgas wergan gæstas, hetlen helsceaþa ‘outcasts, accursed spirits, hostile hell-ravagers’ (363–5a, Muir Reference Muir2000).
As its most extraordinary, most terrible and most threatening occupants, the supernatural beings that were believed to inhabit the unruly alien space beyond the borders of Anglo-Saxon social order were the most dynamic instruments through which the society could both signal and explore its limits (see e.g. Cohen Reference Cohen and Cohen1996: 12–16; Williams Reference Williams1996: 3, 14–15, 82–3; Cohen Reference Cohen1999: 16, 21). The ordered cultural space that a society constructs around itself is of course shaped according to a variety of principles and parameters, covering every area of life from the laws, ethics, traditions and religious beliefs that govern the community to the ways in which individuals are encouraged to conceive of the world around them, their place within it and their own human nature. Any of these areas might attract an appropriate supernatural adversary. Beyond the core set of alien, extraordinary, terrible and threatening traits, any given type of adversary will therefore naturally embody additional distinctive characteristics that are determined by the nature of the challenge they pose.
For example, dragons were significant as threats to the ethical component of human nature. As Beowulf's dragon, the hordweard ‘hoard-guardian’ (2293b, 2302b, 2554b, 2593a), illustrates in its violent reaction to the theft of a single cup, these creatures could in part represent the dangers of avarice, which was a particular concern for a society like that of the Anglo-Saxons in which the flow of wealth from lord to retainers helped to maintain security and stability; in other contexts they could embody other threatening concepts, such as chaos, malice or wanton destruction, as well as being conventionally linked with hell and the Devil (see e.g. Kordecki Reference Kordecki1980: 284–93; Mearns Reference Mearns2003b: 28–37). The same kind of combination of themes can be seen in the giant humanoid monsters – the eoten, ent, gigant and þyrs – whose distorted physical forms were not only significant in themselves, but also represented the excesses of overindulgence, greed and inflated pride (see e.g. Cohen Reference Cohen1999: 17, 20, 51; Friedman Reference Friedman2000: 124; Orchard Reference Orchard2003: 77–85).
In some contexts, we can see evidence of the process of contextual modulation mentioned in section 2. In Guthlac, for example, the devils appear to have a corporeal quality at times, with a physical side to their harassment revealed when they attack the hero with gifrum grapum ‘greedy grasps’ (407a). It is notable that, even in these situations, it is Guthlac's spiritual wellbeing that remains the focus of their assaults, with the physical aspect often just the precursor to a verbal onslaught. Thus, when they later seize him again it is to carry him to the gates of hell, where they try to convince him that he is condemned to descend into that grimman gryre ‘grim terror’ (571a), with the intention that these torncwidum ‘grievous words’ (574b) will lead him into hopelessness. In terms of the prototype model outlined above, contexts of this sort can be seen as instances where incorporeal – elsewhere an expected or even a criterial trait of the devil category – is being demoted as a result of the physicality of the actions attributed to the devil characters, possibly to portray events in a more dramatic way. The spiritual dimension of the devils and their attacks remains an active part of the context, as do the alien, extraordinary, terrible and threatening traits, so the sidelining of the incorporeal trait does not fundamentally alter their role or significance. Another particularly striking example of this contextual modulation occurs in an OE gloss to Boethius’ De consolatione philosophiae, where ent (DOE: giant) renders barbarus ‘barbarian, foreigner’ (BoGl P.4.40), in reference to those who dwell outside the Roman world. The context seems to strip away everything, to leave us with the alien trait and the fundamental idea of exclusion.
5 Conclusion
This article has examined the representation of monsters and devils in OE texts, considering whether it is reasonable and useful to use the term supernatural in an Anglo-Saxon context and, if so, how the OE concept might be characterized. I have argued that there is indeed a conceptual category which encompasses Anglo-Saxon monsters and devils, and which is similar in key respects to the modern notion of the supernatural. The essence of this category is exclusion. The similarity between the medieval and the modern concepts is that both mark the ultimate, defining boundary, with the phenomena that lie beyond representing a challenge to the ways in which humans conceive of themselves and their world. Where they differ is that the medieval boundary was more immediate and less abstract, corresponding more closely with the border between the cultured world of human settlement and the excluded, unruly alien space outside. Anglo-Saxon monsters and devils were closely associated with the other outcasts who occupied this uncivilized region, such as foreigners and criminals. However, they also stood apart as its foremost inhabitants: the most extraordinary, terrible and threatening of the alien beings. From a prototype perspective, these can be considered the typical core traits of the OE category of supernatural enemies. As subcategories within this class, additional traits are commonly associated with the different types of supernatural adversary, reflecting the specific nature of the threat that they pose. Together with variation in peripheral traits that might be promoted or suppressed in particular contexts, perhaps for dramatic purposes, it is the differences in the nature of the threat that they embody which motivate the main variation that we see, for example, in the portrayals of a monster such as Grendel on the one hand and the devils who harass Guthlac on the other. The similarities in the characterization of these different kinds of supernatural enemy reflect the fact that they share a common role in helping to delineate the margins and parameters of society by acting as some kind of challenge or counterexample to one or more of the principles of proper behaviour and accepted beliefs from which that civilized space was constructed. In doing so, they are supporting the normative function of the Anglo-Saxons’ sense of place.
