Introduction
Our conversations about punishment have been constrained by the presumption that crimes ought to be punished. This presumption does not entail that crimes must be punished, but rather that punishment occurs as a natural response to wrongdoing instead of as a conventional creation. Even if it troubles us, we seem to believe that the maintenance of social order requires that we punish the actions that frustrate our most fundamental normative expectations.Footnote 1
Operating in this context, the philosophy of punishment has limited its space of inquiry to the problems of punishment’s permissible aims, techniques and opportunities, leaving unattended the question of what is the source of the state’s authority to set up this practice and exercise this particular kind of power over an individual.Footnote 2 Theories of punishment have not dwelt too much on the question of authority, because under the presumption that punishment is the natural corollary to crime instead of a purely artificial practice, the state does not appear to be the author of the practice, but only its administrator. If there is to be an author of this practice, it should be nobody but the offender. Or, as Hugo Grotius would put it, since punishment is a natural consequence of crime, it is the criminals who have brought punishment upon themselves.Footnote 3
In this article I will trace the origins of this presumption in liberal philosophy and question its validity. In order to do so, I will revisit the debate about the nature of punishment that took place during the emergence of liberal political philosophy. I have chosen this debate because, in the context of liberalism, this was when the issue of the source of the authority to punish was last raised, and thus likely where the presumption of punishment originated. In particular, I will consider the work of 16th and 17th century philosophers such as Francisco de Vitoria, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, John Locke and Samuel Pufendorf, all of whom dedicated part of their scholarship to the question of the nature of the power to punish. I will proceed by first describing in more detail what I have called “the presumption of punishment.” Then, I will present and evaluate the main arguments of the Early Modern debate and I will conclude the article by considering why liberal theories of punishment should give up this presumption.
The Content of the Presumption of Punishment
The point of departure in Western political philosophy is a presumption of liberty according to which individuals are equally free so that no one has a natural privilege to exercise power over someone else.Footnote 4 This presumption triggers a suspicion over political power which is meant to guard the integrity of the individual by distributing burdens of justification: any exercise of power that is exerted over an individual is prima facie impermissible and requires a justification.Footnote 5 Now, let me stipulate the following definition of punishment: whether intended to serve a forward-looking goal or not, punishment is always a deliberate imposition of hard treatment that follows the finding of an individual’s misconduct.Footnote 6 As such, punishment is always an exercise of power, both normative and physical, so if the presumption of liberty holds, any imposition of punishment should be considered impermissible until it is appropriately justified.
An appropriate justification of punishment, in turn, should demand that we account for two sets of issues: first, the appropriateness of punishment as a response to wrongdoing, and second, the normative standing of a certain individual to interact in this way with someone else.Footnote 7
Most punishment theories, however, do not see things this way, and limit the justificatory challenge of punishment to the question of its appropriateness as a response to a certain offense. This limitation comes as a result of the presumption of punishment. In the context that is created by this presumption, the second part of the justificatory challenge, i.e., the question of what gives someone a right to punish someone else, does not arise because here it is the wrong itself that calls for the practice and not someone’s conventional capacity to establish and impose it. As a consequence, within this framework, what needs to be justified is not the very existence of the practice of punishment and the standing of someone to bring it about, but the ways in which it is exercised. Thus, the question of the state’s entitlement to punish is translated into the question of why only the state can punish, which can be easily answered as an issue of expediency or as a matter of political necessity.Footnote 8
Under a presumption of punishment, the existence of standards of good and bad, or right and wrong, entails the existence of punishment, because it is the very possibility of punishment that confirms the existence of social normativity.Footnote 9 So, as long as there are crimes, there ought to be punishment; as long as individuals have rights that we consider to be of primary value, their serious violation must trigger the possibility of punishment upon conviction.Footnote 10 Accordingly, it is not up to political agents to decide whether to establish this practice or not, our job is rather to identify punishment’s appropriate opportunities and to impose it in appropriate ways. Again, as we have not created punishment, we do not have to spend much time explaining what gives us the standing to bring it about.Footnote 11
Now, because this view of punishment constitutes a presumption, we can find evidence of its existence but we lack a contemporary debate about its plausibility. Indeed, the presumption is made apparent by the very fact that the second part of punishment´s justificatory challenge, i.e., the question of political standing, is not a concern for most theories of punishment, because if there was no presumption of punishment this would be a primary issue.
A more positive embodiment of the presumption, however, can be found in some contemporary understandings of the idea of impunity as a political and moral failure.Footnote 12 According to these views it is not just the imposition of punishment that requires a justification, but also the failure to impose it.Footnote 13 Here, the power to punish is understood as a duty of the state or the international community, rather than as a contingent mode or technique of governance; it is, so to speak, a demand of justice. Even for scholars who are committed to a critical approach to the criminal law, it is inconceivable that punishment would not be available as a response to the most serious and uncontroversial wrongs; so for most of them, the social problems that are always present in our systems of punishment do not ignite a specific philosophical problem as much as they evince punishment’s tragic nature or the urgent challenges that our policy makers must confront.Footnote 14
In sum, punishment has been naturalized to the extent that we see it as part of how things are, rather than as something that we have created by use of our imagination and our physical and technological capacities.Footnote 15 This understanding modifies the principle of justification that is entailed by a presumption of liberty: punishment is seen as an instance of political power only to the extent that it is exercised by political agents and not as something they create willingly, and it follows that what must be justified is not the standing of the state to establish the practice, but instead the way in which it administers it. But are there any good reasons to hold this presumption true? And how should we begin a discussion about the reasons that ground a presumption when it has been so effective as to go unnoticed?
It is hard to find arguments about an issue when it has not been considered an issue at all, so for this purpose I will now review the main arguments regarding the nature of punishment when the issue was last openly debated in our philosophical tradition. To invoke Grotian rhetoric again, “[w]here should we begin, if not at the very beginning?”Footnote 16
The Early Modern Debate on Punishment
The contemporary notion that crimes ought to be punished likely sprang from the early modern idea that individuals have a natural right to punish. Indeed, the most explicit defense of a naturalized view of punishment in western thought can be found in some of the foundational discourses of liberalism, like the early modern theories of natural rights developed by Hugo Grotius and John Locke. Basically, these philosophers argued that the power to punish confirmed the very existence of individual rights, and because individual rights were seen as part of individual’s pre-political entitlements, so was the power to punish.Footnote 17
It is true that the very idea of individual rights had been evolving long before the 16th century, but there was a particular shift in our understanding that took place at that time, and this shift was greatly determined by the idea of punishment.Footnote 18 In short, this was the time of a transition into a modern view of the individual, which was not as much determined by the idea that individuals have pre-political rights, as it was determined by a portrayal of a powerful individual whose rights came with a permission to punish.Footnote 19 It was the power to punish that ascertained the priority of rights over duties, and thus helped consolidate a discourse of the self that early modern philosophy was presenting as a turn from the medieval view of the individual, which was that of a teleological being mostly governed by duties.Footnote 20 These discussions contain explicit arguments about punishment as a necessary feature of morality rather than an artificial human creation, and so it must be here where our current reasons to hold this presumption true were conceived.
Of course, historical circumstances and geopolitical contingencies of the 16th and 17th centuries facilitated the emergence of this new view of the individual and its connection to the power to punish.Footnote 21 The debate took place in the context of a far-reaching colonization process undertaken by many European countries; and a permanent threat of war that was a consequence of the new political order of Europe, in which the church no longer had a unifying role.Footnote 22 The presumption of punishment came as a solution to the normative problems that were raised by these events. In the first place, the belief in a natural right to punish provided a justification for European colonization and the use of violent measures to secure new commercial routes.Footnote 23 This was possible because Europeans thought that they were entitled to punish the violations of the natural law that, according to them, were committed by people over whom they lacked civil authority, like the natives from the New World, thus the right to punish moral wrongdoers was translated into a title to wage just war and a permission to colonize.Footnote 24
Additionally, the need to find a common normative language to strengthen the possibility of peace among European nations might have also been a factor for this new view of the individual, since it promoted the emergence of secular arguments that made it unnecessary to rely on religious explanations that had become too controversial after the Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation of the Catholic Church.Footnote 25 Hence, the retreat of religion as a space in which to look for universal answers seems to have enabled a move from the idea of duties to the idea of rights and the emergence of the notion of the individual as the source of all political power, because this allowed for a discourse that could be universalized beyond religious allegiance: it is in the natural moral qualities of individuals that all power resides, and not in their belonging to a given community.Footnote 26
The historical context of this philosophical shift, of course, does not say anything conclusive about the plausibility of the idea that individuals have a natural right to punish, but it is helpful to keep in mind that this idea was conceived in the context of a discussion about political authority. Essentially, it is an idea that was used to dissolve an apparent problem of standing that Europeans were confronting regarding the use of force against foreign communities, and this, of course, also had an impact on their understanding of political power on a domestic level. So let us consider the terms on the discussion.
The debate about a natural right to punish can be presented through two opposing views. One side of the debate regarded punishment as an act of political power that always requires a relationship of authority for it to be permissible. For instance, Scholastic philosopher Francisco de Vitoria explicitly argued that temporal punishment requires civil jurisdiction, i.e., a relationship of political subordination between the parties involved. Vitoria developed this view while discussing whether European colonization could be justified as a way to punish the sins of the colonized.Footnote 27 According to him, Europeans were not entitled to punish those over whom they lacked a relationship of civil authority, so they could not punish sinners from the New World, not even on the authority of the pope, because the pope also had no power to punish those who were not under his jurisdiction.Footnote 28 In sum, because punishment is primarily tied to the existence of a relationship of justified political authority, instances of force that are deployed outside of this kind of relationship were either acts of hostility or instances of a right to defend.Footnote 29
The other end of the debate held that punishment is a natural attribute of human beings, and, as such, there is no need to establish a relationship of authority for punishment to be permissible—each individual’s power to punish provides the primary source of political power. As we will see, this view can be represented in the work of Hugo Grotius and John Locke. Grotius, for example, openly contested Vitoria by defending a natural right to punish in a way that would enable him to justify the international behavior of the Dutch, which involved features that were very problematic in the face of traditional principles of international relations.Footnote 30 According to Grotius, war could be waged against those who had offended the law of nature, even if they have caused no injury to their attackers, because he thought war could be understood as an instance of a natural right to punish offenses to this law. As a natural right, punishment did not require any particular institutional structure.Footnote 31
Grotius’s and Locke’s substantive defense of a natural right to punish was made on three grounds: 1) political authority is superfluous in the sense that all its legitimate powers must have belonged to the individual in the first place, and as a consequence, if the state can punish, individuals must have had this capacity on the first place, 2) if there were no natural right to punish for offenses, governments would not be morally authorized to punish alien wrongdoers that commit crimes in their territory, and 3) natural law must be enforceable to be genuine law and this implies a right to punish the offenses against it. The presumption of punishment represents the triumph of this end of the debate, so in order to bring it into question, I will now review each of these three arguments.
The Superfluous Character of Political Authority
Both Grotius and Locke claimed that all governmental rights must proceed from the individual because political authority results from an agreement among its subjects and individuals can only transfer rights that they possess. Since political authorities punish, the argument goes, individuals must have had a right to punish before the constitution of civil society.Footnote 32 According to this approach, political authority is superfluous in the sense that public officials may not possess more rights than those that were previously possessed by each individual member of the political community.Footnote 33 As a consequence, the political structure represents merely a re-allocation of rights, and does not give rise to new normative realities; we can thus learn about individual’s natural capacities from observing what political institutions do.Footnote 34
It is of course debatable whether any theory of civil society according to which the power of the state is constituted by consent must embrace the view that institutions are morally superfluous in the sense that all their normative capacities and standards must have been part of pre-political individual morality. There are plausible consent-based theories of the state that do not hold such a view and which, indeed, argue that the power to punish can only arise in the context of a political society. Hobbes’s and Pufendorf’s theories are two good examples of this as they both argue that the constitution of a civil society provides the conditions under which certain powers, like the power to punish, can arise. So even though they did see political power as sourced in pre-political features of human beings, for them this did not imply that the specific capacities of political authorities must be equal to the pre-political capacities of individuals. In this sense, Pufendorf held that the right to punish requires a relationship of authority that is absent before the civil pact, where we are in a natural state of perfect equality.Footnote 35
For Hobbes, the constitution of sovereign power provides the basic condition of assurance that makes possible certain normative standards and expectations, so punishment outside of the political context can only be an instance of hostility.Footnote 36 Now this may seem to contradict Hobbes’s own views on punishment, where he argues that the source of the sovereign’s right to punish is his own natural right to do everything that is necessary for his own preservation.Footnote 37 However, according to Hobbes, in a state devoid of assurance over the behavior of others, the basic right we have to do whatever we think necessary to protect ourselves does not give us a moral claim towards others. It is the very institution of the sovereign that transforms this basic right of self-preservation into a practice of justice instead of being an act of hostility.Footnote 38 In Hobbes’s words:
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.Footnote 39
A superfluous view of authority, then, does not seem to be an analytical requirement of any plausible consent-based theory of the state and, moreover, it can be argued that such a view is indeed inconsistent with the very liberal principles that ground consent-based theories of the state, as a presumption of liberty should demand that certain rights and duties only arise under certain institutional arrangements.Footnote 40 But, beyond the philosophical purchase of the idea that political authority is superfluous, there is a deeper question: Why would it matter?
Assume that Grotius and Locke are right that if the sovereign can punish, then individuals must have had a natural right to punish, such that the presumption of punishment holds. But in order to arrive at such a conclusion, we would first need to argue that states can indeed punish. In other words, Grotius and Locke seem to be starting from the assumption that states can punish and, as a result, this capacity must come from the source of all its power, i.e., the individual. Hence, the argument goes, individuals must have a natural right to punish. But the fact that the sovereign does punish says nothing about the permissibility of this practice, so it should also tell us nothing about the nature of the right to punish. So even if it was true that political authority must ground all its powers on individual natural attributes, absent an independent reason to believe that the sovereign is entitled to punish, this argument gives us no reason to believe that the individual had this power before entering the civil compact. To proceed otherwise is to derive ‘an ought from an is.’Footnote 41 Hence, we need to find some other ground for the presumption of punishment to hold.
Punishing Foreigners
Grotius and Locke also argued that without a natural right to punish there would be no ground to punish foreigners who commit crimes in a state’s territory, but we do this all the time.Footnote 42 They both thought there was no other available explanation for this instance of punishment because they saw consent as the source of political authority and, since there is no civil compact between a foreigner and the punishing state, punishment must have been sourced in natural rights. In Locke’s words,
“[I]f by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another”Footnote 43
Like the superfluous view of political authority, this is also a practice-based argument that suffers from the normative fallacy of deriving an ought from a judgment of fact, but before we dismiss this argument on methodological grounds, let us consider whether there is a deeper point worthy of attention.
The issue of punishing foreigners, who commit crimes within the territory of the state that aims to punish them, can be presented in two parts. First, there is the question of whether foreigners are politically related to the state they are visiting or traveling through in order for the state to have authority to punish them. And then, if we think they are not politically related in this way, there is the question of whether the fact that we do punish them gives us reason to hold that individuals have a natural right to punish. I will address these two issues in order.
The question of whether there is a relationship of political authority between a state and a foreigner such that the state has authority to punish depends on both the theory of political authority that one favors and the specific status that a foreigner holds. It is beyond the scope of this article to defend a view of political authority and apply it to the different capacities in which a person can be in the territory of a given state.Footnote 44 Instead, I will focus on Grotius’s and Locke’s view on the matter so we can get a conceptual grasp of their arguments about the nature of the power to punish.Footnote 45
As we will see, it is surprising that both these philosophers thought it impossible to find a ground for a sovereign’s authority to punish the crimes that are committed by foreigners who are passing through its territory, because consent-based theories of political authority, like the ones defended by them, have good resources to claim the opposite.Footnote 46
Arguably, by voluntarily entering the territory of a given state, aliens tacitly consent to respecting its rules, and since both Grotius and Locke thought that tacit consent was a sufficient ground for political authority, it is not clear why they would consider the case of punishing foreigners problematic.Footnote 47 Indeed, even if one disagrees with the capacity of consent to ground political authority over a regular citizen, it appears as a more plausible theory of authority for the specific case of a state’s authority to punish a foreigner.
For most citizens, consent is not a very promising basis for the state’s standing to rule over them, as they have little choice about whether to enter the civil compact or to remain outside. In their case, tacit consent would have to be derived from the mere fact of “living under the dominion” of a given sovereign; but, as Hume argued, the circumstance of living under someone’s dominion makes the idea of consent implausible:
[S]uch an implied consent can only have place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims.
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must lean into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.Footnote 48
Now, it might be the case that, unlike the situation of a regular citizen, consent is enough to ground the thin and transitory relationship that takes place between a foreigner and a host state, which differs radically from the indeterminate and all-encompassing political relationship that takes place between an individual and the institutions that govern his or her life on a regular basis. Then, contrary to what Grotius and Locke thought, it seems to be precisely in the case of foreigners that consent-based theories of authority may work best. To put it again in Hume’s words:
The truest tacit consent of this kind, that is ever observed, is when a foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he must submit: Yet is his allegiance, though more voluntary, much less expected or depended on, than that of a natural born subject. On the contrary, his native prince still asserts a claim to him. And if he punish not the renegade, when he seizes him in war with his new prince’s commission; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the prisoner; but on the consent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent reprisals.Footnote 49
But remember that the argument had two parts. First, the lack of authority between a sovereign and a passerby, and then, the question of whether the fact that we do punish foreigners gives us reason to hold that individuals have a natural right to punish. We know that in the context of a consent-based theory of political authority, it is not so convincing that the state lacks authority to punish foreigners, but in order to assess the second part of the argument, let us assume that Grotius and Locke got it right in the sense that there is no relationship of authority between a state and a passerby. Should this tell us something about the nature of the power to punish?
According to Grotius and to Locke, the absence of a relationship of authority shows that individuals do have a natural right to punish for offenses because otherwise it would be impossible to understand on what ground polities punish foreigners. But again, the question is that they still have to show us that the state can indeed punish foreigners for their argument to make sense. And in this case not even an appeal to our intuitions gives us much insight because our legal practices seem to have systematically expressed certain ambivalence to punishing foreigners through the institutions of deportation and the excuse of normative ignorance. So despite the fact that the problem of standing to punish foreigners seems to be illusory for consent-based theories of the state, most of our legal systems seem to have expressed some ambivalence in punishing foreigners. If there were good reasons to believe in a natural right to punish, presumably this ambivalence would not have arisen.
The Efficacy of Rights
Finally, it was argued that natural law and individual rights must come with the corollary entitlement to punish violations of them, without which these rights would be rendered hollow and superfluous intellectual creations with no real efficacy or meaning. As a consequence, the denial of a natural right to punish would amount to the denial of individual pre-political rights as a set of moral endowments through which we can value and criticize our institutions.Footnote 50
Both Grotius and Locke thought that natural law must be enforceable to be genuine law and, for this purpose, punishment must be available as a means of enforcement.Footnote 51 According to Locke, for example, as creatures of God, human beings are morally bound to respect the law of nature and preserve mankind, which entails that before we set up political institutions, the enforcement of this law is equally placed in everyone’s hands.Footnote 52 This general right to preserve mankind via the execution of the law of nature is substantiated by two distinct rights: the right to punish, and the victim’s right to seek reparation.Footnote 53 Thus the source of the state’s standing to punish: without punishment as a possible means of enforcement, natural law could not be recognized as a serious normative system, nor could we ascertain the view of the individual that early modern philosophy was pushing forward.Footnote 54
Translated into contemporary jargon, this argument holds that an individual’s pre-political rights must be enforceable through punishment if they are to be the kind of thing that we value so dearly as limits and ends of political action. In this view, legal punishment is an institutional expression of a natural element of morality that is meant to shield the integrity of the individual and therefore the question of authority is not a primary issue for its permissibility, instead, the priority is provided by the need to enforce rights through a forcible response to wrongdoing.
But how plausible is this idea? Consider that we have a commitment to view the individuals as possessing a set of moral endowments that we call rights and which are their most precious belongings, such that we believe that we should organize our world in order to protect and promote them. Should these rights come with a power to punish? Would these rights be vain if their violation did not empower us to respond through punishment? In what is left of this section I argue that the answer to this question lies in the difference between defensive and punitive force. Once we situate ourselves in the context of this distinction, a presumption of liberty should entail that pre-conventional individual rights need not come with a right to punish in order to be the kind of moral attributes that we expect them to be.
Remember that I stipulated the definition of punishment as a deliberate imposition of hard treatment that follows an individual’s misconduct and that is not intended to restore the victim to the situation in which he or she was before the crime.Footnote 55 Accordingly, punishment is not an exercise of force that is primarily meant to protect someone’s right from a specific aggression; instead, it is primarily a response to an aggression that already took place. From the point of view of protection then, punishment always comes late. By contrast, defensive force is forward looking in the sense that it is meant to prevent a violation of right from taking place and, as a consequence, it is immediately triggered by a threat or any form of danger, and not by a wrong or an offense.
Of course, one can draw a continuum between punishment and protection as means for defending the integrity of moral values; as a matter of fact, one of the most popular rationales for punishment is the prevention of wrongs through deterrence or incapacitation, so the distinction may be sometimes hard to draw.Footnote 56 However, the fact that these practices converge in their aims does not make them equal as modes of human interaction and, accordingly, they can be governed by different rules. For example, I can lose weight by following a meal plan or by doing exercises, or both, but these are clearly different kinds of actions whose appropriate performance would be subject to very different principles. Similarly, one can understand both the legal permission for self-defense and the legal institution of punishment for murder as modes of protecting an individual’s right to life, but as modes of interaction they are very different and will present different normative challenges.Footnote 57
As a mode of interaction, punishment cannot be fully explained as an instance of defense because it represents a response to something that already took place, and it is indeed the non-defensive aspects of punishment that trigger the requirement of political authority in the views of those who argued against a natural right to punish.Footnote 58 But beyond their opinions, the analytical point is that the enforceability or effectiveness of a right does not depend on the ability to punish violations of it; one can imagine alternative ways by which one can ascertain the importance of rights, so the argument for punishment must be one of choice rather than one of necessity. If this is correct, if the force that is needed to make sense of the idea of a right need not be punishment, then it may be the case that only the direct force that is required to secure rights against imminent aggressions is necessary.Footnote 59 Hence, applying the distinction between offensive and defensive force, one could argue that the concern about efficacy can be sufficiently met by granting rights with a general permission to protect them through force, without assigning them with a power to punish their actual violation.
Going back to our inquiry about whether we can make sense of individual rights without a power to punish, imagine that rights entail a permission to use violence to secure or protect them but not to punish their violation. Would rights be in vain? Are they in vain even though they make it permissible for individuals to use violence against their equals? In the end, the issue raised by Grotius and Locke will turn on how we see forcible interactions, or how much violence we are willing to take for granted. But at least the point can be made that, in a world governed by a presumption of liberty, if I am morally entitled to repel by force a certain action because it infringes on some kind of interest I have, then such interest is not a hollow moral idea but something of significance.
Consider a normative theory that authorizes the use violence as a means to defend our possibility to walk freely. Would this be a normative theory that gives value and substance to my ability to walk freely, at least to the extent that it makes sense to say that I have a right to walk freely and you have a correlative duty not to interfere with it? I believe that it would, and that merely increasing the amount of violence that this right entails by going from a power to defend to a power to punish, should not have any impact on the plausibility of affirming that I do have a right to walk freely.
The analytical distinction between an exercise of defensive force and the force that is entailed by punishment thus allows us to overcome the worry that a right, without the faculty to punish its violations, is a hollow moral entity. Even though the distinction might be hard to place in some cases, it is a familiar distinction that pervades most of our normative judgments, whether legal or moral, as a standard to determine when coercion is acceptable and when it is not.Footnote 60 Now, if the primary assumption of liberal political philosophy is an assumption of liberty, according to which any exercise of power that is exerted over an individual is prima facie impermissible and should be justified, and if something can be recognizable as a genuine right without a faculty to punish its infringements, we seem to have little reason left to prefer a normative context that is governed by the presumption of punishment to one that is not.
In other words, in the context of a presumption of liberty, if the idea of a right need not entail a permission to punish, then it should not, because we should prefer a context in which there is more scrutiny over power than a context where power is not fully brought into question. In sum, to put it in Kantian terms, maybe for a right to be recognizable as such it must come with the authority to exercise the amount of coercion that is necessary to limit any infringement of its rightful exercise.Footnote 61 If the violation of the right already took place, the foundation of the right to respond through punishment cannot be found in the right itself but must reside somewhere else. The locus of this justification resides in the second part of punishment’s justification, i.e., in the question of what gives someone the standing to punish someone else.
Conclusion
The specific question that I raised in this article was a question about the origins of the presumption of punishment in our philosophical tradition and whether the reasons that were given by those who conceived of this presumption can convince us today. The answer is that they cannot, so either a new argument must be given or the presumption of punishment should be abandoned.Footnote 62 Now, in order to move forward, it is important to keep in mind what is at stake in this conversation, and how the revision of this presumption could alter the scope of political philosophy and punishment theory. So, let me say something about this.
In most of our conversations we use presumptions that allocate the burden of proving the different claims that we make and thus facilitate our communication while expressing our commitment to certain values. Some of our presumptions, however, serve no positive role and are merely maintained out of habit or as a way to bypass problems that may seem too hard to deal with, like the presumption that mothers are better caretakers than fathers or that individual action can have no impact on containing global warming. As I mentioned in the beginning of this piece, the specific way in which the tension between liberty and punishment could have been bypassed by the presumption of punishment is by making punishment part of our moral nature such that it is the offense that brings punishment about, and not our act of punishing. Hence, we are not fully responsible for punishing.Footnote 63
The idea that crimes ought to be punished reduces the problem of punishment’s justification to an issue of purpose, opportunity and form, leaving unaddressed the question of the authority of a certain polity to impose this form of treatment on a given individual. This has produced a disconnection between theories of punishment and general theories of political authority, because punishment has been taken to be sufficiently regulated by its own pre-institutional moral principles.Footnote 64As an immediate consequence of this disconnect, punishment theory has been unable to address the impact that a context of extreme social injustice and political disenfranchisement should have on the justification of punishment. The point is not that the presumption of punishment has blinded criminal law theory from acknowledging the extreme levels of unfairness that surround the practice of punishment, but rather that it has made us believe that, whatever kind of problem this is, it is not a problem for a theory about the ideal justification of punishment.Footnote 65
If, instead, we were to understand punishment as an artificial practice, in the sense of being a practice that we have willingly devised in the specific ways in which it exists, then the second part of punishment’s justificatory challenge arises, i.e., the question of what gives someone the authority to punish someone else. This new space of inquiry immediately provides us with a framework to assess the normative problems that punishment’s context could raise for its justification. In other words, once we assume that punishment requires a relationship of authority, its ideal justification will require us to describe the qualities and values of the relationship within which this authority can arise, and here, the fairness of punishment´s social and political context becomes crucial. Hence, once we abandon the presumption of punishment, a new space of inquiry opens up for theories of the criminal law, i.e., the question of what the qualities and values are that the political relationship must aspire to for punishment to be a justifiable form of interaction.
Such an approach will also open a new space of inquiry for political philosophy given that most of our contemporary accounts of political authority appeal to coercion in a generic way, and thus do not distinguish what it is precisely that the state can do when we say that it has normative authority to rule coercively. As I have argued before regarding the distinction between defensive and punitive force, there are different forms through which a community can forcibly protect and promote individual rights or public goods, and punishment is only one of them. Different instances of force will entail different forms of interaction which, in turn, should trigger different standards of justification. As a consequence, just as we can imagine instances of coercion that are permissible outside a political relationship, like self-defense, we can also imagine a political relationship where the state has authority to rule coercively, and yet it lacks authority to punish.
In sum, if punishment originates in our conventions and not in some pre-political feature of human wrongdoing, it should be assessed like any other institution that we have designed to govern our social life, which implies that its permissibility will depend, at least partially, on the quality of the political relationship within which it takes place.Footnote 66 But, of course, such a shift towards a more integrated view of punishment cannot take place as long as we operate under the presumption that crimes ought to be punished.Footnote 67
