Students of the American biologist Charles Otis Whitman are said to have identified each other not by biological speciality (embryologist, geneticist or such) but instead by their answer to the question, ‘what is your beast?’ Likewise, the three biologists who shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1973 for their work on animal behaviour can each be identified with a distinctive sort of animal: Karl von Frisch with honeybees, Konrad Lorenz with geese and Niko Tinbergen with seagulls. Each of these three, furthermore, felt that his favoured animal type was especially well suited to illuminating certain larger questions about animal life.
Charlotte Sleigh focuses her attention on a different collection of investigators of animal life: those who made the ant their ‘beast’ of choice. Indeed, even more often than the lives of gulls or geese (and perhaps almost as often as the lives of bees), the lives of ants have been treated as a font of analogy and instruction, particularly with respect to the question of what the lives of animals can tell us about the lives of humans. How this question has been treated proves to be a marvelous subject for historical scrutiny, as Sleigh ably demonstrates.
Examining a time span of just over a century (1874 to 1975), Sleigh identifies three successive periods of myrmecological interpretation. The first, psychological in nature, was epitomized by the work of the Swiss psychiatrist Auguste Forel. The second, more sociological in orientation, was developed by the American academic (and coiner of the word ‘myrmecology’) William Morton Wheeler. The third, with its focus on information and communication, featured the American ant-watcher and sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson. Sleigh's cast of characters, however, extends well beyond her three archetypes. Her ‘cultural history of myrmecology’ explores the ideas, ambitions, favoured metaphors and institutional and cultural contexts of a wide range of naturalists and other figures who found ants fascinating. Some, like the watcher of army ants Theodore C. Schneirla, could be expected here; others, like the cybernetician Norbert Wiener, come as instructive surprises.
Forel proves to be an excellent starting point. ‘Wherever Forel watched ants’, Sleigh writes, ‘he saw potential lessons for humanity’ (p. 27). He happily named his home and private psychiatric asylum La Fourmilière (the Ant Colony). Key to his thought was his understanding of ant colonies as interspecific communities, with more than one species of ant and various other insects living together harmoniously. His utopian hope was that humans could profit from the example.
Wheeler's motivations were not identical to Forel's (though both men believed in eugenics). Sleigh's account of Wheeler weaves together the intellectual influences on him (for instance, the ideas of the philosopher Bergson and the sociologist Pareto), his scientific concepts, his socio-political context (the Great Depression), his academic setting (he worried that the kind of natural history he wanted to pursue was considered inferior to researches of the sort being done in modern biological laboratories), and his elitist view of the scientist's relation to society. He was interested in neither applied entomology (though his professorship at Harvard was in economic entomology) nor dead specimens. ‘Only ants acting in their full and natural social complexity were worthy of consideration’ (p. 70). What he found most illuminating about fully functioning ant societies was how mutual feeding – ‘trophallaxis’ – held them together. Trophallaxis became for Wheeler the key to understanding ant sociality, ‘the paradigmatic phenomenon of myrmecology qua sociology’ (p. 81).
By Sleigh's account, myrmecology lacked a strong disciplinary identity. The intellectual bridge that linked E. O. Wilson with Wheeler and Forel, she indicates, was provided not by other myrmecologists but instead by two British linguists, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. The two chapters Sleigh devotes successively to their work and to the cybernetics conferences held by the Macy Foundation reveal the great interest that zoologists and cyberneticians took in one another in the early years of the Cold War.
When it comes to Wilson, Sleigh argues that it was not merely coincidental that ‘the author of Sociobiology, with all its controversies, was a myrmecologist by avocation’ (p. 165). Her sketch of Wilson describes his early ambitions as a young scientist and carries up to the time he decided to ground ant sociology on a cybernetic basis. Representing him in the early 1950s as ‘trying out different theoretical approaches, hoping to find something big, something revolutionary … with which to make his name’ (p. 204), she explains how his discovery of pheromones in ants became the starting point for his construction of a whole new discipline (sociobiology), which he envisaged as the major counterbalance among the biological sciences to molecular biology (interdisciplinary competition at Harvard contributed mightily to Wilson's disciplinary aspirations). Curiously, though, she does not reflect on how population genetics fits into Wilson's story, nor does she mention how W. D. Hamilton's idea of inclusive fitness (which Hamilton related to the evolution of social insects) was fundamental to Wilson's work on social insects and sociobiology.
Though the book title Six Legs Better suggests an ironic reading of the myrmecologists' passion, the book itself (perhaps inevitably) has something of the flavour of the ants in T. H. White's The Sword in the Stone singing ‘Antland, Antland over all’. In tracking her ant-watchers Sleigh remains largely silent about their counterparts who studied other animals. She makes scant reference to the continental ethologists, who led the way in bringing scientific credibility to naturalistic animal behaviour studies – and who studied mostly birds. Konrad Lorenz maintained that birds are ideal for behaviour studies because, while shedding light on the behaviour of mammals and humans, it is easier to separate the instinctive and the learned components of behaviour in birds. Surprisingly, Sleigh does not mention Wilson's biographical acknowledgement that the ethologists galvanized his interest in behaviour. Wilson heard a lecture by Lorenz at Harvard in 1953 that impressed him as a ‘call to arms’ for naturalistic behaviour study. That, Wilson indicates, was when he began to think of exploring the problem of ant communication. He decided he would study how ants communicate by chemical releasers (just as the ethologists were studying how birds communicate by sight and sound).
Though Sleigh's cyberneticist portrait of Wilson may need amplification, her book as a whole is a treasure of insights about science and metaphor. Combining the history of ideas and the cultural history of science, she astutely illuminates how ants have served as favoured subjects for thinking about animals and ourselves.
