Detlef Liebs, Emeritus Professor of Roman law at Freiburg im Breisgau, has done scholars of ancient Christianity a great service by gathering together his expertly-written papers on Roman law and the Christians. These elegant papers are not easy reading for those whose field is not law, but they offer many pearls for those interested in the development of Christianity and its eventual adoption and transformation of Roman law. Occasionally Liebs draws intriguing parallels between ancient legal decisions and certain notorious cases in the modern world, particularly in the USA and Germany.
In his essay on the trial of Jesus (pp. 1–19), Liebs for the most part avoids controversial hypotheses. For example, he does not claim that maiestas was the crime for which Jesus was crucified – a charge that would not have been appropriate for a peregrinus (non-Roman citizen) and member of the lower class such as Jesus. Although he does not think it likely that Pilate would have offered to release Barabbas (a known insurrectionist), Liebs makes the problematic claim that the name ‘Jesus Bar-abbas’ (son of the father; Matthew xxvii.17) implies that it was actually Jesus whom the ancient Jews wanted Pilate to free (p. 12). Of more interest is his discussion (p. 15 and cf. p. 41) of coercitio (‘force’ or police power), which Theodor Mommsen took to be the basis for the Roman persecution of the Christians. Some scholars have taken this to mean that Mommsen did not believe that a regular trial procedure was used against Jesus or the Christians. Mommsen, however, argued that trials with extra ordinem procedure (‘Der Religionsfrevel nach römischem Recht’, in Gesammelte Schriften III, Berlin 1907, 389–422, esp. pp. 407–9; cf. this reviewer's Roman attitudes toward the Christians: from Claudius to Hadrian, Tübingen 2009, 151–5 on cognitiones extraordinariae) were conducted in which the magistrate (and not a jury) determined the outcome. Mommsen's ‘religious crime’ may not be the solution to the problem of the persecution of the ancient Christians, but Liebs is unable to establish a pre-Decian alternative. His conclusion about the basis of Jesus’ crucifixion (‘Das Urteil und seine Vollstreckung’, 16–17) is somewhat unsatisfactory, since he merely refers to the ‘basis for the execution’ in the titulus on the cross (John xix.19–20 par).
Liebs argues that during the Neronian persecution the Christians were convicted of arson and hence subjected to the arena, crucifixion and burning at the stake – even though they most probably confessed only to being Christians and not arsonists (pp. 26–7). The effect of the Neronian persecution was profound: Christians were judged worthy of death because of their religion, although there was no imperial edict, rescript or mandate given to the magistrates of the empire (p. 29). This conclusion, however, reverts to something quite similar to Mommsen's original position.
The essay on Pliny's persecution of Christians in Bithynia Pontus is similarly judicious and careful. Although Liebs rejects the view that Pliny used coercitio and not a regular trial process (p. 41), he is unable to establish the legal basis for Pliny's executions – other than the remark that for Pliny the superstition in itself is worthy of death (p. 43). He makes the cryptic statement that Pliny tentatively based his decisions on previously valid law (p. 43). The question is: what was the law that justified the persecution of Christianity? We have not advanced beyond Mommsen and T. D. Barnes's contention (‘Legislation against the Christians’, Journal of Religious Studies lxxviii [1968], 32–50, esp. p. 50) that ‘national apostasy’ (Mommsen) was the equivalent of a rejection of mos maiorum (the custom of the ancestors) – the basis of Roman law (cf. Liebs's reference on p. 45 to the Christians’ rejection of centuries-old Roman rites and festivals). The martyrs used Roman trials for their mission (pp. 47–74). Liebs gives numerous convincing examples of this phenomenon (for example, the two sermons of Pionius of Smyrna during his trial, at pp. 66–7; Mart. Pion 3.3, 4.2–24, 12.3–14.16).
The ‘Constantinian turning point and the law’ (pp. 75–98) and ‘Unrestrained brutality in the laws of the first Christian Caesar’ (pp. 108–45, with twenty-four examples) are two essays that constitute a disturbing look at the cruelty of the laws for which the first Christian emperor was responsible. Such a point of view, however, is relativised by the extensive use in late antiquity of punishments such as crucifixion, burning at the stake and execution in the arena by beasts (p. 83). During Constantine's rule criminal penalties became even more brutal and women lost rights. On a positive note, the lot of the poor before the law did improve. It is somewhat surprising that Liebs does not discuss the problem of the abolition of crucifixion by Constantine (supported by authors as diverse as Aurelius Victor, Ambrosiaster, Augustine, etc.). Whether he agrees with the thesis or not, it deserves more than silence.
Liebs develops a characteristically expert treatment on the trials of the Donatists (pp. 98–107) and explores Constantine's decision to intervene. Another essay examines Symmachus’ ineffective attempt to nullify a Christian senator's theft of another individual's land (pp. 166–85). The first heresy trial (Priscillian and several followers, pp. 186–200) on trumped up charges (black magic) did not bode well for the subsequent history of Christianity.
Liebs's papers are well worth the reader's time, and the book is to be recommended unreservedly.
