Introduction
It is well known that Thatcher’s policies in government had a complex relationship with ‘neoliberal’ ideas. Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, for instance, has argued that Thatcher’s views on social policy owed more to Methodism than ‘neoliberal’ theorists.Footnote 1 In a different vein, Richard Vinen has argued that Thatcherism was ultimately interested in maintaining power, which made it pragmatic and often cautious.Footnote 2 More recently, a new framework has been proposed that sees the rise and fall of economic nationalism as an organising principle of post-war British history, including the power and importance of the warfare state.Footnote 3 It seems pertinent therefore to ask what the relationship was between economic nationalism and the Thatcher governments.
In broad terms, Thatcher has been cast as dismantling the national economy and rejecting industrial strategy, culminating in the ‘post-national’ politics of the 1990s.Footnote 4 In her autobiography, Margaret Thatcher claimed that her governments did not believe in ‘picking winners’.Footnote 5 This view has been supported by recent studies, suggesting that Thatcher herself was crucial in ending state support for ‘near-market research’ during the late 1980s.Footnote 6 Andrew Gamble has argued that there was no industrial intervention under Thatcher, as any attempt at a serious industrial strategy was undermined.Footnote 7 But there were some exceptions to this general trend – and this article looks at one of the most significant of these: the arms industry. Focusing on defence procurement and support for the civil aviation industry, it shows how the Thatcher governments often chose the costly route of developing UK and European projects rather than American alternatives. This was despite growing internal criticism and a widely accepted need to rationalise the United Kingdom’s defence sector. In these areas of policy, Thatcher was more dirigiste and pro-European, and less liberal, than we might expect. The arguments of ‘neoliberal’ academics outside the British state, as well as the liberalism of the Treasury within it, directly contradicted government policy.
There was a critique of the size and scope of the United Kingdom’s arms industry, internally and by a handful of free-market economists. They argued that it amounted to a waste of resources, and that, paradoxically, it would expand if it were more focused on those few areas where it had a competitive advantage. The Treasury, the key economic and finance ministry within the state, was the central voice of this internal economic liberalism. The Number 10 Policy Unit, an advisory group set up to give advice to the prime minister, also echoed these arguments. The armed forces themselves occasionally called for American weapons because of their operational advantages. Nevertheless, Thatcher’s Cabinets, and particularly Thatcher herself, ignored these warnings because they wanted to protect UK and European industries, and particularly national design capacities. The collapse of manufacturing employment also punctured a social democratic wariness about the militarised nature of UK industry, with the Labour Party remaining committed to maintaining a wide-ranging arms industry. Indeed, while several of the decisions Thatcher took on defence procurement were controversial within the state, public opposition to them was muted.
This article shows, with greater clarity than previously appreciated, that the politics of Correlli Barnett, acknowledged as a chief Thatcherite ideologue, can, in fact, be reconciled with the practice of the Thatcher governments.Footnote 8 Barnett wrote an influential book called The Audit of War published in 1986 that lambasted the politicians of the post-war era for building a welfare state rather than for supporting national industry.Footnote 9 Paul Addison described his ideology as ‘Bismarckian nationalism’.Footnote 10 Sir Keith Joseph, a Thatcherite Cabinet minister, is said to have recommended the book to many.Footnote 11 Studying several previously unused state records reinforces Andrew M. Dorman’s points about the persistent Treasury opposition to the scale of defence expenditure in the Thatcher era and the Thatcher government’s desire to feed the armaments sector with work.Footnote 12 Although broadly accepting Warren A. Chin’s argument that the mid-1980s saw a greater focus on value for money and international competition in defence procurement, this article places more emphasis on the consistent desire to maintain the defence industrial base across Thatcher’s time as prime minister, especially in the face of opposition within the state.Footnote 13
Examining the policy towards the arms industry in Thatcher’s Britain also means looking again at Thatcher’s relationship to Europe. As we know, her views on Europe were not simple and changed over time, with her advocacy of the single market operating in tandem with a certain reluctant Europeanism. Writing on Thatcher’s defence policy, for example, Lawrence Freedman has argued: ‘Her scepticism over the European project meant that, unlike Edward Heath, she rarely showed any interest in European defence cooperation beyond ensuring the degree of common effort necessary to persuade the Americans that Europe was still worth defending.’Footnote 14 The Westland crisis of 1985–6 is usually taken as a good example of this view. It was during the crisis that Thatcher’s secretary of state for defence, Michael Heseltine, ended up resigning, arguing in favour of a European bid for the failing British helicopter company, Westland, and against Thatcher’s preferred position, which was an American takeover. When the Cabinet conflict became public, Thatcher’s premiership was briefly called into question. Yet this view does not tell the whole story. While the Treasury and Number 10 Policy Unit did demonstrate a marked Atlanticism and were sceptical of European projects, Thatcher’s views were different. Understanding the internal battles over aviation policy and defence procurement under Thatcher reinforces the claim that the Anglo-American relationship and a hostility to Europe have been overstated as central parts of Thatcher’s mindset.Footnote 15 In fact, her governments often wanted to protect the European defence industry against American technical superiority. Westland was an issue of practicalities, where a European takeover was not seen as a viable solution. In this area of policy, Thatcher’s ‘neo-mercantilism’ won out against her free-market beliefs.
The claim that Thatcher destroyed the ‘post-war consensus’ does not, therefore, hold water. On the contrary, as Richard Vinen has argued, Thatcher actually defended the consensus as it was established in the late 1940s and 1950s against the ‘progressive consensus’ of the 1960s and 1970s.Footnote 16 It was the Labour Party in 1983 that broke with this politics, arguing for unilateral nuclear disarmament and exiting the European Economic Community (EEC).Footnote 17 When thinking about civil aviation, the nuclear industry and defence procurement, the Thatcher governments can be seen as partial ‘1950s redux’, with a renewed technological enthusiasm. For instance, this manifested itself in the renewed emphasis on nuclear power, with plans for a large building programme of American-designed nuclear reactors. While the Labour governments of the 1970s took a cautious view on atomic energy, the 1950s saw Britain establish the largest building programme of nuclear power in the world. Although the level of ambition was not what it was in the immediate post-war decades, the purpose of the investments in civil aviation and defence procurement under Thatcher was to keep abreast of the United States. Labour, meanwhile, championed all this, highlighting how their opposition to nuclear weapons was the exception in their wider autarkic defence policy.
To put this in broader theoretical terms, Thatcher’s approach to civil aviation and defence procurement can be described as ‘neo-mercantilist’. Eric Helleiner, who wrote a global intellectual history of this ideology, defines this politics as ‘strategic trade and other forms of government economic activity to promote state wealth and power in the post-Smithian age’.Footnote 18 An alternative framing could see Thatcher being described as an economic nationalist, and indeed at times she clearly was, supporting, for instance, the development of the British-designed Challenger Mk II tank against American and German alternatives. Yet, as has been made clear, the focus of Thatcher’s government was often on the build-up of European industries, a scale beyond the nation. Advocacy for schemes like Airbus was still partly about nationalism, since from the 1960s onwards it was accepted that collaboration with Europe was vital to the maintenance of the UK’s aviation industry. However, calling this straightforwardly nationalist confuses the politics in play; thus ‘neo-mercantilist’ is preferred. It is a similar story with the term ‘neoliberal’. While this is used to describe those close to free-market think-tanks, the phrase ‘economic liberalism’ is preferred to ‘neoliberalism’ because the former is more closely associated with its hostility to protectionism. The liberalism of the Treasury was about not just cutting costs but also advocating free and open markets in the belief that this would lead to greater efficiency through the pursuit of competitive advantage. As we will see, viewing the Thatcher’s government’s policy on arms and aviation through the twin lenses of neo-mercantilism and economic liberalism provides a range of insights into the rationales behind the shift to free markets in post-war Britain.
Liberal Critics of Britain’s Defence Policy
In the 1990s, the United Kingdom retained a peculiarly large and wide-ranging arms industry for a Western European power.Footnote 19 This was, in part, due to expensive decisions taken during Thatcher’s time as prime minister. In 1983, the Thatcher government backed the UK-designed ALARM air-to-surface missiles for use in the Tornado fleet. The development costs doubled from £200 to £400 million, and delivery was pushed back two years to 1990. The decision to build the Eurofighter, taken in 1988, was initially estimated to cost £1.8 billion, nearly £4.9 billion in 2024 prices. In 1990, Vickers received £90 million to develop the Challenger Mk II tank, which in 1991 resulted in a £520 million order for 140 vehicles. The Thatcher governments continued with Nimrod, an airborne radar developed by the General Electric Company (GEC) started under the Labour government in 1977, which was only cancelled for an American alternative in 1986, after £1 billion had been spent on its development. When Thatcher resigned as prime minister, the equipment budget of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had the same spread as it did when she entered office: 75 per cent was spent in the United Kingdom; 15 per cent on collaborative projects; and 10 per cent on imported equipment.Footnote 20
The civil aviation industry also continued to receive state support under Thatcher, especially through ‘launch aid’, an arrangement where the government helps to cover the development costs in return for a share of the profits, if any materialise. British Aerospace received such support for the Airbus A320 in 1984 and the A330/40 in 1987; Rolls-Royce were funded to develop the V2500 in 1984 (the engines used in the Airbus A320); Westland was given financial help for the W30 helicopter in 1982 and the Anglo-Italian EH101 in 1984, a project better known as the Merlin. These launch aids came to around £2.5 billion in 2024 prices, with over £2 billion going on Airbus projects alone.Footnote 21
During the Thatcher era, some established neoliberal critics of ‘high technology’ voiced their complaints at this high level of expenditure. In his 1985 Reith Lectures, the economist David Henderson criticised ‘do-it-yourself economics’: an unreflective ‘neo-mercantilism’ that led to ill-considered import restrictions and industrial subsidies across the West, including in the United Kingdom under Thatcher. Much of Henderson’s despair was focused on international trade policy, but ‘high technology’ was also singled out as an area in which the ideas of orthodox economists had little purchase. Protectionism continued to prevail due to the interest group politics that defined industrial strategy.Footnote 22 Henderson specifically lamented the ‘much-applauded’ industrial collaborations in Europe, suggesting that these attempts to compete with American industry would only featherbed the European industrial base.Footnote 23 Henderson warned: ‘A country does not gain in defensive capability, nor does it increase its freedom of action, by saddling its business firms and armed services with uncompetitive high-cost systems.’Footnote 24 Henderson was formerly chief economist in the Ministry of Aviation in the mid- to late 1960s, and in 1977, he published a widely read and biting cost–benefit analysis of the Anglo–French supersonic jet Concorde and the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR), a UK-designed nuclear reactor, documenting them as hugely loss-making endeavours.Footnote 25
Keith Hartley, an academic economist connected to the Institute for Economic Affairs, offered the most detailed liberal criticisms of defence procurement under Thatcher. Hartley, another rare critic of industrial collaboration in Europe, complained that these projects did not even promote the integration of European industries but merely sustained uneconomic national firms. Moreover, he argued that the weakness of democratic pressures within the European Economic Community (EEC) meant that interest groups were even more powerful than they were at the national level, leading to projects especially divorced from commercial realities.Footnote 26 In his 1991 book The Economics of Defence Policy, Hartley suggested that these arguments about competitive advantage applied strongly in the case of the United Kingdom, for it was unique among European nations in being able to design a vast array of weapons. He publicly voiced a position many inside the state held: that the defence sector would be better off if it focused on those few areas where it had the world lead. Such a rationalisation would encourage export success, usher in longer production runs, and create a larger armaments industry.Footnote 27 Hartley grumbled that interest groups, especially the unions and the manufacturers, monopolised the advice ministers received and defined the public debate.Footnote 28
The Economist and the Financial Times rarely expressed concerns about accountability or the power of lobby groups, but they did occasionally question the strategic and economic rationality of eschewing American-designed weapons in favour of UK and UK–European alternatives. The Economist suggested that US equipment for the Army would be a better use of state resources than the Eurofighter.Footnote 29 They called for the American Abrams M1A1 over the UK Challenger Mk II tank, insisting that: ‘A bit more competition in armaments research would lead, as in any industry, to lower costs and better technical solutions.’Footnote 30 The Financial Times condemned the Nimrod project as ‘yet another example of the cost to a comparatively small country of a “go-it alone” defence strategy’.Footnote 31 As will be detailed later on, the helicopter company Westland became the site of a major political drama under Thatcher, with a dispute about whether to accept an American takeover or look for an European solution. The Financial Times called for the shareholders of Westland to decide on its future, not politicians. ‘In planning their defence procurement, European governments should take a pragmatic rather than a Gaullist view of the potential US contribution. After all, they are part of the same alliance.’Footnote 32 But there were limits to their free-market criticisms. They tended for instance to support Airbus, arguing that without UK support for civil aviation in Europe, the United States would be granted a monopoly.Footnote 33
Some of these criticisms were echoed in the Treasury, which had complained about high levels of military spending throughout the post-war decades.Footnote 34 During the early 1980s, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) argued that if the United Kingdom were to maintain its current capacities to design weapons, then its budget would have to increase to cope with the rising costs. The Treasury systematically rebutted the MoD’s arguments. They rejected the ‘import-saving’ claim, suggesting that the costs of developing domestic machines far outweighed any such benefits. They dismissed talk of ‘spin-off’, arguing that the United Kingdom’s arms industry imposed a cost on the rest of the economy by diverting skilled workers from other industries. They also complained that the reasons for ‘Buying British’ in defence were too abstract, being rarely comprehensively evidenced or even discussed with specific examples in mind. They rolled out the standard liberal arguments about comparative advantage, claiming that cutting back the nation’s design capacities would, ultimately, expand exports and create more employment in the armaments industry.Footnote 35 The civil aviation industry was also condemned in terms of opportunity costs and industrial capture. Airbus was viewed as a ‘problem industry’ comparable with British Leyland.Footnote 36 One official suggested that aerospace had received ‘a totally disproportionate share of Government R&D money, with very doubtful benefit to the UK’s overall economic performance’.Footnote 37
When the major decisions in defence procurement and civil aviation came up for Cabinet discussion, Treasury ministers offered detailed criticisms on a case-by-case basis. They urged the licensing of American armaments or simply avoided the development of new ones. In 1983, the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Leon Brittan, stressed that UK-designed ALARM missiles would cost around 65 per cent more than buying the American HARM. He also warned that the UK programme carried a far greater risk of slippage and could leave the RAF without a defence suppression weapon for several years.Footnote 38 In 1988, Peter Lilley, then economic secretary to the Treasury, questioned the need to develop the Challenger Mk II tank, urging the minimum of modernisation to the existing Chieftain tanks, and called for the decision to be reassessed a few years later, when the choices would be clearer.Footnote 39 Also in 1988, John Major, the chief secretary to the Treasury, repeatedly insisted that the government should hold talks with the United States about joining the development of the Hornet 2000 fighter bomber aircraft, and also look into enhancing the Tornados already in use, both of which would be far cheaper routes than building the Eurofighter.Footnote 40 When both were chief secretary to the Treasury, Leon Brittan and John MacGregor doubted the optimistic assessments British Aerospace provided of the A320 or A330/40 aircraft, arguing that if the company believed them, they should fund the projects without state help.Footnote 41
The Treasury’s key allies in these fights was the Number 10 Policy Unit, which was tasked with giving the prime minister political advice. They, too, argued for the American-designed HARM missiles and urged delay on the Eurofighter.Footnote 42 They were even more clearly in favour of the American-designed Abrams M1A1 tank over the Challenger Mk II.Footnote 43 Moreover, the Policy Unit voiced a broader critique as well, which was triggered by the debate over the surface-to-air missiles for the Tornado fleet. It was essentially Keith Hartley’s point, then brought up in the Treasury, about the need to rationalise the arms industry. In 1983, Nicholas Owen, who came to the Policy Unit through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), explained:
Our defence equipment industry includes some of our most successful businesses. But a committed buy-British approach is not always consistent with value for money and is in effect an industrial support system without a coherent strategy. We need to distinguish, more clearly than we have up till now, those items of equipment which we are especially good at producing, in terms of total development times and cost, from those with less promising prospects . . . . A discriminating approach to procurement, guided by competitive considerations, would actually do more to improve the performance of this important industry and provide us more defence for our money.Footnote 44
In response to Owen’s arguments, Thatcher agreed to a review into what weapons the United Kingdom needed to be able to design and produce purely on security grounds before ministers committed to any other major weapons projects.Footnote 45 Thatcher placed Owen on the committee conducting this study, which was otherwise comprised of officials from the Treasury, the DTI and the MoD.
The study came to an astonishing conclusion: when considered strictly in terms of security, the government only needed to maintain national capabilities in nuclear weapons, chemical and biological defence and electronic warfare. All other military equipment could be bought from abroad.Footnote 46 David Pascall, who worked for British Petroleum in oil trading before being seconded to the Policy Unit, suggested that the report demonstrated that defence procurement decisions were based on economic and political considerations, not military strategy. Now it was necessary to work out where the United Kingdom had a competitive advantage in its defence economy, to ensure that the government’s decisions made commercial and industrial sense.Footnote 47 Pascall later complained: ‘There is a general tendency within the MoD to exclude overseas competition except for a few particular cases. This trend needs to be reversed.’Footnote 48
These liberal complaints were the most persistent and important internal objections to the size and scope of the United Kingdom’s arms industry, but they were not the only ones in play. The Foreign Office and the MoD had their own arguments. There was a concern in the Foreign Office that developing national weapons like ALARM, when cheaper and better American ones were available, would only strengthen the hand of the lobbyists in the United States arguing against the purchase of UK weapons, and that such economic nationalism would encourage economic nationalism in others.Footnote 49 Within the MoD and among the chiefs of staff, there was a desire to equip the armed forces with the best weapons. Officials in the MoD argued for the American-designed Abrams M1A1 because it was operationally better, especially in terms of firepower, armour and mobility, as well as 13 per cent cheaper than the proposed UK alternative. The Abrams was also already in service, while the Challenger Mk II was not yet even developed. If this UK tank was produced without any delay, the MoD believed that it would still miss the required in-service date by ten months.Footnote 50 Indeed, Michael Alexander, the ambassador and permanent representative to NATO, told Thatcher that ‘for almost the first time (and perhaps somewhat to their own surprise) the MoD and the Army have carried through a genuinely objective analysis of a major weapons procurement decision’.Footnote 51 He warned that if the government did not pick the Abrams, these ‘new, more cold-eyed’ views in the MoD would be undermined.Footnote 52 According to Charles Powell, Thatcher’s principal private secretary and crucial foreign policy advisor, the Army leaked their preference for the Abrams to the press.Footnote 53
The debate over the replacement for the Chieftain tank was also a rare but important instance when the secretary of state for defence did not support the national option. George Younger, a pro-European, Tory paternalist, who had fought in the Korean War during his National Service, did warn Thatcher that choosing the American Abrams M1A1 would probably lead to the irreversible loss of a national design capacity.Footnote 54 Yet, for the Defence and Overseas Committee, Younger wrote a memorandum that avoided making a personal judgement between the options and ended by pointing out that the Equipment Policy Committee of the MoD had many arguments in favour of the American tank.Footnote 55 Younger warned that the Challenger Mk II carried much technical risk and was unlikely to be in service in time. He also emphasised that it would have a rifled bore gun, whereas most of the allied armies in NATO used smoothbore guns, meaning that the United Kingdom would undermine efforts to promote the interchangeability of ammunition.Footnote 56 Moreover, Younger stressed that ‘Buying British’ would undermine the then accepted efforts to reduce defence research and development spending: ‘I cannot be expected to manage the defence programme within sharply reducing ceilings when colleagues are not prepared to take the difficult decisions on individual cases that the R&D policy requires.’Footnote 57
The internal critics of the United Kingdom’s arms industry were not ignored. They in fact won the argument, albeit in abstract terms. Conservative ministers accepted that the United Kingdom’s defence sector was too large, and that its size was damaging the wider economy. In 1986, the Ministerial Group on Research and Development Priorities chaired by William Whitelaw, the Lord President of the Council and Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party, noted that 53 per cent of government research and development spending went on defence, far more than any other developed country. It was suggested that this disproportionate focus was draining resources and scientific manpower away from more profitable ends.Footnote 58 In 1986, the Ministerial Steering Committee on Economic Strategy agreed to cut defence R&D spending by 15 per cent before the end of the decade, and by 45 per cent by 1994/5.Footnote 59 Ministers accepted that this would require more military equipment to be purchased from overseas suppliers and understood that this would be ‘politically sensitive’.Footnote 60 However, cuts on this scale never materialised. Government spending on defence research and development dropped by only 29 per cent by 1994/5.Footnote 61 The reality of agreeing to purchase more weapons from overseas was harder to realise than an abstract commitment to making cuts.
Maintaining Design Capabilities
There was much official and ministerial support for maintaining a wide-ranging arms industry focused on the need to maintain design capacity. Officials in the MoD and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI argued that ALARM had to be developed to retain a UK expertise in anti-radar weaponry.Footnote 62 The support for the Eurofighter, a European project, rested on the same fundamental point. When the project was in its early stages in the mid-1980s, Michael Heseltine, the secretary of state for defence, and Norman Tebbit, the secretary of state for trade and industry, warned that without it, British Aerospace would lose its capacity to design combat aircraft and that the United Kingdom would therefore rid itself of its dominant position in Europe as a design leader.Footnote 63 These arguments were powerful enough to convince sceptics. Charles Powell, Thatcher’s private secretary and a key foreign policy advisor, thought that the MoD had stifled proper studies of alternatives to the Eurofighter, but nevertheless he argued that it had to go ahead. ‘Withdrawal would be a major blow to the British aerospace industry and might spell an end to the British (and European) capability to build modern warplanes.’Footnote 64 A similar consideration was central to the politics of Airbus. In his memoirs, Norman Tebbit put the point bluntly: ‘It was not easy to make the business case to compete headlong with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas but I had no doubt that if Europe was to maintain a civil aircraft industry it had to be done.’Footnote 65 While the MoD favoured the Abrams, the DTI wanted the Challenger Mk II on industrial grounds.Footnote 66 In the Defence and Overseas Committee itself, Thatcher put her key concern very clearly, that the ‘choice of Abrams would be likely to entail the irrevocable abandonment of a national tank design and production capability’.Footnote 67
Thatcher herself often played a decisive role in these contentious decisions. Given that the Defence and Overseas Committee was split on the Challenger Mk II tank, and that George Younger, the secretary of state for defence, was increasingly hostile to this national project, it is unlikely that it would have gone ahead without her support. She was also a keen supporter of the UK-designed ALARM missiles. Thatcher argued in the Cabinet: ‘The choice reflected the Government’s confidence in British industry and the importance of preserving a national capability in an area of advanced technology vital for defence.’Footnote 68 In other cases, however, Thatcher did, at times, show more Atlanticism than many of her Cabinet colleagues. She was, for instance, initially interested in an Anglo-American alternative to the Eurofighter.Footnote 69 Yet, even in this case, as Alan Clark, minister for defence procurement and himself a fervent nationalist, recorded in his diary, Thatcher’s support for the project, despite her initial reservations, was pivotal to its survival.Footnote 70
Younger’s lack of support for the Challenger Mk II tank was unusual. Thatcher’s secretaries of state for defence generally disagreed with the Treasury and the Number 10 Policy Unit. The Thatcherite John Nott, who held the position between 1981 and 1983, supported the MoD in its calls for increases to the equipment budget: ‘The Ministry of Defence either needs more money, or we must face up to the traumas of deliberately creating a narrower industrial and R&D base.’Footnote 71 Michael Heseltine, the secretary of state for defence between 1983 and 1986, sought to bring greater market competition to the procurement process and move away from ‘cost-plus’ contracts, but buying or building American weapons under licence was not part of his reform agenda.Footnote 72 In response to the Policy Unit’s arguments, he suggested that for industrial and political reasons, it would be wrong to rely heavily upon allies for the nation’s future supplies of weapons.Footnote 73 While Thatcher talked to Heseltine about a study to determine those areas where the United Kingdom had the competitive advantage in armaments, it never materialised.Footnote 74 When the Ministerial Group on Research and Development Priorities offered its conclusions on defence research and development, Heseltine argued against cuts, emphasising the dire ‘industrial implications’ of such a course.Footnote 75
The agreement to reduce defence R&D was only made after Heseltine had resigned. His replacement was Younger who, despite his ambivalence about the Challenger Mk II tank, was a supporter of the national arms industry. A few months into his new role, Younger told his Cabinet colleagues that their decisions in defence procurement, and especially their support for the Eurofighter, made such steep research and development cuts impossible. He also argued against building American weapons under licence: ‘We would lose the long-term industrial and technological benefits for which we have striven, and we would lose some credibility in the eyes of our allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Domestically, the implications for the defence industries and their overseas sales would be profound.’Footnote 76
There were other political contingencies that ensured support for the domestic industry continued. For instance, the launch aid for the V2500 engine was partly about the politics of privatisation. In 1984, Norman Tebbit, then secretary of state for trade and industry, argued that it was needed to ensure a sound financial base for selling Rolls-Royce.Footnote 77 There were also electoral concerns in play. John Nott, who was secretary of state for defence between 1981 and 1983, supported the development of a new fighter aircraft to replace the Jaguar, but not because he believed in the military case for it. There were many constituencies involved in the aerospace sector, especially in the North of England. A demonstrator aircraft for a new fighter jet, which would eventually lead to the Eurofighter, therefore had to go ahead, especially after the closure of the Chatham Dockyard had imperilled many Conservative seats.Footnote 78 Likewise, in 1987, Paul Channon, the secretary of state for trade and industry, accepted that giving a substantial launch aid to the Airbus A330/40 was not the right spending priority, but he also pointed out that over seventy Conservative MPs in marginal seats represented workers in the aviation industry.Footnote 79
The Westland crisis brought many of these issues to a head. In 1986, the Conservative Cabinet allowed Westland to be bought up by the American firm Sikorsky. Michael Heseltine had advocated a European merger instead and ended up resigning when this option was rebuffed. The ensuing debate was understood as a clear ideological and personal fight: Thatcher as an Atlanticist and a free-marketer; Heseltine as a European and an interventionist. On Westland, Lawrence Freedman has written:
Although party political ambition and loyalty played their part, the Westland affair was largely driven by the force of two competing concepts of Britain’s external industrial policy. It was not so much a question of whether the most valuable associations were to be formed with the United States or Western Europe, as whether government should steer industrial policy at all.Footnote 80
There are, of course, broad truths behind these characterisations. Yet, there was a reluctance among Thatcher’s Cabinet to weaken the United Kingdom’s arms industry through selling off Westland to an American company, even if many ministers saw it as the only way to secure its long-term future.
During the early 1980s, the Thatcher government had in fact attempted to build up the design capacities of Westland, which ended up backfiring. Since its establishment in 1961, Westland had mainly built Sikorsky-designed helicopters under licence. The W30 helicopter programme, which the Thatcher government supported, was meant to help them build up their design capacities. The Treasury was against this expansion of their role. One official bluntly suggested: ‘Rather than go into the high risk business of designing helicopters, Westland might be better to stick to their present role of building under licence.’Footnote 81 However, Conservative politicians ignored such warnings, even from Treasury ministers. Geoffrey Howe, the chancellor of the exchequer, argued: ‘It would be a pity to allow the British helicopter industry to follow the motorcycle industry off the map.’Footnote 82 It was the failure of Westland’s move into design that partly caused the Westland crisis; the W30 helicopter attracted few orders.
There was little enthusiasm for an American takeover of the company within the Cabinet, even among Thatcherites. Norman Tebbit, when secretary of state for trade and industry, told the prime minister: ‘I do not find the prospect of American ownership welcome.’Footnote 83 The Cabinet as a whole agreed that, in abstract terms, a European merger would be preferable. Sir John Cuckney, the chairman of Westland, was made aware of the government’s preference.Footnote 84 Cuckney, however, argued that a European solution could not guarantee the long-term success of Westland, nor even avoid its short-term collapse.Footnote 85 Heseltine argued that Sikorsky was only interested in Westland to undermine the European helicopter industry.Footnote 86 In contrast, the management of Westland looked upon the Black Hawk as a major export opportunity.Footnote 87 Here we see voices of industry arguing that building foreign designs under licence was not a form of industrial weakness, but a way to build up manufacturing strength. There were, once more, multiple nationalisms in play. And generally, it is clear that Thatcher’s Cabinet were not indifferent to the industrial future of Westland. All ministers wanted to avoid the company going into receivership and most believed that the Sikorsky bid was the only way to secure this.
It was a similar story with the cancellation of UK-built Nimrod early warning radar aircraft. Many at the time argued that this revealed a Thatcherite indifference to national industry and a wrong-headed devotion to the United States. Yet, once again, the internal politics reveal an ideological resistance to the eventual decision taken. The Nimrod AEW3 was started under the Labour government in 1977, and in the months after coming to office, Conservative ministers avoided an early opportunity to cancel it because they believed in the industrial advantages of ‘Buying British’. In 1979, the Treasury was already arguing for licensing the Boeing E-3, particularly because of the risk of cost escalation on the UK alternative.Footnote 88 The MoD accepted that in several ways this American radar would be better for the military, especially as it would be in service earlier and had a greater detection range. Yet, at this time, the MoD insisted that Nimrod had to continue. It would damage their reputation to cancel it so soon after they backed it. Officials also stressed that 5,000 people were employed on it and warned that cancellation would cause ‘a substantial loss of industrial morale’.Footnote 89 In light of such arguments, Francis Pym, the secretary of state for defence, and Geoffrey Howe, the chancellor of the exchequer, decided to keep Nimrod going.Footnote 90
The cancellation only came after the internal opposition to the project grew forceful and widespread. In 1985, Sir John Fieldhouse, the chief of defence staff, argued that Nimrod would be so operationally inadequate that it would be unacceptable to the RAF, even for training purposes. Moreover, to even get a training aeroplane, it would cost a further £375 million on top of the £882 million already spent. In 1986, George Younger, then secretary of state for defence, ignored pleas from within the MoD for its immediate cancellation. He gave GEC six months and £50 million to see if they could make it work. Younger had ‘no confidence’ in their ability to do so, but he thought it was politically useful to give them this opportunity, as it would help limit the public opposition to buying the American alternative.Footnote 91 When the final decision had to be made later in the year, the military and technical experts in the MoD were unanimously in favour of cancellation. This was hardly surprising, as Nimrod’s performance would still be ‘grossly inadequate’. GEC would not achieve the acceptable technical standard by the in-service date of 1989; it would take until at least the mid-1990s. The MoD thought that Nimrod was so bad that they were happy to pay more for the Boeing E-3.Footnote 92 Even more astonishingly, the government was faced with the possibility that, since the production of the Boeing E-3 was coming to an end, the UK would have no adequate airborne early warning capability at all. The Cabinet thus went for the Boeing E-3, despite, in Thatcher’s words, ‘the advantages of purchasing a British system’.Footnote 93
Supporters and Critics in Parliament
There was little public dissent from Conservatives about the United Kingdom’s wide-ranging arms industry. Much of the right echoed the complaints of the left, arguing that Thatcher was inadequately supporting it. Thatcher’s enemies within her own party were unlikely to criticise her government for its ongoing ‘neo-mercantilism’. When Nimrod was cancelled, many senior Conservative MPs objected, including former Prime Minister Edward Heath, who spoke of lost jobs, wasted export potential and a dented national pride.Footnote 94 In memoirs and personal political manifestos, many of the old Heathite ministers called for more intervention to support the manufacturing sector. Both Jim Prior, Thatcher’s secretary of state for employment, and Francis Pym, Thatcher’s secretary of state for defence and foreign secretary, called for a comprehensive industrial strategy.Footnote 95 Michael Heseltine belonged to a younger generation of Tories and was more free-market orientated, but he made similar arguments. Heseltine even complained of the economic liberalism of the Treasury and dismissed their faith in laissez-faire as an imperial hangover. In his 1987 book Where There’s a Will, Heseltine called for a strengthened DTI with power to develop targeted interventions in industries, very much anticipating the arguments of the Labour modernisers.Footnote 96
Many Conservative politicians, both Thatcherites and critics of Thatcher, also had close links with the United Kingdom’s defence sector, acting as advisors and chairs. For instance, during the late 1980s, Norman Tebbit became an honorary advisor to the chairman of British Aerospace.Footnote 97 Lord Glenarthur acted as a consultant to British Aerospace between 1989 and 1999. He was a former pilot with British Airways Helicopters, who had a series of ministerial jobs under Thatcher, lastly becoming a minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. After resigning as foreign secretary in the wake of the Falklands crisis in 1982, Lord Carrington briefly became the chairman of GEC. Jim Prior, who resigned as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in 1984, succeeded him. The Conservative peer Lord Rees-Mogg, the editor of The Times from 1967 to 1981, also served as a non-executive director of GEC between 1981 and 1997. Geoffrey Pattie, Edward Leigh and Michael Marshall also had links to the arms industry.Footnote 98 British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce and Airbus Industries also provided many Conservative MPs with free trips overseas, including Robert Atkins and Gerald Howarth.Footnote 99 In 1990, British Aerospace funded a ‘fact finding tour’ of Saudi Arabia for Michael Colvin, the chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Aviation Committee.Footnote 100 The Registry of Members’ Interests suggests that few Labour MPs received such benefits – Tony Benn’s one-day visit to Toulouse in 1989 to celebrate Concorde, paid for by British Aerospace, being a notable exception.Footnote 101
The criticism voiced inside the state about the arms industry was not echoed among the opposition parties in Westminster. While the 1983 election manifesto of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)/Liberal Alliance did call for a reduction in the proportion of research and development spending allocated to defence, the politicians in these parties did not criticise the individual decisions that would have made this possible.Footnote 102 In 1982, John Cartwright, a former Labour MP who defected to the SDP, celebrated Heseltine’s decision to adopt the ALARM missile system, thus securing ‘an independent British missile technology’.Footnote 103 In 1988, Menzies Campbell assured the House of Commons that the Liberal Democrats ‘warmly welcomed’ the decision to fund the development of the Challenger Mk II tank.Footnote 104 There was also much support for using state funds to maintain the civil aviation industry. In 1983, David Owen, then leader of the SDP, personally wrote to Thatcher in support of the A320 and British Aerospace: ‘I believe they have a well-founded case and hope your Government will grant them sufficient launch aid. I do not see any similarity to Concorde.’Footnote 105 The SDP/Liberal Alliance showed a strong belief that European industries had to be supported in order to challenge the dominance of the United States. This was, for instance, one of the key themes of the SDP/Liberal Alliance’s 1987 election manifesto. They argued that the United Kingdom’s manufacturing industry – ‘devastated in recent years’ – needed to be strengthened through greater collaboration in order to ensure that Europe could compete in a world of superpowers.Footnote 106 For leading figures, this anti-Americanism even extended to nuclear weapons. In 1986, David Steel, the leader of the Liberal Party, and David Owen, the leader of the SDP, met with French President François Mitterrand and the NATO commanders in Brussels to discuss Anglo–French cooperation in nuclear weapons, the so-called Euro bomb.Footnote 107
It was the Labour Party, though, that offered the most steadfast support for maintaining the size and scope of the arms industry. There had been a social democratic critique of Britain’s high levels of defence spending in the 1970s. Initiatives such as those at Lucas Aerospace emerged, which sought to transition from military work to what was called ‘socially useful production’.Footnote 108 Yet, these efforts remained relatively marginal, and in the 1980s Labour’s positions were strikingly autarkic. While the SDP/Liberal Alliance reluctantly accepted the cancellation of Nimrod and the American takeover of Westland, the Labour Party opposed both decisions. In 1985, John Smith, the shadow secretary of state for trade and industry, praised Michael Heseltine for fighting for the ‘national interest’ in trying to find a European solution for Westland.Footnote 109 In 1986, Denzil Davies, the shadow secretary of state for defence, moved a motion calling on the Conservative government to stick with Nimrod.Footnote 110 Davies even said that, if a Labour government were elected, they would consider restarting it.Footnote 111 In 1989, Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, was actively lobbying for the Challenger Mk II tank, visiting Vickers and putting pressure on the Thatcher government. A press release from Kinnock warned: ‘The first British tank came under Churchill. If the Tory Government gets this decision wrong, we may have seen the last British tank under Thatcher.’Footnote 112 Rather than replacing Polaris with ‘the expensive American Trident system’, the Labour manifesto of 1987 pledged to use this £10 billion to strengthen the United Kingdom’s conventional forces and specifically said that a ‘buy British-made’ approach would be adopted whenever possible.Footnote 113
Labour saw maintaining design capacities as critical. In 1986, Denzil Davies, when shadow secretary of state for defence, dismissed subcontracting work, arguing that to be a ‘viable industrial nation’, the United Kingdom had to be the prime contractor, the central designer and manufacturer of weapons.Footnote 114 In the same year, Peter Shore, when shadow leader of the House of Commons, bemoaned how the ‘Westland Story’ was presented as a choice between either a European or an American helicopter industry. Shore insisted that if the United Kingdom could not recognise the importance of ‘an independent national helicopter design and manufacturing capacity’, then its ‘industrial future [was] at risk’.Footnote 115 This feeling needs to be understood in the context of the collapse of much of UK manufacturing and cuts in R&D. Thus, even the moderate Denis Healey was happy to countenance a strong national policy, alongside figures like Tony Benn, a Labour Cabinet minister in the mid- to late 1970s, who argued strongly for protecting British industry behind tariff barriers. Healey was a critic of Benn, but he did not oppose economic nationalism in principle.Footnote 116
There was also union pressure underpinning these beliefs. Powerful union leaders from across the political spectrum were united in lobbying for the Challenger Mk II tank: from Ron Todd, a left-wing figure and a committed supporter of unilateral nuclear disarmament, to more moderate figures like Gavin Laird and Bill McCall. They wrote a joint letter to Kinnock: ‘To buy British would not only benefit the Army and the taxpayer but would also avoid catastrophic consequences for industry and employment in our country.’ They also made claims of national greatness: ‘We consider it inconceivable for this country to abandon its present world leader status in this field of high technology.’Footnote 117 Those on the far left of the union movement made similar claims. Ken Gill was a particularly keen advocate of ‘Buying British’. Gill was the general secretary of the Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS) and later of the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union, bodies that contained many of those who worked in the United Kingdom’s defence industry. In his 1986 pamphlet Save Our Industry, Gill lamented the Thatcher government’s ‘hell-bent’ desire to sell off national industries to American multi-nationals, as this damaged the United Kingdom’s capacity to determine its own future. ‘It is no good voting in an election for an expanding economy when the industries which are to expand are owned and controlled by someone else.’ Gill’s plan for industry called for a block on all foreign takeovers, import controls on key sectors and the scrapping of nuclear weapons. This was to be accompanied by a commitment to ‘retain a viable defence sector based on British-made conventional arms’.Footnote 118
The left-leaning press shared this vision of the British arms industry. For the Observer and the Guardian, it was vital to support European ventures such as Airbus and even national projects like Nimrod to maintain a manufacturing industry in the United Kingdom and Europe that could compete with the United States, especially in the context of a decline in the industrial base.Footnote 119 Both newspapers, in fact, offered a ‘neo—mercantalist’ critique of the Conservative government’s attitude towards defence procurement. One editorial in the Guardian suggested that the Westland affair highlighted how Thatcher – ideologically a bedfellow of American free marketeers – did not understand the benefits of industrial collaboration in Europe. Without a rationalisation of European industries, there would be no ‘high tech’ sector left in the United Kingdom. ‘Look around in your high street shop for a European-made video recorder or music centre: and be prepared to look hard and long. The whole area of consumer electronics . . . is sliding from our grasp.’Footnote 120 The Labour-supporting Daily Mirror offered a more UK-focused jingoism. The advantage of both the European bid for Westland and the case for Nimrod was maintaining ‘British jobs’ and securing ‘the defence of Britain’.Footnote 121
While many on the radical left argued for a reduction in defence spending when Thatcher was in power, this rarely translated into a call for the abandonment of particular projects. For instance, the Morning Star condemned the Thatcher governments for high levels of defence spending but celebrated the Challenger Mk II ‘supertank’ and bemoaned the loss of jobs after Nimrod was cancelled.Footnote 122 Tribune reported on Nimrod via the complaints of TASS about the employment consequences and the squandering of a great export opportunity.Footnote 123 Even those on the far reaches of the Labour left like Ken Coates, a former Trotskyite and committed unilateralist, argued that the Westland crisis highlighted how Europe needed to consolidate its technical might against the ‘Atlanticist hegemony’.Footnote 124 Indeed, Frances Morrell, the former political advisor to Tony Benn, made the same argument.Footnote 125
There was a crucial shift in Labour policy towards the end of the 1980s. As Colm Murphy has argued, the centrality of a state-driven economic strategy focused around the manufacturing industry would slowly be displaced with a privileging of the service sector and investments in human capital.Footnote 126 While it took until the early 1990s for this shift to be fully apparent, the seeds of it were clear while Thatcher was still prime minister. Many Labour figures came to voice the liberal critique of industrial strategy – that dirigisme empowered lobby groups. In the mid-1980s, Tony Blair, a rising figure on the right of the party, was tasked with working on industrial strategy for Kinnock. Blair wanted tripartite committees that brought together the unions, employers and the state to put together packages of intervention across sectors. This was to avoid trade unions and industrial interests simply becoming ‘political lobbyists’ for their own narrow desires.Footnote 127
After Labour’s third successive election defeat in 1992, Kinnock’s policy review called for a new DTI that would not ‘pick winners’ or become involved in ‘detailed operational decision-making in industry’ and certainly not establish a ‘vast bureaucracy’. Rather, they called for a ‘medium term industrial strategy’ in which planning would complement market imperatives resulting in ‘strategic interventions in key sectors’.Footnote 128 Yet the Labour Party kept its commitment to maintaining a strong arms industry in the United Kingdom. In 1989, the final report of the policy review on ‘Britain in the World’ contained no commitment to reduce defence expenditure below that of the Conservatives’ targets. Labour was no longer calling for the outright cancellation of Trident, although they did suggest that the United Kingdom did not need a fourth Trident submarine and argued this money would be better spent on a non-nuclear hunter–killer submarine.Footnote 129 Despite the thaw in the Cold War, the Labour Party still stressed that there would be a continued need for ‘the maintenance of a substantial defence manufacturing industry in Britain’.Footnote 130
Conclusion
While the national economy was abandoned in many areas, the Thatcher governments and particularly Thatcher herself sought to ensure that the United Kingdom maintained a wide-ranging arms industry. This was not a straightforward story of interest groups taking over the state; ideology mattered profoundly. Thatcher and her ministers wanted to keep national design capacities and ensure that Europe could compete with the United States in some very particular areas of industry. There was little or no public criticism of these policies, and even the left was in favour of maintaining the size and scope of the United Kingdom’s arms industry, especially in the context of declining employment in the manufacturing sector. The real battles were fought inside the state. Officials, especially those in the Treasury and in the Number 10 Policy Unit, campaigned for more economic liberalism, but to little avail. This was an instance of ‘quiet politics’, but one that challenges the concept as Pepper D. Culpepper defined it. Culpepper argued that low salience issues create ‘quiet politics’, which leads to the dominance of interest groups.Footnote 131 In contrast, the most important politics around civil aviation and defence procurement under Thatcher was quiet not because it was low salience – on the contrary, these decisions were much discussed in the press and Parliament – but because there was effectively a public consensus in favour of British and European programmes. The real debates were hidden from view inside the state.
Acknowledging the ‘neo-mercantilism’ of the Thatcher governments, and recognising the internal critique of it, has wider implications for how we think about the shift to free markets. The older narrative that ‘neoliberalism’ came from think-tanks like Institute of Economic Affairs has been replaced with more complex stories.Footnote 132 For instance, writing about the United States, Elizabeth Popp Berman has charted the rise of an ‘economic style of reasoning’, which became institutionalised across the state, often through parties and politicians of the centre-left.Footnote 133 Looking at the politics of aviation and defence procurement under Thatcher also brings our attention to the forces inside the state who argued for economic liberalism. We already know that senior officials urged the prime minister to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1960s, arguing that the UK would benefit from the market competition.Footnote 134 Whitehall’s opposition in the 1970s to the great techno-nationalist programmes of the post-war era, the investments in supersonic aviation and civil nuclear power, has also been well documented.Footnote 135 Writing about the mid-1970s onwards, Aeron Davis argued that the Treasury was a crucial force in creating a UK economy dependent on financial services.Footnote 136 Nevertheless, while the ‘Treasury view’ is an old concept in British historiography and political science, and its liberalism is well known, the extent to which officials led the abandonment of the national economy compared to ministers needs further investigation. What is already clear is that Whitehall had the capacity to be a force for important changes in policy, and particularly for it to be critical of protectionism, rather than standing for the continuity that it is more commonly known for. What the case of the arms industry under Thatcher further underlines is that the shifting political economy of the post-war United Kingdom can only be fully grasped from the inside, where the key debates took place outside of public view.
Competing interests
The research for this article was conducted while studying for my PhD at King’s College, London. It was funded by a Hans Rausing 1+3 Scholarship and research grants from the Institute for Humane Studies. The preparation of the paper for submission was done while a postdoctoral research associate at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in collaboration with the Productivity Institute, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
