Generations of scholars have assumed that Plato's dialogues indicate that his thought changed over time. But while busying themselves with what they took to be Plato's development, despite the fact that the dialogues themselves give no clear indication that Plato's thought ever changed once he had begun writing, they failed to notice that the thought of Plato's Socrates, if not of Plato, surely did develop or change over time. Laurence Lampert's book, which is about “how Socrates became Socrates,” is therefore a breath of fresh air. Lampert notes that there are four dialogues bearing on Socrates's development. Although he makes the mistake of discussing only three of them—he discounts the Apology, and all that it entails, apparently because he regards it as too exoteric (2–3, 63)—his book is the first to try to do so much of what must be done if the Socratic turn from natural to political philosophy is to be fully understood. Lampert's first aim is to show how Socrates became Socrates, “by showing how Plato ordered his Phaedo, Parmenides, and Symposium chronologically to give his readers access to Socrates’ development” (1). At the same time, however, Lampert tries to show how, when Socrates became Socrates, he actually became Nietzsche. “Like all [his] books, this book too is an installment in the new history of philosophy made possible by Friedrich Nietzsche” (5, 221). The result is a highly original, revisionist history of Socrates's development, with which Lampert succeeds in his second aim of placing Plato squarely within “a Nietzschean history of philosophy,” insofar as that means imposing a point of view, like a “commander and legislator” (226, 222), without regard for the truth of the matter.
Although Lampert thinks philosophy consists in the search for knowledge (2, 4, 8, 49, 54, 84–85, 88, 221), he thinks it consists also, or instead, in ruling the minds of nonphilosophers “as Homer . . . ruled,” by myth making, in order to make the world safe for philosophy (30–31, 68–71, 116, 149–51, 196, 226). “Philosophy [is] the attempt to understand rationally the causes of all things and to generate a social order within which that gift can prosper” (226, emphasis added). The “philosopher-ruler” is thus moved not only by the desire to know but also, or instead, by “the quiet virtue of generosity,” gratitude, eros, or justice (48, 84–85, 87, 124, 226). The Phaedo is a good example of “a philosopher-ruler in action” because, there, Socrates prepares the ground for Christianity (68–71, 148–51). He does so by persuading his audience that the soul is immortal, which he accomplishes largely by persuading them that there are transcendent forms—there are not, they are exoteric, but belief in them somehow helps nonphilosophers believe in immortality (61, 68–69, 80–81, 91)—and by putting his money where his mouth is and dying “heroically” (3, 8, 30–31, 48). Lampert thinks Socrates's death was “genuinely heroic” and yet, at the same time, easy. For Socrates was “completely at home” in the world (209): not just perfectly composed in the face of death, but even positively grateful, in the vein of Nietzsche's yes-saying, for “mortal life” (82, 85–86, 189, 226). But is heroism easy? Socrates was, moreover, perfectly happy knowing the truth about eros (cf. 189)—even though, since eros for immortality is “the fundamental passion” (194–95) and immortality is impossible (153, 167, 190–91), that truth is “terrifying.” Lampert never explains why the dying Socrates covered his face (8, 82), which is quite unlike him.
Lampert's discussion of Socrates's intellectual autobiography, the first stage of his development, takes up less than half of the chapter on the Phaedo. Lampert notes that Socrates was a natural philosopher in his youth who was, as such, searching for the material and efficient causes of the world. And he offers an account of how the young Socrates became dissatisfied with natural philosophy before turning first to teleology and then, when his hopes of finding a defense of teleology in a book by Anaxagoras were disappointed, to either the logoi or transcendent forms. According to Lampert, however, the Phaedo does not answer the question of “how or why” Socrates turned; the “actual reasons” for Socrates's turn are only given in the Parmenides (52, 56–57, 85; cf. 54).
Lampert's discussion of the Parmenides is, however, hard to fathom. Lampert speaks confidently of “the problem of the one and the many,” as if it needed no introduction. But what is the problem? Even readers already persuaded that it is of the utmost importance, both in itself and to Plato, will be disappointed by Lampert's failure to spell it out in such a way as to convey something at least of its true meaning. The situation is not helped by the fact that Lampert's discussion of the Parmenides eventually becomes a discussion of Seth Benardete's discussion of the Parmenides. For Benardete, similarly, “spends no time whatever testing the validity of any of Parmenides’ arguments. . . . He focuses on the action of the argument” (126). According to Lampert, young Socrates actually believed in transcendent forms—Lampert's young Socrates is incredibly conventional: he is also, it turns out, oblivious to exotericism (46–47, 102, 108), if not to philosophy itself (45), and pious (114, 117–18)—but the second stage of his development consists in “the refutation of transcendent forms,” by Parmenides, “plus a profound positive gain” (124). Specifically, after refuting Socrates's belief in transcendent forms, Parmenides taught him an “epistemological skepticism,” just like Nietzsche's: “dreaming and shadow-painting . . . inevitably constructs the forms and particulars of human experience blocking all direct access to beings” (190–91, 129–31, 133–34, 144, 146–48, 185, 223).
For the “most important,” third stage of Socrates's development (136), Lampert turns to young Socrates and Diotima's conversation in the Symposium where, he thinks, Diotima offers a Nietzschean solution to Socrates's Nietzschean problem. Philosophy's “skepticism” is not “terminal” (132) to philosophy, apparently because Diotima's “ontology of eros” (134), an “ontological psychology akin to Nietzsche's insight into . . . will to power,” comes to the rescue (152, 131). Lampert discounts what Socrates and Diotima actually say in order to maintain that eros is, like will to power, “both beautiful and good,” and an “insatiable desire for desire” (à la Callicles) rather than a longing for immortality (170–71). His Diotima leaves “to easy inference the conclusion that the nature of nature is universal process, a becoming that is an internal drive to fulfill itself whose product is an internal drive to fulfill itself,” although, to be sure, she never says anything of the sort (190). She offers to solve the Nietzschean problem, that human experience is a dream, by positing will to power as the fundamental fact about the world (222–23, 185–86). Apparently, since nothing is true, it is permissible to make everything up.
Throughout, Lampert engages more deeply with the dramatic details of the dialogues, “the argument of the action,” than with the arguments themselves. But dramatic details, while not unimportant, are no substitute for “testing the validity of . . . arguments” (contrast 126 with 57), especially since Lampert's third and ultimate aim is to show that Socrates and Nietzsche agree because their conclusions are the conclusions of reason itself (224). For example, Lampert claims that “as a young man [Socrates] rationally abandoned” theism (52n88). How so? Notwithstanding natural philosophy's impiety (39), Lampert's Socrates was somehow pious until Parmenides proved to him that the gods are “unknowing of us, unknowable by us” (115). If, however, the gods are unknowable—at least, “to human nature” (Parmenides 135a5)—how do we know of them that they are unknowing of us? Man is not necessarily the measure. But Lampert, as was already indicated, sees no tension between skepticism and rationalism. Seeing no overlap between skepticism and theism either, he mistakes the “someone,” looming in the background of the whole entire Parmenides, threatening to undermine reason, for a Protagorean (132n38). Lampert's Socrates does not so much engage in philosophy by responding to the objections of nonphilosophers, for instance, as he defends philosophy from persecution by ruling their minds. The great advantage of Lampert's book is to make one wonder how reasonable this typically modern strategy is.
