I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) has doubled over the past decade.Footnote 2 The most prevalent form of ART is in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), in which a woman’s eggs are extracted, fertilized in a laboratory setting, and then implanted in the uterus.Footnote 3 Many IVF procedures involve the use of eggs or sperm that have been stored for later use, using a process called cryopreservation. Using the most current compiled data, the CDC reported there were 306,197 ART cycles performed in 2018 in the United States alone, 103,078 of which involved freezing eggs or embryos for later reproductive use.Footnote 4 As of 2017, there were approximately 620,000 embryos stored in cryopreservation facilities throughout the United States.Footnote 5 Approximately 1.9% of infants born in the United States were conceived using ART.Footnote 6 Recently, the Access to Infertility Treatment and Care Act was introduced in the House and the Senate; if enacted, the Act would “require coverage for fertility preservation services for individuals who undergo a medically necessary procedure that may cause infertility, such as chemotherapy.”Footnote 7 If the Act passes, the storage of reproductive material will undoubtedly increase.
With increased cryopreservation of reproductive material, the possibility that such material will be lost or destroyed also increases.Footnote 8 Recently, litigation surrounding the destruction of human embryos made national news after over four thousand cryopreserved human embryos inadvertently were destroyed at the University Hospital Fertility Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio.Footnote 9 The emotional harm associated with such a loss can be extreme, especially in cases where the loss destroys an individual’s only hope of becoming a parent.Footnote 10 Despite the severity of the emotional harm suffered due to the loss of one’s ability to become a parent, those impacted by the loss (i.e., the aspiring parents) often face an uphill battle when trying to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).Footnote 11 NIED law is in disarray, with confusing variations from state to state that often stand as obstacles to recovery.Footnote 12 The battle for NIED recovery is particularly daunting for plaintiffs when reproductive material is lost or destroyed.Footnote 13
Recovery for stand-alone NIED is virtually impossible in jurisdictions where NIED recovery requires plaintiffs to suffer a physical injury or impact, to be within a “zone of danger,” or to meet stringent “bystander” rules for recovery.Footnote 14 In addition, when NIED recovery for loss or destruction of reproductive material is the focus, some courts have exacerbated the confusion and heightened the difficulty of recovery by insisting the reproductive material itself first must be classified before recovery for NIED may be addressed.Footnote 15 For example, in cases involving loss of cryopreserved embryos, courts have disagreed on whether an embryo stored outside the body should be treated as a person, as property, or as “something in-between” deserving “special respect.”Footnote 16 Courts have used the classification to deny NIED recovery, misdirecting their focus toward the reproductive material lost, rather than focusing on plaintiff’s emotional harm caused by the loss of plaintiff’s opportunity to become a parent.Footnote 17
Restatement (Third) of Torts section 47(b) provides a reasonable and clear route for courts to bypass the confusion and address aspiring parents’ stand-alone claims for emotional distress when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. This Article posits that the duty of care owed by ART practitioners, including cryopreservation professionals, to aspiring parents objectively holds the potential for serious emotional harm in the event of breach and encompasses an implied duty to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being.Footnote 18 The duty is based on the special relationship or undertaking between aspiring parents and ART practitioners, supported by Restatement section 47(b).Footnote 19 Breach of this duty should give rise to common law recovery for stand-alone NIED when cryopreserved reproductive material is lost or destroyed.Footnote 20 Although not every relationship or undertaking should support stand-alone NIED recovery,Footnote 21 section 47 has been followed in the context of healthcare special relationships or undertakings.Footnote 22 Section 47 represents the current trend in the development of emotional distress law,Footnote 23 and should be used as the basis for recovery when aspiring parents assert claims for NIED after an ART practitioner’s negligence results in the loss or destruction of reproductive material. Further, the approach under Restatement section 47(b) makes the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander inquiries irrelevant, and renders unnecessary the need to classify the reproductive material before establishing NIED liability. Therefore, courts should not apply the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander barriers to NIED recovery in cases against ART practitioners when cryopreserved embryos, sperm, or other reproductive material is lost or destroyed.Footnote 24 Finally, this Article explains why the policy concerns which support the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander requirements used to limit NIED recovery are not implicated in NIED cases involving loss or destruction of cryopreserved reproductive material.
Part II of this Article addresses ART, focusing on the increased use of IVF and the cryopreservation of reproductive material in the United States. Part III will discuss the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander barriers which are used to limit recovery for NIED. Part IV will argue that recovery for common law NIED when plaintiff’s reproductive material is lost or destroyed should be permitted under Restatement section 47(b) based on the special relationship or undertaking between plaintiff and ART practitioners. This Part also will explain why public policy concerns supporting the traditional barriers do not apply when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. Part V contains the conclusion.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND CRYOPRESERVATION OF REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES
In the past decade, use of ART has dramatically increased.Footnote 25 Couples use ART to become parents or to secure their ability to become parents at a later date.Footnote 26 In short, ART is primarily about procreation and assisting individuals or couples who wish to become parents. Some couples use ART because they have fertility problems and are unable to conceive without using reproductive technology, such as IVF.Footnote 27 Others may use ART simply to preserve their ability to procreate or to delay having children.Footnote 28 Finally, many use ART because cancer or some other illness (or the treatment of the illness) threatens to destroy their ability to procreate.Footnote 29 ART gives such individuals the opportunity and ability to procreate despite their condition. For many, ART represents their only hope of becoming parents.Footnote 30
One prevalent form of ART is IVF.Footnote 31 IVF provides individuals, who would otherwise have little chance of becoming parents, an opportunity to have children.Footnote 32 More than one million babies have been conceived using IVF in the United States alone.Footnote 33 IVF is a process whereby eggs are removed from the body and combined with sperm in a petri dish to fertilize them.Footnote 34 The fertilized eggs, referred to as embryos, may then be implanted in the uterus or cryopreserved for later use.Footnote 35 In fact, cryopreservation is an integral component of most IVF programs.Footnote 36 Sperm, eggs, and embryos may be cryopreserved for later use.Footnote 37 Most reproductive material, including embryos, are stored at approximately -321 degrees.Footnote 38 When properly stored, the material remains viable, in theory, for an indefinite length of time.Footnote 39 Healthy children have been born using embryos that were frozen for more than a decade.Footnote 40 Egg freezing is no longer viewed as experimental, and frozen embryos have a survival rate between 90% and 95%.Footnote 41 Pregnancy rates using fresh embryos and cryopreserved embryos are now similar.Footnote 42 Medical publications note that “women who used thawed embryos have good chances of delivering healthy babies.”Footnote 43 Research also has shown there is no difference in the rate of birth defects or other health issues when children are born using frozen embryos versus embryos that were not frozen.Footnote 44 Despite the increased use of ART in today’s society, several traditional barriers remain that prevent aspiring parents from recovering for stand-alone emotional distress when ART practitioners negligently lose or destroy reproductive material.
III. NIED LAW IN DISARRAY: USE OF PHYSICAL INJURY OR IMPACT, “ZONE OF DANGER,” AND BYSTANDER REQUIREMENTS AS BARRIERS TO STAND-ALONE NIED RECOVERY WHEN REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL IS LOST OR DESTROYED.
Courts and scholars have recognized that NIED law in the United States is “in an almost unparalleled state of confusion.”Footnote 45 Although NIED involves basic negligence law, requiring plaintiff to establish duty, breach, causation, and damages,Footnote 46 the requirements that entitle one to relief vary widely from state to state. While some jurisdictions simply adhere to the traditional approach requiring plaintiff to establish duty, breach, causation, and damages,Footnote 47 other jurisdictions have added barriers to NIED recovery when one seeks to recover for emotional harm alone.Footnote 48 Although these barriers may be referred to as rules, tests, or requirements, depending upon the jurisdiction, their function is the same: namely, to significantly limit recovery for stand-alone NIED.Footnote 49 Three main barriers have emerged to limit NIED recovery in the United States, these barriers include: the requirement that plaintiff must suffer a separate physical injury or impact, be in the “zone of danger”, or meet rigid “bystander” requirements.Footnote 50 When NIED claims seek to recover for purely emotional harm that is not “parasitic,”Footnote 51 courts struggle with them and treat the claims as suspect.Footnote 52 Plaintiffs who reside in jurisdictions that impose these obstacles to stand-alone NIED recovery face an uphill battle to obtain relief. This is particularly true in stand-alone NIED cases involving the loss or destruction of reproductive material where these obstacles effectively bar NIED liability.
A. The Physical Injury or Impact and “Zone of Danger” Requirements will Bar Aspiring Parents’ Recovery for Stand-Alone Nied When Cryopreserved Reproductive Material is Lost or Destroyed.
The main obstacle used by jurisdictions to restrict recovery for stand-alone NIED claims is the requirement that plaintiff must suffer a separate physical injury, distinct from emotional harm.Footnote 53 In other words, a plaintiff may not recover for an emotional injury alone, unless the emotional injury “result[s] directly from tortuously caused physical injury.”Footnote 54 Plaintiff typically must prove his injury using the clear and convincing evidence standard.Footnote 55 Some jurisdictions frame the requirement using different language and require plaintiff to prove a “physical impact” in order to recover for emotional harm. For example, in Florida, courts have framed the impact rule as “before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact.” Footnote 56 The physical injury or impact requirements found support in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 436A which states: “If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.”Footnote 57 A related obstacle to NIED recovery is the zone of danger approach, which requires that, in the absence of physical injury or impact, plaintiff must be in the “zone of danger” in order to recover for NIED.Footnote 58 Under the zone of danger approach, plaintiffs may recover for purely emotional injury if they were at risk of physical injury or impact themselves, caused by the defendant’s negligence.Footnote 59 The zone of danger approach exists in many jurisdictions as an exception to the physical injury or impact requirement,Footnote 60 whereas other jurisdictions have used it to replace the physical injury or impact requirement.Footnote 61 As illustrated by Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., in jurisdictions that have adopted the physical injury, physical impact, or zone of danger requirements, plaintiffs who seek to recover for NIED when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed are typically denied relief.Footnote 62 Although Irvine Scientific Sales Co. is not a case where plaintiffs are suing ART practitioners,Footnote 63 it nevertheless remains instructive regarding use of the physical injury or impact barrier to deny aspiring parents stand-alone NIED recovery.
In Irvine Scientific Sales Co., the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit when, during IVF procedures, plaintiffs’ sperm eggs, embryos, or other reproductive materials were exposed to human albumin potentially contaminated with Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (“CJD”), rendering the material unsuitable for reproductive use.Footnote 64 CJD is a fatal neurological disorder in humans, similar to “Mad Cow Disease” that infects livestock.Footnote 65 Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer and distributor of the human albumin, a blood-derived product.Footnote 66 Two donors of the plasma used to create the product were at risk for CJD.Footnote 67 Human albumin is used to store sperm, eggs, and embryos during the IVF process.Footnote 68
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent in their recall and withdrawal of the potentially contaminated human albumin from the market.Footnote 69 Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant manufacturer failed to warn its distributors, consumers, and others when it first became aware the human albumin was possibly contaminated with CJD.Footnote 70 Plaintiffs sued seeking compensatory and punitive damages, asserting that they “have sustained and or may sustain personal injuries, property damage, emotional distress, and economic loss as a result of the Defendants’ actions.”Footnote 71 Only plaintiffs’ claim for NIED will be discussed, as it is the focus of this Article.
The court used Virginia’s “physical injury” requirement to deny recovery for plaintiffs’ NIED claim. In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court noted that emotional distress damages are not recoverable in Virginia “unless they result directly from tortuously caused physical injury.”Footnote 72 The court ruled that plaintiffs lacked a physical injury based on their embryos’ exposure to potentially contaminated human albumin, despite plaintiffs’ distress when the exposure rendered their embryos unusable.Footnote 73 The court noted that mere exposure to a contaminated product does not create a physical injury.Footnote 74 The court stated that, although plaintiffs must repeat the IVF procedure, there is “no evidence of any physical injury to the eggs, sperm, and embryos exposed to the Albumin.”Footnote 75 As to plaintiff’s claim that she suffered physical injury when she had the potentially contaminated embryos implanted (and because she must have the procedure repeated), the court held the defendants could not be held responsible, because “the implantation procedure is not an injury caused by Defendant’s actions, but is an elective process which Jane Doe chose to undergo for fertility treatment at the Jones Institute.”Footnote 76 There also was no evidence that Jane Doe was exposed to CJD or infected with the disease.Footnote 77 As a result, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ NIED claim, ruling plaintiffs lacked “a legally cognizable physical injury.”Footnote 78 The court concluded by stating: “With all due respect to their situation, it appears to the court that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief.”Footnote 79
Even in situations where a special relationship between plaintiffs and defendants is present, courts continue to require plaintiffs to plead and establish they were in a zone of danger and feared for their own safety to recover for stand-alone NIED.Footnote 80 For example, in K.A.C. v. Benson, over fifty patients sued a gynecologist and clinic using various theories of recovery, including NIED, after a gynecologist performed procedures on them while he was HIV positive and was suffering “from open sores on his hands and forearms.”Footnote 81 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants.Footnote 82 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, dismissing many of plaintiffs’ claims but ruling “a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dr. Benson placed his patients in a zone of danger.”Footnote 83 Ultimately, all plaintiffs settled, with the exception of one, plaintiff T.M.W, who appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.Footnote 84
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment in favor of defendants.Footnote 85 When addressing plaintiff’s ability to recover for NIED, the Minnesota Supreme Court held plaintiff was not in “the ‘zone of danger’ for purposes of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.”Footnote 86 Although plaintiff alleged that her proximity to the gynecologist’s infected body fluids placed her within the zone of danger, the court noted that the law requires plaintiff to be in “actual personal physical danger caused by defendant’s negligence.”Footnote 87 The court held plaintiff was not in such danger because she never had actual exposure to the AIDS virus, and actual exposure was “never more than a remote possibility.”Footnote 88 The court ruled plaintiff’s NIED claim failed as a matter of law, and noted that “a remote possibility of personal peril is insufficient to place plaintiff within a zone of danger for purposes of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.”Footnote 89
Aspiring parents who seek to recover for NIED when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed are typically denied relief in jurisdictions which have adopted the physical injury, physical impact, or zone of danger requirements.Footnote 90 The loss or destruction of the reproductive material usually occurs in a laboratory or storage facility, out of the presence of the aspiring parents. Therefore, when the cryopreserved reproductive material is lost or destroyed, the aspiring parents will not suffer a physical injury or impact. Similarly, because the aspiring parents are not present, they also will not be in the zone of danger and will not fear for their own safety because of defendant’s negligent conduct. In fact, even if aspiring parents were present at the time their reproductive material was destroyed, the ART practitioners’ negligence would not place the aspiring parents in a zone of danger where they were at risk of physical injury or impact and feared for their own safety. As a result, aspiring parents in such cases would not meet “zone of danger” requirements. For this reason, in many cases involving destruction of cryopreserved reproductive material, plaintiffs do not plead physical injury or zone of danger. Instead, aspiring parents often sue using theories such as breach of contract, bailment, and loss of irreplaceable property, which typically are inadequate theories to compensate them for their serious emotional harm.Footnote 91 As illustrated by Irvine Scientific Sales Co., even when plaintiffs have argued they suffered a physical injury because the defendant’s negligence necessitated they undergo additional IVF procedures (such as harvesting additional eggs, creating additional embryos, etc.), courts have denied recovery, labeling the additional IVF procedures “an elective process” rather than a physical injury.Footnote 92 The end result is that the physical injury and zone of danger requirements effectively bar stand-alone NIED recovery when reproductive material is lost or destroyed due to an ART practitioner’s negligence. Just as the physical injury or impact and zone of danger requirements serve to bar stand-alone claims for NIED, the bystander requirements also pose an insurmountable obstacle for aspiring parents who seek to recover when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed.
B. The “Bystander” Limitation to Nied Recovery will Bar Aspiring Parents’ Recovery for Stand-Alone NIED when Cryopreserved Reproductive Material is Lost or Destroyed.
Another common obstacle to NIED recovery is the requirement that plaintiffs meet strict “bystander” requirements to recover for NIED.Footnote 93 In jurisdictions using a bystander approach, NIED recovery typically requires plaintiffs to witness (or sensorially perceive) the death or injury of a close relative as it occurs.Footnote 94 Under this approach, aspiring parents who experience severe emotional distress based on the loss or destruction of reproductive material will be unable to recover. The aspiring parents cannot meet typical “bystander” requirements, because they typically are neither present nor aware of the loss/destruction of their reproductive material at the time it occurs. Additionally, many courts have found the legal categorization of the reproductive material fails to meet the “close relative” requirement. Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island illustrates a plaintiff’s inability to recover for NIED in a jurisdiction following the bystander approach.Footnote 95
In Frisina, three separate couples’ lawsuits against a hospital’s in vitro fertilization clinic for loss and destruction of human embryos were consolidated as the court ruled on defendant clinic’s motion for summary judgment.Footnote 96 The first couple, David and Carol Frisina, froze nine embryos at the clinic to be used at a later date.Footnote 97 They later learned from the clinic that only three of the nine were “available,” and the clinic informed them that those three embryos were not “suitable for transfer” to her uterus.Footnote 98 The second couple, Robert and Vickie Lamontagne, successfully fertilized seven eggs at the clinic.Footnote 99 Three were implanted resulting in the birth of a baby girl; however, the clinic informed the couple that the remaining four embryos were “lost.”Footnote 100 The third couple, George and Susan Doyle, also had a healthy baby girl using IVF at the clinic.Footnote 101 When they returned to use five remaining embryos they had stored at the clinic, however, the clinic informed them the embryos were “inadvertently destroyed” when the clinic relocated.Footnote 102 Plaintiffs sought recovery for the loss and destruction of their embryos using several legal theories, including medical malpractice, bailment, loss of irreplaceable property, and breach of contract.Footnote 103 Plaintiffs also sought relief for “severe trauma and emotional anguish, pain and suffering.”Footnote 104 Only the latter will be addressed, as recovery for emotional harm is the focus of this Article.
The court addressed plaintiffs’ ability to recover for emotional harm as a distinct, stand-alone injury using a cause of action for NIED.Footnote 105 The court began its inquiry into the viability of plaintiffs’ claim by noting that the plaintiffs did not claim a “physical injury” to themselves.Footnote 106 As a result, the court applied Rhode Island law for NIED recovery when one witnesses injury to another victim.Footnote 107 In other words, the court used what most jurisdictions refer to as the “bystander” approach to recovery for NIED, the approach used when plaintiffs’ emotional harm is based on witnessing injury to another and plaintiffs do not suffer physical injury to themselves. The court noted that under the Rhode Island bystander requirements, plaintiffs cannot recover for NIED unless they establish: (1) they are a “close relative of the victim”; (2) they were “present at the scene” and “aware that the victim [was] being injured”; and (3) they suffer “physical symptomatology” as a result.Footnote 108
The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant clinic on plaintiffs’ claims for NIED.Footnote 109 First, the court noted that plaintiffs could not be close relatives of the “victim,” because embryos lacked legal status in Rhode Island.Footnote 110 Although the court noted that IVF has been used for decades, there was a lack of “both statutory authority and case law” regarding recovery for loss or destruction of embryos.Footnote 111 In order to properly analyze the “close[ly] relat[ed] [to] the victim” requirement for bystander NIED, the court stated it would be necessary to explore the legal status of embryos.Footnote 112 In particular, the court was concerned with whether an embryo could be considered a “victim.” The court noted the lack of consensus amongst jurisdictions regarding the status of embryos, which ranged from labeling the embryo as a person, as property, or as something in-between which deserved “special respect.”Footnote 113 Ultimately, the court noted that defendant clinic’s argument was more compelling; namely, if “a nonviable fetus is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the [Rhode Island] wrongful death statute, [that] would preclude pre-embryos from being considered victims [under the first element of NIED].”Footnote 114
The court also noted plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the remaining elements to recover for NIED as bystanders. Plaintiffs were not “[p]resent at the [s]cene” when the embryos were lost or destroyed.Footnote 115 Instead, rather than witnessing the loss or destruction, they learned of it later. Finally, Rhode Island requires that plaintiffs establish physical symptomatology, i.e., “his or her mental anguish objectively manifested itself in the form of some physical ill.”Footnote 116 The court noted that plaintiffs neither claimed nor established “any physical manifestations of their emotional distress.”Footnote 117 Based on the above, the court stated that “plaintiffs face tremendous difficulty in meeting all three requirements” and entered judgment in defendant’s favor on the NIED claim.Footnote 118
As illustrated by Frisina, the bystander approach makes aspiring parents’ recovery for stand-alone NIED virtually impossible when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. First, the loss or destruction of such material typically occurs outside of the presence of the aspiring parents; therefore, the aspiring parents are rarely, if ever, present at the scene and contemporaneously aware of the destruction as it is occurring. Second, the “closely related to the victim” requirement also poses a huge obstacle to an aspiring parent’s NIED recovery as a bystander. The “closely related to the victim” bystander requirement requires courts to engage in the herculean task of analyzing the legal status of the lost or destroyed reproductive material itself.Footnote 119 For example, in Frisina where the lost and destroyed reproductive material consisted of embryos, the court asked: Is an embryo property? Is an embryo a person? Is an embryo something in between the two? The Frisina court noted the importance of such an inquiry in order to determine whether the embryos could be classified as “victims.”Footnote 120 Although the Frisina court did not answer the question,Footnote 121 the court ruled it was “unlikely that the plaintiffs could establish that the pre-embryos were victims,” because a non-viable fetus is not a person under Rhode Island’s wrongful death statutes.Footnote 122
An inquiry into the legal status of the lost or destroyed reproductive material is unnecessary and misses the point. Unlike traditional bystander cases which involve a “victim” distinct from the plaintiff, plaintiffs whose reproductive material was lost or destroyed are not seeking to recover for witnessing an injury to another. Indeed, it is the aspiring parents themselves who are the victims. As one court noted: “[I]n cases in which an ART practitioner engages in negligent or reckless conduct, the tissue or embryo is not the primary victim at all. The victims are the parents who have been deprived of the potential to conceive a child together.”Footnote 123 The victim is not the reproductive material. As a result, courts’ continued reliance on third party precedent to bar NIED liability is misguided.Footnote 124 The courts’ misguided focus on third party precedent creates the need to classify the lost or destroyed reproductive material; the classification, however, is unnecessary and forces the court to ignore the real issue:
Although this argument [that the classification of the destroyed reproductive material is central to recovery] merits attention, after careful consideration, the court concludes that it is misplaced in this context. The question here is not what legal rights ovarian tissue, embryos, previability fetuses or postviability fetuses enjoy in their own right, but rather what type of emotional injury is foreseeable for parents to incur as a result, of the defendant’s discarding the ovarian tissue, reproductive material which, according to the complaint, resulted in the Witts losing the potential to conceive a child together at some point in the future.Footnote 125
NIED claims should therefore focus on the aspiring parents as victims of defendant’s negligence, rather than on the classification of the reproductive material, which is neither the cause of their distress nor the basis for their recovery. When reproductive material is lost or destroyed, the plaintiffs’ emotional distress is due to the loss of the ability to use the reproductive material to become parents. That loss remains and is not dependent upon how the reproductive material is legally classified. Further, the emotional distress caused by that loss remains just as serious and real to the aspiring parents, regardless of how their reproductive material is classified. Classification of the lost or destroyed reproductive material would not diminish the severity of the aspiring parents’ distress. Finally, the classification of the reproductive material is unnecessary to support the aspiring parents’ NIED claim, because the aspiring parents are neither bystanders seeking to recover for distress caused by witnessing an injury to another, nor are the aspiring parents seeking to recover the value of their lost reproductive material. Instead, the aspiring parents are seeking to recover for the emotional distress they directly suffered as victims of defendant’s negligence which has deprived them of the ability to become parents.
Further, the seriousness of the aspiring parents’ emotional distress remains regardless of the potential for their reproductive material to produce a viable child. Irrespective of the likelihood of IVF to produce a child, the plaintiffs’ have still lost their opportunity to become parents. As one court recognized:
The defendant argues that it is not reasonably foreseeable for it to have comprehended the emotional distress that could result from its discarding the plaintiff’s ovarian tissue, as no pregnancy could be guaranteed in the first place. This argument, however, confuses the loss of a pregnancy itself with the loss of an opportunity to potentially become pregnant, and thereby experience pregnancy, prenatal bonding and the birth of a child. As in Perry–Rogers and in Del Zio, it is the loss of the opportunity potentially to become pregnant rather than the loss of an actual fetus that caused the emotional distress.Footnote 126
Thus, aspiring parents are the victims, and their emotional distress, based on the loss of their opportunity to conceive a child together and to become parents, is serious. Plaintiffs’ distress is not caused by witnessing an injury to a third party, nor is it linked to the legal classification of the lost reproductive material. Focus on the classification of the lost or destroyed reproductive material is both unnecessary and misguided.
Courts’ use of the traditional barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery will continue to bar aspiring parents’ claims for recovery when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed. In such cases, the aspiring parents have not suffered a physical injury or impact, nor does the loss or destruction of their reproductive material place them in the requisite zone of danger. Similarly, the aspiring parents cannot meet the bystander requirements that they be closely related to the victim and present at the scene of defendant’s negligence when it occurs. As explained below, under Restatement section 47(b), the traditional barriers are inapplicable and should not be used when the basis for aspiring parents’ NIED claim is the special relationship or undertaking between aspiring parents and ART practitioners.Footnote 127 The special relationship or undertaking between aspiring parents and ART practitioners poses a significant risk of serious emotional harm in the event of breach and encompasses an implied duty to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being thereby supporting the aspiring parents’ claim for NIED.
IV. THE TRADITIONAL BARRIERS TO STAND-ALONE NIED RECOVERY SHOULD NOT BE USED TO BAR RECOVERY IN CASES INVOLVING THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL BECAUSE UNDER RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS SECTION 47(B), THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP/UNDERTAKING BETWEEN ART PROVIDERS AND ASPIRING PARENTS ENCOMPASSES AN IMPLIED DUTY TO CARE FOR THE ASPIRING PARENTS’ EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING.
The law regarding recovery for stand-alone emotional distress in the United States is evolving.Footnote 128 The current evolutionary trend is best portrayed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, published in 2012.Footnote 129 Courts have recognized that the current evolutionary trend of NIED law “expand[s] liability for emotional damages even when a plaintiff was never personally placed in physical danger.”Footnote 130 Section 47 is an important part of this evolutionary trend.Footnote 131 Under section 47, recovery for stand-alone emotional harm is permitted whenever there is a special relationship or undertaking between plaintiffs and defendants that poses an especially likely risk of serious emotional harm in the event of breach.Footnote 132 As explained below, the special relationship or undertaking between aspiring parents and ART practitioners objectively poses an especially likely risk for serious emotional harm in the event of defendant’s breach of duty and, therefore, encompasses an implied duty to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being.Footnote 133 Breach of this duty gives rise to common law recovery for stand-alone NIED when cryopreserved reproductive material is lost or destroyed.Footnote 134 Further, when the special relationship or undertaking approach is used to permit recovery for NIED, the traditional barriers to recovery do not apply, and the confusing inquiry into the legal status of the lost or destroyed reproductive material is unnecessary.Footnote 135 Finally, the public policy concerns which gave rise to the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander limitations to recovery are neither implicated nor violated by permitting NIED recovery when aspiring parents’ reproductive material is lost or destroyed.
A. Restatement (Third) of Torts Section 47 Renders the Traditional Barriers to Stand-Alone NIED Recovery Inapplicable When Defendant Has a Special Relationship or Undertaking with Plaintiff that Implicates Plaintiff’s Emotional Well-Being.
Courts’ continued use of the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander requirements to bar NIED recovery when reproductive material is lost or destroyed is misguided. The Restatement recognizes that these barriers to recovery do not apply when a special relationship or undertaking exists between plaintiffs and defendants that implicates plaintiffs’ emotional well-being.Footnote 136 The Restatement (Third) of Torts section 47 sets out the parameters of when plaintiff may recover for emotional harm alone. Section 47 states:
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct:
(a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the danger; or
(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.Footnote 137
The Restatement intends section 47(b) to apply to situations where defendant’s conduct “does not create a risk of bodily harm [to plaintiffs] but nevertheless poses a significant risk of serious emotional harm.”Footnote 138 Subsection (b), regarding special relationships and undertakings forming the basis for a stand-alone cause of action for NIED, permits recovery without the need for physical injury or impact. Footnote 139 In fact, the authors of the Restatement stated that section 47 is intended to replace section 436A in the Restatement (Second), which barred such recovery; the Restatement authors expressly acknowledged that when a special relationship or undertaking exists to provide the basis for stand-alone NIED recovery, the traditional barriers to NIED recovery such as the requirement of physical injury or impact, the zone of danger test, or bystander rules, do not apply.Footnote 140 Further, this approach to NIED liability need not, and does not, center upon whether the emotional harm was subjectively foreseeable to defendants.Footnote 141 Instead, the court should examine whether the undertakings of defendant or relationship between defendant and plaintiffs objectively pose a significant risk for serious emotional harm in the event of defendant’s breach, thereby meriting stand-alone NIED recovery.
Not every relationship or undertaking poses a significant risk of serious emotional harm. Although section 47(b) provides a path to recovery, courts have not been clear regarding what types of undertakings or special relationships will support stand-alone NIED recovery.Footnote 142 The earliest examples of such cases were those where a telegram or other communication erroneously announced a death and cases involving the mishandling of a corpse.Footnote 143 Professor Dan B. Dobbs recently published an article which thoroughly examined the historical patterns in NIED claims involving undertakings and special relationships.Footnote 144 Professor Dobbs’ insights and conclusion are most helpful here. After surveying NIED cases where courts awarded stand-alone recovery, Professor Dobbs noted that “[l]iability was appropriate in those cases because the courts understood from the relationship of the parties that the defendant undertook to provide care and protection against emotional harm.”Footnote 145 Ultimately, Professor Dobbs concluded the question in such cases is whether, due to an undertaking or special relationship, “[d]efendant has undertaken a duty of care that implicates the plaintiff’s emotional well-being.”Footnote 146 In other words, does the relationship or undertaking “objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach,” so as to “encompass an implied duty to care for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being”?Footnote 147 When defendants engage in such undertakings or enter special relationships with plaintiffs, “courts should honor the duties created by the defendant’s special relationships and by his undertakings to care for the plaintiff.”Footnote 148
Although section 47 has not been expressly adopted as the basis for recovery in cases involving NIED claims by aspiring parents against ART practitioners,Footnote 149 section 47 has been followed by several courts in the medical context. For example, in Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic,Footnote 150 a patient sued a clinic and his physician for NIED after he was erroneously informed he was HIV positive.Footnote 151 As a result of the inaccurate diagnosis, plaintiff became severely depressed, lost his job, began using illegal drugs, and developed an eating disorder.Footnote 152 Plaintiff’s relationship with his daughter was also negatively impacted.Footnote 153 Because he despaired and felt he had no reason to live, plaintiff also engaged in risky behavior, such as intercourse with a woman he knew to be HIV positive.Footnote 154 Plaintiff suffered serious depression for five years under the mistaken belief he was HIV positive, until another clinic informed him the original diagnosis was inaccurate.Footnote 155 When he learned of the mistaken initial diagnosis, plaintiff wept as if he were “a man being released from prison.”Footnote 156 Because plaintiff’s suit against the original clinic and physician sought recovery for emotional harm alone, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiff could not establish he was in the “zone of physical danger” from the misdiagnosis.Footnote 157 A panel of the court of appeals affirmed.Footnote 158 On petition for rehearing, the court of appeals, sitting en banc, considered whether the traditional zone of danger barrier to NIED recovery should apply when plaintiff’s doctor’s negligent misdiagnosis caused serious emotional injury.Footnote 159
The court of appeals ruled the zone of danger barrier, while remaining a valid limitation, should “not be applied indiscriminately in all cases” where plaintiff seeks recovery for stand-alone NIED.Footnote 160 The court followed the tentative draft of Restatement (Third) of Torts section 46 [the current section 47] and recognized a duty to avoid negligent infliction of emotional distress where “the plaintiff’s emotional well-being … is necessarily implicated by the nature of the defendant’s undertaking to or relationship with the plaintiff, and serious emotional distress is especially likely to be caused by the defendant’s negligence.”Footnote 161 The court stated the Restatement approach set forth in section 46 [the current section 47] reflected current developments in the law and the trend toward permitting recovery for emotional harm alone when specific relationships or undertakings are present.Footnote 162 Under the Restatement approach, the court stated that there are two requirements which must be met to establish defendants owed a duty to care for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being: first, there must be a special relationship or undertaking between plaintiff and defendants that implicates the plaintiff’s emotional well-being; and second, there must be an “especially likely risk that defendant’s negligence would cause serious emotional distress.”Footnote 163 The court addressed each of these requirements.
First, the court acknowledged that the inquiry into whether a relationship or undertaking implicates plaintiff’s emotional well-being is an objective one.Footnote 164 The court noted that emotional well-being remains the very purpose of some relationships, such as between a psychologist and patient.Footnote 165 With other relationships, it may not be as clear. The court recognized that a physician’s negligence, however, often implicates a patient’s emotional well-being:
Certain other doctor-patient relationships can be said to involve the care of not just physical illness or conditions, but also of the mental and emotional distress that can result from physical ailments and, indeed, can trigger, aggravate and impede the treatment and alleviation of illness and symptoms. Because care for the body and the emotions are so interlinked, and patients often are dependent of their physicians’ exercise of due care, they therefore are susceptible to suffer emotionally as well as physically as a result of their physicians’ negligence.Footnote 166
Although the court acknowledged that not all cases of physician negligence will support a stand-alone claim of NIED, the court recognized the second requirement under the Restatement will act to limit liability.Footnote 167 The negligent breach by the defendant must be “especially likely” to cause “serious emotional distress.”Footnote 168 This inquiry is also an objective one. The court ruled that the standard is “what a ‘reasonable person’ in the defendant’s position would have foreseen under the circumstances in light of the nature of the relationship or undertaking.”Footnote 169 The inquiry must be handled on a case by case basis, and “[j]udges will necessarily have to draw on their reservoir of knowledge of societal norms, as well as evidence of professional and ethical standards and norms of practice.”Footnote 170 The court noted that the “seriousness” of plaintiff’s distress is also measured objectively, and should be “acute, enduring or life altering” to support stand-alone NIED. Footnote 171 For example, there is a great difference between the objective likelihood of serious emotional distress to a mother when an obstetrician’s negligence permanently injures a child versus a case involving emotional distress caused when a podiatrist negligently treats a plaintiff’s ingrown nail.Footnote 172 The court ultimately concluded that defendants owed a duty to care for plaintiff’s emotional well-being. His physicians had a duty of care that objectively implicated his emotional well-being when they tested him and diagnosed him as being HIV positive.Footnote 173 The court noted that the presence of HIV is tantamount to “a death sentence,” and that a positive diagnosis carries an “emotional impact [that] can be catastrophic.”Footnote 174 Negligence by defendants was objectively especially likely to cause serious emotional harm when they misdiagnosed him as being HIV positive, because HIV is a life altering chronic disease that is potentially fatal and carries social stigma.Footnote 175
Mower v. Baird is another case that adopted, in part, Restatement section 47(b) in the context of a medical relationship or undertaking.Footnote 176 In Mower, a father sued his minor daughter’s psychologist and therapy center for NIED after false allegations of sexual abuse were made following defendants’ treatment of his daughter.Footnote 177 The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the father appealed.Footnote 178 Based on procedural posture, the court of appeal accepted all facts in the complaint as true, including allegations that the therapy deviated from commonly accepted protocol, tainted the child’s memory, and was designed to corroborate allegations of abuse.Footnote 179 This case illustrates an especially interesting use of Restatement section 47(b) to support stand-alone NIED liability, because the patient in this case was the minor daughter, not the plaintiff father. The court framed the issue as follows: “In this case, we’re required to determine whether a treating therapist owes a duty of care to a nonpatient parent in the treatment of the parent’s minor child for potential sexual abuse alleged against that parent.”Footnote 180 The court noted that it would first determine whether the therapist owed a “limited traditional duty,” and then would consider whether to follow the approach of Restatement section 47(b) to address whether the duty obligates defendants to care for plaintiff’s emotional well-being.Footnote 181
The court held that the therapist owed a traditional duty to nonpatient parents of a minor being treated for potential sexual abuse.Footnote 182 The court noted that the duty was a limited one, and ruled that policy considerations warranted limiting the duty to “conducting treatment in a manner that doesn’t recklessly give rise to false memories or allegations of childhood sexual abuse.”Footnote 183 Next, the court addressed whether the scope of the duty extended to encompass a duty to refrain from causing plaintiff emotional harm.Footnote 184 The court adopted, in part, Restatement section 47(b).Footnote 185 The court found that the therapist owed a duty to the nonpatient parent under section 47(b).Footnote 186 First, the court held the counseling of a child for potential sexual abuse by the nonpatient parent objectively implicates that parent’s emotional well-being.Footnote 187 The court noted that the therapist has a “substantial connection” to the child’s parents, and allegations of sexual abuse by a parent “strike[s] at the core of a parent’s basic emotional security.”Footnote 188 Next, the court found it especially likely that the therapist’s negligence would cause severe emotional distress.Footnote 189 Using an objective approach, the court noted that a false finding of abuse due to a therapist’s negligence would most likely destroy that parent’s relationship with the child and other family members.Footnote 190 The parent would also be separated from the child, causing severe distress.Footnote 191 Further, the stigma associated with being labeled a child abuser would have severe ramifications emotionally, professionally, and personally.Footnote 192 The court noted that although it steadfastly adhered to the traditional zone of danger approach when a plaintiff seeks to recover for emotional harm alone, the zone of danger requirements do not apply when recovery is based on a special relationship or undertaking under Restatement section 47(b).Footnote 193 After concluding the duty to refrain from causing plaintiff emotional harm exists, and that recognition of the duty would not be contrary to public policy,Footnote 194 the court reversed and remanded.Footnote 195
Just as the special relationships between healthcare professionals and plaintiffs in Hedgepeth and Mower were recognized to encompass an implied duty to care for plaintiff’s emotional well-being, so too should the special relationship between ART practitioners and aspiring parents. As will be explained below, the special relationship between aspiring parents and their ART practitioners, whereby the latter undertake to store and safeguard plaintiffs’ reproductive material, is a relationship or undertaking that implicates plaintiff’s emotional well-being. Negligence by ART practitioners is especially likely to cause aspiring parents serious emotional harm. Therefore, courts should recognize the relationship or undertaking encompasses an implied duty by ART practitioners to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being under Restatement section 47(b).
B. The Special Relationship or Undertaking Between ART Practitioners and Aspiring Parents Encompasses an Implied Duty to Care for Aspiring Parents’ Emotional Well-Being.
The special relationship or undertaking between ART practitioners and aspiring parents is objectively especially likely to cause serious harm in the event of an ART practitioner’s negligence; therefore, an ART practitioner’s duty to aspiring parents encompasses an implied duty to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being. It is time for courts to recognize this new paradigm and to set aside the traditional barriers to stand-alone NIED claims when recovery is based on Restatement section 47(b). First, it will be necessary to establish that a special relationship or undertaking exists between ART practitioners and aspiring parents that implicates the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being. Second, it will be necessary to establish that serious emotional harm is especially likely in the event of negligence by ART practitioners.
1. A Special Relationship/Undertaking Exists Between Aspiring Parents and ART Practitioners that Implicates Aspiring Parents’ Emotional Well-Being.
Based on the medical nature of ART and its need to employ highly trained fertility specialists, there should be little controversy in asserting that a special relationship or undertaking exists between aspiring parents and ART practitioners wherein the emotional well-being of the aspiring parents is implicated. First, a special relationship exists between aspiring parents and ART practitioners. This relationship is one where aspiring parents seek the services of fertility experts. Cryopreservation of reproductive material, whether it be sperm, eggs, or embryos, requires individuals to participate in a medical process involving healthcare professionals.Footnote 196 In fact, individuals who use ART are referred to as “patients.”Footnote 197 Those who practice ART are healthcare providers, including physicians and other fertility specialists. As the American Society for Reproductive Medicine notes in their “Guide for Patients” regarding ART:
[It is common for] ART programs to have personnel on their staff who have been trained in reproductive endocrinology, laparoscopic surgery, sonography, hormone measurement, tissue culture technique, and sperm/egg interaction.Footnote 198
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends that patients who use ART inquire whether “the physicians [are] board certified in reproductive endocrinology and infertility.” Footnote 199 For decades, courts have recognized the importance of a special relationship, such as the one between doctor and patient, for purposes of establishing a duty in tort law.Footnote 200 It requires no extension or distortion of the law to acknowledge that a special relationship exists between individuals who use ART and their ART healthcare practitioners.Footnote 201
Second, the special relationship objectively implicates the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being. The link between ART practitioners and their patients’ emotional well-being has been well-documented. The ART process has been described as “emotionally draining for both prospective parents.”Footnote 202 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s Guide for patients regarding ART acknowledges that the ART process is one that requires an emotional commitment and that the relationship between ART practitioners and aspiring parents poses a risk of serious emotional harm; for that reason, many ART programs include mental health professionals on their staff:
Assisted reproductive technologies involve significant physical, financial, and emotional commitments on the part of the couple. Psychological stress is common, and some couples describe the experience as an emotional roller coaster. The treatments are involved and costly. Patients have high expectations, yet failure is common in any given cycle. Couples may feel frustrated, angry, isolated, and resentful. At times, frustration can lead to depression and feelings of low self-esteem, especially in the immediate period following a failed ART attempt. The support of friends and family members is very important at this time. Couples are encouraged to consider psychological counseling as an additional means of support and stress management. Many ART programs have a mental health professional on staff to help couples deal with the grief, tension, or anxieties associated with infertility and its treatment.Footnote 203
Therefore, because a special relationship exists between ART practitioners and aspiring parents that objectively implicates the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being, the first requirement essential to recover stand-alone NIED has been established. We now turn to the second requirement which relates to the scope of the duty ART practitioners owe to their patients.Footnote 204 In other words, does the duty of an ART practitioner encompass an implied duty to refrain from causing their patients emotional harm? This is the focus of the second requirement under Restatement section 47(b) which asks whether negligence by the ART practitioner is especially likely to pose a risk of serious emotional harm. Though not every relationship or undertaking should support stand-alone NIED recovery.Footnote 205 As explained below, this Article posits the answer is “yes,” and, as a result, aspiring parents should be permitted to recover for stand-alone NIED when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed.
2. ART Practitioners have an Implied Duty to Care for Aspiring Parents’ Emotional Well-Being Because ART Practitioners’ Negligence is Especially Likely to Pose a Risk of Serious Emotional Harm.
ART practitioners’ negligence objectively poses a risk to cause serious emotional harm to aspiring parents. The likelihood of serious emotional harm to aspiring parents caused by the negligence of ART practitioners has been recognized by several courts in jurisdictions where the traditional barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery were abandoned and did not stand as obstacles to plaintiffs’ recovery.Footnote 206 These cases, which predate publication of Restatement section 47, permitted aspiring parents to recover for NIED using a traditional negligence approach in which foreseeability of emotional harm was crucial to establishing defendants’ duty.Footnote 207 For example, in Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,Footnote 208 the Connecticut Superior Court addressed whether plaintiffs’ “lost opportunity to potentially conceive a child together” supported claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.Footnote 209 The hospital fertility center discarded plaintiff Carolyn Witt’s cryogenically frozen and stored ovarian tissue.Footnote 210 Plaintiffs, a husband and wife with no children, asserted two counts each for both intentional and negligent emotional distress against the hospital.Footnote 211 Plaintiffs alleged “the defendant was providing reproductive technology services to them with the full knowledge that the frozen ovarian tissue it had harvested and stored was their only hope of one day conceiving a child together.”Footnote 212 Carolyn Witt had her ovarian tissue frozen prior to beginning chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer, which she was told would likely render her infertile.Footnote 213 Defendant hospital filed a motion to strike all four counts.Footnote 214 The court allowed the claims for intentional and negligent emotional distress to proceed, striking only the husband’s, Thomas Witt’s, count for intentional infliction of emotional distress, ruling that he had not sufficiently supported his claim.Footnote 215 In its opinion, the Witt court addressed the special relationship between plaintiff and the ART healthcare practitioners and acknowledged that the relationship posed a risk of causing serious emotional harm to aspiring parents. The court noted:
[T]he relationship between parents and ART practitioners [is] analogous to the relationship shared by immediate family members and a mortician. In both cases, there is an important dignity interest shared by families: caring for human remains in a respectful manner in the case of a relative's corpse and preserving the potential for human reproduction in the case of a spouse's ovarian tissue. Moreover, the relationship that a mortician has with the immediate family members of the decedent is akin to the relationship that a fertility physician has with both parents: both relationships involve a class of related people who are particularly vulnerable emotionally and are heavily dependent on the practitioner's diligence. Most importantly, though, in both situations the practitioner's duty to the immediate family is predicated on the family's shared reliance on the practitioner's professional performance to ensure the desired result. Just as a mother and father would be equally distressed to learn that their deceased child was cremated despite their instructions to the mortician to embalm the child for an open casket wake, so, too, would the same parents be equally distressed to learn that their only hope for having a child together was discarded by their medical provider.Footnote 216
In Witt, the court addressed whether the special relationship or undertaking between ART professionals and aspiring parents was one where stand-alone NIED recovery should be permitted based on the risk of serious emotional harm caused by a breach. The court noted that this was a case of first impression, and that foreseeability to the defendant of serious emotional harm was a primary focus.Footnote 217 The Witt court answered in the affirmative, noting that serious emotional harm was objectively foreseeable to the ART practitioners in the event of breach of duty: “[T]he anxiety the plaintiffs experienced as a result of the lost ovarian tissue was so predictably severe that the defendant should have known that it could reasonably lead to illness or physical injury.”Footnote 218 The court explained that the likelihood of serious emotional harm should have been apparent, based on the aspiring parents’ relationship and undertaking with ART practitioners:
[T]he legal academy has also documented the significant emotional stress that routinely accompanies ART procedures, further buttressing the viewpoint that reasonable health care professionals are aware of the heightened potential for emotional distress that negligence can cause in these cases. [citations omitted] … Accordingly, the court concludes that the parties in this case entered into a similar relationship—one predicated on the special relationship forged between a professional and emotionally vulnerable clients who rely on the practitioner's care to navigate emotionally charged human experiences. In such a relationship, both parties reasonably expect that the practitioner will exercise care in mitigating the potential for conduct that would foreseeably result in an even greater emotional injury than the circumstances that brought them to the practitioner's office in the first place. Footnote 219
The appellate division of the New York Supreme Court also recognized the likelihood of serious emotional distress caused by an ART practitioner’s breach of duty in Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju.Footnote 220 In Perry-Rogers, the court refused to dismiss the aspiring parents’ lawsuit against ART practitioners; plaintiffs sued for malpractice but sought recovery for emotional harm alone.Footnote 221 Defendant ART practitioners mistakenly implanted plaintiffs’ embryo in an unidentified third party who became pregnant.Footnote 222 Plaintiffs alleged this negligence caused them serious emotional harm, because they undertook the difficult process of in vitro fertilization and desperately wanted a child; now that child was possibly going to be another couple’s child, and plaintiffs might never know their child’s fate, or “experience pregnancy, prenatal bonding, and birth of their child.”Footnote 223 The court noted that the traditional barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery are not used in New York, as no physical injury is required, and plaintiffs’ distress need not be caused by fear for their own safety.Footnote 224 Instead, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ claim to proceed, based upon the foreseeable risk of serious emotional harm caused by the ART practitioner’s breach of duty:
Here, it was foreseeable that the information that defendants had mistakenly implanted plaintiffs’ embryos in a person whom they would not identify, which information was not conveyed until after such person had become pregnant, would cause plaintiffs emotional distress over the possibility that the child they wanted so desperately, as evidenced by their undertaking the rigors of in vitro fertilization, might be born to someone else and that they might never know his or her fate.Footnote 225
Both Witt and Perry-Rogers establish that an ART practitioner’s breach of duty poses a significant, or especially likely, risk of serious emotional harm to aspiring parents. Although both cases predate Restatement section 47(b) and use foreseeability of harm as a key to establishing the ART practitioners’ duty, the courts’ decisions would likely remain unchanged under the Restatement approach. Both Witt and Perry-Rogers objectively established the likelihood of serious harm as required by Restatement section 47(b), and the question of whether emotional harm is “foreseeable” as compared to the question of whether emotional harm is “especially likely” to occur are arguably similar, if not synonymous.Footnote 226 In any event, Restatement section 47(b) only requires the court to ask whether the special relationship or undertaking objectively poses a risk of serious emotional distress in the event of a breach by defendant.Footnote 227 The Restatement makes it clear that plaintiff’s emotional harm need not be subjectively foreseeable to defendants.Footnote 228 In fact, the Restatement expressly states that liability is not a question of whether the emotional harm was subjectively foreseeable to defendants.Footnote 229
Serious emotional harm is especially likely to occur when cryogenically stored reproductive material is lost or destroyed. The likelihood of serious harm makes sense when one considers the fact that the ART process is an emotionally draining one, even without negligence on the part of ART practitioners. If the process itself places aspiring parents on an emotional roller coaster, where they may often experience frustration, depression and feelings of low self-esteem, especially in the immediate period following a failed ART attempt, then it stands to reason that the aspiring parents’ emotional distress would be especially likely to occur, and would be magnified, if an ART practitioner negligently lost or destroyed the aspiring parents’ reproductive material. One scholar noted that couples often “show an abnormal attachment to the embryos, sometimes even naming them, and experience deep depression if successful implantation does not occur.”Footnote 230 In many cases, the loss or destruction of reproductive material completely eliminates the aspiring parents’ opportunity to conceive a child together and to become parents.Footnote 231 This typically occurs in cases where illness or age have left the couple without the ability to replace the lost or destroyed reproductive material.Footnote 232 Objectively, the emotional distress that a reasonable person would experience after such a loss is severe.
As a result, based on Restatement section 47(b), ART practitioners have an implied duty to care for their patients’ emotional well-being which, if breached, gives rise to stand-alone NIED liability. In other words, the scope of an ART practitioner’s duty encompasses a duty to care for the patients’ emotional well-being. Under section 47, no inquiry into the legal status of the lost or destroyed reproductive material is necessary to establish NIED liability.Footnote 233 Section 47(b) also recognizes the traditional barriers to liability, such as physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander requirements, do not apply under those circumstances.Footnote 234 In addition, as will be explained below, the traditional barriers are inapplicable because the policies supporting those barriers do not apply to NIED claims asserted by aspiring parents whose reproductive material has been lost or destroyed.
C. Public Policy Concerns Behind the Physical Injury or Impact, Zone of Danger, and Bystander Limitations to Recovery are Neither Implicated nor Violated by Permitting NIED Recovery when Aspiring Parents’ Reproductive Material is Lost or Destroyed
Although use of section 47 renders the traditional barriers inapplicable, the barriers’ use would nevertheless be improper because the policies supporting these barriers do not apply in cases where plaintiff’s reproductive material is lost or destroyed by an ART practitioner’s negligence. There are several policy reasons behind the barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery: First, when physical injury (or the risk thereof) is absent, emotional harm is usually deemed “trivial,” and the “law does not concern itself with trifles.”Footnote 235 This approach found support in the Restatement (Second) of Torts which noted that, under such circumstances, the emotional injury “is likely to be so temporary, so evanescent, and so relatively harmless and unimportant, that the task of compensating for it would unduly burden the courts and the defendants.”Footnote 236 Because claims without injury are deemed trivial, courts are also concerned about false claims of emotional injury.Footnote 237 A physical injury accompanying a claim of emotional harm helps to guarantee that the claim for emotional harm is genuine.Footnote 238 Second, if recovery is permitted for emotional injury alone, false claims may become widespread, resulting in a flood of litigation, because “in contrast to the situation with physical injuries, there are no necessary finite limits on the number of persons who might suffer emotional injury as a result of a given negligent act.”Footnote 239 Third, some courts have noted that policy supports denial of stand-alone claims of emotional distress because it may be difficult to establish a causal link between defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s distress when a physical impact is lacking.Footnote 240 This difficulty is particularly true because “emotional injuries may occur far removed in time and space from the negligent conduct that triggered them.”Footnote 241 None of these policy concerns arise in stand-alone NIED cases when aspiring parents’ reproductive material is lost or destroyed. Therefore, continued use of the traditional barriers in such cases is misguided.
1. Aspiring Parents’ Emotional Distress is Severe and Not Feigned.
When plaintiffs’ reproductive material is lost or destroyed, their emotional harm is severe, not trivial, and concern over the distress being feigned is virtually non-existent. Over the past several decades, both courtsFootnote 242 and scholarsFootnote 243 have well-documented the emotional stress involved in the IVF process. Use of the IVF process to overcome infertility has been described as “an all-consuming quest.”Footnote 244 The process is “emotionally draining” for both prospective parents who have invested their time, money, hopes, and dreams to become parents.Footnote 245 The fact that IVF participants “experience deep depression” when the process fails (even when not due to negligence) has also been well-documented.Footnote 246 Scholars describing the “emotional effects of infertility” have noted that “infertile couples experience loss of control, stress, anger, stigma, isolation, self-doubt, guilt, lowered self-esteem, and impaired health, relationships, and ambitions, all symptoms contributing to depression.”Footnote 247 As a result, it stands to reason that the distress of prospective parents is severe when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed due to defendant’s negligence.Footnote 248 Courts have noted that the emotional distress which follows such loss or destruction is predictably severe and genuine.Footnote 249
The severity and genuineness of aspiring parents’ emotional injury was addressed in Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital,Footnote 250 where a husband and wife sued a hospital, a physician, and the trustees of Columbia University for conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress after plaintiffs’ fertilized ova were destroyed.Footnote 251 Plaintiffs participated in an IVF procedure at the hospital, supervised by physicians who were clinical professors at Columbia University.Footnote 252 Because of numerous operations on Mrs. Del Zio’s abdomen, her physician noted that he would not perform any future procedures and, as a result, this was “her last chance to become pregnant.”Footnote 253 Plaintiffs’ fertilized ova were placed in an incubator, owned by Columbia, at the hospital where it was scheduled to remain for four days.Footnote 254 One day after the fertilized ova were placed in the incubator, however, the supervising physician ordered the ova to be removed and placed in deep freeze, thereby destroying them.Footnote 255 A jury verdict was rendered in plaintiffs’ favor, and defendants moved to set aside the verdict or, in the alterative, to grant a new trial.Footnote 256 The court held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find each element of intentional infliction of emotional distress was satisfied. In particular, when addressing the severity of the emotional injury to plaintiffs, the court noted that the evidence supported a finding that defendants disregarded “the substantial certainty that severe emotional distress would follow” defendants’ destruction of plaintiffs’ fertilized ova.Footnote 257 Based on the above, a fear the emotional harm is trivial or may be feigned is misguided and does not apply in cases involving the loss or destruction of reproductive material.Footnote 258 Severe distress follows this loss or destruction, and the distress is particularly severe when aspiring parents lose their only opportunity to become pregnant and have a child together.
2. Permitting Aspiring Parents to Recover will not Open the Floodgates of Litigation.
Eliminating the traditional barriers to recovery in cases involving lost or destroyed cryopreserved reproductive material will not cause the floodgates of litigation to open. The policy reason behind the requirement that plaintiff suffer a physical injury or impact, be in the zone of danger, or be “closely related” to the “victim” is to remove the potential for unlimited liability to third parties.Footnote 259 However, because the special relationship or undertaking is only between ART practitioners and aspiring parents when stored reproductive material is lost or destroyed, the potential universe of plaintiffs in such cases is extremely limited. The aspiring parent, or parents, to whom the ART practitioners owe a duty are the plaintiffs; the concern of infinite and unpredictable liability for ART practitioners is unfounded.Footnote 260 Plaintiffs in cases of lost or destroyed reproductive materials should be limited to those individuals who are in the special relationship with the ART practitioners or who are party to the undertaking. Therefore, in cases of lost or destroyed reproductive material, plaintiffs are limited to either one or both of the aspiring parents.Footnote 261 As a result, rather than opening the floodgates, the number of plaintiffs would, in most cases, not exceed two.Footnote 262 As one court noted, the “opening the floodgates” concern is inapplicable, and public policy would actually be served best by permitting NIED recovery in cases where reproductive material is lost or destroyed:
[B]ecause there is a limited number of potential litigants, i.e., the parents seeking ART treatment, it is unlikely that recognition of this duty will significantly increase litigation in this area or increase the potential for double recovery. At the same time, ensuring that ART practitioners are accountable to the couples they assist for the emotional injury that would foreseeably result from their negligence is likely to ensure greater diligence and further increase patients’ confidence in their ART provider. Greater practitioner accountability, coupled with increased patient confidence, is likely to help ensure robust participation in ART clinics. Thus, recognition of this duty raises little fear that such a duty will “impose an added economic burden upon society” [citation omitted]; while at the same time increasing society’s utilization of these vital services going forward.Footnote 263
As courts have noted, greater accountability of ART practitioners and increased patient confidence are likely to follow if NIED recovery is extended to cases where reproductive material is lost or destroyed. ART practitioners would not fall prey to NIED lawsuits filed by an unlimited number of victims.Footnote 264 Thus, an argument that a flood of litigation would result if the traditional barriers are removed is unpersuasive.
3. The Causal Link Between ART Practitioners’ Negligence and Aspiring Parents’ Emotional Distress is Neither Weak nor Tenuous.
Finally, in cases involving the loss or destruction of reproductive material, it should not be difficult for aspiring parents to establish a causal link between defendant’s negligence and aspiring parents’ distress despite the absence of physical injury or impact. Courts have noted that distress does not need physical injury or impact to be severe, and some distress can be even more severe without physical impact.Footnote 265 Further, as established above, aspiring parents’ emotional distress is both severe and foreseeable when their reproductive material is lost or destroyed, depriving them of the opportunity to become parents.Footnote 266 When reproductive material is lost or destroyed, aspiring parents are not bystanders; they are direct victims of the ART practitioner’s negligence. Therefore, causation is not tenuous, as it may be in some third-party cases. Finally, as in any NIED claim, defendants may argue they did not cause plaintiff’s distress. Causation may be contested. Regardless, plaintiffs are still required to meet their burden to prove their distress was causally linked to defendant’s breach.Footnote 267 Rather than barring plaintiff’s NIED claim at the onset using the traditional barriers to recovery, the just and reasonable approach is to give plaintiff an opportunity to establish causation. If the court concludes that no jury could reasonably find plaintiff met her burden to establish causation, then the court may remove the NIED claim from the jury, performing the court’s “standard gatekeeping function.”Footnote 268 Public policy is not furthered by retaining the traditional barriers to stand-alone NIED recovery when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. Instead, courts should recognize that the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander requirements should not be used when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. The policies supporting the traditional barriers are not implicated or violated in such cases.Footnote 269
V. CONCLUSION
Restatement (Third) of Torts section 47(b) offers aspiring parents a clear path to recover stand-alone NIED when ART practitioners’ negligence results in the loss of the aspiring parents’ opportunity to become parents when reproductive material is lost or destroyed. The special relationship or undertaking between ART practitioners and aspiring parents implicates the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being. Serious emotional distress is especially likely to follow ART practitioners’ negligence. As a result, ART practitioners owe a duty to care for the aspiring parents’ emotional well-being. The duty is based on the special relationship or undertaking between aspiring parents and ART practitioners and is supported by Restatement (Third) of Torts section 47(b), scholars, and case law. Breach of this duty gives rise to common law recovery for stand-alone NIED when cryopreserved reproductive material is lost or destroyed. Further, this approach makes the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander inquiries irrelevant, and renders unnecessary the need to classify the procreative material before establishing NIED liability. Therefore, courts should not apply the physical injury or impact, zone of danger, and bystander barriers used to deny recovery for common law NIED when cryopreserved embryos, sperm, or other reproductive material is lost or destroyed. The policy concerns supporting the use of these traditional barriers are not implicated in NIED cases involving loss or destruction of cryopreserved reproductive material.
I would like to thank Professor Michael Flynn and Dean Michele Struffolino for their helpful comments and suggestions.
