In Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society, Arwen Mohun of the University of Delaware analyses changing forms of risk management in the United States since the eighteenth century. Dividing her narrative into three chronologically ordered parts, Mohun uses different scenarios to highlight changes in the ways Americans have dealt with physical risks to their bodies and property. Part I deals with ‘natural’ risks such as fire, smallpox, weather and animal hazards in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America. Part II analyses the industrialization of risk in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by focusing on railroad development, factory safety and the ‘safety-first’ movement. Part III focuses on such diverse cases as automobile regulation, gun control, amusement parks and post-war product safety.
According to Mohun, American approaches to hazards such as fire, disease, animals and weather were originally informed by vernacular knowledge based on personal experience and ‘common sense’. However, the eighteenth century brought changes: using statistics, Americans subscribed to new fire insurances and created permanent firefighting institutions. While the professionalization of firefighting was successful, attempts to combat smallpox with science-based inoculation only partially replaced vernacular disease prevention. By contrast, Americans embraced scientific risk prevention through their conspicuous consumption of elaborately decorated lightning rods. In American streets, horses’ unpredictable nature prevented centralized approaches to risk prevention and traffic control.
The nineteenth century saw the advent of new science- and statistics-based risk and safety regimes. Complex techno-social organizations like railroad companies found that they could no longer rely on decentralized vernacular safety strategies. Instead, they adopted a hybrid strategy of technological safeguards and employee disciplining to reduce risk. In the case of factories, the US government started collecting accident statistics and installed factory inspectors. While early government inspectors battled placid legislators and paternalist employers, turn-of-the-century companies increasingly equated safety with cost efficiency. Led by US Steel, companies established internal factory inspectorates and insurance regimes. Inspired by industry, progressive ‘safety-first’ campaigners educated the American public about risk prevention. To their frustration, campaigners soon found that fellow citizens often favoured vernacular traditions over ‘rational’ education.
In the twentieth century, official interest in risks permeating the consumer's private sphere grew. Faced with a dramatic rise in accidents, federal and state governments became involved in automobile and traffic regulation. While new brakes, lights and safety glass made cars safer, officials began licensing drivers and registering cars as well as enacting and enforcing road codes. Vernacular traditions of road safety were also changed by insurers’ commodification of drivers’ individual risk. Whereas progressive reformers framed car accidents as a public-health threat, they were unable to do so in the case of gun violence. Skilful NRA lobbying on behalf of its powerful white middle-class clientele repeatedly thwarted attempts to centralize control over American vernacular gun culture. In contrast to gun owners, American amusement parks replaced vernacular risk management with expert-centred safety regimes. Industry experts were so successful that park owners were able to block state intervention well into the post-war years.
In contrast to ‘safety-first’ campaigners, post-war consumer activists and state regulators redefined consumers as citizens who had to be protected from and not educated about hazards. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, government control expanded into the design of consumer products such as lawnmowers. Institutionalized in the form of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the paternalist safety policy was attacked by the Reagan administration. However, popular demand for centralized consumer protection and the spectacular success of class-action suits led to a further expansion of health and safety regulation and thinking.
Writing in a lucid style, Mohun gives an impressive overview of the American transition from vernacular to expert-centred or state-driven risk regimes. Significantly, Mohun shows that definitions of risk and safety were and are subject to continuous negotiation between experts, officials, industry and the public. If individuals or industries were unwilling to follow expert advice or developed successful safety regimes of their own, external and non-vernacular regimes usually failed.
In spite of its breadth, Mohun's book fails to address some important points. A central aspect of previous work on risk such as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wilavsky's Risk and Culture (1982), Ulrich Beck's Risikogesellschaft (1986) and François Ewald's L’état provedence (1986) was the wider influence of socio-economic and cultural factors on changing definitions of risk. While Mohun successfully challenges Beck's chronology of reflexive societies, her necessarily brief analysis of each of the many case studies occasionally omits discussion of wider aspects of demographic, social, cultural and moral change. For example, it remains unclear why judges and juries steadily increased the penalties and compensation awarded to workers and consumers.
Whereas Mohun shows the strong influence of statistics and experts on notions of safety and risk, the nature of the juxtaposed experience-based vernacular knowledge of risk remains vague. How did the vernacular differ between different socio-economic and ethnic groups, who were in turn exposed to different kinds of risk? Although African Americans and immigrants appear in the book, differences in their encounters with the hazards of American life are seldom analysed. Differing religious and gendered perceptions of risk are not studied either. In contrast to Christopher Sellers's seminal The Hazards of the Job (1997), Mohun only touches once on changing concepts of health and disease in the case of eighteenth-century smallpox. This is a curious choice, given contemporaries’ repeated use of public-health terminology to frame accidents and homicides as ‘epidemics’ (p. 241) and the fact that 44 per cent of 1970s class-action suits were not about lawnmowers but about asbestos (p. 252). The rising importance of environmental degradation in post-war risk discourse is not studied either. Still, in spite of these gaps, Arwen Mohun's book is informative about a wide range of creatively chosen case studies in an important field of historical research.
