President Barack Obama delivered this statement on the release of the Nuclear Posture Review

President Obama. One year ago yesterday in Prague, I outlined a comprehensive agenda to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them. I look forward to advancing this agenda in Prague this week when I sign the new START Treaty with President Medvedev, committing the United States and Russia to substantial reductions in our nuclear arsenals.

Today, my Administration is taking a significant step forward by fulfilling another pledge that I made in Prague—to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and focus on reducing the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, while sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States and our allies and partners as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review, led by the Department of Defense, recognizes that the greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states. Moreover, it recognizes that our national security and that of our allies and partners can be increasingly defended by America's unsurpassed conventional military capabilities and strong missile defenses.

As a result, we are taking specific and concrete steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while preserving our military superiority, deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of the American people.

First, and for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is now at the top of America's nuclear agenda, which affirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have aligned our policies and proposed major funding increases for programs to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Our nuclear security summit next week will be an opportunity for 47 nations to commit to specific steps to pursue the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. And next month in New York, we will work with the wider world to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime to ensure that all nations uphold their responsibilities.

Second, we are further emphasizing the importance of nations meeting their NPT and nuclear nonproliferation obligations through our declaratory policy. The United States is declaring that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This enables us to sustain our nuclear deterrent for the narrower range of contingencies in which these weapons may still play a role, while providing an additional incentive for nations to meet their NPT obligations. Those nations that fail to meet their obligations will therefore find themselves more isolated, and will recognize that the pursuit of nuclear weapons will not make them more secure.

Finally, we are fulfilling our responsibilities as a nuclear power committed to the NPT. The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons.

As I stated last year in Prague, so long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States, reassures allies and partners, and deters potential adversaries. To that end, we are seeking substantial investments to improve infrastructure, strengthen science and technology, and retain the human capital we need to sustain our stockpile, while also strengthening the conventional capabilities that are an important part of our deterrent. The nuclear strategy we're announcing today therefore reaffirms America's unwavering commitment to the security of our allies and partners, and advances American national security.

To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear terrorism, and pursue the day when these weapons do not exist, we will work aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda—to reduce arsenals, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, and to strengthen the NPT. These are the steps toward the more secure future that America seeks, and this is the work that we are advancing today.

Secretary Hillary Clinton, Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary Steven Chu, and Admiral Michael Mullen delivered this announcement on the Release of the Nuclear Posture Review in Washington, DC

Secretary Gates. Thank you all for being with us today. Today, the Department of Defense is releasing the Nuclear Posture Review, a report that outlines a balanced and comprehensive approach to dealing with the role of nuclear weapons in America's national security.

I'm pleased to have Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu joining us to make this announcement. Their presence is indicative of the importance of the issues and the significant interagency cooperation that the review enjoyed. Both Secretaries Clinton and Chu as well as Admiral Mullen will make brief comments in a moment. And then we'll take three or four questions limited to the NPR and START.

The NPR provides a road map for implementing President Obama's agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our allies and partners and the international community. This review describes how the United States will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of a nuclear-free world.

Driven by the changing nature of the security environment, the NPR focuses on five key objectives: first, preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism; second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy; third, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and finally, sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

To these ends, the NPR includes significant changes to the U.S. nuclear posture. New declaratory policies remove some of the calculated ambiguity in previous U.S. declaratory policy. If a non-nuclear-weapons state is in compliance with the nonproliferation treaty and its obligations, the U.S. pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. If any state eligible for this assurance were to use chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies or partners, it would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.

Still, given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons.

The review rightly places the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the U.S. nuclear policy agenda. Given al-Qaida's continued quest for nuclear weapons, Iran's ongoing nuclear efforts and North Korea's proliferation, this focus is appropriate and indeed essential, an essential change from previous reviews.

The NPR concluded that stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic nuclear vehicles by approximately 50 percent from START I levels, a finding that drove negotiations for the new START treaty with Russia. The United States will pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with both Russia and China that are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient and transparent strategic relationships.

This NPR determined that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Programs to extend the lives of warheads will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.

We will study options for ensuring the safety, security and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis. In any decision to proceed to engineering development, we will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of any nuclear components, if absolutely necessary, would require specific presidential approval.

Correspondingly, the United States must make much-needed investments to rebuild our aging nuclear infrastructure, both facilities and personnel. I have asked for nearly $5 billion to be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy over the next several years to improve our nuclear infrastructure and support a credible modernization program.

There are also areas of continuity in this report, among them:

First, the United States will continue to hold accountable any state, terrorist group or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Second, we will maintain the nuclear triad of ICBMs, nuclear-capable aircraft and ballistic-missile submarines. Third, we will continue to develop and improve non-nuclear capabilities, including regional missile defenses, to strengthen deterrence and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture. And finally, the United States will continue abiding by its pledge not to conduct nuclear testing.

This NPR, while led by the Department of Defense, was from beginning to end an interagency effort. And I want to express my appreciation for the contributions from all departments, but especially the leadership of Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu.

In closing, I'd like to thank the men and women at the Departments of Defense and Energy, including the national labs, who are critical to sustaining our nuclear arsenal. Their important work underwrites the security of the United States as well as that of our partners and allies.

Secretary Clinton.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates. And let me begin by thanking you for your leadership in this effort and for the collaboration that persisted throughout it.

The Nuclear Posture Review we are releasing today represents a milestone in the transformation of our nuclear forces and the way in which we approach nuclear issues. We are recalibrating our priorities to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and we are reducing the role and number of weapons in our arsenal, while maintaining a safe, secure and effective deterrent to protect our nation, allies and partners. This NPR provides a foundation on which we and our allies can build a more secure future. This review is important not only for what it says, but also the way in which it was conducted. I believe it is the first unclassified NPR in its totality.

Secretary Gates is responsible for making this the most inclusive Nuclear Posture Review in history. Admiral Mullen, the Joint Chiefs, have been instrumental in working through a lot of the issues that have been raised. The Department of Energy has brought its expertise to the table and I'm very proud of the role that the State Department played in helping to set the policy, and we'll be working with our allies and partners to explain it and implement it.

So it truly was a collaborative effort in keeping with the agenda and goals set by President Obama. The consultations that supported this process included more than 30 of our allies and partners. For generations, the United States’ nuclear deterrent has helped prevent proliferation by providing our non-nuclear allies in NATO, the Pacific and elsewhere with reassurance and security. The policies outlined in this review allow us to continue that stabilizing role.

This NPR also makes it clear we will cooperate with partners worldwide to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Under President Obama's leadership, we work to advance that agenda beginning with last year's UN Security Council summit and the President's speech in Prague. Thursday, the President will be back in Prague to sign a historic new START treaty with Russia and next week, President Obama will host more than 40 heads of state and government to tackle the most dangerous threat we face today, the threat of nuclear terrorism.

This Nuclear Posture Review provides the strategic basis for all of these efforts, and it demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

We are enforcing our commitment to the NPT by stating clearly, for the first time, that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT, and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.

We believe that this is an important step and it will help reinvigorate the global nonproliferation regime, especially as we approach the NPT review conference next month. So let me thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Chu and Admiral Mullen.

And also you'll be hearing from four of the experts who worked on this so hard: from the State Department, Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher; from the Energy Department, Tom D'Agostino; from the Defense Department, Jim Miller; and also from the Joint Chiefs, General Cartwright.

And I just want to thank everyone who helped work on this, because as Secretary Gates said, it took a lot of meetings, it took a lot of effort, but we believe that this represents the best interests for the United States, our partners and allies around the world.

Secretary Chu. Well, let me begin by first thanking Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton and Admiral Mullen. As was said before, while the Defense Department led the effort, this was a truly multi-agency review that reflects the important expertise of the State Department, at the Energy Department, as well as the Department of Defense.

This report reflects the Administration's understanding that the effort to reduce nuclear dangers will require an all-out government approach. It also reflects the President's commitment to addressing these issues in a way that improves security for the American people, our friends and allies around the world.

As the President said in Prague, we will sustain a safe, secure, effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. This Nuclear Posture Review reflects the commitment and puts the nation on a path to providing the resources required to make that possible. It defines specific steps to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and accelerate the securing of nuclear materials worldwide. The NPR is based on several key principles that will guide U.S.—future U.S. decisions on stockpile management.

First, the United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Second, we will not develop new nuclear weapons. Our laboratory directors and a host of other outside technical reviews have been very clear that our life-extension programs can maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile without testing. To accomplish that goal, the NPR makes it clear the United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of nuclear weapons on a case-by-case basis.

Consistent with congressionally mandated stockpile-management programs, the full range of life-(inaudible) programs— life-extension programs approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and the replacement of nuclear components. This NPR makes clear that the United States will only use nuclear components based on previously tested designs and will not support new nuclear missions or provide new nuclear capabilities.

Finally, in any decision to proceed to the engineering development for warhead life-extension programs, the United States will give strong preference to the options of refurbishment or reuse. This NPR makes clear that the replacement of nuclear components, as already said by Secretary Gates, would only be undertaken only if critical stockpile-management program goals cannot otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President.

These are the principles that define how we intend to implement the President's strong commitment to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of an aging stockpile. But this NPR does further than that. It provides an outline of the resources we will need to get the job done.

The NPR calls for the modernization of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the sustainment of the science, technology and engineering base which is required to support the full range of nuclear security missions. This is reflected in the President's budget request, which includes a 13.4 percent increase in the funding for the NNSA. This investment is critical to addressing our aging infrastructure, sustaining our deterrent and enhancing our efforts against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. It will also allow the U.S. to reduce many non-deployed warheads currently kept as a technical hedge. The NPR notes the importance of recruiting and retaining the human capital needed in the DOD and DOE, for the nuclear mission, and proposes building on current efforts.

If we're going to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals because at the department, our people are our greatest asset.

So I applaud the team that worked so hard over the last year, to complete this review, and look forward to working with Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Admiral Mullen and, of course, the Congress to implement this in the coming years.

Thank you very much. And I turn it over to Admiral Mullen.

Admiral Mullen. Thank you. Thank you to Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Chu for your leadership in this tremendous effort and also leading it in a way where the process was very collaborative and really a strength of the interagency, which produced a great product.

The chiefs and I fully support the findings of this Nuclear Posture Review, because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies and force structure to meet an ever-changing security environment. We appreciated the opportunity to inform it and, quite frankly, to be informed by it, as the process went forward. Even while it reduces the role played by nuclear weapons—a reduction I wholly endorse— this Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the United States and those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear means than we have at our disposal today.

Even while it retains the strategic triad of bombers, submarines and missiles that have served us so well, the review further strengthens us—the United States command and control, works to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation, and suggests new dialogues through which to improve transparency with Russia and China. And even while it precludes nuclear testing and the development of new warheads, the review bolsters regional deterrence by fielding new missile defenses, improving counter-WMD capabilities and revitalizing our nuclear support infrastructure.

As Secretary Gates made quite clear, we must invest more wisely and more generously to preserve the life span and the effectiveness of our existing arsenal. We must hold ourselves accountable to unimpeachably high standards of nuclear training, leadership and management. And we must recruit and then retain the scientific expertise to advance our technological edge in nuclear weaponry.

I'm encouraged to see these requirements so prominently addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review, but I'm also mindful of the challenge. Without such improvements, an aging nuclear force supported by a neglected infrastructure only invites enemy misbehavior and miscalculation.

Thank you.

Staff. Bob.

Q. Yes. Mr. Secretary, the review says that it's the Administration's goal to create conditions for which—in which the only purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear attack, as opposed to other kinds of attacks. What will it take to get to that state? And why can't you go there now?

If I may ask a question of Secretary Clinton also, would you comment on Secretary—I mean, Minister Lavrov's statement today in Moscow that Russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the new START treaty if it felt that the U.S. missile defense became a strategic threat to the Russian deterrent? And will the U.S. also have a unilateral statement about the treaty?

Secretary Gates. First, the NPR is very explicit in referring to the fundamental role of nuclear weapons being for deterrence. I know that there was—there's been a lot of speculation outside the government and there was a lot of discussion inside the government of how to—how to frame that and how to describe it, whether it would be the sole purpose, whether we would forgo non-first—forgo first use and so on.

And I think that there was agreement within the administration that we didn't think we were far enough along the road toward getting control of nuclear weapons around the world to limit ourselves so explicitly. And so I think there was general agreement that the term “fundamental purpose” basically made clear—and other language makes clear—this is obviously a weapon of last resort, and we also are very explicit about that.

So I think—I think we recognized we need to make progress moving in the direction that the President has set, but we also recognize the real world we continue to live in.

Secretary Clinton?

Secretary Clinton. Well, Bob, I'm not aware of the statement, but it's no surprise that the Russians remain concerned about our missile defense program. We have persistently sought to explain to them the purpose for missile defense, the role that we believe it can and should play in preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and we have consistently offered the Russians the opportunity to cooperate with us.

The START treaty is not about missile defense, as you know. It is about cutting the size—the respective sizes of our arsenals, our strategic offensive weapons. And we will continue our conversations with the Russians. We have made it clear that we look forward to the ratification of START and then another round of discussions with the Russians about further reductions in our arsenal. And we will also be working with them to try to find common ground around missile defense, which we are committed to pursuing.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, tactical nuclear weapons have not yet been mentioned in your discussion today. What does the NPR say about American and allied tac nukes in Europe? What efforts are under way with the allies to reduce them? And what will be required of the Russians as part of this process?

Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, the NPR is very explicit that any decision with respect to NATO's nuclear capabilities will be handled within NATO according to the consensus principle and that as long as there are nuclear weapons that threaten NATO, NATO will need to maintain a nuclear capability. But this is clearly one of the issues that will be addressed in the strategic concept that NATO is undertaking, the revision of the strategic concept.

I would say—and I would invite Secretary Clinton to comment—but basically, I think what the NPR does is draw attention to the number of tactical nuclear weapons, and also to the number of non-deployed weapons that we're looking at; and that these clearly should be part of the arms-control agenda as we move forward.

Secretary Clinton. Well, Bob is absolutely right. I mean, there is a section in the NPR, for those of you who haven't had a chance yet to review it—including a picture, might I add, of Sergey Lavrov— yes, you'll—I hope you'll look at that; it's in there—yes, page 19.

And in the chapter called “Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners,” we make it very clear that any changes in NATO's nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within and decision by the alliance. And those conversations have begun in connection with the new strategic concept that is being worked on, that hopefully will be ready for consensus discussion at the NATO conference in Lisbon.

Q. I'd like to ask both you, Mr. Secretary and Secretary Clinton, about your concerns about Iran and what role those concerns played in formulating this review. The President very briefly said the other day he was concerned Iran was still on a track for nuclear capability. Your current assessment of the time frame, what that really means, what message you're sending to Iran with all of this?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think that the—I actually think that the NPR has a very strong message for both Iran and North Korea, because whether it's in declaratory policy or in other elements of the NPR, we essentially carve out states like Iran and North Korea that are not in compliance with NPT. And basically, all options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category, along with nonstate actors who might acquire nuclear weapons.

So if there is a message for Iran and North Korea here, it is that if you're going to play by the rules, if you're going to join the international community, then we will undertake certain obligations to you, and that's covered in the NPR. But if you're not going to play by the rules, if you're going to be a proliferator, then all options are on the table in terms of how we deal with you.

Q. Can I ask you a follow-up on that? Page 33 of the report talks about one of the goals of an enhanced regional architecture is to ensure that any attempts to attack U.S. forces or partners or allies will be blunted and their aims denied with an enhanced set of capabilities. Translate to the Middle East: Does that mean if Iran attacks Israel or the Gulf States with either conventional or nuclear weapons, the U.S. would attack to blunt their aims?

Secretary Gates. I'm not going to go down a hypothetical road with you on that.

Last question. Yeah.

Q. Yeah, on the alert status, why does that remain unchanged if so many other things are changing under this NPR? And also, could you tell us a little bit more about how the presidential decision-making process also will be changed under the NPR?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think—I think there are provisions—and the experts can get into it with you—but there are some changes that we've made in command and control that we think tighten things up and also give the President more time for the—for a decision. I'm sorry, what was the first part of your question?

Q. On the—on the military alert— trigger alert?

Secretary Gates. Oh, on the alert status. Well, frankly, we feel like the situation is pretty—is a satisfactory one at the current time. We have no armed bombers sitting at the end of runways any longer. We have—as you'll read in the NPR, our ICBMs are all targeted right now on the oceans so that if, God forbid and for the first time in 60 years there were an accidental launch or a problem, the—it would put—it would put a missile right into the middle of the ocean rather than targeted on any—on any country. So I think we've taken a number of steps to ensure, A, that the President has additional time for decision, but, B, that the forces on alert are not subject to some kind of disaster.

Thank you all very much.

Secretary Hillary Clinton published this op-ed, titled “Our Giant Step Towards a World Free from Nuclear Danger,” in UK's The Guardian, Germany's Berliner Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger and Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, and Poland's Gazeta Wyborcza

Tomorrow the United States and Russia will sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) in Prague, reducing the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our arsenals to levels not seen since the first decade of the nuclear age. This verifiable reduction by the world's two largest nuclear powers reflects our commitment to the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—all nations have the right to seek the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but they all also have the responsibility to prevent nuclear proliferation, and those that do possess these weapons must work towards disarmament.

This agreement is just one of several concrete steps the United States is taking to make good on President Obama's pledge to make America and the world safer by reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, proliferation and terrorism.

Yesterday the president announced the US government's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which provides a roadmap for reducing the role and numbers of our nuclear weapons while more effectively protecting the United States and our allies from today's most pressing threats.

Next week President Obama will host more than 40 leaders at a nuclear security summit for the purpose of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials as swiftly as possible to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists.

And along with our international partners, the United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts that create real consequences for states such as Iran and North Korea that defy the global nonproliferation regime.

These steps send clear messages about our priorities and our resolve. To our allies and partners, and all those who have long looked to the United States as an underwriter of regional and global security: our commitment to defend our interests and our allies has never been stronger. These steps will make us all safer and more secure.

To those who refuse to meet their international obligations and seek to intimidate their neighbours: the world is more united than ever before and will not accept your intransigence.

Tomorrow's agreement is a testament to our own determination to meet our obligations under the NPT and the special responsibilities that the United States and Russia bear as the two largest nuclear powers.

The New Start Treaty includes a 30% reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads the United States and Russia are permitted to deploy and a strong and effective verification regime, which will further stabilise the relationship between our two countries as well as reduce the risks of miscommunication or miscalculation.

And the treaty places no constraints on our missile defence plans—now or in the future.

President Obama's Nuclear Posture Review makes the principles behind this treaty—and our larger nonproliferation and arms control agenda—part of our national security strategy. Today nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have replaced the cold-war-era danger of a large-scale nuclear attack as the most urgent threat to US and global security. The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defences and diplomacy are geared towards meeting these challenges effectively.

As part of this new approach, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the NPT and in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. There should be no doubt, however, that we will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction.

The NPR also emphasises close cooperation with our allies around the world, and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security. We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures, such as missile defences, and other conventional military capabilities. The United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world.

Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are global challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why President Obama has invited leaders from around the world to Washington for a nuclear security summit and will seek commitments from all nations—especially those that enjoy the benefits of civilian nuclear power—to take steps to stop proliferation and secure vulnerable nuclear materials. If terrorists ever acquired these dangerous materials, the results would be too terrible to imagine.

All nations must recognise that the nonproliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity. That is why we are working to build international consensus for steps that will convince Iran's leaders to change course, including new UN security council sanctions that will further clarify their choice of upholding their obligations or facing increasing isolation and painful consequences. With respect to North Korea, we continue to send the message that simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough. Pyongyang must move towards complete and verifiable denuclearisation, through irreversible steps, if it wants a normalised, sanctions-free relationship with the United States.

All these steps, all our treaties, summits and sanctions, share the goal of increasing the security of the United States, our allies, and people everywhere.

Last April President Obama stood in Hradcany Square in Prague and challenged the world to pursue a future free of the nuclear dangers that have loomed over us all for more than a half century. This is the work of a lifetime, if not longer. But today, one year later, we are making real progress towards that goal.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Secretary Robert Gates were interviewed in Washington, DC by Bob Schieffer of CBS's “Face the Nation”

Q. Good morning again. It seems like we've been talking about nothing but health care in Washington for months now. But last week, the Administration shifted the focus to the life-and-death issue surrounding nuclear weapons— what to do with them and what to do about them. The Administration began a major push. Tomorrow, 46 world leaders will be here in Washington to talk about how to keep terrorists from stealing or buying nuclear weapons. The President and his Russian counterpart signed a major agreement Thursday that will reduce the size of both countries’ stockpiles.

And, perhaps, most important—the Administration announced a major change in nuclear strategy telling non-nuclear nations that as long as they do not acquire nuclear weapons, we will not attack them with our own nuclear weapons. The idea being that they are safer from nuclear attack without these weapons than with them. That sparked immediate criticism. So that's where we started our joint interview with the two secretaries at the Pentagon.

But already, the critics on the right, especially, are saying we're giving away too much, Mr. Secretary; that if, for example, we're attacked with biological or chemical weapons, that the attacker won't have to worry that we won't use nuclear weapons against them. So why was this a wise change?

Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, the negative security assurance that we won't use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, in conformity with—or in compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty, is not a new thing. The new part of this is saying that we would not use nuclearweapons against a non-nuclear state that attacked us with chemical and biological weapons.

Q. Yes.

Secretary Gates. But there are a couple of things to remember about this. First of all, try as we might, we could not find a credible scenario where a chemical weapon could have the kind of consequences that would warrant a nuclear response. We were concerned about the biological weapons, and that's why the President was very clear in the—why we are very clear in the Nuclear Posture Review that if a state—if we see states developing biological weapons that we begin to think endanger us or create serious concerns, that he reserves the right to revise this policy.

But there's one other piece of this that I think folks have missed, and that is that if a non-nuclear state attacks us with chemical or biological weapons, that it says, and I quote from the Nuclear Posture Review, that country will suffer a devastating conventional retaliation and we will hold the leaders and the commanders in that country personally responsible.

Q. Are our non-nuclear weapons so good now, Madam Secretary, that we don't have to rely on nuclear weapons anymore?

Secretary Clinton. We rely on both, Bob, and I think that's the point that Secretary Gates is making. We have maintained a strong, robust nuclear deterrent, as set for in the Nuclear Posture Review. But we have also in this Administration moved toward a global strike capability to enhance our conventional response. And we have an enormous amount of firepower conventionally, and it is also clear that this is putting everybody on notice. We don't want more countries to go down the path that North Korea and Iran are, and some countries might have gotten the wrong idea if they looked at those two over the last years. And so we want to be very clear: We will not use nuclear weapons in retaliation if you do not have nuclear weapons and are in compliance with the NPT.

But we leave ourselves a lot of room for contingencies. If we can prove that a biological attack originated in a country that attacked us, then all bets are off if these countries have gone to that extent. So we want to deal with the nuclear threat first and foremost, because that's the one that we face right today.

Q. You did make an exception to North Korea and Iran, and explain to me what that means, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Gates. Well, because they're not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. So for them, all bets are off; all the options are on the table.

Q. Do we still reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first if we think our security is in danger and requires that?

Secretary Clinton. Yes. Now, that's not our preference and we make it very clear that we want to maintain a strong deterrent. We see that primarily for the purpose of deterring bad actors against us and responding if necessary. But we did not go so far as to say no first use.

Q. Talk about missile defense, and that is, using missiles to shoot down missiles. Are we still going to rely on that? Because I think some of the statements coming out of Moscow have disturbed some people, because—am I correct in saying the Russians have said they'll withdraw from this treaty if we press on with missile defense?

Secretary Clinton. Well, that's not exactly what they said. First of all, in any treaty, in previous arms control treaties, there is a provision which basically states the obvious: that either country can choose to withdraw if they determine that it's in their interest to do so. What the Russians have said is that they're concerned about our continued development of missile defense. We have made it very clear we are pursuing missile defense, and there is absolutely nothing in the new START treaty that in any way impinges upon our efforts to pursue and perfect missile defense.

We also have, on a regular basis, reached out to the Russians to say, “Cooperate with us.” We would like to see a joint effort on missile defense, because we don't see the principal threat in nuclear terms coming from Russia. We see it coming from state actors like Iran or non-state actors like a terrorist organization like al-Qaida getting a hold of nuclear material. So missile defense remains not only alive and well, but we're going to be deploying it in Europe to protect our European allies and partners from a potential attack by Iran. And we're going to continue to try to work with the Russians to convince them that this is in their interest as well as ours.

Q. So we're not backing off at all on going forward with missile defense, a missile defense system?

Secretary Gates. Not at all. And not only are we putting significant additional resources into the budget for missile defense, particularly the theater level and regional missile defenses that Secretary Clinton was talking about, but we have also—we're putting over a billion dollars into continuing the development of the ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska that have the longer-range capability.

Q. A big gathering of, what, 46 leaders from around the world coming to Washington this week for this big conference on nuclear proliferation. We know there's going to be an enormous traffic jam. What else can we expect Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Gates. Well, personally, I'm leaving the country. This is really more in Secretary Clinton's area, but my expectation is, first of all, it's an extraordinary achievement to get that number of leaders to come to Washington to talk about this subject. And the key front end piece of the Nuclear Posture Review, where this is different than any in the past, is the focus on nonproliferation and on gaining control of nuclear materials around the world.

Secretary Clinton. And, Bob, that's what we're aiming to achieve. We are seeking to get agreement and a work plan about how each country will do its best to better secure the nuclear material that it has within its borders to prevent the transit of nuclear material. I'm sure that there will be discussion of some of the smuggling incidents that the IAEA has provento have happened in the last years. But this is a very big part of President Obama's agenda on nonproliferation.

Q. My thanks to both.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you.

Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the United States

In April 2009, President Obama addressed the citizens of Prague and the world, stating clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. Recognizing this goal is not immediately achievable, the President laid the groundwork to ensure that through the steady accumulation of progress we move continually along the path toward this critical objective.

In that speech, the President identified the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, called for an international four-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material, and announced his intent to host a Nuclear Security Summit. Over the past year, with the leadership of President Obama, we have made progress on this unprecedented call to action. At the United Nations Security Council last fall, we unanimously passed Resolution 1887 endorsing the goal of securing all nuclear materials and preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons.

This Nuclear Security Summit takes place on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders from 47 nations as well as the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union will gather in Washington, DC—the largest gathering of heads of state and government in Washington's history.

Our objective is clear: ensure that terrorists never gain access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium—the essential ingredients of a nuclear weapon. The challenge we face is how to lock down the over 2000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries with a variety of peaceful as well as military uses. The consequences of a nuclear detonation, or even an attempted detonation, perpetrated by a terrorist or criminal group anywhere in the world would be devastating. Not only could there be an enormous loss of life but there would also be overwhelming economic, political and psychological consequences that would reverberate worldwide.

Just as the United States is not the only country that would suffer from nuclear terrorism, we cannot prevent it on our own. The goal of the Nuclear Security Summit is to highlight this global threat and agree to steps we can take together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The Nuclear Security Summit provides an occasion for the United States to highlight some of its recent and future efforts to show leadership in improving the security of nuclear materials both at home and abroad.

Domestic Nuclear Security: Our first priority is to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities in the United States are secure. Through sustainable security programs, including a continual evaluation of the threat, inspections, and emergency response, preparedness and coordination programs, the United States keeps its materials secure. Following September 11, 2001, security at domestic facilities was enhanced and is evaluated on a continuous basis. Most recently, on March 22, 2010, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee— an ultra-secure uranium warehouse that replaces multiple aging facilities with a single, state-of-the-art storage facility— came on-line as one measure of our increased security posture.

As part of our ongoing efforts to evaluate the security of its nuclear facilities, we will request an advisory mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Physical Protection Advisory Service to review physical protection at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Center for Neutron Research, licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Center's reactor supports a broad program of research using neutron techniques, and develops and applies new neutron measurement technologies. NIST has committed to convert its reactor from highly enriched uranium to a new low enriched uranium fuel once that has been tested and approved for use. This advisory mission will provide an independent, confidential comparison of the physical protection regulations and their implementation with international guidelines and best practices.

Ratifying Conventions: The United States has accelerated efforts to complete ratification procedures for the two key international treaties governing nuclear security, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Legislation that brings U.S. laws into line with these treaties has been submitted to the Congress. Once laws are in place implementing the conventions, the United States will deposit its instruments of ratification.

Minimizing Highly Enriched Uranium: In 2009, the United States completed conversion of all 20 of our highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors that could be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel. There are six remaining highly-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors in the United States that will be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel once acceptable fuel has been developed.

Plutonium Disposition: The United States and Russia have just signed the Protocol to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which commits both countries to eliminate 68 metric tons of plutonium (34 each) from their weapons programs—enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons combined. Furthermore, the United States is in the final stages of approval to bring up to 100 kilograms of plutonium from sites of concern into the United States pending disposition, thereby eliminating vulnerable, weapons-usable plutonium in certain cases where no other solution is available.

Nuclear Detection: Due to shortages in materials for current neutron detectors, the United States is working to develop and deploy new neutron detection technologies through an aggressive program of research, development, test, and evaluation. The time frame for this effort has been shortened from 5 years to 18 months.

Nuclear Forensics: With the emerging discipline of nuclear —archeology!, the United States has launched an international effort to develop nuclear forensicslibrary, exercises, common lexicons, and other foundational elements that will provide the framework for cooperation between governments investigating the illicit use of nuclear materials.

Sharing Best Practices: Nuclear security can be advanced through sharing best practices among those with responsibility for securing and accounting for nuclear materials in the private and public sectors. We are working with Russia and other members to turn the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into a durable international institution. The United States strongly supports the World Institute for Nuclear Security as an effective forum for sharing best security practices, based on its broad membership in 44 countries, representing private industry, police, government agencies, state regulators and national laboratories. We will continue to provide financial support and expertise and encourage other countries to do so as well.

International Cooperation: Working within existing legal and multilateral nuclear security frameworks, U.S. nuclear security cooperative activities help states worldwide meet their nuclear security obligations, uphold the highest international nuclear security recommendations and standards, and maximize the peaceful benefits of nuclear materials while reducing the risks of their misuse. In its Fiscal Year 2011 budget request, the U.S. has requested the largest amount ever—$1.6 billion, a 31% increase over the previous year—for these programs across multiple agencies working with countries around the world.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: In 2009 the UN Security Council created a committee to assist states in implementing their obligations under this universal, binding resolution. The United States has proposed, and intends to contribute to, a voluntary fund to help countries meet the obligations this resolution places on them, and to match them up with wide range of national, international, and nongovernmental sources of assistance.

Nuclear Security Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency: In 2009, the United States led efforts to gain agreement of the 150-plus nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish for the first time a dedicated budget line for nuclear security, which had until then been funded exclusively through voluntary contributions from member states. The U.S. voluntary contribution to this effort has risen 59% since 2007.

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: In 2002, under the leadership of Canada, the G8 committed $20 billion over ten years to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Eight years later, the 23 G8 Partners have allocated more than $18 billion to this effort. We have made progress with Russia to eliminate stocks of chemical weapons and to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines. We are ready to join with our Canadian colleagues and call for another ten-year extension with an expanded scope/mission and to commit up to another $10 billion towards new projects, including expanding our efforts to improving nuclear security to countries not previously eligible for G8 assistance.

Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.

In addition to our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. Therefore those gathered here in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2010, commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation.

We welcome and join President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as we work together to enhance nuclear security.

Therefore, we:

1. Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security;

2. Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary;

3. Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible;

4. Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures;

5. Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;

6. Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans;

7. Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships;

8. Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance;

9. Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies;

10. Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture;

11. Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and

12. Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well.

Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation and undertaken on a voluntary basis by States. We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states.

Thus, we issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations. We will hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012.

Highlights of the National Commitments made at the Nuclear Security Summit

Armenia: Ratified International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, passed new export control law Argentina: Joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Australia: Moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Belgium: Contributing $300,000 to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund

Canada: Returning a large amount of spent highly enriched uranium fuel from their medical isotope production reactor to the United States; championing the extension of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; funding highly enriched uranium removals from Mexico and Vietnam; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices workshop in Ottawa; unveiling $100 million in new bilateral security cooperation with Russia

Chile: Removed all highly enriched uranium (18kgs) in March 2010

China: Announce cooperation on nuclear security Center of Excellence Egypt: Passed new comprehensive nuclear law in March 2010 that includes nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage and illicit trafficking provisions as well as envisaging an independent regulatory authority

France: Ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear materials; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; incorporating training in nuclear security at the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute and the International Nuclear Energy Institute (announced during March 2010 Paris nuclear energy conference)

Finland: Invited an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency

Germany: Moving toward ratifying 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Georgia: Signed instrument of approval for International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on April 7, 2010

India: Announcing the creation of a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component

Italy: Signed a Megaports agreement (to install detection equipment at ports) with U.S.; establishing a school of nuclear security in Trieste, in collaboration with the Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to train nuclear personnel from developing countries

Japan: Launching an integrated regional support center; research and development on detection and forensics; contributing new resources to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices conference

Kazakhstan: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium; cooperative work on BN-350 rector shutdown and fuel security; hosting a Global Initiative Activity in June; considering a International Nuclear Security Training Center.

Malaysia: Passed new export control law

Mexico: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium working through IAEA

New Zealand: Contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; contributing to the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative

Norway: Contributing $3.3 million over the next four years to the IAEA nuclear security fund (flexible funds for use for activities in developing countries); contributing $500,000 in additional support to Kazakhstan's efforts to upgrade portal monitors to prevent nuclear smuggling as part of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Philippines: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Republic of Korea: Hosting 2012 Nuclear Security Summit; hosting a Global Initiative activity

Russia: Signing Plutonium Disposition protocol; ending plutonium production; contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund

Saudi Arabia: Hosting a UNSCR 1540 conference for Gulf Cooperation Council

Thailand: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Ukraine: Removing all highly enriched uranium by next Summit—half of it by year's end

United Arab Emirates: Signed a Megaports Agreement with the U.S.

United Kingdom: Contributing $6 million to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Vietnam: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor; joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

IAEA: Completing final review of the next revision of INFCIRC 225, the IAEA nuclear physical security guidance document

President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in Washington, DC at the Nuclear Security Summit

President Obama. Good afternoon, everybody. We have just concluded an enormously productive day.

I said this morning that today would be an opportunity for our nations, both individually and collectively, to make concrete commitments and take tangible steps to secure nuclear materials so they never fall into the hands of terrorists who would surely use them.

This evening, I can report that we have seized this opportunity, and because of the steps we've taken—as individual nations and as an international community—the American people will be safer and the world will be more secure.

I want to thank all who participated in this historic summit—49 leaders from every region of the world. Today's progress was possible because these leaders came not simply to talk, but to take action; not simply to make vague pledges of future action, but to commit to meaningful steps that they are prepared to implement right now.

First, we agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat. Coming into this summit, there were a range of views on this danger. But at our dinner last night, and throughout the day, we developed a shared understanding of the risk.

Today, we are declaring that nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security. We also agreed that the most effective way to prevent terrorists and criminals from acquiring nuclear materials is through strong nuclear security—protecting nuclear materials and preventing nuclear smuggling.

Second, I am very pleased that all the nations represented here have endorsed the goal that I outlined in Prague one year ago—to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years’ time. This is an ambitious goal, and we are under no illusions that it will be easy. But the urgency of the threat, and the catastrophic consequences of even a single act of nuclear terrorism, demand an effort that is at once bold and pragmatic. And this is a goal that can be achieved.

Third, we reaffirmed that it is the fundamental responsibility of nations, consistent with their international obligations, to maintain effective security of the nuclear materials and facilities under our control. This includes strengthening national laws and policies, and fully implementing the commitments we have agreed to.

And fourth, we recognized that even as we fulfill our national responsibilities, this threat cannot be addressed by countries working in isolation. So we've committed ourselves to a sustained, effective program of international cooperation on national [sic] security, and we call on other nations to join us.

It became clear in our discussions that we do not need lots of new institutions and layers of bureaucracy. We need to strengthen the institutions and partnerships that we already have—and make them even more effective. This includes the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the multilateral partnership that strengthens nuclear security, prevent nuclear trafficking and assist nations in building their capacity to secure their nuclear materials.

But as I said, today was about taking tangible steps to protect our people. So we've also agreed to a detailed work plan to guide our efforts going forward—the specific actions we will take. I want to commend my partners for the very important commitments that they made in conjunction with this summit. Let me give some examples.

Canada agreed to give up a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium. Chile has given up its entire stockpile. Ukraine and Mexico announced that they will do the same. Other nations—such as Argentina and Pakistan—announced new steps to strengthen port security and prevent nuclear smuggling.

More nations—including Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam— agreed to join, and thus strengthen, the treaties and international partnerships that are at the core of our global efforts. A number of countries—including Italy, Japan, India and China—will create new centers to promote nuclear security technologies and training. Nations pledged new resources to help the IAEA meet its responsibilities.

In a major and welcomed development, Russia announced that it will close its last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor. After many years of effort, I'm pleased that the United States and Russia agreed today to eliminate 68 tons of plutonium for our weapons programs—plutonium that would have been enough for about 17,000 nuclear weapons. Instead, we will use this material to help generate electricity for our people.

These are exactly the kind of commitments called for in the work plan that we adopted today, so we've made real progress in building a safer world.

I would also note that the United States has made its own commitments. We are strengthening security at our own nuclear facilities, and will invite the IAEA to review the security at our neutron research center. This reflects our commitment to sharing the best practices that are needed in our global efforts. We're seeking significant funding increases for programs to prevent nuclear proliferation and trafficking.

And today, the United States is joining with our Canadian partners and calling on nations to commit $10 billion to extending our highly successful Global Partnership to strengthen nuclear security around the world.

Indeed, in recent days we've made progress on every element of this agenda.

To reduce nuclear arsenals, President Medvedev and I signed the historic new START treaty—not only committing our two nations to significant reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, but also setting the stage for further cuts and cooperation between our countries.

To move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and to focus on the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, our new Nuclear Posture Review reduces the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is at the top of America's nuclear agenda, which reaffirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said today that pressure and sanctions—speaking of Iran's nuclear program—pressure and sanctions cannot fundamentally solve the problem. I was wondering if you could clarify exactly what you believe President Hu Jintao has agreed to, whether you think there actually will be economic sanctions with teeth that the Chinese will sign off on; and what you have told the Chinese in terms of their concern about how much fuel they get from Iran, what the U.S. can help them with in that regard. Thank you, sir.

President Obama. Here's what I know. The Chinese have sent official representatives to negotiations in New York to begin the process of drafting a sanctions resolution. That is part of the P5-plus-1 effort. And the United States is not moving this process alone; we've got the participation of the Russians as well as the other members of the P5-plus-1, all of whom believe that it is important for us to send a strong signal to Iran that their consistent violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their obligations under the NPT have consequences, and that they've got a better path to take.

Now, you're exactly right, Jake, that the Chinese are obviously concerned about what ramifications this might have on the economy generally. Iran is an oil-producing state. I think that a lot of countries around the world have trade relationships with Iran. And we're mindful of that. But what I said to President Hu and what I've said to every world leader that I talked to is that words have to mean something, there have to be some consequences. And if we are saying that the NPT is important, if we're saying that nonproliferation is important, then when those obligations are repeatedly flouted, then it's important for the international community to come together.

And what I would say is that if you consider where we were, say, a year ago, with respect to the prospect of sanctions, the fact that we've got Russia and China, as well as the other P5-plus-1 members having a serious discussion around a sanctions regime, following up on a serious sanctions regime that was passed when North Korea flouted its obligations towards the NPT, it's a sign of the degree to which international diplomacy is making it more possible for us to isolate those countries that are breaking their international obligations.

And as I said I think several weeks ago, my interest is not having a long, drawn-out process for months. I want to see us move forward boldly and quickly to send the kind of message that will allow Iran to make a different calculation.

And keep in mind, I have said repeatedly that under the NPT Iran has the right to develop peaceful civilian nuclear energy—as do all signatories to the NPT. But given the repeated violations that we've seen on the part of Iran, I think understandably the world community questions their commitment towards a peaceful civilian energy program.

They have a way of restoring that trust. For example, we put before them—I'm saying the P5-plus-1, now, as well as the IAEA—put before them a very reasonable approach that would have allowed them to continue their civilian peaceful nuclear energy needs, but would have allayed many of the concerns around their nuclear weapons program. They have rejected that so far. And that's why it's important—and I said from the start that we're going to move on a dual track, and part of that dual track is making sure that a sanctions regime is in place.

Last point I'll make about sanctions. Sometimes I hear the argument that, well, sanctions aren't really going to necessarily work. Sanctions aren't a magic wand. What sanctions do accomplish is hopefully to change the calculus of a country like Iran so that they see that there are more costs and fewer benefits to pursuing a nuclear weapons program. And in that process what we hope is, is that if those costs get high enough and the benefits are low enough, that in time they make the right decision not just for the security and prosperity of the world but also for their own people.

Scott Wilson, Washington Post. Where's Scott? There we go.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. You have spoken often about the need to bring U.S. policy in line with its treaty obligations internationally to eliminate the perception of hypocrisy that some of the world sees toward the United States and its allies. In that spirit and in that venue, will you call on Israel to declare its nuclear program and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty? And if not, why wouldn't other countries see that as an incentive not to sign on to the treaty that you say is important to strengthen?

President Obama. Well, Scott, initially you were talking about U.S. behavior and then suddenly we're talking about Israel. Let me talk about the United States. I do think that as part of the NPT our obligation as the largest nuclear power in the world is to take steps to reducing our nuclear stockpile. And that's what the START treaty was about—sending a message that we are going to meet our obligations.

And as far as Israel goes, I'm not going to comment on their program. What I'm going to point to is the fact that consistently we have urged all countries to become members of the NPT.

So there's no contradiction there. We think it is important that we have a international approach that is universal and that rests on three pillars: that those of us who have nuclear weapons are making serious efforts to reduce those stockpiles; that we all are working against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and those countries that don't currently have nuclear weapons make the decision not to pursue nuclear weapons; and that all countries have access to peaceful nuclear energy.

And so whether we're talking about Israel or any other country, we think that becoming part of the NPT is important. And that, by the way, is not a new position. That's been a consistent position of the United States government even prior to my administration.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Given the goals of this conference and the goals of your administration on nuclear policy, why does it appear as if Pakistan is playing by a different set of rules? I know they have not signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it appears they're expanding their nuclear program and the proximity to al Qaeda. Should there be more pressure internationally on Pakistan, not just coming from the United States, but the world?

President Obama. I don't think Pakistan is playing by a different set of rules. I think we've been very clear to Pakistan, as we have been to every country, that we think they should join the NPT. I have actually seen progress over the last several years with respect to Pakistan's nuclear security issues.

I want to lower tensions throughout South Asia when it comes to nuclear programs. And I think that the fact that [Prime Minister] Gilani came here, signed on to a communiqué, and made a range of commitments that will make it more likely that we don't see proliferation activities or trafficking occurring out of Pakistan is a positive thing.

Do we have a lot more work to do? Absolutely. But I think that President— Prime Minister Gilani's presence here was an important step in assuring that we do not see a nuclear crisis anywhere in South Asia.

Okay? All right, Jeff Mason.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. A follow-up question on two that have been asked. First, how realistic do you believe it is that countries will agree on sanctions in the coming weeks, which is the deadline that you're looking for? And a second, a follow-up on Pakistan—is the United States confident that Pakistan's nuclear materials are protected and will not be vulnerable to terrorists like al Qaeda?

President Obama. To take the second question first, just as a part of a follow-up on Chuck's question, I feel confident about Pakistan's security around its nuclear weapons programs. But that doesn't mean that there isn't improvement to make in all of our nuclear security programs. You'll recall that we had a little incident a while back where we had nuclear-tipped missiles on a bomber flying across the United States and nobody knew about it. And Secretary Gates took exactly the right step, which was to hold those in charge accountable and to significantly alter our practices to make sure something like that didn't happen again.

So I think it's important to note that every nuclear power, every country that has a civilian nuclear energy program, has to take better steps to secure these materials. And Pakistan is not exempt from that, but we aren't, either. And that's I think the goal of this summit, and that was the goal of the communiqué and the work plan that we put forward.

With respect to sanctions, I think that we have a strong number of countries on the Security Council who believe this is the right thing to do. But I think these negotiations can be difficult. And I am going to push as hard as I can to make sure that we get strong sanctions that have consequences for Iran as it's making calculations about its nuclear program and that those are done on a timely basis.

I'm not going to speculate beyond that in terms of where we are.

Secretary Hillary Clinton, Secretary Steven Chu, and Foreign Minister Jorge Enrique Taiana delivered these remarks in Washington, DC at the signing of the Megaports Agreement

Secretary Clinton. Well, I am very pleased to be here with Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and to join Foreign Minister Taiana to sign this Megaports Agreement on behalf of our two countries. This launches a cooperative effort between the United States and Argentina to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. This pact paves the way for our government to work with Argentine customs, to install radiation detection equipment, and associated infrastructure at the Port of Buenos Aires.

And this is a very fitting occasion for us to be signing this agreement. The Megaports Initiative embodies the spirit and the substance of this summit. It aims to strengthen the capacity of governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials transiting the global shipping system. The initiative currently extends to 30 ports around the world with work underway at additional ports in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.

So the agreement we signed today builds on this progress as we work toward our goal of equipping 100 key ports with radiation, detection equipment, and providing port personnel with training and technical support. It also builds on our cooperation with Argentina on nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism. Argentina is on the forefront of the fight for nuclear security. And with this signing, it will make yet another contribution to our common efforts to enhance the safety of our peoples and indeed of all people. It is a symbol not only of our shared commitment to the issue of nuclear security, but also of our strong bilateral partnership.

So thank you and please thank your president and your government for this important event, and I'd like to invite you to say a few words.

Foreign Minister Taiana. Okay. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Chu, it's really a good moment to be here at that summit and have the opportunity to sign this cooperation agreement. We were working on that for a while. But now, it's now and time arrive and it's, I think, like a way to show a practical outcome of this summit. This is a very practical cooperation agreement. We were to receive equipment and will be operated by our Argentines there and to avoid the possibility of illegal traffic of nuclear materials and radioactive materials.

I think that it is also good recognition of the level of some of our ports, particularly Port of Buenos Aires, Dock Sud, and Campana, that are the two ports that are contemplated in this agreement. And it's not only a way to fight illegal nuclear trafficking, but also it's a way to improve our trade and the dynamism and work of our ports. So I'm very happy to sign it here and thank you, Hillary, for this opportunity.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.

Moderator. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Argentine Republic are signing the Megaport Initiative Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered these remarks in Washington, DC at the signing of the Plutonium Disposition Protocol

Secretary Clinton. Well, good afternoon, and let me state the obvious. I am very pleased that Foreign Minister Lavrov and I are able to do this together. We have had many meetings over the past 15 months and I always look forward to a productive discussion, a candid exchange of views, and a determination to make progress together.

This is an historic time for U.S.-Russian relations. Last week, our presidents signed the new START treaty, which will make our two countries and the world safer and more secure by reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons in our stockpiles. And this week, we've gathered with representatives from more than 45 nations to address the urgent global threat posed by vulnerable nuclear material.

And now, we are taking another step to increase our mutual security and deepen our bilateral cooperation. Under the agreement we are about to sign, the United States and Russia will each irreversibly and transparently dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Together, that is enough material for nearly 17,000 nuclear weapons. And we will put in place the framework and infrastructure needed to dispose of even more plutonium from defense programs in the future.

The agreement provides for monitoring and inspections that will ensure that this material will never again be used for weapons or any other military purpose. By using civil nuclear reactors to dispose of the plutonium, we gain an added benefit— to produce electricity for our people, even as we remove a potential serious danger.

And I want to thank the two teams from both Russia and the United States who worked together to hammer out this agreement. I see familiar faces, both from my country and now, after so many meetings, familiar faces from Russia. And Minister Lavrov and I could not be standing here without the extraordinary expertise and commitment that these teams brought to this occasion. Thank you very much.

Foreign Minister Lavrov. Thank you. And I believe that the protocol which we are about to sign, the protocol to the agreement on utilization of weapon-grade plutonium, the agreement of the year 2000, actually, signed at that time but not implemented because of some technical reasons—the protocol which we are signing today is going to remove those technical impediments and obstacles, and the agreement would be implemented in practical terms.

Thirty-four tons of plutonium, which the United States and Russia each would utilize, is a lot. It's certainly a step in the direction of our shared goal of nuclear disarmament, because apart from actual limitations and reductions in nuclear strategic offensive arms, you need to do something about the plutonium which is released because of that process. And the event which you are witnessing here today is of—well, maybe not less important, but certainly it's of very significant importance.

And we would be doing this process, we would be doing these—implementing these obligations transparently, as the Secretary said, and in the way which would absolutely preclude military use of this plutonium in the future and which ensure its effective and safe usage for peaceful purposes to produce nuclear energy. And we certainly consider that this step is the contribution by the Russian Federation and the United States towards the implementation of Article Six of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

When this mechanism starts working, we expect its positive influence on the process of nonproliferation, including making the process of nuclear disarmament multilateral at some point, hopefully not very far from today. And this is what we believe is the significance of this event. To utilize 34 metric tons of plutonium in Russia, the Russian Government will spend approximately $2.5 billion and we are grateful to the United States for contributing to this program by providing up to $400 million for this particular program.

Thank you very much, and I join the Secretary in thanking the teams which negotiated this agreement.

Moderator. Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov are signing the protocol to amend the 2000 agreement on the Management and Disposition of Plutonium No Longer Required for Defense Purposes.

(The protocol was signed.)

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in New York City at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Secretary Clinton. I want to thank the Secretary General, Director General Amano, Ambassador Cabactulan, for their outstanding leadership in pulling together this Review Conference and addressing the challenges of nuclear proliferation.

As you know, President Obama has made reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and materials a central mission of our foreign policy, and the NPT lies at the core of that mission. I want to begin by reading a section of the message that President Obama has sent to this conference:

“For four decades, the NPT has been the cornerstone of our collective efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But today, this regime is under increasing pressure. A year ago in Prague, I therefore made it a priority of the United States to strengthen each of the treaty's key pillars as we work to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them.

“Today, the eyes of the world are upon us. Over the coming weeks, each of our nations will have the opportunity to show where we stand. Will we meet our responsibilities or shirk them? Will we ensure the rights of nations or undermine them? In short, do we seek a 21st century of more nuclear weapons or a world without them? These are the questions we must answer and the challenges we must meet. At this conference and beyond, let us come together in partnership to pursue the peace and security that our people deserve.”

Our Nuclear Posture Review ruled out the development of new U.S. nuclear weapons and new missions and capabilities for our existing weapons. It also stated we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. We have made a commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we are ready—past ready—to start multilateral negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

And today, I am announcing we will submit protocols to the United States Senate to ratify our participation in the nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been established in Africa and the South Pacific. Upon ratification, parties to those agreements will have a legally binding assurance that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them, and will fully respect the nuclear-weapons-free status of the zones. And we are prepared to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapons-free zones in Central and Southeast Asia, in an effort to reach agreement that would allow us to sign those protocols as well.

We support efforts to realize the goal of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the 1995 Middle East Resolution. The Middle East may present the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation in the world today. Adherence to the NPT is not universal, and a few countries that are parties to the NPT have violated their treaty obligations. But in spite of these difficulties, we want to reaffirm our commitment to the objective of a Middle East free of these weapons of mass destruction, and we are prepared to support practical measures that will move us toward achieving that objective.

President Obama has made clear the Unites States will retain a nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist, one that can protect our country and our allies. But we will continue to seek further reductions and we will pursue concrete steps to improve the transparency of our nuclear arsenal. Beginning today, the United States will make public the number of nuclear weapons in our stockpile and the number of weapons we have dismantled since 1991.

So for those who doubt that the United States will do its part on disarmament, this is our record, these are our commitments, and they send a clear, unmistakable signal. We are also committed to bolstering another pillar: access to civilian nuclear energy. We unequivocally support the rights of states that are in compliance with the treaty to access nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes. The IAEA's high-end projection for new nuclear capacity has nearly doubled since the last Review Conference five years ago. And the United States wants to help expand the ability of all states to utilize peaceful nuclear energy. Over the past decade, we've provided nearly $200 million to support the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund. We are the largest contributor to that effort. And it has helped more than 100 countries develop or expand the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Today, the President has asked me to announce that the United States will make an additional commitment of $50 million over the next five years for a new IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. We hope other partners will match this contribution with an additional $50 million. We will use these resources to improve health care and nutrition, manage water resources, increase food security, and help countries develop the infrastructure for the safe and secure use of nuclear power.

Now, I am not proposing to amend the treaty to limit the rights of states to withdraw. But we cannot stand by when a state committing treaty violations says it will pull out of the NPT in an attempt to escape penalties and even pursue nuclear weapons. Parties to the NPT have invested decades in building a global nonproliferation regime, and that work will be rendered meaningless if the international community continues allowing nations to break the rules of the NPT with impunity.

Our work at this conference must provide a foundation for future actions, including strengthening IAEA safeguards, negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and toughening enforcement against proliferation violations at the UN Security Council.

The last 40 years have proved that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. We believe it can be stopped, but it will take all of us here recognizing common dangers and finding common ground, rolling up our sleeves and getting creative, taking practical steps together in the next month.

President Barack Obama delivered this statement in Washington, DC

President Obama. I welcome Indonesia's important announcement at the opening session of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that they are “initiating the process of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” The United States thanks President Yudhoyono and the Government of Indonesia for its responsible leadership in the global effort to reinforce the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This is another signal that nations are joining a renewed effort to reinforce global nonproliferation, which advances the vision I outlined in Prague in 2009, and advances the security of the United States, Indonesia and the world. Reinforcing the norm against nuclear testing will help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and support our efforts to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

The United States is committed to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force, and we will work with the United States Senate to help achieve advice and consent to this important international agreement. The United States stands ready to work with all states and encourages them to ratify the treaty and to help bring it into force.

Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia—an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our relationship and protects the security of the American people.

America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners. As such, the first step of the year-long Nuclear Posture Review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. This in turn provided the basis for our negotiations of New START. The results of those studies give me confidence that the Department of Defense will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure that they are safe, secure and reliable, all within the limits of the new treaty.

The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on the triad of delivery systems—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers—within the boundaries negotiated in the New START treaty. These are:

An upper boundary of 1,550 deployed warheads;

Up to 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and

Up to 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Under this treaty, we retain the power and the freedom to determine the composition of our force structure, allowing the United States complete flexibility to deploy, maintain and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protects our national-security interests. The Defense Department has established a baseline force structure to guide our planning, one that does not require changes to current or planned basing arrangements.

The department will retain 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, distributed among 14 submarines, each of which will have 20 launch tubes. This is the most survivable leg of the triad.

Recognizing the need for flexibility in the bomber leg, we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all 18 operational B-2s.

Finally, the U.S. will retain up to 420 deployed single-warhead Minuteman 3 ICBMs at our current three missiles bases.

Let me also address some of the things the treaty will not affect.

First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in the U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3 missile, which we will deploy in Europe.

As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces and our allies and partners against ballistic missile threats, and as Secretary Clinton has pointed out, our request for missile defense in the FY11 budget is 700 million dollars over FY10 number, and we are looking at an increase beyond that of potentially up to another billion dollars for FY12. We made all this clear to the Russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty.

It is not surprising that Russia continues to object to our missile defense program as they have objected to all U.S. missile defense efforts for several decades. The Russians know that our missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea. Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation's large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile defenses do not, and will not, affect Russia's strategic deterrent. To build such a capability—a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980's—is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and destabilizing. Therefore we have no plans to do so. Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the interest of both nations. But such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitations on our programs or our deployment plans.

Furthermore, the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less. The treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, combined with the ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads, accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability. We are also currently examining potential future prompt global strike systems that would not be limited by this treaty.

In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for a strong verification regime. While the intelligence community will provide a detailed classified assessment, I would like to emphasize some of the key elements of this regime, which will monitor Russia's compliance with the treaty while also providing important insights into the size and composition of Russian strategic forces.

The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year at operating bases for ICBMs, SSBNs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, as well as storage facilities, test ranges and conversion and elimination facilities.

The agreement establishes a database, updated every six months, which will help provide the United States with a rolling overall picture of Russia's strategic offensive forces.

Unique identifiers for the first time will be assigned to each ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing us to track accountable systems throughout their life cycles.

The treaty provides for noninterference with national technical means of verification such as reconnaissance satellites, ground stations and ships.

While telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions of this treaty, the terms nonetheless call for the exchange of telemetry on up to five launches per year, for each side.

I am confident that the New START treaty will in no way compromise America's nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a credible deterrent requires an adequate stockpile of safe, secure and reliable nuclear warheads. This calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex—that is, our infrastructure and our science, technology and engineering base. And I might just add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this and this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal.

To this end, the Department of Defense is transferring $4.6 billion to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapons life-extension programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this funding along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear reactors are reflected in the President's FY 2011 budget request, which I urge the Congress to approve. These investments and the Nuclear Posture Review strategy for warhead life extension represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrent.

Let me close with a final, personal observation. I first began working on strategic arms control with the Russians in 1970, 40 years ago, a U.S. effort that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with Moscow two years later. The key question then and in the decades since has always been the same: is the United States better off with a strategic arms agreement with the Russians, or without it? The answer for successive presidents of both parties, as Secretary Clinton has said, has always been, with an agreement. The U.S. Senate has always agreed.

The same answer holds true for New START. The U.S. is better off with this treaty than without it, and I am confident that it is the right agreement for today and for the future. It increases stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, and preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense.

In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification on the new treaty.