In the introduction to this book of essays on Dignitatis Humanae (DH), Kenneth L. Grasso and Robert H. Hunt lay out two principal goals of the volume: “to explore the teaching of this seminal document,” and “to begin the long-overdue task of addressing the questions that collectively constitute Dignitatis Humanae's unfinished agenda” (xxvii). The first six essays are primarily directed toward the first goal; the second goal is addressed in the final three essays.

In the opening essay, Robert P. George and William L. Saunders, Jr. note that individuals have a right to religious freedom because of religion's importance for human flourishing. Coercion undermines the good of religion (7), but government nonetheless has a responsibility to promote religion. It must “help to create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life” (6). George and Saunders take this statement to be the “heart of the Declaration” (11), noting that the state can fulfill its responsibility by “respecting and protecting religious freedom, including the full and generous recognition of the freedom of the Church” and “by providing for the accommodation” of the free exercise of religion (12). Robert H. Hunt points out that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment as requiring government neutrality among religions does not meet the standards of the Declaration. Instead, “it must ultimately affirm a conception of human freedom that drives a stake through the heart of religious freedom, especially as that freedom is understood by the authors of Dignitatis Humanae” (30). Religious freedom as envisioned by the Declaration is something quite different from religious freedom as understood by the Court.

Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J. and Francis P. Canavan, S.J. considers the Declaration in the light of previous Catholic teaching on religious freedom. Dulles concludes that “…there has been true progress without reversal…The teaching has developed in important ways but has not undergone contradictory change” (61). Canavan, likewise, claims that the Church did not alter its fundamental teaching, but instead changed its conception of the state.

That change arises at least in part from the idea that religious and civil authorities have distinct responsibilities, and that the civil authority must operate within a limited sphere. David T. Koyzis notes that this development has been paralleled in the Reformed tradition and points out how such parallels enable Catholics and neo-Calvinists to agree on a number of important matters. They can agree, for instance, that religious freedom must be tied to the dignity of the human person without being individualistic, and that the Church as an institution must also enjoy freedom (125–126). There are also important parallels on such practical matters as education (126–129).

Thomas Heilke, John F. Crosby, Kenneth L. Grasso, and David S. Crawford consider the justification of the right to religious liberty — a justification that John Courtney Murray admitted was not adequately developed in the text of Dignitatis Humanae. Heilke critically examines the language the Declaration uses to ground the right, while Crosby, Grasso, and Crawford seek a philosophical justification for it. Crosby and Crawford turn to the work of the late Pope John Paul II, finding that it gives “a fuller account than DH gives of the immunity from coercion which DH affirms” (155) and offers a better account of the nature of freedom. Grasso explores the implications of the Declaration for a Catholic understanding of the proper role of the state, drawing critically on Murray's work in that exploration. He argues that, though the Declaration requires a limited role for the state, it does not give an adequate reason for that requirement. Efforts to ground the limited state in human dignity alone are insufficient. Though beginning with human dignity makes sense, justification of a limited role for the state requires that we also consider the pluralist nature of society. In fact, “the idea of society as a community of communities is absolutely essential to the successful elaboration of the theory of the state presupposed by DH” (187).

Each of the first six essays is strong, and together they provide the reader with a good understanding of both the development of the Declaration and its contemporary implications. Political scientists with a particular interest in interpretation of the First Amendment will find the essays by George and Saunders and Hunt of particular interest, as they address both the limited role of the state and explore the implications of differing understandings of freedom for how the state ought to fulfill that role. Those with an interest the Declaration's implications for practical cooperation between citizens of different religious traditions will find much of value in Koyzis' piece.

It is the final three essays, however, which do the most to move the discussion forward in their effort to provide adequate justification for the right of religious liberty affirmed in the Declaration. Grasso's essay in particular, with its emphasis on society as a “community of communities,” not only is helpful as a beginning in providing an adequate justification for religious liberty, but also gives rise to other important questions, such as how the communities comprising society should relate not only to the state, but to each other.