‘Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?’ (New Testament, Matthew 7. 1–3)Footnote 1
As Michael Stolleis states in his essay ‘The Eye of the Law: Reflections on a Modern Metaphor’ (translated by Thomas Dunlap and published here as a complementary essay to ‘In the Name of the Law’), ‘[i]n the western cultural realm, the metaphors and sayings that relate to the eye begin in the Old and New Testaments’ (p. 8). The eye of judgement, which in The Old Testament exercised surveillance on behalf of a stern and vengeful God,Footnote 2 is criticised in the above passage from The Gospel According to St Matthew for failing to recognise and redress its own weaknesses, follies and misdemeanours. The ocular image of an omniscient power exerting oppressive and coercive authority is replaced by one of self-reflection and self-correction.
The use of the eye as a symbol of omnipresent judicial authority was not unique to Judaeo-Christian religious cultures (Stolleis reminds the reader that in Islam, Allah ‘“sees through and knows all things,” he is “all-hearing, all-seeing, almighty” [Surah 31:17, 29]’ (p. 8)); nor indeed did the metaphorical association between ocularity and a pervasive, surveillant, legal institution originate with them. In classical antiquity, Xenophanes of Colophon referred to the divinity as all-seeing, while Plato distinguished between mere physical perception and rational insight by reference to the ‘physical eye’ and the ‘mind's eye’ (p. 13). In the iconography of ancient Greek jurisprudence, Dike (daughter of Zeus and Themis) was attributed with an ‘all-seeing gaze’ (p. 15), while the god-king of the ancient Egyptians, Osiris, had as his hieroglyphic symbol an eye.
In the monotheistic religions that provided the moral and ethical foundations of secularised Western jurisprudence, the utility of ocular imagery is obvious. It represents the omniscient god who created mankind and gave him his laws, and to whom all are ultimately accountable. The deity sees through the action to the motive, through the body to the soul, and through the physiological organ of sight to the mind's eye. Endowed with the metaphysical quality of insight, the visual sense is of greater symbolic importance to the iconographer than are the other senses of taste, smell, hearing and touch. In relation to law, the symbolism of the eye exerts the dual role of protection and surveillance, overseeing and controlling the individual by its constant presence. One of the signal achievements of Stolleis in this slim volume is to emphasise the blurred distinction between the eye as a benevolent symbol of ‘the shepherd who never sleeps’ (p. 46) and the dystopian visions of oppressive vigilance described in fictional terms by Huxley (Reference Huxley1970) in Brave New World and Orwell (Reference Orwell1949) in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and in his definitive historical analysis of oppressive state-surveillance, by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (Reference Foucault and Sheridan1991).
In the theocentric Western jurisprudences of the medieval world, legal institutions continued to be dominated by the absent presence of the divine lawgiver. In England, for example, the prelates of the church presided over the administration and execution of secular law, while the origins of the English Bar lay in the monastic orders, whose members regularly acted as advocates in local disputes. Indeed, the word ‘advocate’ (from Latin advocatus) originally described a pleader in the ecclesiastical courts, his counterpart in the king's courts being described as a ‘narrator’ (Brand, Reference Brand1992, pp. 48, 94). As the seventeenth-century historian William Dugdale recorded, the itinerant justices of the king's court were ‘antiently persons in holy Orders’ (Reference Dugdale1666, p. 141), determining that common law was rationalised under the influence of canon law and its concomitant imagery.Footnote 3 This development was to have notable consequences for the legal iconography of the immediate post-Reformation period, as the secularisation of municipal law ensured that the representation of sovereignty was predicated on the omnipotence of the king, rather than on the mystical authority of the deity. Stolleis accurately notes that ‘[t]he Eye of God migrated to the prince as the secular governor of God’ (p. 36), and consequently the vigilant eye of the deity was gradually translated into the surveillant eye of the state.
From the earliest days of the secularised state, the eye of justice became associated with the oppressive enforcement of law, in the name of the king. As the political tendencies of English monarchs began to resemble those of their Continental counterparts, so the movement from limited to absolutist monarchy implied the omnipresence of the king. In England, the Crown was contending with the putative rights guaranteed to subjects under the fictive, unwritten charter known as the ancient constitution. Writing in 1582, the lawyer and antiquary William Lambarde interpreted the primary role of the Justice of the Peace as that of conducting vigilant surveillance of the king's subjects:
‘in every Shire, the king himselfe should place speciall eyes and watches over the common people, that shoulde be both willing & wise to foresee, and bee also enabled with meete auctoritie to represse al intention of uproare and force …’ (Reference Lambard1582, pp. 21–22)
This stark and oppressive analysis of justice in the shires calls into question the efficacy of the ancient constitution, which was claimed (by Sir John Fortescue and other early modern jurists) to protect the liberty of subjects and their inalienable rights, irrespective of social status.
Stolleis has incorporated numerous pictorial images throughout the essay, ranging in style from the emblematic and the allegorical to the satirical and the abstract (examples include: Raymundus Lullus, Arbor Philosophica; Jakob Böhme, Earthly and Heavenly Mysteries; Johann Daniel Preysler, Allegory of the Law; Honoré Daumier, The Indiscretion; and an untitled painting by Joan Miró). Common to all of these is the idea that the eye forming the focal matter of the illustration is intrusive and invasive. Whether it is Daumier's furtive voyeur, looking through the keyhole at the eponymous indiscretion, or the celestial eye of Preysler's Allegory of the Law, radiating light and extending its inscrutable gaze over the earth, the eye is penetrative rather than protective. Insofar as many of these images represent the eye of the law, they are representative of absolute authority, depicting in figurative terms the imperial model of lawful order, as expressed in the maxim of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian: Quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet (‘That which pleases the prince has the force of law’) (535 ce, Bk 1, Title II).Footnote 4 The assertion of unrestricted imperial power is antithetical to the equitable principles of common law, encapsulated by the medieval jurist Henry de Bracton in the phrase lex facit regem (‘law makes the king’).Footnote 5 Stolleis ignores the great constitutional moment in early modern English history, when these two conflicting ideologies collided head-on in the Civil War of 1642–1648, concentrating instead on the centrality of sovereignty or majestas to the absolute monarchies of Continental Europe. In his discussion of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, he considers the subtle development in institutional iconography whereby the eye was increasingly employed as a symbol of illuminati (especially and most successfully in the revolutionary regimes of America and France). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mechanisation and industrialisation were reflected in the demise of the living eye as an image either of divinely ordained authority or enlightened aspiration. Included in the final section of this essay is Man Ray's Indestructible Object (a 1932 sketch of a metronome, with a photograph of a human eye attached by a paperclip to the pendulum), accurately prefiguring the Orwellian dystopia of continuous and irresistible technological surveillance by a state that ‘neither sleeps nor slumbers’ (p. 51).
The theme of transference from spiritual to temporal authority is continued and developed in the second essay in this volume, ‘In the Name of the Law’. Here, Stolleis is concerned with the legitimate authority of law and with discovering the originary, in the name of which the legal institution acts. Inevitably the meaning of the image is central to the analysis, but while figurative art provided the mise-en-scène for ‘The Eye of the Law’, the aesthetic form under consideration in ‘In the Name of the Law’ is the theatre of law. Specifically, Stolleis examines the meaning of substitution in the legal institution and asks the pertinent question: ‘In whose name do its actors speak?’ The disputed substance of representation was of course the theological crux of the Reformation in early modern Europe, while in England a parallel dispute was emerging between those who believed the king to be the law itself – lex loquens – and those, like Sir Edward Coke, for whom representation was symbolic rather than transformative. The latter constituency sought to restrict the mysterious power of kingship by rendering it accountable to law: the king was not lex loquens, although his crown was ‘an hieroglyphic of the laws’.Footnote 6
At the start of his essay, Stolleis draws the attention of the reader to an obvious, but valid, correlation between the priest and the lawyer: ‘priests proclaim that they are acting in the name of God’ (p. 53). Without making the explicit claim that lawyers embody an ordained, secular priesthood, Stolleis makes the semiotic link between agency and representation. Throughout their history, the constituent politico-juridical structures of the Western legal tradition have sought to justify their status as licit substitutes of an irrefutable original. Of course, Stolleis approaches the theme of substitution from the perspective of the Continental tradition of legal codification; it is unsurprising therefore that he should concentrate on the written constitutions of Continental Europe and address the crucial issue of whether they speak for the state (in the form either of monarchy or republic) or the people.
In the English legal system, predicated on the unwritten constitution and the centrality of immemorial custom to its juridical procedure, the aesthetics of substitution is (and always has been) a defining feature of its institutional form. In the early modern period, common lawyers were forthright in asserting the belief that they were the anointed substitutes of God Almighty, articulating His word and transmitting it to His people. In his influential paean to English law, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (c. 1470), the Lancastrian Chief Justice Sir John Fortescue enunciated the religious symbolism of the judge's role: ‘[W]e, who are the Ministerial Officers, who sit and preside in the Courts of Justice, are therefore not improperly called: Sacerdotes (Priests): The import of the Latin Word (Sacerdos) being one who gives or teaches Holy Things’ (Selden, Reference Selden1737, pp. 4–5). Fortescue represented belief in the idea (popular among common lawyers) that the judiciary were legitimate substitutes for the Supreme Judge. In this capacity, judges collectively performed the sacred role of oracle to an omnipotent deity. This thesis persisted among common lawyers, and indeed was reinforced during the period of the Reformation, as the true meaning of the substituted image became the principal theme of religious and political debate. Hence, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Elizabethan common lawyer William Fulbecke would repeat the above sentiments of Fortescue, when he stated that: ‘[T]hough the charge and calling [of the lawyer] be seculer, yet it must be religiously handled. For God is the author of the Law, and the revenger of the abuse thereof …’ (Reference Fulbecke1600, B2.v).
Stolleis is alert to the religious symbolism and drama of the courtroom, noting especially the theatrical form of its rituals:
‘The ceremony of the court largely resembles that of the religious service. The judges clad in robes enter the room, those present rise and are then informed by a gesture that they may be seated. The crucial text, the decision, is read with an invocation of a higher authority “In the name of …”’ (p. 58)
As the Reformation was conclusively to demonstrate, the sign must be licit, guiding and directing the viewer, audience or congregation to comprehension of invisible, intangible truths. The icon was the authentic representation of truth, while its antithesis, the idol, was the embodiment of falsehood, a vacuous simulacrum. Presumably conscious of the image of majesty that the judiciary must present, so that they might persuade the affective subject of law of their elevated authority, Fortescue complained to the Prince of Wales that judicial robes were insufficiently ornate: ‘[W]hen you come in Power, I could wish Your Highness would make a little more Ornamental, in Honour of the Laws, and also of Your Government’ (Selden, Reference Selden1737, p. 120). In order for it to enact its iconic function, the sign must be transformative rather than merely imitative. The audience must believe in the fact of transubstantiation, or the ritual becomes idolatrous: a blasphemous parody of the truth. A similar observation was made in relation to King Louis XIV by Louis Marin in his seminal work Portrait of the King:
‘The king is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images. They are his real presence. A belief in the effectiveness and operativeness of his iconic signs is obligatory, or else the monarch is emptied of all his substance through lack of transubstantiation, and only simulacrum is left …’ (Reference Marin and Houle1988, p. 9)
Both Stolleis and Marin are describing a Eucharistic rite, whereby the spirit attains corporeality, the invisible truth becomes apparent to all and the Word is made flesh. As Peter Goodrich has noted, the theological concept of presence in the Eucharist translates into secular jurisprudence as a question of the ‘spirit of law’ (Reference Goodrich1990, p. 55). And we should not be led to believe (despite my remarks above about ‘the Continental tradition of codification’) by the ‘crucial text’ to which Stolleis refers in the above extract (and in the various written constitutions which he cites throughout the essay) that the written word is anything but another form of sign:Footnote 7 an aesthetic artefact directing the reader to an understanding of its true meaning, which lies beneath the written word and awaits exegesis. The text itself is not the literal truth: a statement that applies as much to the written constitutions of Continental Europe as it does to the records of common law (contained in its reports, statutes and commentaries). The text is the trace of an absent presence, and the interpreter of the text – be he priest, lawyer or jurist – exposes the embedded truth through the application of ‘artificial reason’.Footnote 8 Emotional attachment and willing obedience of the subject to the legal institution are contingent upon the persuasive power of the sign. The images and narratives of Western law have been continuously adapted to suit the circumstances of its immediate condition.Footnote 9 Just as the crown – the image of the king – is ‘an hieroglyphic of the laws’, so the ‘sacral elements’ (p. 58) of juridical procedure (to which Stolleis refers) are signs, unravelling in pictorial and aural images the complex emotional bond between the legal institution and the subject of law.
‘In the Name of the Law’ asks important substantive questions concerning the legitimacy of modern Western constitutions, and Stolleis is especially alert to juristic trends in the second half of the twentieth century. Perhaps foremost among these was the ‘anti-positivistic renaissance of natural law in the first years following the Second World War’ (p. 65): an inevitable response to the monstrous travesty of positive law enacted by the government of the Third Reich. The title of Stolleis's essay is specific insofar as it derives from the sentencing formula employed by the Allied occupying forces in post-1945 Germany (p. 64). But equally, the title hints more broadly at the spirit of law, and its author engages throughout with the metaphysical issue of identifying the originary of law: the absent presence in whose name the substitute may legitimately speak.
