Soon after beginning Vernon Bogdanor's important book I found myself wondering: How will a proponent of a codified, epitomic, rationalistic constitution interpreted by a constitutional court with the power to invalidate acts of the legislature and the executive that run counter to the court's interpretation of that constitution write a book about a customary constitution? Of course, most of the parts of a customary constitution are usually written down by, for example, a parliament or a commentator on long practice in the courts or the executive. But, unlike a codified, epitomic constitution, there are no precise boundaries to a customary constitution separating what is constitutional from what is not and no constitutional court with the power to determine authoritatively what is and what is not constitutionally permitted or required. Tougher still: how does one write such a book when some of the more recent parts of that customary constitution are conceptually part of the juristic world of codified, epitomic constitutions and courts with something like constitutional-review powers as distinguished from the standards of the world of custom? And how to do it so that one's preference for a codified, epitomic, rationalistic constitution does not prevent one from writing about the customary constitution that is the subject of the book both accurately and in a style appropriate to such a constitution? Vernon Bogdanor's The New British Constitution comes about as close to showing how to do that as anyone is likely to.
Bogdanor, Professor of Government and Law at Oxford, magisterially lays out the formal-legal details of recent constitutional change in Britain that lead him to see a “new British constitution” in the making. And he lays them out in the only way one can faithfully lay out the details of a customary constitution in the process of self-transformation: by laying out those changes in bits and pieces such as treaty commitments, legislative acts, and practices that centrally or tangentially have modified the British constitution. He does that with admirable clarity and precision.
In the abstract (though things are less clear in the concrete) there are two different sorts of changes that allow Bogdanor to write plausibly of a “new” constitution. One kind of change consists in constitutionally important acts of Parliament as well as constitutionally relevant practices in the courts or in Parliament or in the government that do not undermine the conception of the British constitution as a customary one with fluid boundaries that vary as all political customs vary over time. Such changes may well be the subject of political challenge, of political struggle over the interpretation of the import, scope, suitability, etc., of altering a custom to fit new conditions. Such challenges and struggles are fought out politically. So the choice between a new adaptation of an old custom and the reaffirmation of an old one is made in the political arena and ultimately decided by parliamentary elections producing a majority for one or the other.
The second kind of change involves the erection of institutional arrangements under which one or more features of the constitution are codified and placed in a context where their interpretation is formally vested exclusively in an independent judiciary with the power to annul acts of any other body when the judges believe those acts to be at odds with the constitution. In such a framework the challenges and struggles over matters at issue normally must be fought out by and among a judicial elite through the process of litigation. Political challenges and struggles over the matters at issue are relegated to the margins where support may be mustered to try to alter or retain the intellectual context in which these matters are perceived, or to bear the costs of litigation or, perhaps, to find ways of altering the membership of the highest court with constitutional-review powers.
Bogdanor's book carefully lays out both kinds of changes that have occurred in recent years. And he explores both possible and likely directions in which those recent changes point. Anyone wishing to study those changes and reflect on their implications for the future of British constitutional law should read his book. He covers so many important issues that a reviewer cannot summarize them all. So let me very briefly lay out a few major points organized in terms of the distinction I made above between the two different sorts of constitutional changes under study.
Consider first the changes that do not include the transfer of disputes about constitutional issues from the political sphere to the courts, but do raise serious problems for the customary legal principle of the sovereignty of Parliament.
A series of acts of Parliament in 1998 involved two major kinds of constitutional novelties. Substantial powers of self-government were “devolved” from the Parliament in Westminster to newly constituted assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland without abolishing their seats in the UK's Parliament at Westminster. The resulting anomaly is that English MPs at Westminster cannot vote on a whole range of Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish matters; but MPs from those three can vote on all English matters since they remain within the scope of Parliament's powers. And those same acts of devolution involve a second novelty: each of them was conditional upon its acceptance at a popular referendum—as was the 1998 act reorganizing the Greater London Authority and the Local Government Act of 2000.
Now, of course, one can say with respect to all of those acts that parliamentary sovereignty could still be asserted in the sense that no court has jurisdiction to invalidate new acts of Parliament revoking those devolutions or overturning those referenda. But politically speaking it is hard to envisage Parliament trying to do such things without a major constitutional crisis.
There are some other recent changes treated by Bogdanor that pose less critical challenges to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, although insofar as they are part of a trend they may lead to significant constitutional change, taking “constitutional” in the broad British usage that is not limited to the relatively few articles included in such epitomic constitutions as those of France, Germany, and the United States. These would include such things as the legislation requiring elections by proportional representation for seats in the assemblies established for Scotland and Wales and for seats in the European Parliament (rather than the first-past-the-post plurality rule in choosing MPs in the single-member constituencies of the Westminster Parliament); the granting to the Bank of England independence from the Government in matters of monetary policy; and the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, both of 2000.
However, the second set of changes Bogdanor considers edges much closer to a fundamental replacement of the customary constitution. The changes clearly edge toward, but do not quite cross, the line that distinguishes a constitution in which Parliament is both formally and in large measure practically sovereign from a constitution in which there is a formal and real separation and balance of sovereign powers between at least two major institutions, in this case Parliament and a constitutional court.
Britain backed into this process legally by helping draw up the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 and then ratifying it in 1951. The Convention instituted the European Court of Human Rights to hear cases alleging violation of the provisions of the Convention. Still, it was not until 1966 that the British government permitted individual Britons to bring their allegations to the European Court, but only after exhausting their search for remedies in British domestic courts that were only empowered to provide remedies according to British law rather than according to the European Convention. This left the European Court in the paradoxical situation of acting, so to speak, as a court of first instance, since none of the previous litigation in Britain had addressed claims of violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, whereas cases from Continental countries would be appeals from national courts dealing directly with such claims. But finally, in 1998, the British Parliament passed the Human Rights Act. It allowed Britons for the first time to have British courts to adjudicate claims of violations of rights guaranteed by the Convention.
But what if a Briton's allegation is upheld? Whereas an American judge can declare a law invalid because unconstitutional, the British judge cannot invalidate an act of Parliament on the grounds that no construal of the act in question can be reconciled with the rights guaranteed to Britons by the European Convention. Under the Human Rights Act of 1998 the British judge can only declare his finding that the act is incompatible with the Convention. The sovereignty of Parliament is formally preserved since repeal or amendment of the offending legislation remains a matter for Parliament to decide.
All of this is made more puzzling by the fact that Parliament has undertaken but not completed a radical reform of the House of Lords. Among those parts of the reform of the Lords that have been adopted so far, by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, is the abolition of the Law Lords as the highest court in the United Kingdom and its replacement by a new Supreme Court which is not only not part of Parliament at all but has even been moved out of the Palace of Westminster to a new building of its own. Yet it has not been granted the power to invalidate acts of Parliament. Bogdanor is cautious here. He foresees possible clashes between the government and the judiciary (85–86). But he is broadly sanguine about the constitutional developments so far, seeing them as constituting a general trend toward development of a “constitutional state” with a written constitution and with the courts having the power of constitutional review. Oddly, he never mentions that the text of the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant the Supreme Court the power of invalidating legislation on the grounds of unconstitutionality, a power that the politically astute John Marshall managed to assert successfully in Marbury v. Madison. But American readers will inevitably wonder whether the new British Supreme Court will find its John Marshall and a suitable British analogue to Marbury with which to break the legal doctrine of the radical sovereignty of Parliament and so establish a balance of power between Parliament/Government and the Court. Bogdanor does not so much as mention Marshall, Marbury, or Sir Edmund Coke, but the thrust of his argument is one that leaves one thinking of (hoping for?) an avatar of Marshall or Coke on the new Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, Bogdanor's sanguine view of all of the foregoing simply leaves out deep theoretical questions involved in all of this: are there fundamental disadvantages involved in replacing a customary constitution where constitutional issues including issues about fundamental rights must ultimately be fought out politically, by public discussion, dispute, and voting by a constitutional system in which such matters become the monopoly of a juristic elite of judges and lawyers to whom the rest of the political community are simply subject? Is the movement in that direction an expression of a loss of confidence in the coherence of the political community, such that one cannot really hope to rely on the resource of a deep, shared sense of the rights of Britons, vague but real, that, messily and slowly, is refined and articulated by public dispute and eventually expresses itself in legislative reform? May it be the case that, in the long run, transferring that function of authoritatively articulating the constitutional norms of right to the processes of litigation, monopolized by jurists, tends to make the constitution just another superficial, formal, coercive imposition by “them” on “us,” so that it is no longer the expression of what we are, what constitutes us, as a people but what we have become as subjects? Is it the case that such a state of affairs is an inescapable part of modernity and its modern state such that the only serious question is whether to do modernity more or less well?
Bogdanor's inquiry does not address those questions, or others—for example, What is the point or points of elections? Are they to mainly choose a leader of a group of people to govern and a general direction of policy? Or is it to allow us to express as much as possible our differences in policy orientations and potential governing personnel?—that inevitably come up with respect to the issue of proportional representation which the author generally favors and which the new Cameron-Clegg coalition in Parliament seems likely to put to a referendum.
One may wish to raise such questions, but one is unlikely to do so wisely without reading Vernon Bogdanor's book. It is a must-read for anyone concerned with the constitutional ferment in Britain.
