In 1992 A. P. Martinich published The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics (Cambridge University Press). The book is among the most significant studies of Hobbes to appear in the last three decades. The question of Hobbes's atheism had been a contested one among modern scholars. Martinich weighed in on the side of the theists, against (among others) Straussian interpreters, but he escaped the confines of the narrow, textual methodology deployed by others of his view, including Howard Warrender. Martinich preferred a contextualist methodology, which positioned Hobbes within a particular Christian culture, namely, the Jacobean English milieu that uniquely combined Calvinist theology, episcopal ecclesiology, and a high deference to the spiritual authority of monarchs. However “nonstandard” Hobbes's religious views might appear, Martinich insisted on their sincerity and rejected readings of them as “esoteric” efforts to undermine Christian orthodoxy.
Two Gods produced considerable pushback, and Martinich reveled in the controversies that followed. His latest book is a collection of his prior short pieces, mostly produced by these debates. There is only one original piece among the thirteen chapters. Three of the pieces are Martinich's half of published exchanges (with Edwin Curley, John Deigh, and myself). That Martinich reprints only his part in these exchanges is understandable, but the literary effect of this is jarring, rather like listening to one side of a telephone conversation. The relevant chapters do not reference or cite their foils. My own answer to Martinich does not even appear in the bibliography. The standalone chapters are also generally framed as criticism of others. The reprinting together of so many pieces written to refute critics lends the volume a captious tone.
Reprinting pieces in collections is usually a way of bringing them to new audiences, but many of the essays in this book will be explicable only to readers familiar with the debates in which they were originally embedded. The book, further, does not offer a rounded account of “Hobbes's political philosophy,” but a series of essays oriented around, in the first instance, Hobbesian political topics that implicate his possible theism (natural law, covenants, ecclesiology, and so forth) and, in the second instance, Martinich's principles of textual interpretation.
Martinich's interpretations of Hobbes are always interesting, but interpreting Hobbes has also provided him with occasions to present broader hermeneutic principles. He is not a trained historian but an analytic philosopher, and he has written extensively on the philosophy of language. This interdisciplinarity sharpens his critiques of historians whose interpretations can be more eclectic and perhaps less logically precise. Historians will counter that Martinich's interpretative rules are too rigid for sensitive rhetorical analysis and that his understanding of context is alternatively too broad or too scattershot to do the work of compelling contextualization.
Principles of good interpretation often do not guarantee scholarly consensus, Martinich argues, because relevant data is interpreted through competing “networks of belief.” Individual interpreters will only adjust their network minimally and reluctantly. Competing interpretations will be particularly unwelcome if they are general and far ranging in their implications. Any “inference to the best explanation” will be heavily conditioned by an interpreter's network. Motivated reasoning, however, is not insuperable. Martinich considers certain properties of good interpretation capable of at least partially overcoming it. These include consistency, completeness, connectedness, and defensibility.
For all of his skill at elucidating principles of interpretation, Martinich does not always apply these to his readings of Hobbes. Illustrating the virtue of consistency, for instance, Martinich writes: “I do not know of any legitimate way of both acknowledging that Hobbes sincerely but stubbornly defended novel and obviously contradictory mathematical beliefs and also maintaining that he insincerely but stubbornly defended novel and obviously contradictory religious/political beliefs, as some atheist-interpreters do, ceteris paribus.” Martinich is very attached to this point, and repeats it often, but it fails. Critics might point out, for instance, that mathematical orthodoxy was not enforced with violence, as early modern theological orthodoxy was. Or that Hobbes considered mathematics the very model of scientific reasoning, and theology an obscure set of mysteries accepted on faith in authority. “If Hobbes's contradictions about religion indicate that he believes that God does not exist, then his contradictions about mathematics should indicate that he believes that numbers and figures do not exist.” This comment is an obvious false analogy.
Martinich disdains secondhand reports about Hobbes except when they are useful to his own interpretations. He dismisses contemporary critiques of Hobbes as gross misunderstandings, but derives great meaning from a few Calvinist contemporaries who read Hobbes sympathetically. At times Martinich insists on interpretive contextualization that is extremely precise (Hobbes as a Jacobean, Calvinist, episcopalian). At other times his contextualization is dubiously broad (a fideism running from Montaigne to Kierkegaard; a theological materialism that encompassed both Tertullian and Mormons). Martinich chides others for offering a partial accounting of evidence, but he regularly does so himself: he assesses Hobbes's supposedly positive opinion of the Nicene Creed only by way of the Latin Leviathan, ignoring more critical comments in later works; he insists on Hobbes's consistent favorability toward episcopacy, but ignores—amazingly—the only letter that survives to or from Hobbes during the composition of Leviathan, in which his close friend Robert Payne criticized the work as an attack on the bishops.
Martinich tends to argue in a piecemeal fashion. Hobbesian proposition X must be orthodox because something similar was said by patristic Y. Proposition A is theistic because it is also held by sectarian B, who was a theist. Hobbes's biblical criticism must have been sincere (and Christian) because some of it has been adopted by modern biblical critics (many of whom are not Christian). These trees just do not add up to a forest, and Martinich's more general interpretive “network” often seems awry. It will be a rare reader of Leviathan, for instance, who agrees with Martinich that Hobbes's masterwork “is obviously Christian and pious in spirit.”
Among Martinich's most consistent complaints is any reading of Hobbes that interprets his theological paradoxes, contradictions, or rhetoric as an effort to suggest heretical beliefs while paying lip service to formal orthodoxy. That Hobbes was sometimes forced into insincerity or evasiveness in this manner is a complete nonstarter for Martinich. And yet, in his own interesting chapter contrasting Hobbes's account of “sovereign-making” covenants with his account of biblical covenants, Martinich himself argues that inconsistencies in Hobbes's account of covenants resulted from an effort “to make his theory of sovereign-making covenants as palatable to his readers as possible.” Hobbes pulled his punches and offered a “relatively straightforward description of the biblical stories” out of a “fear of generating controversy” or introducing novelty at a sensitive time. Martinich sustains this argument rather well, but it is not the sort of argument that he allows others.
It is impossible in a short review to do justice to this varied and interesting collection. Initiated readers will find it guiltily pleasurable, as academic controversies can be. Less versed readers may be mystified by its often recondite discussions. Martinich's past critics, most notably Edwin Curley, may be frustrated at being muted while their supposed mistakes are extensively catalogued. The book is very much A. P. Martinich's attempt at a last word. Its best feature is its well-versed analysis of good interpretive principles. Whether Martinich's various local arguments about Hobbes successfully exemplify those principles will continue to be a matter of controversy.
