There is no shortage of books analysing and predicting the course of US–China relations. It seems as though another one is released every week. And with China's power and influence consistently rising within a global order dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War, it is evident why so many intellectuals have turned their attention in this direction, and will continue to do so.
With Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US–China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, James Steinberg and Michael E. O'Hanlon have added another work to this body of scholarship. The subtitle of their book, however, is somewhat misleading. It doesn't actually comprehensively address US–China relations – something the authors note (p. 4). Rather, it analyses their strategic/military dimensions.
Steinberg and O'Hanlon's central aim is to provide concrete strategic/military policy steps that both the United States and China can take to mitigate the risk of conflict resulting from the latter's rise. They feel that “the pessimistic outcome [of conflict] is not inevitable. But there are powerful forces that make it quite possible, and perhaps even likely, in the absence of a comprehensive strategy by both countries to resist them” (p. 4). These forces include: (1) the United States' alliance system that China may see as a containment mechanism; (2) the two countries' strategic cultures that are unwilling to accept vulnerability and through which the United States feels responsible for global security while China seeks the restoration of stature and perceived historical territory; (3) differences in regime type that can result in misunderstandings and sharp ideological frictions; and (4) domestic politics where nationalism can push leaders towards combative postures.
But these specific tensions aside, the book essentially offers views on how to fight the forces of Realism. This theory posits that states are the sole guarantors of their security in an anarchic and Darwinian world. Such an environment produces security dilemmas whereby states seek to increase their security by enhancing their military capabilities, which other states see as threatening so they respond in-kind. This can lead to arms races, increased tensions, and even conflict, even though no side actually desired conflict. In such a world competition is inevitable, but “[t]his book sets out an approach that seeks to bound the competition and reinforce the cooperative dimensions of [US–China] bilateral relations” (p. 4).
The approach can be summed up in one passage: “Each side must be prepared to do what it can to reassure the other of its cooperative intentions – but at the same time, each will need to demonstrate that it has the necessary will and capacity to defend its vital interests if necessary. Put another way, strategic resolve is the necessary complement to strategic reassurance” (p. 203). These are textbook countermeasures to a security dilemma.
The authors then apply these general principles to specific areas of US and Chinese policy: (1) military spending and modernization; (2) military contingencies in the event conflict; (3) the key strategic nuclear, space, and cyber domains; and (4) bases, deployments, and general operations. For each realm propositions are made for unilateral self-limitations, formal and informal agreements, transparency and information sharing so that each side can allay the concerns of the other while maintaining a requisite military capacity to feel secure. They are interesting balancing exercises that Steinberg and O'Hanlon undertake to varying degrees of success.
One of the most prudent chapters is that on the need to plan for and implement dialogues on the most likely military flashpoints between the two countries: the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and islands and seas in East and Southeast Asia. It is sensibly argued that “[c]onsiderations of deescalation and conflict termination should be as high as, if not higher than, the priority for victory in any classic sense” (p. 121). Both sides must have protocols in place that emphasize non-military responses, minimize force deployments, and signal interest in rapidly constraining and ending conflict (p. 122).
There are, however, several weaknesses in the authors' positions. The first of note is their opinion that “efforts by each side to strengthen resilience to attack are generally stabilizing and desirable” (p. 10). But while these can increase opportunities to diffuse situations by enhancing survivability and lessening injury, resilience building can also feed a security dilemma through its intrinsic need to enhance strategic/military capabilities, which can evoke similar responses. The lack of recognition of the double-edged nature of such actions is significant.
Second, the entire book relies on the assumption that the United States and China are in a prisoners' dilemma: “If they cooperate, both sides will achieve their best outcome, but if one unilaterally seeks to improve its position at the other's expense, the second will take steps in response that ultimately will make both sides worse off” (p. 205). However, in light of China's recent assertiveness in regional territorial disputes, there is a strong argument that, at least in certain strategic/military areas, this is not the case. China's push for territory and regional security inherently diminishes US security outlooks and commitments to allies. But it is likely that China would not have achieved the perceived gains it has in the South China Sea through cooperation, and its unilateral actions have thus far failed to provoke a US countermove that makes China worse off than before.
Ultimately, the authors' premise is quite basic: addressing the US–China security dilemma through mutual strategic/military reassurance and resolve. As such, the book suffers from an abundance of conceptual repetition and isn't for those lacking a deep interest in the particulars of US and Chinese security policies and figures. But those who do possess such an interest may find it quite rewarding.
