Oliver Crisp's Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin offers a careful and thorough analysis of Edwards' doctrine of sin, or hamartiology, and considers its contributions to contemporary philosophical theology. Crisp examines the central features of Edwards' account of sin from the standpoint of analytic philosophy, with the goal of demonstrating how Edwards' treatment of the metaphysics undergirding the doctrine might be helpful for contemporary debates in this field. Crisp is effective in presenting Edwards as a thinker whose arguments are technically rigorous and highly theological, making a viable case for turning to Edwards' thought as a means of addressing central concerns in analytic philosophy.
The focus of this work is not simply to summarise Edwards' understanding of sin, but to assess the ‘central structures of the metaphysics of sin in Edwards’ philosophical theology’ (p. 2). These structures are addressed with philosophical rigour in each chapter. Crisp begins with the doctrine of divine decrees (focusing on Edwards' view of election and reprobation), moves to Edwards' discussion of Adam's fall and its implications for the authorship of sin, considers the notion of the secret and revealed will of God, and concludes by addressing the question of the imputation of sin to Adam's descendants and the idea of inherited guilt. Crisp examines Edwards' view of each of these concepts with a nuanced eye, acknowledging their shortcomings without allowing these shortcomings to serve as grounds for dismissing Edwards completely.
Indeed, Crisp's ability to point to limitations in Edwards' position is one of this work's most helpful contributions to the contemporary study of Edwards, insofar as it enables him to offer guidance into how the weaknesses might be taken into account as his position is recovered. Crisp suggests that Edwards' metaphysic of sin has many positive features but that it fails, in spite of Edwards' best intentions, to avoid presenting God as the author of sin. Crisp contends that this failure lies most centrally in Edwards' ‘occasionalism’, the notion that God immediately creates each occasion anew (p. 130). For Crisp, Edwards' commitment to this idea is problematic for his understanding of sin because it leads to a view of causation effectively equivalent to ‘continuous creation’: God creates the world at each occasion of its existence and consequently is the only causal force in the world (p. 131). Crisp argues that this occasionalism is the basis of Edwards' failure to avoid presenting God as the author of sin because it necessarily requires that God causes all events, including human sin. Edwards attempts to affirm that God ‘permits’ sin but is not morally responsible for it; however, Crisp explains, Edwards' occasionalism requires a view of causation that makes a distinction between permission and causation untenable (p. 91). God is causally responsible for every event that takes place, and he therefore must be morally responsible too (pp. 62–9).
Recognising this shortcoming of Edwards' position, Crisp identifies the key issues at stake in a manner that is well-suited to his broader programme of recovering the central tenets of Edwards' view of sin. He points out that Edwards at least succeeds in demonstrating that his inability to resolve this problem decisively is common to ‘theological libertarians’ as well as to ‘determinists’; Edwards' Original Sin may not adequately demonstrate that God is not the author of evil, but it does demonstrate that Arminians are not able to address this problem more effectively than Edwards himself does (p. 54). For Crisp, this argument shows that Edwards' failure does not necessarily call his theological determinism into question. This point, in turn, is important because it defines the terms in which Edwards' position can be recovered: Crisp's conclusion implies that it is not necessary to reject Edwards' account of free will in order to ensure that God is not the author of sin. By developing this claim, Crisp provides a foundation for recovering Edwards' position without falling prey to its imperfections. Indeed, Crisp's work concludes by suggesting that even though Edwards appears to believe his occasionalism to be central to his metaphysics, Crisp believes that this assumption is mistaken, and that it is possible to retrieve the core of Edwards' hamartiology while avoiding the problematic extremes of his occasionalism (p. 134). This concluding argument offers suggestions for how Crisp's analysis of Edwards could provide a basis for subsequent constructive work.
Although Crisp's rigorous engagement with Edwards' argument from the standpoint of analytic philosophy is noteworthy, this approach has led him to examine Edwards' writings more or less in isolation from specific works of his contemporaries. Crisp does not neglect Edwards' historical context entirely; for example, he offers a helpful explanation of the distinctions between Edwards' view of free will and the Arminian position, and he also more broadly recognises Edwards' situation within the Augustinian and Reformed tradition as important to the development of his thought. Although Crisp's analysis of Edwards' writings is fundamentally sound, his work would benefit from further engagement with the arguments embedded in other historical perspectives, as a more thorough consideration of debates contemporary to Edwards would fruitfully highlight other nuances in his position. In spite of this possible deficiency, however, Crisp's argument is thorough, careful and highly effective both in representing the technical features of Edwards' own arguments and in suggesting how Edwards' argument might contribute to constructive debates in contemporary philosophical theology.
