In this book, Kari Frederickson, a historian specializing in the history of the American South, extensively considers the case of the construction of the Savannah River Plant (SRP) in western South Carolina. The SRP was developed during the Cold War so that the United States could build a hydrogen bomb. The sprawling site was selected in 1950, and construction began the following year.
Frederickson’s primary argument is that this major federal project not only spurred economic development but also served as a catalyst to modernize the surrounding area. One of the key themes the book considers while exploring this thesis is that growth came at a cost, whether from residents’ displacement or from unexpected changes in lifestyle. Another is that policy decisions have trade-offs: This theme is discussed in detail when Frederickson considers the decision not to create a company town for the SRP and also Du Pont’s decision against implementing fair-hiring practices at the time. While costs were incurred and some decisions produced setbacks in other areas, in the end Cold War investment was a major ingredient in the emergence of the political, social, and economic structures we now see in the South.
The first half of Cold War Dixie focuses largely on the actual process of constructing the SRP, starting with the decision by the Truman administration to pursue the construction of a hydrogen bomb and the decision to contract with Du Pont to run the bomb plant. The book then describes why the site along the Savannah River was suitable geologically and in terms of the political goals of being near a moderately populated city, but not a large urban area. Frederickson details many of the costs of building the plant to local residents—several had to be relocated and have their property bought out. The book also details the massive scope of constructing the plant and hiring the many temporary and permanent employees needed at the site. The author describes important conflicts that emerged in this process, such as Du Pont's decision against implementing fair-hiring practices along racial lines, instead opting not to challenge existing social patterns of the region.
The second half of the book analyzes how the plant influenced the surrounding area, particularly the nearby city of Aiken, SC. On the one hand, household earnings and the average level of education increased dramatically in the area, which produced better quality of life for residents. On the other hand, those in the area with old wealth shunned those with new wealth, excluding plant workers' families from existing social clubs and resisting a number of the modernizing changes that the city implemented with plant workers' support.
With this analysis of the plant's impact, Chapters 5 and 7 are most likely to be of interest to political scientists and public policy analysts. In Chapter 5, Frederickson examines the decision not to create a company town to accompany the plant. The Truman administration believed that private construction and local authorities could handle the new residents that the SRP would create, and it wanted to avoid a garrison state in which too much control was given to the government. Unfortunately, towns like Aiken and Augusta, Georgia were not ready to house all of the new employees of the SRP, which led to rapid rises in local housing prices. Local authorities in small nearby towns like Williston, SC, lacked the water and sewage infrastructure necessary to handle the massive growth in its population. The author makes the important point that policy questions were not asked early enough, nor were solutions implemented quickly enough, to avoid several of the problems that such an influx of people would create. Chapter 5 serves as a great case study of what can go wrong in the absence of any coordinated policy.
In Chapter 7, Frederickson discusses how politics and race relations were affected not only by national-level factors but also by local social and economic changes brought on by the construction of the SRP. The book recounts that the national Democratic Party's increasing support for civil rights reform contributed to the decline of the party in the South, clearly exemplified by the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948. Later, the policy stances of politicians like Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon contributed to the increased Republicanism in the region. Intriguingly, Aiken led the rest of South Carolina in Republican voting, and in fact, Aiken County was the only county in the state that Eisenhower carried in 1956. Frederickson argues that it is reasonable that Aiken led this shift because the area had several Republican transplants from other regions who came to work at the SRP, the plant made the Cold War and the fight against communism salient for locals, and the area became substantially wealthier on account of the SRP's effect on rising average wages in the area.
This discussion of the ways that partisanship was affected by local factors ought to prompt further research on the partisan realignment that has occurred since the 1960s. What led some areas to change more rapidly than others? V. O. Key (Southern Politics in State and Nation, 1949) observed that counties with fewer African Americans, as well as those with a higher concentration of social conservatives (i.e., in favor of Prohibition), were most likely to defect from the South's solid Democratic coalition, voting for Herbert Hoover in 1928, for instance. Beyond this, did factors such as average income in an area have a general effect? The story Frederickson tells seems to indicate that economic development was a major force in altering the partisanship of the area around the SRP, with employees of the SRP being more likely to vote for Republicans than workers at mills. If this pattern were found to hold in general, then perhaps economic growth would serve as a predictor of voting change in a Southern locale from Democrat to Republican. Given that the income gap between the South and the rest of the country has narrowed dramatically since the Truman administration, wages may be an important part of the realignment story.
This book ties nicely to other research on the relationship between class and partisanship, such as the finding that class-based partisanship is more prevalent in the South than it once was (Richard Nadeau et al., “Class, Party, and South/Non-South Differences: An Update,” American Politics Research, 2004). The book also ties in with other works on the policy successes of the Civil Rights movement and how they were transformative in the region, both by reducing discrimination in the social and political landscape and by changing party dynamics in the region (David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change, 2004). Frederickson also does a nice job, from a historical perspective, of showing how in-migration can alter local political dynamics, which is a process that interests scholars of contemporary Southern politics (M. V. Hood, III, and Seth C. McKee, “What Made Carolina Blue? In-migration and the 2008 North Carolina Presidential Vote,” American Politics Research, 2010).
Overall, Cold War Dixie is a worthwhile read for scholars who are interested in southern politics, city and regional planning, or partisan realignment, making worthwhile contributions to these streams of research.
