Why are teachers afraid of sentences that begin with “I feel …” or that draw on personal experience? When Enid Bloch, a former practitioner of political science, asked her colleagues these questions, she was given the standard answer of “subjectivity” or “when someone brings up personal feelings there is nothing to discuss” (1999, 69–73). That may be true for other subfields of political science but surely the books we teach in political theory are brimming with subjectivity. Aren't they? And surely the essays we assign call for injecting the writing self into the broader political discussion. Don't they? So what gets in the way?
Bloch points to “a strange dissociation in modern American academic life, a separation between the personal feelings and experiences of scholars and what it is they allow themselves to teach and write” (1999, 69). Referring to this “subtle yet pervasive emotional state” as “fear of the self,” (1999, 69) Bloch looks to Ralph Waldo Emerson's “Divinity School Address” to explain the properties of this professional phobia. True preachers, as Bloch quotes Emerson, give one the impression that they are offering their lives “passed through the fire of thought” (1999, 69). False preachers tell us lots about what they have read but give the distinct impression that they haven't lived at all. “Shouldn't we be teaching our students to use their emotions,” asks Bloch, “rather than repress them, to recognize in their own delights and fears and confusion the very keys to the human condition?” (1999, 70). Unfortunately, concludes Bloch, “our universities often seem to do their best to drive away some of their own most talented students and teachers, those special individuals who cannot submit their searching minds to the orthodoxies of particular disciplines or the passing minds of schools of thought” (1999, 71). Rather than pass our lives through the fires of thought, we parse our profession through the grammar of orthodoxy breeding a new generation of political theorists with a strong case of onto-phobia.
I read Bloch's essay early on in my teaching career and have taken her concerns to heart. As a result, I include in the political theory syllabus essayists like Montaigne, Emerson, and Audre Lorde as a way of offering models of reflective subjectivity, examples of writing where the author passes his or her life through the fire of thought. And while for the most part this practice has been very successful, there's been an element in the struggle that I was not prepared for—the extent to which our nation's adolescents are resistant to personal writing. While I was worrying about liberating their minds from the “orthodoxies of particular disciplines” their souls had been made docile by, what Michel Foucault would call “the society of control.”
Teaching Foucault always feels a bit dangerous, but nowadays his analysis seems so apt that his influence is downright scary. The students who entered college in the last few years understand how power operates intimately on the body. If you don't pass your community service requirement, you can always join the military, they're told. If you don't pass the literacy test, you can always take Ritalin, they hear. Particularly in the context of heightened national security, these students have no trouble seeing how entering a high school is not unlike entering a prison, or for that matter, an airport. Since 9/11, just about every activity they engage in, from getting a driver's license to applying for financial aid, seems to take place within the carceral archipelago.
Unfortunately, Foucault's analysis of this invisible form of power often leaves them wary of personal expression. Isn't that how biopower works? The self reveals its urges and the professional returns the ill-formed sentiments in the tidy package of diagnosis. High school students know from experience that the more they talk about themselves, the more will be taken away. For many of them, surviving high school is an exercise in keeping the authority out of their souls: their strategy is to disappear. So it isn't just faculty members who are afraid of the personal essay, our students have good reason to be suspicious.
Having regularly witnessed the chilling effect Foucault has on my students' speech, I am even more insistent on using the personal voice, if for no other reason than to displace the preponderance of passivity I find in their essays. At this point, I'm not just trying to restore emotional content to the life of the mind, to save the Academy from its lifeless orthodoxy. No, I've got a more immediate problem to confront. If the effect of reading Foucault is to create more passivity, more helplessness, more nihilism, then I owe it to these students to offer more active forms of resistance. Given Foucault's primacy with this post-9/11 generation, it is essential that I bring him into this effort.
The first question we consider is, “what does Foucault's strategy of disappearance look like?” In the introduction to The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language (1982), Foucault offers the reader a window into his mind. His internal critics have accused him of being unprofessional, of changing his ways: “Aren't you sure of what you're saying?” they ask going directly for the jugular of every scholar. “Are you going to change yet again, shift your position according to the questions that are put to you …?” they ask, deriding his intellectual rigor (1982, 17). In the end, he appears to have withdrawn from the confrontation, “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write” (1982, 17). A parting shot? Perhaps, but it quickly becomes clear that in leaving his critics behind he has given himself space to consider the writing process.
Foucault, I point out, is not disappearing, rather he is
… preparing—with a rather shaky hand—a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. (1982, 17).
Rather than asserting himself, making his claim, refuting his critics, Foucault escapes the morality police by moving underground, away from their rules and restrictions, their itinerary and predictable reiterations. “I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face,” he concludes, providing us with an intriguing method: Don't face the disciplinary logic of biopower (1982, 17). Go inside and lose yourself in your writing.
Assignment #1: Speaking to Biopower
Those two voices—the one hostile, entrenched, and hyper-professional, and the other asserting, at first hesitantly and then with conviction, the possibility of writing oneself to a different place—provided our Foucault seminar with a writing prompt. We each took an unlined sheet of white paper. On the top half, we gave voice to our internal critic, our personal bureaucrat, our very own police-person. On the bottom half we asserted our right to exist. The top half was easy to fill: we all knew our weaknesses, our academic deficiencies. We had no trouble articulating our failings; the grammar of the morality police fell neatly into place. But how would we defend ourselves? It's all very well and good for someone named Foucault to call off the morality police and send the bureaucrats scuttling, but how do those of us laboring in the industry of higher education get free of those constraints?
Here is how Ameé Latour, a freshman from Utica, New York, described the experience of giving voice to her hostile critic. She had no difficulty in transcribing its demands. The difficulty came in deciding
[w]hich criticism should I express at the moment (of the very many)? Eventually I settled on a topic and began with a question that haunts me, and is specific to being a humanities student at Marlboro: “What am I doing here?” I've asked myself many times, and written about it in personal journals, so that part wasn't very trying. It was hard to stop, actually. (2005)
Ameé points to the seductive insistence of the disciplinary voice. It is hard to curb the hostile critic's relentless litany of all our shortcomings, it is also hard to stop paying attention to its corrections. She might have continued to transcribe its logic on to the page but for the demands of a teacher (equally in bondage to her own interior masters), who redirected her efforts to the second phase of the assignment. This is how Amée described the shift to her own voice:
I knew that a second part was requested of me, though, and ended the first section after a few minutes of frantic scribbling. Then I paused. At first, all I could think to articulate in response to the critic was a single word: “No.” Then I really paused. I don't know how long I sat with no words in me, but the difficulty of defending myself against the critic was remarkable. Eventually my fingertips untied themselves and I laid out a response. I must admit that the defense felt more like a desperate attempt to convince myself of something I didn't quite believe, to justify something unacceptable and, essentially, to make myself feel better about “what I'm doing here.” (2005)
A desperate attempt. These are words used to describe efforts that don't follow the logic of the moment. To speak on behalf of the self, whether in jail or in college or in line for a domestic flight, often feels desperate, particularly if that discourse is constantly being displaced by an impersonal orthodoxy. We might think of Amée's desperation as just another example of a female freshman's low self-esteem, but that would miss the larger disciplinary lesson.
In an important sense, the assignment is a set up. The personal writing follows on the heels of our worst enemy, the internalized hegemon who derides all initiative, all originality, the bloody defender of orthodoxy and impossible standards. For students who take the idea of biopower seriously, who are no longer willing to accept purely political explanations for human conduct but who understand the role of society in reproducing and rearticulating government agendas, this assignment reveals to them just how “governmentality” works on their own imaginations. But in the very difficulty of switching from the voice of discipline to the voice of self-legitimization, each one of them began to realize exactly what sort of ontological work needed to be done. Amée, the freshman, was not the only student struggling to give reason to her existence. Even the senior, who was using Foucault in his senior thesis, couldn't face his critics. The bottom half of his page was left blank.
Obviously, if this is the only intervention, it won't do much to liberate the self. However, once students recognize how biopower functions in their own psyche, they at least have a sense of nature of the struggle. The trick then is to introduce a method that enhances the self without letting the internalized critics dictate the terms of engagement. The master of this method is Michel de Montaigne, the man who created the genre of the essay and, in that creation, recreated himself.
Montaigne's efforts
In 1571, at the age of 38, Michel de Montaigne fell into a deep depression, or as he might have said, “his complexion was unbalanced by an increase of melancholy ‘humour’” (Screech 1991, xiv). In need of a project to save himself from his despair, he began to compose essays. From the French verb, essayer (to try), Montaigne's method is pure experiment, a trial, in every sense of the word, of Michel de Montaigne: “Others form man; I tell of him and portray a particular one, very ill-formed, whom I should make very different from what he is if I had to fashion him over again” (Montaigne 2003, 740). As we read through the essays, the relationship between telling and making becomes clear: by telling the story of his life, with all its messy confusions and contradictions, he makes a space to reflect on his own foibles, thus producing a meta-author. This meta-author writes with the critical distance of a self emancipated from the prejudices of daily life.
But discovering this emancipated self, this meta-author, takes quite a bit of reading. The early essays reek of privilege, or so my students say. He is a white, owning-class male who, like most of his class, is incredibly … dare I say, “subjective.” They accuse him of being self-absorbed. Of course he uses the personal voice, they insist. People like him are incapable of thinking beyond their bourgeois lives!
It takes a bit of effort on my part to give a political context to his project. And here is where Foucault is particularly helpful. One can find, in Foucault's writing, a genuine concern with self-production. “How can the subject tell the truth about itself?” is a question he returns to again and again.1
See, for example, an interview with Gérard Raulet, “Structuralism and Post-Structuralism,” published in The Essential Foucault, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), 95.
Like Foucault, Montaigne understands knowledge as a dangerous form of power. “In all things men cast themselves on the resources of others,” he writes, “to spare their own.” But in sparing our brains from the trouble of thinking, we end up impotent against the dominant order. Rather than relying on others' thinking, Montaigne tells us to rely on our own resources, “which alone are sure and alone powerful if we know how to arm ourselves with them” (2003, 973). No bourgeois quietism here! Writing the essay, to Montaigne's mind, is armed resistance. Self-reflection is a revolutionary act.
Montaigne arms himself by taking the time to consider his responses to the concerns of his time: war and plague, Protestant rabble-rousers and corrupt monarchs. Fear, he discovers, pushes his compatriots away from their inner wisdom. “Every man rushes elsewhere and into the future,” he writes in one of his last essays, “because no man has arrived at himself” (2003, 973). Even when he was suffering from kidney stones, he preferred his own methods of healing, rather than risk the remedy of some doctor whose wisdom was devoid of personal experience. He was equally suspicious of lawyers since “human justice is formed on the model of medicine” (2003, 999). If you want a good country, he tells us in the first part of “Of Physiognomy,” don't allow in lawyers and doctors (2003, 994).
In his criticism of any profession that assumes to know the client better than herself, Montaigne has much in common with Foucault. But rather than providing a genealogy of how the existing authority came to be, Montaigne reveals just how uncertain all knowledge is, including his own. Montaigne's tagline is “Que sais-je?” (What do I know?), a question posed more as a heuristic device, a reminder of our own deformities, than as a testable hypothesis: “I learn to distrust my trot in general and set about improving it. To learn that we have said or done a stupid thing is nothing: we must learn a more ample and important lesson: that we are but blockheads” (1991, 1,218–9). Once we've accepted our fallibility, we're less at risk of being controlled by our internal critics. When they ask, “Aren't you sure of what you're doing?” the best response, it turns out, is an unapologetic, no.
But Montaigne's humility shouldn't suggest any lack of authority. He uses his experience to formulate judgments on matters of self and government. Laws may suffer from “irregularity and lack of form” but that doesn't mean Montaigne cannot profit from his experience of living under them (2003, 1000). As he tells us in his final essay, “I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics” (2003, 1,000). Admitting to being a blockhead does not mean that he can't criticize the world around him nor that he can't take himself seriously. Indeed, he seems to argue, being a good critic requires being an excellent judge of one's self.
An essay, then, puts its author on trial, but what sort of trial? There is a trial in the sense of testing something out, of weighing and considering various hypotheses and how they play out in the human body/soul. There is also the sense of a challenge, as in putting one's thoughts and assumptions before a judge.2
My thanks to Khristina Haddad for her insights on the multiple meanings of “trial.”
Assignment #2: Story/Theory
The story/theory assignment gives students an opportunity to describe a personal experience and then theorize the power relations involved in that experience, using the texts as part of that theorizing. Below is an assignment I might give for a five-page essay that follows readings in Montaigne.
Begin by describing a situation in which you felt at odds with a professional (a doctor, a lawyer, a therapist, a teacher, a social worker). Show us (don't tell us) how your experience of the event differed from that of the professional. Let the details of the story convey all the confusions of this experience. Stop and breathe. In the subsequent section, use one or two passages from Montaigne to analyze this experience, to unpack the confusion, and to lay out the terms of power. Finally, what did you learn about yourself as a result of writing this essay?
I learned about this method from Gail Griffin, who gave a talk at Marlboro on “Teaching Whiteness” (2005). Gail has used this type of assignment in her women's studies classroom and more recently in her anti-racism pedagogy (1992).3
See Gail B. Griffin, Calling: Essays on Teaching in the Mother Tongue (Pasadena, CA: Trilogy Books, 1992). A book that is sadly out of print.
Producing a collectivity
So far we've considered how personal writing offers a space beyond the reaches of disciplinary structures (Assignment #1) and how it allows for reflection on one's own terms (Assignment #2). The third component of personal writing offers an opportunity for students to speak on behalf of a larger group.
Many of my students arrive at Marlboro with experience at group decision-making, whether it's through working with Common Ground on the Katrina Relief effort; or through volunteering at a soup kitchen or on a crisis line; or working on a youth empowerment initiative through their place of worship. What I'm calling an ontological project, they understand as leadership training or capacity building; the difference is that they hadn't seen these efforts as benefiting the self but as advancing the group's mission.
Along with these various experiences of volunteering and community service has come the attendant skepticism. In this case, the criticism isn't as personal as we addressed in the first assignment; the critics don't challenge the legitimacy of the self but the legitimacy of any political effort. The term for this type of criticism is nihilism, and, as was the case with biopower, students immediately recognize its presence. They wonder about the efficacy of volunteer work; they worry that every political effort will be co-opted by commercial interests. They notice that this season's line at the Gap looks a lot like what anarchists wore at the last anti-WTO protest. They know the voice of nihilism, whether they think it themselves while off duty or are challenged while gutting houses: “Nothing you do matters.”
While we might use the story/theory method to deconstruct nihilism's hold on our imagination, we might also end up giving nihilism a more powerful grip in our psyche. Like the internalized critics, the voice of nihilism is seductive. It's hard to turn off its logic. So, rather than give performance space to the destructive siren, I've started asking students to begin by asking a big question, such as “What is nihilism?” and then think about it in terms of their experience.
Assignment #3: Asking the Big Question
This assignment followed a chapter on nihilism in Cornel West's Democracy Matters (2005).
Use the following questions to help structure a five-page essay: What is nihilism? How does Cornel West talk about it? What does nihilism look like? How have you furthered nihilism's logic? How have you countered it? Describe experiences that help us to see what nihilism looks like in your life.
Ben Levy, a sophomore from Chicago, pointed to “the obsession Marlboro's student body has with its academic work—a form of academic fundamentalism,” an obsession that, according to Ben, “exhibits certain parallels with the materialism obsession and free-market fundamentalism so detrimental to democracy” (2006). Ben's essay looked at how Marlboro's emphasis on academic production precluded the experimentation and inefficiency so necessary for social action committees. Asking students to read more Tocqueville, it turned out, made it harder for them to experience the democratic pleasures described in Democracy in America.
Ben was not alone in making collective claims as part of his argument. Here is a passage from an essay by Charlie Egan, another sophomore from the Chicago area who, as a result of this assignment, became a spokesperson for his generation:
While maybe young people have always been nihilistic, my generation seems to have a distinct form of informed nihilism. My generation is the first to grow up with the widespread use of the Internet. You can obtain knowledge about any world issue as quickly as you can type a handful of words into a search engine. But to a large extent, this knowledge hasn't given my generation the motivation to further democratic social action. (2006)
Asked to think about their experience in the context of nihilism, these students were able to make claims about structural forces, constituting through their writing a “we” that I hadn't noticed before. As a result of this sort of inquiry, the subject that emerged at the end of the essay was not singular but collective. The internal judge, it turned out, could speak for more than the self.
Asking a big question allows students to consider how social relationships are structured by ideological forces. This can happen on the level of identity politics, where asking big questions about racism or sexism reveals how social relationships are structured along hierarchies of dominance and subordination, or on the level of movement building, where asking big questions about nihilism reveals generational differences about what is politically possible. Following a big question with personal experience makes clear the link between ideology and practice. Just as students in feminist theory classes begin to look at how they reproduce gendered hierarchies of dominance and subordination, students who take on nihilism begin to see how they perpetuate its logic. My goal in both cases is that awareness will allow for more creative, less scripted, possibilities.
Maggie Jones, a senior from Portland, Oregon, took up the challenge of nihilism in her senior thesis (what Marlboro calls a Plan of Concentration) on her generation's political apathy. While she writes much of her plan in the first-person singular, there are moments when she begins to realize that what she is experiencing is not an isolated occurrence:
We have come of age in a society in which there is a sense of inevitability to our continued consumption of products and policies we would rather not condone. The college students spending their summers going door-to-door for Greenpeace are working for a corporation; the young activists protesting the war ride in vehicles that run on oil. Corporations so thoroughly pervade our lives that it would be necessary to be completely self-sufficient in order to survive a total boycott. To avoid all traces of involvement in bad politics, like Jainist monks wearing face coverings to avoid the accidental inhalation of even the tiniest insect, will require more sacrifice than we are willing to commit.
What Maggie gives us is an expression of collective life, waiting to be passed through the fire of thought. At one point in her writing, it appeared as if the voice of nihilism would gain the upper hand. Instead, what happened is that she discovered in Michael Hardt's and Antonio Negrí's Empire, a criticism of pure politics that allowed her to forgo a hyper restrictive reading of “Do no harm” (2000). By asking a big question, “What is purity in politics?” she was able to challenge one of nihilism's most effective camouflages.
Conclusion
To ask our students to engage in personal writing does not foreclose political discussion. On the contrary, the three assignments I've suggested in this article make it possible for substantive political discussions to occur. By identifying the disciplinary forces working inside their psyches, students are given the opportunity to reconsider the authority of those voices. By allowing for both experimentation and analysis in the personal essay, students practice passing their lives through the fire of thought. And by asking for real experiences about abstract concepts, students get a sense of how collective identity is both constituted by and constitutive of ideological forces.
The key point to remember when encouraging personal writing is that the writer must be both producer and first judge. Disciplinary forces are a real danger, whether they are professional demands or matters of national security. If we ask students just to talk about their experiences without allowing them to pass those experiences through the fire of thought, we have furthered the disciplinary agenda. Political theory, it seems to me, offers the tools to reconsider received wisdom and prevailing ideologies, the very tools necessary for reflecting back on personal and collective experience. The personal essay allows that work to be done on a level that is not just soul deep but, from a civic standpoint, politically necessary.
Author Bio
Margaret Mott teaches political theory at Marlboro College and is currently working on a book about teaching Spinoza during the end-times. She wishes to thank Tom Dumm, Rebecca Fowler, Khristina Haddad, Alison Mott, Jacob Turino, and the anonymous reviewers at PS for their help in this effort. Comments are welcome at: megmott@marlboro.edu.
