As part of his personality cult, the late President Saddam Hussein of Iraq liked to advertise his powerful affinity for the heritage of ancient Mesopotamia. Saddam launched a grand reconstruction of the site of ancient Babylon as he visualised it at the time of its ruler Nebuchadnezzar (605–562 BC), using bricks inscribed with the names of Nebuchadnezzar and himself in modern Arabic, rather than the original Babylonian cuneiform. For the International Babylon Festival in 1990, he invited his cabinet ministers, senior officials, diplomats and international reporters to celebrate his 53rd birthday in his home village. The climax of the festivities involved a wooden cabin, wheeled out before prostrate crowds dressed in ancient Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian and Assyrian costume. When the cabin doors opened, inside was a palm tree from which 53 white doves flew up into the sky; beneath them a baby Saddam, lying in a basket, came floating down a marsh-bordered stream.
“Moses redux”, wrote a watching reporter from Time magazine. But why would Saddam Hussein wish to compare himself with a Jewish leader? In fact, the reporter had missed Saddam's point. The Iraqi dictator's allusion was to an event much older than that of the birth of Moses. He was referring to the infancy of Sargon, the great king of Akkad in the late third millennium BC. According to his legend, Sargon was born of lowly origins and abandoned in a river—presumably the Tigris or the Euphrates—by his mother. “My priestess mother conceived me, in secret she bore me. She set me in a basket of rushes and sealed my lid with bitumen”, says the Sumerian cuneiform literature written down a thousand years later, though prior to the era usually ascribed to Moses; “She cast me into the river which rose over me”. Rescued by a drawer of water, the orphaned baby became a gardener and eventually the founder of the first true Mesopotamian empire, that of the Akkadians, which went on to have a long and complex relationship with the somewhat later, more southerly Babylonian empire.
Sargon's reign falls around the end of the period, 3000–2300 BC, on which David Wengrow, reader in comparative archaeology at University College London, focuses in What Makes Civilization?, his brief study of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt and their significance to modern civilisation in the West.
Traditionally, this has been regarded as the period in which the early glories of civilisation developed in the Fertile Crescent and beside the river Nile, in the form of city-states like Uruk, the pyramids at Giza, and writing in cuneiform and hieroglyphic (not to mention the contemporaneous Indus Valley civilisation centred on Mohenjo-daro and Harappa). But as the story of Saddam and Sargon suggests, “Alongside such positive appraisals”, writes Wengrow, “there exists the memory of another kind of ‘ancient Near East’; an alien and sometimes bizarre world where we explore the discontents of modern civilisation; where the allure of sacred kingship can still be felt, and the fate of humans is directed by the will of the distant and unfathomable gods”. For example, the story of the Tower of Babel and the dispersion of humanity, which Isaac Newton placed around 2,400 BC. Writing in the late seventeenth century after the overthrow of King James II in England, Newton believed that Europe owed not only the earliest glimmers of the Enlightenment—farming, literacy, astronomy, and navigation—to ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, but also a darker heritage—sacred kingship and the dynastic cult of the dead.
Wengrow's comparative approach is in line with the recent emphasis on the interconnectedness, rather than the isolation, of different ancient civilisations—as displayed, for example, in the redesign of the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford opened in 2009, and in the British Museum's 2010 BBC radio series, A History of the World in 100 Objects. Yet, he admits, most archaeologists continue to prefer the more traditional focus upon a single region or a series of artificially isolated regions. Their predominant view—like that of non-specialists—is still of an ancient world populated by ‘Greeks’, ‘Egyptians’, ‘Mesopotamians’ and so on, who supposedly think and behave in ways that are distinctively ‘Greek’, ‘Egyptian’, ‘Mesopotamian’ and so forth. Not only does this view assist specialists to maintain and manage their disciplines, it also helps us all to define the meaning of ‘civilisation’. Wengrow quotes a striking insight from the sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss, written in his essay The Nation in 1920: “Societies live by borrowing from each other, but they define themselves rather by the refusal of borrowing than by its acceptance”.
Mesopotamia and Egypt, despite their geographical proximity and their location in the flood plains of great rivers, provide a fascinating example of the truth of Mauss's observation. For all the impressive scale and sophistication of these two civilisations during the third millennium BC, they developed in very different ways. Astonishingly, there is no written evidence that they were directly aware of each other during their first thousand years of existence, such as through trading contacts. Indeed, writing was invented in Mesopotamia, as cuneiform script circa 3300 BC, and in Egypt, as hieroglyphic script circa 3200 BC, virtually simultaneously; yet, the two scripts have absolutely no resemblance and appear to have arisen independently.
However, both civilisations certainly traded with areas further afield than each other well before the third millennium. Precious lapis lazuli, for instance, which must have come from its nearest source in mountainous Afghanistan both by land and by sea, is found in Egyptian burials as early as the fourth millennium BC. In the third-millennium-BC cuneiform archives of Ebla, in modern Syria, discovered in the 1960s, there was a manual listing more than fifty different varieties of lapis having both local and Sumerian names.
Most of the book is devoted to outlining and comparing the economic, social, political and religious organisation of the two civilisations, as revealed by excavations over the past two centuries and the decipherment of the hieroglyphic and cuneiform scripts. Only the last chapter or two tries to deliver on the promise of its preface: to ponder how the ‘birthplace of civilisation’ came to matter to the self-definition of western civilisation, not least in the aftermath of the latest war in Iraq, with its scandalous destruction of Mesopotamian antiquities. Here Wengrow's own thinking is apparently influenced more by Mauss (and perhaps today's cultural separatism in the region from Egypt to Afghanistan) than by current notions of the growth of civilisation as being a universal, multicultural phenomenon. Whilst not denying the great importance of mixtures and borrowings, What Makes Civilization? nevertheless concludes that: “If the parallel development of Mesopotamia and Egypt demonstrates anything, it is surely the deep attachment of human societies to the concepts they live by, and the inequalities they are prepared to endure in order to preserve those guiding principles”.
