In early 1932 there was a cold snap and the Dniester River froze over. In some areas the ice was over 37 cm thick.Footnote 1 On 2 March, a family of four left their home in the village of Ghidirim in the southwest of Ukraine. They walked down to the riverbank and, at 10:30pm, the family set out across the ice. Unbeknownst to them, a Soviet border guard named Semyanikov was hiding in wait. Without warning, he opened fire on the family and they fled. Three of them made it to Bessarabia, but the father – Ivan Yahevich – was killed.Footnote 2 These events were typical of the westward crossings of the Dniester River during the onset of the Stalinist famine in Ukraine. The day before, however, Ivan Siomov and Ivan Visciun, two people smugglers from Chișinău, had wrapped themselves in white bedsheets to provide camouflage against the snow as they crept down to the other side of the riverbank. They were smuggling three Jews – Volodya, Bara and Herșcu – into Soviet Ukraine. The three Jews ventured out onto the ice and the two Ivans began walking back to the city of Tighina. They shed their bedsheets and were almost immediately spotted by Romanian border guards. The two Ivans ran, but they were caught, arrested and eventually imprisoned.Footnote 3
As soon as the river froze, starving Soviet peasants seized the moment to escape from the onset of famine. Between 28 February, when the archival record begins and 4 April, when the river fully thawed, Soviet secret police (Ob’edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, hereafter OGPU) border guards recorded 568 attempts to cross the Dniester from Ukraine to Bessarabia; 40 people were shot and killed by the OGPU, 295 were caught and 233 crossed successfully.Footnote 4 During the same window, the OGPU recorded 82 successful crossings from Bessarabia into famine-stricken Ukraine. In Bessarabia, Jews suffering under Romanian state-sponsored antisemitism seized the opportunity to escape to the Soviet Union – a brave new world that promised them equality and empowerment. Encouraged by Soviet propaganda and undercover OGPU operatives, Bessarabian Jews utilised organised crime networks centred in Chișinău to make their way to the Dniester and out over the ice. They, presumably, did not know or did not believe that they were crossing into Soviet Ukraine during the onset of an unprecedented famine. This article examines why the border between the Soviet Union and Romania was so porous. I argue that – on both sides of the border – people instrumentalised the natural environment and cross-border networks in ways that states could not control, and that these networks and this knowledge had a greater impact on migrant behaviour than the ideological or political contexts on either side of the border.
Recent work on Soviet famines has elucidated how peasants utilised cross-border connections and the natural environment as survival resources. Sarah Cameron, writing on the Asharshylyk (or Kazakh Famine), describes how Kazakhs were able to exploit cross-border ties with Uyghurs to illegally migrate to Xinjiang.Footnote 5 More recently, Iryna Skubii has shown how peasants’ utilisation of the natural environment increased over time during famine in Ukraine – in her case typified by the changing conceptualisation of food waste.Footnote 6 I find an analogue of this phenomenon in the instrumentalisation of the Dniester. Once famine began, peasants used the Dniester in new ways – in winter, the Dniester’s ice facilitated crossings on foot; in summer, its water facilitated crossing by swimming. In a study of the westward Dniester crossings, Eduard Baidaus argued that the river ‘killed and saved’ – it provided an opportunity to escape from the onset of famine, but attempted crossers often fell through the ice and drowned.Footnote 7 Baidaus further highlighted the role of collectivisation and repression in prompting the crossings, as well as the tactics employed to cross the river.Footnote 8
Recent works on Jewish migration in the interwar period have sought to de-emphasise narratives of ‘flight’ and instead emphasise the choices made by Jews migrating from Europe, examining themes like remigration and the utilisation of informal networks to migrate.Footnote 9 Tobias Brinkmann has highlighted that scholarship (and popular narratives) have predominantly focused on Jewish migration from ‘the “cursed” Russian lands, to the two main destinations, the United States and (Mandate) Palestine/Israel’.Footnote 10 Brinkmann wonderfully elucidates what he calls ‘the global dimension of Jewish migration from Eastern Europe’ – detailing migration to ‘the most important overseas countries that remained accessible during the 1920s… . Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and Palestine’.Footnote 11 Jewish migration to the Soviet Union, however, remains understudied. Most scholars have assumed that it did not happen – Brinkmann wrote that ‘illegal crossing [to the Soviet Union] ceased to be a viable option’ after the 1920s and that ‘apart from committed Communists relatively few foreign Jews settled in the Soviet Union before 1939’.Footnote 12
In this article, I build on this work by placing out-migration from and in-migration to the Soviet Union side by side, as well as by taking a more explicitly environmental approach. By centring the Dniester River and utilising historical hydrological data to correlate migrant behaviour with climactic conditions, I argue that a shared geography and climate influenced people in different situations in radically different states to act similarly: to instrumentalise the natural environment and cross-border networks to cross the frozen Dniester River in search of a better life. Behaviours that have often been described as specific to the Soviet context were in fact shared – albeit with some important differences – with people in a neighbouring state.
What follows also serves as a case study of a transnational microhistory. In her 2011 article, Francesca Trivellato argued that ‘the potential of a microhistorical approach for global history remains underexploited’ as micro-global histories tend to present ‘narration rather than social scientific analysis’.Footnote 13 In a ‘torturous’ response (his own words), Carlo Ginzburg argued that microhistory can be an ‘indispensable tool’ of global history, as ‘a close analysis of a single case study may pave the way to much larger (indeed, global) hypotheses’.Footnote 14 While I make no claims to ‘global hypotheses’, it is worth noting that the Soviet borders with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China were all partially on rivers or lakes, and it seems reasonable to suggest that similar events occurred in all these places. My approach is ‘micro’ in Ginzburg’s sense in that it is ‘based on artificially selected cases, analysed at a close distance’.Footnote 15 It is also micro in its scope – this article details a few days in the lives of a small handful of characters in close physical proximity in March 1932.
Archives and Sources
My transnational and environmental perspectives are made possible by the (ongoing) Moldovan archival revolution, which allows access to sources from Soviet Ukraine (the ‘Moldavian ASSR’) in the Archive of Socio-Political Organisations of the Republic of Moldova (Arhiva Organizaţiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova, formerly AOSPRM) and sources from the Kingdom of Romania (Bessarabia) in the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova (Arhiva Naţională a Republicii Moldova, formerly ANRM).Footnote 16 My environmental analysis is based on historical hydrological data from a scientific archive, the State Hydrological Service (Serviciul Hidrometeorologic De Stat, SHDS), which I use to correlate migrant behaviour with climactic conditions.
In this article, the Soviet perspective is based predominantly on OGPU reports (svodki). There is a rich debate on how to read these materials and, indeed, whether these materials can be used to gain insight into social realities at all. Sarah Davies read these materials largely uncritically, viewing them as a window onto the peasantry and arguing that they reveal widespread ‘anti-Soviet’ popular opinion.Footnote 17 In a critical review of her work, Stephen Kotkin argued instead that these sources ‘express the play of bureaucratic interests, the mentality of recorders, the bustle of toadies, and, most conspicuously, the deepest fears, even paranoia, of the authorities’.Footnote 18 Subsequent scholars went even further. Cristina Vatulescu cautioned against attempting to read secret police files for ‘nuggets of true information’ and instead chose to focus on ‘rhetoric’ and what these files reveal about ‘what the secret police understood by evidence, record, writing, human nature, and criminality’.Footnote 19
My approach lies somewhere in the middle of all of this. OGPU reports, of course, are not neutral descriptions of objective facts. But nor are they merely overt instruments of power that produce subjects. OGPU agents were trying to understand the material reality around them – they merely did so through a Marxist-Leninist ideological lens and while reflecting the institutional culture of the secret police. To take one example, OGPU agents – influenced by Marx’s concept of ‘false consciousness’ and Lenin’s deep and abiding need for enemies – tended to view uprisings as planned and directed by individual ‘saboteurs’ or ‘agitators’, rather than as grassroots rebellions. They might describe peasant uprisings led by women (known as bab’i bunty) as being secretly led or directed by men, for example – also reflecting their views on gender.Footnote 20 I read OGPU reports critically and reflect upon how OGPU officials’ statements of ‘fact’ were shaped by the ideological, institutional and social worlds around them. I also tend to trust cases of OGPU reports that vary over time, that converge with Party reports (which are often remarkably different, as Party officials were under pressure to paint as rosy a picture as possible, while OGPU officials were tasked with finding and exterminating enemies of the state), and that can be cross-referenced with other sources, like journalistic accounts.
The eastward crossings were documented by Romanian border guards and individuals who were arrested (and those accused of aiding them) were interviewed by Romanian police. While these documents provide a granular level of detail, they cannot be cross-referenced with other sources I was able to obtain. When those who failed to cross successfully were interviewed in Romania, they tended to feign ignorance and attempt to shift the focus of the police investigations elsewhere. By cross-referencing the testimonies of a group of people-smugglers and their associates, I provide a case study of how the eastward crossing phenomenon typically played out.
The Dniester: From Transboundary River to Disputed International Border
The Dniester River was the southwestern frontier of the Russian Empire until 1812, when Bessarabia was ceded to the Empire in the Treaty of Bucharest. For the next 106 years, the river merely separated administrative regions of the Empire: the Bessarabia Governorate was on the right bank (the west), and the Podolia and Kherson Governorates were on the left bank (the east).Footnote 21 In 1918, amid the chaos of the First World War and the 1917 revolutions, the Kingdom of Romania annexed Bessarabia with a degree of local support from the Sfatul Țării, the region’s de facto Parliament. Romanian political elites had long regarded Bessarabia as Romanian irredenta and proclaimed its annexation as the dawn of România Mare – Greater Romania.
The Bolsheviks never gave up on reclaiming Bessarabia and they considered several military proposals to reconquer the region in 1920 and 1921. Diplomatic negotiations over the region’s status broke down in September 1921. Then, in 1924, the Bolsheviks landed on the solution that would last the interwar era: the establishment of the ‘Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’. They proclaimed the establishment of a ‘Moldavian’, that is, Romanian-speaking, republic whose claimed territory included the whole of Bessarabia, and whose capital was the ‘temporarily occupied’ city of Chișinău. In reality, the ASSR consisted of a thin strip of land in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the left bank of the Dniester, and the ‘temporary capital’ was located in Balta, before it was moved to Tiraspol in 1929. The Moldavian ASSR was to project Soviet power into Bessarabia and lay the groundwork for the future reunification of the two territories.
The Soviet leadership in Moscow had wanted a fully-fledged Soviet Socialist Republic, but Ukrainian SSR leaders in Kharkiv pressed their case and successfully retained ultimate control of the territory.Footnote 22 The region, after all, had a relative majority of Ukrainians, who made up 49 per cent of the population, while ‘Moldavians’ (Romanian-speakers) made up just 32 per cent.Footnote 23 By 1924, Bessarabia was part of the Kingdom of Romania and the Moldavian ASSR was part of Soviet Ukraine. The two banks of the river were now patrolled by armed sentries with machine guns, rifles and grenades. The two states had no formally demarcated border and would not establish diplomatic relations until 1934 (see Figure 1).
Administratyvna Karta Ukraïnsʹkoï Sotsialistychnoyi Radians’koyi Respubliky 1927. The Moldavian ASSR and Bessarabia are highlighted in red in the bottom left.

Collectivisation, Dekulakisation, and Famine. Why Migrate West?
To Soviet peasants, Bessarabia looked like paradise. Full-scale collectivisation across the Soviet Union began in late 1929 and it was a catastrophe that provoked widespread resistance – especially in Ukraine. In March 1930, under the guise of ‘consolidating successes’, Stalin announced that collectivisation would slow down to prevent ‘distortions’ of the policy.Footnote 24 In reality, collectivisation had destabilised the country. But in March 1931, with order broadly restored, collectivisation accelerated again. The agricultural cycle was disrupted by the process of collectivising farms and the forced expulsion and appropriation of so-called ‘kulaks’ (wealthy peasants). Peasants were forced to sell their grain to the state at artificially low prices; the state offered to sell it back to them later at five or six times the price when they were starving.Footnote 25 Banned from keeping any of their produce, peasants had no incentive to keep farming. People slaughtered their animals and burned their crops to prevent them from being seized by the state that was terrorising them. The food supply was destroyed. There were ample grain reserves but using them meant recognising that collectivisation was failing. In early 1932, widespread famine set in across the Ukrainian republic (after already having devastated the Kazakh ASSR and parts of the Russian SSR). Peasants in Ukraine were effectively banned from emigrating to cities where they might find food.Footnote 26 Ukrainians were banned from entering the Russian or Belarusian republics.Footnote 27 Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants fleeing their villages in search of food were arrested and deported home.Footnote 28
The Moldavian ASSR, like much of the Soviet Union, was hit by the grain procurement crisis of 1928.Footnote 29 Collectivisation began shortly afterwards, exposing the local authorities to the fact that their power barely extended into the region’s many remote villages. Dekulakisation followed. The number of kulak households in the region fell from 3176 (2.7 per cent of households) in 1929 to 2325 (1.8 per cent) in 1930.Footnote 30 The dry summer of 1931 led to crop failure and the wet autumn destroyed much of the remaining harvest. But the grain procurement plans remained high and the transformation of self-sufficient villages into unproductive collective farms continued. By early 1932, famine had set in.Footnote 31 Comrade Sirno – the Secretary of the Moldavian Oblast Committee of the CP(b)U – attended the now-famous 3rd All-Ukrainian Party Conference of July 1932, where delegates warned that the impossibly high grain quotas would exacerbate the already existing state of famine. But the quotas remained high, which ensured the continuation of the famine into 1933 and 1934.Footnote 32
OGPU agents first recorded ‘aspirations to move to the Right Bank [of the Dniester]’ in their ‘special reports on the mood of the peasantry’ in March 1930.Footnote 33 But most peasants did not yet resort to crossing. Instead, from the 4–6 March, the region was rocked by bab’i bunty – women’s uprisings against collectivisation.Footnote 34 In Nezavertailovca, a village of around 6000 inhabitants, over 400 women revolted for an entire day. They freed 40 collectivised horses and rescued two imprisoned kulaks.Footnote 35 The revolt fizzled out during the evening, but events like this continued throughout the year.
Awareness of the superior conditions in Bessarabia grew over time. On 21 November a group of peasants in the village of Bâcioc heard music across the river in Bessarabia, prompting a peasant to complain that ‘the peasants in Bessarabia are better off, they have multiple pairs of trousers and boots while our peasants are barefooted in winter and nobody cares’.Footnote 36 A similar incident occurred in the village of Butuceni. Ivan Funtika, while being arrested for hoarding bread, pointed across the river and shouted ‘life is good in Bessarabia! People live and have fun! But here’s it’s just torment!’.Footnote 37 An OGPU report from 21 December 1930 noted an increase in the number of peasants aspiring to flee to Romania. During the seizure of surplus wine from her father, a woman named Maria warned the OGPU agents: ‘it’s a pity that there is no ice on the Dniester. As soon as the Dniester freezes, I’m moving to the other side’.Footnote 38
Peasants began employing the threat of begging the Bessarabians for food or defecting across the river during protests, seemingly hoping to provoke concessions. On 8 January 1931, 150 peasants, predominantly women, surrounded the building of the Slobozia region’s Central Election Commission, chanting ‘give us bread, we’re starving!’.Footnote 39 A member of the Commission named Dominic Muntian joined the protestors. Addressing the crowd, he shouted ‘follow me to the bank of the Dniester! There we will ask the Romanians to save us from starvation’.Footnote 40 A similar revolt occurred on 28 January. This time the crowd, now 300-strong, again surrounded the Commission building and chanted ‘give us bread, we are starving! If you don’t give us bread, then we’ll go and smash the grain warehouses or we’ll go to the bank of the Dniester to beg the Romanians to save us from starvation!’.Footnote 41 Unlike the bab’i bunty of early 1930, these protests demonstrated knowledge of the better material conditions in Bessarabia and seemingly of geopolitics – they expected that Soviet officials did not want them to expose their conditions to Bessarabians and presumably hoped for concessions as a result. When it became clear that concessions were not forthcoming, significant numbers of crossings began. In a single week that January the OGPU recorded 22 families fleeing across the Dniester from the Slobozia region.Footnote 42 This wave of crossings was ultimately limited by the short, mild winter and patchy river ice impeded individuals’ ability to cross (Table 1).
River ice in early 1931Footnote 43

Table 1 Long description
River ice thickness in centimeters is listed for four locations from 1 January through 1 March. Camenca stays at 0 cm through 21 January, rises to 23 cm on 1 February, remains near 20 to 21 cm through 21 February, then returns to 0 cm by 1 March. Dubăsari increases steadily from 10 cm on 1 January to 27 cm on 21 February, then drops to 0 cm on 1 March. Tiraspol records 10 cm on 1 January, 0 cm on 11 January, 14 cm on 21 January, has missing values for February dates, and is 0 cm on 1 March. Krasnye Mayaki shows 15 cm on 1 January, 0 cm on 11 and 21 January, rises to 22 cm on 1 February and peaks at 33 cm on 11 February, has a missing value on 21 February, and is 0 cm on 1 March. Overall, the thickest ice occurs in February, with several gaps marked as not available that limit comparisons for some dates and sites.
Peasants could only take advantage of between 10 and 20 days of thick ice. In early 1932, however, there was a prolonged cold snap, which facilitated sustained mass crossings throughout March (Table 2).
River ice in early 1932Footnote 44

Table 2 Long description
Ice thickness in centimeters is listed for four river locations from 1 January through 21 March, with readings about every ten days. Dubăsari (north) is consistently thickest, increasing from 27 cm on 1 January to 37 cm on 1 March and staying near 36 cm through 21 March. Camenca (far north) remains fairly steady around 28 to 32 cm in January and February, then declines to 22 cm by 21 March. Tiraspol (south) starts with no ice on 1 January, reaches 22 cm by 1 February, drops to 10 cm by 21 February, and has no data reported for March dates. Krasnye Mayaki (far south) is highly variable, falling from 11 cm on 1 January to 0 cm on 21 January and 1 February, then rising sharply to 34 cm by 11 March before dropping to 21 cm on 21 March. Overall, northern sites show thicker and more sustained ice than southern sites, but comparisons for March at Tiraspol are limited by missing values.
Crossing West – 8 March 1932
In this section, I will focus on a few specific cases to illustrate the dynamics of westward migration. Westward crossings peaked on 8 March, when the OGPU recorded 98 attempts. 8 March was the warmest day in weeks and the temperature peaked at 1.8°C.Footnote 45 Perhaps this relative warming prompted the exodus as the peasants feared that the ice would soon melt, cutting them off from Bessarabia once again. The day began with an attempted crossing from Tiraspol at 7am. Ivan Barba, ‘the son of a kulak’ was caught ‘trying to cross to the right bank’.Footnote 46 Early in the evening in the village of Speia, OGPU agents caught Mikhail Kozhukharii, his wife and their child ‘preparing to cross to the right bank’. The family was arrested.Footnote 47 At 11pm in the village of Delacau, a group of 26 peasants attempted to cross the river. They walked ‘carefully’ across the ice. A border guard patrol nearby spotted the group and shouted at them to freeze. The group splintered and started running towards Bessarabia. The guards opened fire. Seven members of the group were killed, including a 13-year-old girl and a 7-year-old boy. Another couple lost their only child in the shooting, while another three children were left orphaned. Of the 19 survivors, 16 were caught and arrested; only three of the original group of 26 made it to Bessarabia.Footnote 48 Around the same time, in the village of Hlinaia, the Zinoviev family, Danil, Iustina and their children Ivan and Aleksandra, ‘were caught trying to cross to the right bank’.Footnote 49 Around midnight, border guard Shinkarevskii ‘came upon a group of [border] violators numbering 18 people trying to cross to the right bank’ in the Korotnianski flood plains. The ethnically mixed group contained Ukrainians, Moldavians and Jews who seemed to be caring for a Moldavian orphan. Sofron Sokolan, one of the would-be crossers, disappeared into the flood plains, but was shot and killed by an adjacent detachment of border guards. The remaining 17 were caught and arrested, including Sokolan’s wife and two children.Footnote 50
In Rybnitsa, Safron Stadnik crossed successfully with his wife and their three children.Footnote 51 Another family of five, the Ostapovs, also crossed from Rybnitsa.Footnote 52 In the village of Tirnauca, one unknown individual made it across.Footnote 53 Groups of three successfully crossed from Rascova, Ghidirim and Tabuleuca.Footnote 54 In Speia a group of 16 peasants split in two groups to break through the demarcation line at two separate points, seemingly as a tactic to maximise their chances of success. All 16 made it to Bessarabia.Footnote 55 In the Slobozia region, Anna Manor and her two children sprinted across the ice and were shot at by a guard named Shumov’shii. One of the children was shot and ‘heavily wounded’, but they all made it across.Footnote 56 In Cioburciu, the seven-strong Narkos family successfully crossed.Footnote 57
Of the 568 crossing attempts recorded by the OGPU between 28 February and 4 April 1932, only 60 were made by individuals, while 508 were in groups. Most groups were pairs or nuclear family units of between three and seven people. Pairs were typically siblings like the Kovrig brothers, ‘speculators’, who escaped from Tiraspol on 7 March, or the Iamargarivii brothers, who were just 10 and 8 when they were caught on 29 March.Footnote 58 There were also sisters, like the two teenage Bilenko girls who were caught mid-crossing on 17 March, as well as couples like Avksentii Sakharov and his wife, who tried to cross near Cioburciu on 11 March.Footnote 59
The most common group format was the family. In March 1932, families ran across the ice together – like the five Stadniks or the five Ostapovs.Footnote 60 The seven-strong Dubailo family successfully crossed in early March as well.Footnote 61 The nine-strong Baranov family were less lucky – they were caught and arrested on 1 April at 5am.Footnote 62 In the summer, families had to improvise to ensure that their children would not drown while swimming. Peasants often disassembled their modest village huts to construct rafts out of the material. For example, on 3 June, Peter Konstantinov, his wife and their four children crossed the river together at night. They had fashioned a raft from the front door of their home in the village of Cioburciu; the four children sat on the raft while Peter and his wife swam alongside it, pushing it as they went.Footnote 63 One week later in Slobozia, Andron Foshk and his family (all of whom were suffering from kwashiorkor, as the report into the incident noted, they were ‘swollen from starvation’) were arrested for attempting the same thing.Footnote 64 On 26 June at midday, a group of border guards in Cioburciu found ‘a large crate’.Footnote 65 Their investigation eventually established that Grigorii Vornik, a local middle-peasant had successfully crossed the river in the crate with his five children.Footnote 66
Families were often separated by the border. On 19 March, a 70-year-old kulak called Vasilii Kaftan was caught crossing with two children of a friend who had already crossed – the family had been hoping to reunite in Bessarabia.Footnote 67 On 24 June, the border guards found a woman attempting to cross on a raft at 11pm. Her husband had built it for her and crossed the day before; she was attempting to reunite with him.Footnote 68 They probably never saw each other again. On 15 June at 1am, a patrol in the Hlinaia area spotted Emelian Guzin and Sekleteia Koksha swimming across the Dniester. One of the guards shouted at them to stop. They kept swimming and he began firing. Sekleteia swam back to the Soviet bank and was captured; Emelian kept swimming. The guard kept shooting, but could not hit him due to a heavy fog, despite being only 70 metres away.Footnote 69 He made it across, but at 8pm the next day, Emelian swam back and was captured. He did not want to escape without Sekleteia.Footnote 70
The OGPU recognised the centrality of family units in the exodus. As crossings accelerated in March 1932, they began conducting raids on the houses of families allegedly preparing to flee and arresting the fathers in the hope that this would prevent or deter the rest of the family from crossing. For example, on 10 March in the village of Speia, ten men – all ‘heads of families’ – were taken from their homes in the night and arrested for ‘intending to emigrate to the right bank’.Footnote 71 It is unclear if the measure was successful. On 2 April, a border guard named Kirilovyi noticed three women and a boy crossing the ice near Speia. He shouted at them and the group splintered off in different directions across the river. Kirilovyi unleashed his dog Venger and ‘opened fire on them with his rifle’.Footnote 72 Vasilisa Lupulova and Evgeniia Samoilova were heavily injured; Evdokiia Bernover and her son Zakharii were killed.Footnote 73 No additional details are given in the case report, but the group could easily have been victims of the raid in Speia that occurred a few weeks before their attempted crossing.
Rumours about the better conditions in Bessarabia and the possibility of crossing the river often spread through families. In March 1932, the OGPU conducted surveys of peasants arrested for attempting to cross the border. Yakov Vasil’ev Burdiuta, from the ‘Dawn of Moldavia’ collective farm (kolkhoz) in Nezavertailovca, crossed after his brother told him that in Bessarabia farmers were paid in bread every day, unlike in their kolkhoz, where they received nothing.Footnote 74 Burdiuta told his fellow kolkhoznik Viktor Alekseev Fortun, who was convinced, and left with him.Footnote 75
The family unit was central to the crossing phenomenon. Information about crossings spread through families, and the majority of crossings were planned and carried out by families. The OGPU recognised this fact and attempted to deter crossings by separating families, but it is doubtful that this measure worked given the prevalence of lone women crossing with children in areas where this measure was implemented. Parents went to extraordinary lengths to protect their children. Sometimes they left their children in the care of trusted friends and crossed alone to make sure it was safe with the aim of reuniting later. Sometimes they built rafts for their young children who could not swim and pushed them across the river.
Tactics: Rumours, Cross-Border Networks, Geography
The OGPU correlated border crossings with rumours as soon as they first recorded significant numbers of crossings in January 1931. That month, an OGPU report noted that ‘you can see groups of peasants talking about life in Bessarabia, they say that life is much better in Bessarabia, that there is cheap bread, there is no hunger’.Footnote 76 In another report from September 1932, the newly installed head of the Moldavian OGPU sought to explain the crossing phenomenon. Whilst primarily blaming ‘the prospect of famine’, he also blamed rumours ‘about a better life in Bessarabia’.Footnote 77 In particular, the rumour that peasants who fled to Bessarabia were sometimes given their own gardens to farm.Footnote 78
Lynne Viola argued that rumours became a trusted source of information across the Soviet Union as an alternative to state-sanctioned knowledge.Footnote 79 Peasants in the Moldavian ASSR, however, could try to confirm rumours by communicating across the river with Soviet refugees and Romanian border guards. The aforementioned OGPU head’s report describes ‘frequent communication between former residents of the Slobozia region who fled to Bessarabia’ with their counterparts in the Moldavian ASSR, as well as Romanian soldiers who facilitated cross-river communication.Footnote 80 He gave the following example:
On 14 August [1932], three Romanian soldiers brought a group of refugees from Cioburciu who fled to Bessarabia last winter, dressed in festive clothes. They [the refugees] turned to the residents of Cioburciu who were swimming by the left bank and called on them to cross over, shouting: “are you still alive, fulfilling your quotas? Better come to us – we live well and they don’t requisition anything from us!”.Footnote 81
In this case, villagers validated rumours about the superior conditions in Bessarabia by communicating across the Dniester. These cross-border networks seem to have encouraged crossings and, in some cases, they even saved lives. At 7pm on the 19 June 1932, a Soviet guard named Nichvolod saw a Romanian guard and a man shouting at each other across the river, around 600 metres from his position. As Nichvolod approached the man, the Romanian guard began shouting to warn him that Nichvolod was approaching. The unknown man ‘immediately fled and disappeared’.Footnote 82 Nichvolod shot at him and later found traces of blood on the ground, but the unknown man was never caught.Footnote 83 This kind of communication was common. Just two days later Soviet guards recorded two Romanian soldiers shouting across the river: ‘if you have a peasant government, why don’t they let the peasants come to us? Come to us, it’s better here!’.Footnote 84 If OGPU reports are to be believed, Bessarabians even provided material assistance to those who attempted the crossing. On 1 June, two families – the Babaks and the Shevchenkos – sailed to Bessarabia in a raft.Footnote 85 According to ‘unverified information’ obtained by the OGPU, the raft was ‘provided to them from the right bank’.Footnote 86
Those who made the crossing also utilised knowledge of their surroundings to travel to areas where the course of the river was narrower or where there were fewer guards.Footnote 87 They learnt to cross under cover of darkness late at night or early in the morning – only 65 crossings took place in daylight.Footnote 88 Peasants who worked along the river were able to exploit their familiarity with the natural environment. On 8 March, a group of six peasants crossed in broad daylight while they were working in the flood plains removing reeds. They snuck through the reeds and across the river in the middle of the day.Footnote 89 Tactics changed after the river ice melted. There were no crossing attempts between 3–26 April 1932 because there was no ice to walk across and it was still too cold to risk swimming. There were then sporadic swimming attempts until the end of the archival record in late June 1932, when hundreds began to swim across. Families, particularly those with young children, crossed on rafts.
Soviet peasants – by seeking and spreading information about Bessarabia, by utilising cross-border networks and by utilising their knowledge of the local geography – developed a sophisticated understanding of their predicament and how to escape from it.
State-sponsored Antisemitism, the Great Depression and the Soviet Pull – Why Migrate East?
The eastward migration of Bessarabian Jews to Soviet Ukraine is little-known. Scholars of Jewish migration have traditionally focussed on migration to the United States and Mandatory Palestine, and more recently to Latin America and China.Footnote 90 Scholars of Jewish migration and Soviet borders alike have tended to assume that Soviet borders were impenetrable to illegal migration.Footnote 91 At first glance, it might seem unusual that people sought to migrate to Soviet Ukraine during a period of famine and repression. But Bessarabian Jews in interwar Romania had to contend with official and popular antisemitism, high unemployment and the rise of far-right paramilitaries, while Soviet propaganda – and to some extent Soviet reality – promised a brighter future for Jews. While Romania had nominally agreed to protect its minority populations in exchange for international recognition of its expanded post-First World War borders, the 1923 constitution denied enfranchisement to 80,000 Romanian Jews, the majority of whom lived in Bessarabia.Footnote 92 Antisemitism was widespread among the Romanian elite and bolstered by the emerging popularity of eugenics.Footnote 93 Meanwhile, Romanian state institutions such as the police, the army and local administrations bolstered antisemitism ‘by presenting many of Romania’s social, economic, and political dysfunctions as results of Jewish exploitation’.Footnote 94 Many Jews felt that Bessarabia was a tinderbox: rumours of impending pogroms were omnipresent and the 1920s and 30s saw sporadic outbursts of anti-Jewish violence.Footnote 95
The Great Depression made matters worse. Between 1929 and 1933, the net national income fell by over 37 per cent, industrial output slumped, urban unemployment skyrocketed and the banking system collapsed.Footnote 96 The Romanian Government’s response prioritised ethnic Romanians over minorities, who were increasingly politically isolated.Footnote 97 Over the course of the 1930s, Romanianisation policies excluded non-Romanian speakers from withdrawing pensions, entering universities and practicing law.Footnote 98 The economic crisis bolstered the antisemitic, fascist Iron Guard paramilitary, as well various parliamentary antisemitic and far-right forces. In 1935, the National Agrarian Party and the National-Christian Defence League – both explicitly antisemitic – merged to form the National Christian Party, which entered government in 1937. Bessarabian Jews responded to these crises in different ways. Many embraced Zionist groups and made Aliyah.Footnote 99 Others, however, saw their chance for salvation not in Palestine, but in Ukraine.
Jewish achievements in the Soviet state were real. Between 1918 and 1921, at least 100,000 Jews had been massacred in pogroms on the territory of what became the Second Polish Republic, Soviet Ukraine and the southwestern parts of Soviet Russia.Footnote 100 The Bolsheviks, despite having occasionally participated in the antisemitic attacks, restored order and imposed a state monopoly on violence after their victory in the Civil War, ending the wave of anti-Jewish terror. Some Jews flocked to the Bolsheviks as a survival strategy; others embraced them and found positions in the Bolshevik legal structures and secret police to seek justice.Footnote 101 Communist Jews could gain positions of power and influence through the Yevsektsiyas, the ‘Jewish sections’ of the Communist Party, which promoted the use of Yiddish in the Communist Party, established Yiddish schools, published Yiddish newspapers, promoted the inclusion of Jews in the Red Army, and founded Jewish agricultural colonies and communes.Footnote 102 For the first time in this part of the world, Jews entered government in significant numbers.Footnote 103 To be sure, many Jews regarded the Yevsektsiya as an attempt to deprive Jews of autonomy.Footnote 104 And, while some achievements were made in improving the material condition of Jews on the Soviet side of the Dniester in the 1920s, religious Jews and Zionists were heavily repressed by the OGPU.Footnote 105 These facts, however, may not have been accessible to the average Bessarabian Jew. Even if they were, Bessarabian Jews may have been willing to take their chances.
The combination of real problems for Jews in Bessarabia and real Jewish achievements in the Soviet Union laid fertile ground for Soviet propaganda in Bessarabia. The Soviet Union sponsored a ‘Society of Bessarabians’ to promote the future annexation of the region.Footnote 106 They published a newspaper, Krasnaia Bessarabia (Red Bessarabia), which advocated for revolution in Bessarabia and inspired acts of sabotage and uprisings against Romanian rule.Footnote 107 The OGPU were also active in Bessarabia, although the scope and nature of their activities have been notoriously hard to ascertain. The Romanian police archives are replete with arrest warrants for communists allegedly acting on behalf of the Soviet state.Footnote 108 OGPU documents also refer to the activities of their agents in Bessarabia. One OGPU directive from January 1933 describes ‘the additional deployment of cross-border agents to organise the return of emigrants’.Footnote 109 The phrase ‘additional deployment’ implies that agents like these had long been active in Bessarabia.
Crossing East – 9 March 1932
In this section, I will focus on a few specific cases to examine the dynamics of eastward migration. On 9 March, the notorious people smuggler Petre Teodor – who had evaded capture by Romanian police on several occasions – led four Jewish men from Chișinău down to the banks of the Dniester near the city of Tighina.Footnote 110 The report of what happened next, filed the next day and sent to the office of the ‘General Inspector of Police and Security’ in Bessarabia, reads: ‘caught by border guards and ordered to stop, the four young men surrendered, while the smuggler attempted to flee and was shot’.Footnote 111 Teodor was then captured and taken into custody.
On the same night, Iosif and Dușca Volman, Boris Gurfinchel, Malta Pitcov and Gigins Pecea, all from Chișinău, attempted to cross the Dniester near the village of Lipceni. They were spotted by border guards and warned to stop. The first four complied, but Pecea fled and was ‘fatally shot’.Footnote 112 As such, ‘the Border Guard Prosecutor’s Office was notified and they requested a delegation from the Military Prosecutor’s Office to begin an investigation’ (see Figure 2).Footnote 113
Photo of Iosif Volman and Boris Gurfinkel after their Capture by Romanian Border Guards.

Like their Soviet peasant counterparts, Bessarabian Jews capitalised on the freezing of the Dniester and relied on cross-border networks (in the form of people-smugglers who transported them from Chișinău to the border and helped them across). The case from 1 March in the introduction of this article is illustrative and left a rich paper trail.
The Case of the Two Ivans
At the time of his arrest, Ivan Siomov was 21 years old. He was an ethnic Russian, born in Tighina, then in the Russian Empire. He was illiterate, only spoke Russian and had no prior criminal record.Footnote 114 Ivan Visciun was also 21 years old. He was an ethnic Romanian, born in Chișinău, then in the Russian Empire. He had a full-time job as a carpenter. He had completed several years of school and spoke Romanian and Russian.Footnote 115
When the two Ivans were arrested, they were found with 214 Romanian lei and a budget allocating 34 lei for food, 10 lei for a tram ticket in Chișinău, 96 lei for a train ticket from Tighina back to Chișinău and 74 lei spare. Siomov was carrying his identity document, two copies of a ‘Russian [sic] newspaper’ and a copy of the Dimineața (Morning) newspaper from 1 March. Viscuin was carrying his identity papers, a conscription order and a corresponding enlistment certificate and the two bedsheets they had used to conceal themselves during their smuggling operation.Footnote 116
Upon their arrest, the two Ivans tried to mislead the border guards who arrested them, concocting a story about ‘Șmif Fangherș’ – a local warehouse owner who was supposed to pay them. The police followed this lead and discovered that Fangherș did not exist.Footnote 117 When pressed, the two Ivans implicated a cast of characters, who gave the following testimonies.
Hiușa, whose real name was Ilia Croinștut, was a 31-year-old photographer from Chișinău. Two weeks before the two Ivans were arrested, his friend Volodya Faermann came to his studio and told him that he had arranged an illegal crossing to the Soviet Union. Volodya was nervous and he asked Hiușa to accompany him to meet the woman who had agreed to take the payment for the crossing. Hiușa happened to know the woman in question – Reiza Ciocler. Volodya outlined the plot to Hiușa: (I) Volodya would pay Reiza for the crossing, (II) Reiza would find a people-smuggler, (III) the smuggler would arrange the crossing, (IV) on the river bank, Volodya would pass the smuggler a handkerchief and a password, which he would give to Reiza in order to receive the payment. Volodya asked Hiușa to check that Reiza received the handkerchief and password, and then to tell his parents that the crossing had been a success. Together they went to Reiza’s house, where Reiza agreed to tell Hiușa once she had received the handkerchief and password.Footnote 118
Unprompted, Hiușa then told his interrogators that, a week before Volodya showed up asking him to accompany him to Reiza, his friend Sioma Caufman – a soldier on leave – came to his photography studio and paid him to copy and enlarge a photo of his platoon and then give it to his platoon sergeant. Hiușa never got round to making the copy. Two days after Volodya crossed into Soviet Ukraine, Sioma’s sister turned up at his studio and asked if he had seen Sioma, who had been missing for two days. Hiușa then told the police: ‘hearing this, I was immediately convinced that Sioma had also gone to Russia [sic] with Volodya Faermann. I don’t know the third young man who left with them’.Footnote 119 He continued: ‘I do not know how much money was deposited for the crossing with Reiza Ciocler and I did not see if she gave the money to the smugglers’.Footnote 120
In Hiușa’s telling, he was merely a concerned friend of both Volodya and Sioma. He knew that Volodya was planning to cross but had no role in the plot. He agreed to accompany Volodya to Reiza – who he characterised as a local Jewish criminal who dealt with these matters – and to check that the crossing had succeeded so he could tell Volodya’s parents. The police did not press charges against Hiușa.
Two weeks before the crossings, Reiza Ciocler, a 31-year-old Jewish housewife and mother of four, was sitting at home at 104 Old Armenian Street, Chișinău.Footnote 121 An acquaintance of hers, Hiușa, showed up at her house with a man she characterised as a ‘stranger’. According to Reiza, Hiușa asked her to help them find a smuggler to smuggle three young men across the Dniester. Reiza complied and, later that day, she happened to bump into Petre Siomov – a well-known people-smuggler – to whom she pitched the mission. Petre demurred, saying that he was ‘very busy’, but that he would happily pass the case on to his brother Ivan. Reiza and Ivan agreed that the crossing would take place at night on 29 February.Footnote 122
According to Reiza, Hiușa paid her 3,000 lei and gave her the following instructions: she was to give the money to Ivan Siomov, but only after he presented her with a handkerchief and a password. Ivan was to be given the handkerchief and the password after the successful completion of the crossing, thus entitling him to the payment. The password was ‘slovo platocic’.Footnote 123
As it was, Ivan Siomov was caught and arrested. Then, on Friday 4 March, two women turned up at 104 Old Armenian Street. Reiza described these women as the two Ivans’ sisters.Footnote 124 The two women handed Reiza a handkerchief and told her the password. Reiza, having expected Ivan, refused to hand over the money. Three days later, Petre Siomov – Reiza’s initial choice of smuggler and Ivan’s brother – turned up at Reiza’s house, complete with handkerchief and password. Reiza again refused to hand over the payment, until she eventually decided to check with the mother of one of the men who had crossed, who agreed that in Ivan’s absence the payment could be made to Petre. She handed over the money and Petre left.Footnote 125
In Reiza’s telling, she was a simple housewife. She characterised Hiușa as the main facilitator of the crossing. She did not offer an explanation as to why Hiușa would ask her if she knew any smugglers, or how she did in fact know a smuggler. Nonetheless, the police did not press charges against Reiza.
Ivan Visciun’s wife Iulia was brought in for questioning. Iulia was an unemployed, 19-year-old housewife who lived with Ivan in Visterniceni, a northern suburb of Chișinău. She professed ignorance about the nature of her husband’s work. Iulia told the police that she went to meet her husband at Chișinău railway station after he returned from a trip to Tighina. She was accompanied by Ivan’s sister Olga and Ivan Siomov’s sister. To Iulia’s surprise, the two Ivans arrived under a police escort, having been arrested. They nonetheless managed to slip Iulia the handkerchief and tell her the password.Footnote 126
Iulia tried to take the handkerchief to her brother-in-law Petre, but she could not find him. She did, however, find his wife Polca. Seemingly clued in, Polca took Iulia to see Reiza, who, as we know from Reiza’s testimony, refused to hand over the payment to the two women. Several days later, as Reiza testified, the women returned to Reiza with Petre, and, after Reiza checked with the parents of one of the men who had been smuggled, the money was at last handed over. Petre, in turn, gave Iulia 1100 lei. According to her police interview, she spent 700 lei on legal debts and 400 lei on food. At the end of her testimony she added, unprompted, ‘when my husband Ivan Visciun left to cross the Dniester into Russia [sic] with some young men, I did not know anything about it because he had kept it secret from me’.Footnote 127 The police did not press charges against Iulia.
As one might expect, the testimonies contradict one another and do not reveal the full details of the Babelesque plot. According to Hiușa, Volodya had pre-arranged to meet Reiza, who had promised an introduction to a smuggler. According to Reiza, Hiușa proposed the crossing to her and she happened to encounter a smuggler by chance. They both claimed to be merely performing favours for friends and acquaintances. Iulia pleaded ignorance, but what did she think she was collecting a payment for? The OGPU failed to intercept the three men once they crossed and there is no record of what happened to them in the Soviet Union.
The detective in charge of the case, Ștefănescu, wrote up his final report on 23 March and asked the Royal Chief Commissioner to press charges against the two Ivans.Footnote 128 Their crime was ‘facilitating the illegal crossing of three young Jewish individuals over the Dniester River into Ukraine’.Footnote 129 Ștefănescu cannot have believed all of the testimonies because they contradict each other on multiple points. Maybe he just did not care. After all, Hiușa, Reiza and Iulia merely connected people and held and collected payments – they never even left Chișinău. The two Ivans, on the other hand, had been caught red-handed on the border aiding people that the Romanian state would likely have regarded as communist subversives.
The eastward crossers, like their Soviet peasant counterparts, sought to escape from their predicament, and they utilised non-state sanctioned knowledge (in the form of an informal network connecting would-be migrants to people-smugglers), the freezing of the Dniester and cross-border networks to do so. But there were also significant differences between the two crossing phenomena. Bessarabian Jews, predominantly based in the region’s urban centres, lacked the firsthand knowledge of the river valley that the Soviet peasants employed to great effect. The eastward crossers therefore relied on people-smugglers to act as intermediaries – taking them down to the river and providing guidance and material assistance to cross.
Conclusion
Between 28 February and 4 April, the OGPU recorded 568 westward crossing attempts. The archival record continues until 26 June, during which time there were a further 163 attempts. If the account of Donald Hall – an English travel writer who visited the region in the summer of 1932 – is to be believed, then these numbers are just the tip of the iceberg. In Tighina, Hall’s fixer told him that ‘last winter [1931–2] in this district alone about a thousand escaped’.Footnote 130 The Prefect of Tighina told Hall that ‘there must be about a hundred thousand [Soviet refugees] in different parts of Romania’.Footnote 131
References to the eastward crossings are few and far between. While the Soviet archival record contains only 82 cases, there certainly will have been more. This little-known wave of migration challenges previous assumptions about chronologies of in-migration to the Soviet Union and the migration behaviour of Jews in interwar Europe.
Prior to the Moldovan archival revolution, tactics of informal migration in and out of the Soviet Union were largely hidden. The Moldovan archives provide a unique case where sources from the Soviet Union can be read side-by-side with sources from a neighbouring non-Soviet country. But this does not mean that the stories in this article are unique. On the contrary, it is doubtless that similar phenomena occurred on all of the Soviet Union’s riverine borders. The Moldovan archives, therefore, provide a window onto the whole Soviet Union, allowing for microhistories with Soviet-wide implications.
Taken together, the two waves of migration reveal that the border between the Soviet Union and the Kingdom of Romania was porous at a time when scholars have often assumed that out-migration was exceptional and in-migration was non-existent. While histories of migration often fall back on grand narratives of persecution and pre-planned and well-informed migration decisions, the case studies in this article show how migration could also be opportunistic and shaped by local conditions as simple as the weather, the ability to access information about life across a border, and personal connections to people who could facilitate illegal border crossings. People’s interactions with the border were shaped by the physical geography of the border, the climate, and the networks of people that spanned it, rather than the political systems and contexts on either side of it.
Donald Hall wrote that ‘the river seemed to separate two worlds’.Footnote 132 On the contrary, the river between worlds was crossed many times.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Igor Cașu for facilitating the archival research this article is based on, Roxana Diochețanu for help translating Romanian language source material, and Paula Chan, Zbig Wojnowski, and Olga Khomenko for encouragement, guidance, and feedback. Any mistakes are my own.
