The variation in welfare-state systems among the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) continues to fascinate political scientists. One reason is that the variation is so great, regarding both size and institutional configurations. After all, these countries are competing in the same globalized market economy, and despite the increased globalization and extended periods with less economic growth, the differences have become more profound. The three books under review all address this puzzle, especially how welfare states have managed to adapt to the quite dramatic changes in demographic, economic, and social conditions during the last decades.
Silja Häusermann's The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe deals with pension reforms in France, Germany, and Switzerland between 1970 and 2004. Seen from the perspective of existing theories, both the policy area and the countries she compares are excellent choices, since it has been argued that these states in particular, with their entrenched political institutions, would have difficulties adapting to problems such as falling economic growth and demographic changes. Stakeholder groups (which are especially strong when it comes to pensions) would prevent necessary changes, making these systems economically dysfunctional.
Häusermann's analysis directly challenges several of the most dominant theories in this field, such as the well-known power-resource theory and theories that have pointed to the stability of institutions. The latter would predict that “insiders” would use their institutionally entrenched power to prevent resources being channeled to “outsiders.” The author shows that in these three countries, reforms have instead benefited groups—the young, the low skilled, and people with atypical employment—whose power has been much less institutionalized. The power-resource theory would predict that changes should have followed the established left–right class-based dimension in politics. But she shows that this is not the case. Using a sophisticated and original methodological approach, which combines an impressive amount of quantitative and qualitative data, she shows that centrally placed reform agents have been able to build cross-class alliances and utilize what she defines as the “multidimensionality” of conflicts in which not only class but also issues about gender and various skill levels within the traditional working class have become important. To this she adds the importance of value changes, such as individualization and how single-parents (usually mothers) are viewed.
Contrary to much quantitative work, Häusserman does not just assume the preferences of political parties, unions, and employers' organizations. Instead, she has meticulously coded the central actors' positions on all 36 pension reforms that took place in these countries between 1970 and 2004. This allows her to actually analyze how policy reforms have been possible and how reformers have been able to create new and often surprising alliances by exploiting the multidimensionality of interests and values. By analyzing documents and interviewing 20 representatives of the major organizations, Häusermann is able to methodically capture agents' positional changes over time. One of the main results is that the level of change in these pension systems has been quite intense, which is contrary to the general picture of rigidity that has characterized the welfare-state systems in “Bismarckian” welfare states such as France and Germany. The reforms seem largely to have been driven by a logic of modernization intended to make the pension systems more compatible with overall structural changes in these societies. In a nutshell, Häusermann's theoretically sophisticated analysis shows that even in “the least likely cases,” democratic politics works, allowing the system to make necessary adaptions, even in a highly entrenched and institutionalized policy area such as pensions.
Mark Vail's Recasting Welfare Capitalism covers the same period as Häusermann's book and, with the exception of Switzerland, also covers the same countries. It is not focused on a specific policy area but covers a broader spectrum of welfare-state policies, including social insurance, antipoverty programs, and labor market policy. Methodologically, this book is more traditional and builds mainly on the existing literature.
Vail's main question is how France and Germany have managed to adapt their respective welfare state systems when the general economic conditions have changed from prosperity to austerity. Like Häusermann's, his main “bête noire” is the theory that these welfare states should be characterized as “frozen” and lack the ability to change and adapt. Vail refutes this view by showing that the welfare-state policy landscape has been marked by an impressive reform capacity. Like Häusermann, he shows that to a surprising extent, these new reforms have benefited groups that have a weak standing in the political system.
One of Vail's most interesting conclusions is that in order to be able to change and adapt, the traditionally “dirigiste” French state has had to engage to a great degree in negotiations with interest groups, while the traditionally more consensual and neocorporatist German state has had to become more conflict oriented. To explain this pattern, he operates with a very broad theory that includes formal and informal institutions, coalitions, established norms, new ideas, traditional power configurations, structurally induced incentives, and opportunity structures. The problem is that such a broad net makes it difficult to assess the weight of these variables in explaining the changes that have taken place. As the author states, his book demonstrates that “economic adjustment is driven by shifting political dynamics, coalitions, and bargaining structures that vary from one political-economic context to another” (p. 162). One may ask how it could be otherwise.
The third book under review, Transformations of the Welfare State, which has no fewer than six authors, takes up almost the same theme for the same period as the two books previously discussed. The argument for choosing “small states” is that they can be seen as “inherently vulnerable” to economic changes in the world market and to “socio-economic modernization” (p. 1). This motivation for choosing small states is somewhat strange since several earlier studies, starting with Peter Katzenstein's influential Small States in World Markets (1985), have shown that “smallness” makes it easier for central agents both to effectively represent broad interests and to reach “win-win” compromises with other interest organizations and representatives of the state. The stronger argument of Herbert Obinger and his colleagues is that the existing literature regards four states as exemplifying three distinct welfare-state models, namely, the stratified “Bismarckian” continental model (Austria), the universal social democratic model (Denmark), and the liberal-residual model (New Zealand and Switzerland).
Two theories they set out to test are neo-liberalism and neo-Marxism. While in many ways very different, when it comes to the modern welfare state both theories have presented almost identical predictions, namely, that increased global economic competition will “induce a downward spiral in benefit provision,” also known as a “race-to-the-bottom” (p. 6). Another theory is that globalization would lead to convergence toward the residual-liberal model. Yet another is that four models are so institutionally entrenched that we should expect stalemate and inability to adapt to the challenges to arise from globalization.
The country chapters offer both rich historical descriptions and detailed analyses of central policy reforms, and the result of their careful work is a refutation of all four theories. First, there is no “race-to-the-bottom” or convergence around a residual model. Austria is still very much in line with the “Bismarckian” model, as is Denmark with the universal social democratic one. It is interesting that Switzerland has changed enough from a residual-liberal pattern to be more like Austria, providing “significantly increased welfare state coverage” (p. 230), while New Zealand has gone in the opposite direction and become more of a residual-liberal welfare state. Second, as pointed out in the two other books under review, an impressive amount of change has occurred, not least in Austria and Denmark. What emerges is something of a paradox, namely, that these two countries change in order to stay the same. For example, to meet increasing demands for individualization, social-provision systems in Denmark now allow for choice of service providers. This is, however, carried out within a system of universal public funding, including quite strict regulations, and thus can be seen as a way to keep the middle class (and a population with increasingly “libertarian” values) loyal to the universal system and thereby willing to pay the comparatively high Danish taxes. The Danish case is an illustration that demands for “freedom of choice and increased user rights” (p. 121) can be satisfied within a universal system. Another main shift in Denmark is from passive (but generous) unemployment insurance to a reactivating labor-market policy.
In the concluding chapters, the authors present more surprising results. One is that despite all the talk about “permanent austerity,” all OECD countries except one increased their public social spending as a percentage of GDP between 1980 and 2005 (the exception is the Netherlands). There is thus clearly something wrong with the “permanent austerity” thesis; not only are these countries much richer now than in 1980, but they also spend a higher percentage of their wealth on public social programs. The book ends with an admittedly speculative conclusion in light of the current economic crisis, namely, that “we have every reason to predict that small countries will also weather the current storm” (p. 276).
These three books all provide interesting and well-informed analyses, as well as thought-provoking results that are highly relevant to both research and policy. In particular, the results from these books put into question the dominance of purely interest-based models of how to explain changes in systems of social protection. Another relevant result is that what may look like profound changes at the meso level of analysis may in fact point to stability at the macro level. At the same time, these books share some weaknesses common to much work in this area.
The first weakness is that the actual agents of change are mysteriously omitted from the analyses. One would like to know who the agents are that present the new policy solutions or create the new “multidimensional” political alliances. Are they leading politicians? Or are they high-level civil servants? Or maybe the leaders of powerful interest organizations? Or experts called in from research institutions? In other words, is this rule by technocrats or by elected politicians or by coalitions of interest organizations?
A second weakness is a strange inattention to the role of voters. More precisely, what is the democratic legitimacy of all these decisions? Are these reforms to be understood as resulting from some kind of “will of the people,” or are voters put in front of a series of “faits accomplis?”
A third problem is that two quite different economic concepts are conflated, namely, expenditures and costs. It is certainly correct to state that universal welfare programs, like Denmark's, will come with high public expenditures. But this is not the same as saying that they lead to high costs, because costs can never be estimated without an analysis of likely costs associated with alternative policies. Take universal public health care. This is undoubtedly a very expensive program. However, because of a problem that in economics is known as “asymmetric information,” we should expect such a program to be far less costly than the provision of similar services through the market. The reason is that in a market system, providers will have a strong incentive to overtreat and overcharge, something the insurance companies cannot handle precisely because of this information problem, which implies that they cannot control what goes on between the providers and patients. More than 20 years ago, Nicholas Barr, one of the few economists who has dealt with this problem, came to the conclusion that these problems of asymmetric information “provide both a theoretical justification of and an explanation for a welfare state which is much more than a safety net. Such a welfare state is justified not simply by redistributive aims one may (or may not) have, but because it does things which markets for technical reasons would either do inefficiently, or would not do at all” (Barr, “Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation,” Journal of Economic Literature, 30 [June 1992]: 741–803; p. 796). This failure to distinguish between expenditures and costs for social programs can explain why the United States has twice the costs for health care as those states with universal health insurance. It may also explain why the world's leading business organization, the World Economic Forum (WEF), in its annual “Global Competitiveness Index,” ranks high public-expenditure welfare states like Denmark and Sweden clearly above most low public-spending liberal-residual welfare states.
My guess is that the WEF may have discovered something that most welfare-state researchers have yet to figure out: that a large part of what modern welfare states produce in terms of social insurance and social services should not be seen as a liability for increased economic prosperity but, instead, as a precondition for a well-functioning and internationally competitive market economy. Like high-quality infrastructure, the rule of law, and investment in mass education and basic research, many welfare-state programs should be understood not as a system for the redistribution of “private goods” but as genuine “public goods” needed to make markets work more effectively.
