Statement from NSC Spokesman Tommy Vietor on the National Security Advisor's visit to Saudi Arabia, October 1, 2011Footnote 1
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon concluded a positive and productive one-day visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today. During his visit to Riyadh, Mr. Donilon met with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud to discuss a broad range of regional political, security, and economic issues of mutual interest. Mr. Donilon commended the King and the Gulf Cooperation Council for their recent statements calling for an end to violence against civilians perpetrated by the Assad regime.
Mr. Donilon and King Abdullah stressed the shared deep and abiding strategic interests that have served as the foundation for the U.S.-Saudi partnership for decades. They expressed satisfaction with the breadth and strength of the bilateral relationship. The United States looks forward to continuing close consultations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the full range of issues of mutual interest.
Remarks by President Obama and Tunisian Prime Minister Essebsi, October 7, 2011Footnote 2
President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi gave these remarks at the White House
President Obama. Well, it is my great pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Caid Essebsi here to the Oval Office.
As I think all of you know, Tunisia was the first country in the North African Middle East region to begin this incredible transformation that we now call the Arab Spring. The movement that began with one street vendor protesting and taking his life in response to a government that had not been responsive to human rights set off a transformation in Tunisia that has now spread to countries throughout the region. As a result, Tunisia has been an inspiration to all of us who believe that each individual, man and woman, has certain inalienable rights, and that those rights must be recognized in a government that is responsive, is democratic, in which free and fair elections can take place, and in which the rights of minorities are protected.
We are deeply encouraged by the progress that's already been made in this short period of time. In part, because of the extraordinary leadership of the Prime Minister, what we've seen is a orderly process that includes constituent assembly elections this month, that will include the writing of a constitution and fair and free elections both for a new parliament and a new President.
So given that Tunisia was the first country to undergo the transformation we know as the Arab Spring, and given it is now the first to have elections, we thought it was appropriate that Tunisia would be the first to visit the White House.
The Prime Minister and I had an excellent discussion about both the opportunities and the challenges that Tunisia faces going forward and how the United States can be a helpful partner in that process. In particular, we discussed the importance of having a economic transformation that has taken place alongside the political transformation.
The United States has an enormous stake in seeing the success in Tunisia and the creation of greater opportunity and more business investment in Tunisia. And so in addition to the $39 million that we have already provided in assistance to Tunisia as they make this transformation, we discussed a package that includes loan guarantees, assistance in encouraging trade and foreign investment—a whole range of support programs that will allow Tunisia to create a greater business investment, offer more opportunities for employment to its young people, and further integrate it into the world marketplace.
We also discussed issues regarding the transformation that has taken place in the region as a whole. And I expressed my great admiration and appreciation for the Libyan—for the Tunisian people in the hospitality and kindness that they showed to Libyan refugees during the tumultuous period that has taken place in Libya over the last several months.
Let me just close by pointing out that Tunisia is one of our oldest friends in the world. Tunisia was one of the first countries to recognize the United States of America over 200 years ago. One of the first trade agreements that we had as a country was with Tunisia. And so I told the Prime Minister that thanks to his leadership, thanks to the extraordinary transformation that's taking place in Tunisia and the courage of its people, I'm confident that we will have at least another two centuries of friendship between our two countries. And the American people will stand by the people of Tunisia in any way that we can during this remarkable period in Tunisian history.
Prime Minister Essebsi. What could I add? I entirely agree with everything that the President said. But first and foremost, I'm very grateful, first of all, for having been invited by President Obama.
I came here to convey the great satisfaction, the great gratitude of the Tunisian people for the constant support that he provided to the change in the revolution that took place in Tunisia. And in fact, he was the very first person—the very first person to applaud, to congratulate the change that took place in our country on the 14th of January. And this change, this support, I believe is irreversible. I came here to express to him my personal esteem for him, because he was the first to truly understand the depth, the importance of the changes that were occurring in Tunisia, and also the importance for the entire region.
You spoke about the Arab Spring, but up until now the Arab Spring is only really the “Tunisian Spring.” So what I do hope is that this—our spring will not limit itself exclusively to Tunisia, and that it will spread throughout the region, and that of course depends for large part on the economic and political success of Tunisia.
And I'm confident in the success of this process, thanks to the support expressed by President Obama today. And I told him that the longstanding and privileged relations that exist between the United States and Tunisia will not last merely for 200 years but hopefully until eternity.
The President mentioned the fact that Tunisia was one of the very first countries to recognize the independence of the United States. I also reminded him of the fact that the United States was also one of the very first countries to recognize the independence of Tunisia.
At any rate, at the end of this visit I would like to reiterate my thanks to President Obama and assure him that in Tunisia he will always find a credible and sincere friend.
President Obama. Thank you, everybody.
Q. Mr. President—the women who won the Nobel today, any reaction?
President Obama. The three women who won the Novel Prize today are all remarkable examples of not only their own determination and spirit, but also a reminder that when we empower women around the world, then everyone is better off; that the countries and cultures that respect the contributions of women inevitably end up being more successful that those that don't.
Thank you very much. Thank you, everybody. Thank you.
Statement by the Press Secretary on Violence in Egypt, October 10, 2011Footnote 3
The President is deeply concerned about the violence in Egypt that has led to a tragic loss of life among demonstrators and security forces. The United States expresses our condolences to the families and loved ones of all who were killed or injured, and stands with the Egyptian people in this painful and difficult time. Now is a time for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt. As the Egyptian people shape their future, the United States continues to believe that the rights of minorities—including Copts—must be respected, and that all people have the universal rights of peaceful protest and religious freedom. We also note Prime Minister Sharaf's call for an investigation and appeal to all parties to refrain from violence. These tragic events should not stand in the way of timely elections and a continued transition to democracy that is peaceful, just and inclusive.
Statement from the Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative's Support for the Democratic Aspirations of the Tunisian People, October 11, 2011Footnote 4
Since January 2011 and in immediate response to the Tunisian Revolution, the United States has committed approximately $55 million in non-security assistance in support of Tunisia's democratic transition. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) at the Department of State is the principal contributor to the overall non-security assistance the United States is providing, leading the U.S. Government's efforts to support the Tunisian people during this historical transition. After January 14, 2011, MEPI realigned its budget to free up more than $26 million, supporting more than 30 projects in Tunisia working directly with Tunisian society. Through its regional office in Tunis and headquarters in Washington, DC, MEPI has worked with Tunisians since 2002, supporting their aspirations for prosperity and long-term stability. MEPI currently supports programming in the following areas:
Enhancing Tunisian Civil Society
MEPI continues to expand its engagement with local civil society organizations through its unique local grants program, which directly supports civic groups throughout the country. MEPI local grants respond to priorities and proposals from local organizations, ensuring that Tunisians remain in front of their democratic transition and have opportunities to get involved in civic life. Since January 2011, MEPI's Regional Office in Tunis has awarded more than 15 new local grants to advance the role of Tunisia's civil society with a focus on women and youth. Grantees such as the Center for Arab Women Training and Research (CAWTAR) are working to increase public awareness about citizen rights, gender equality, and active citizenship. MEPI has awarded two larger grants to Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground, both working with Tunisian civil society organizations across the country to promote civic engagement with youth from the capital and coastal cities to the interior of the country.
Expanding Freedom of Expression and Strengthening Political Participation
New MEPI projects are empowering citizens, especially women and youth, to share their ideas with national and international audiences and to discuss social issues and governmental actions through blogging and internet-based media sites. MEPI local grantee Club UNESCO created a youth-run web-radio station to cover political events, and the Tunisian American Association for Management Studies (TAAMS) is working with youth to develop their sense of responsibility for the democratic process while instilling the values of tolerance. The Institute of International Education (IIE) is building the capacity of civil society organizations to effectively use new media—such as Face-book, Twitter, blogging, and other internet-based tools—to strengthen constituent outreach, inform and engage communities, and improve communication with government institutions on social and political issues. MEPI is also working with the Institute of War and Peace Reporting to increase the quality of local news coverage by engaging with members of the media and citizen journalists, placing an emphasis on accurate political reporting throughout the country.
Advancing the Rule of Law
MEPI is assisting Tunisians to develop and promote a new legal system that is accessible and fair and that protects the rights of all citizens. In partnership with the American Bar Association (ABA), MEPI is promoting legal reforms across a range of sectors in Tunisia. ABA is partnering with the Tunisian Bar Association and other legal entities to reform Tunisia's electoral code, address citizen electoral complaints, and improve women's legal rights and participation in the political process. Later this year, ABA will work with its Tunisian partners to organize a national forum on the role of women in transitional processes focusing on comparative experiences; women's rights in law and constitutional reform; and advocacy for law reform. Participants will include women jurists, rights groups, civil society organizations, and political party representatives, among others.
Widening Economic Opportunity
Since January of 2011, MEPI has increased its assistance in market-relevant skills training, job placement, and access to start-up business resources. With MEPI support, the Education for Employment Foundation (EFE) recently launched job placement and entrepreneurship programs for youth throughout Tunisia. MEPI's regional partner Injaz Al-Arab is inspiring a culture of business innovation among Tunisian youth through business plan competitions for hundreds of young entrepreneurs. In addition, the Commercial Law and Development Program (CLDP) and the Financial Services Volunteer Corps (FSVC) are supporting entrepreneurship and franchising, as well as reforms to the country's commercial legal infrastructure.
The United States is committed to supporting the Tunisian transition and the Tunisian efforts to build strong foundations for democratic growth and economic opportunity. MEPI plans to devote additional resources in the months and years ahead to assist Tunisia in becoming a more pluralistic, participatory, and prosperous society, as well as a stable and successful example of democratic transition in the region. For more information about MEPI, please visit www.mepi.state.gov. Click here to learn about the President's Framework for Investing in Tunisia, or visit www.whitehouse.gov.
Statement from the Office of the Spokesperson, October 11, 2011Footnote 5
Secretary Clinton spoke with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr this afternoon to convey our deep concern about the violence that occurred over the weekend. She expressed condolences for all those who were killed and injured as a result of the violence.
The Secretary conveyed U.S. support for the Egyptian Cabinet's decision to launch a transparent and credible investigation into the violence and stressed the importance of the investigation beginning immediately and holding accountable all responsible parties with full due process of law.
Secretary Clinton reiterated the need for the Egyptian government to ensure that the fundamental rights of all Egyptians are respected, including the rights of religious freedom, peaceful assembly, and the end of military trials for civilians, and that efforts be made to address sectarian tensions.
Statement by the Press Secretary on the Passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2014, October 21, 2011Footnote 6
We applaud the strong action taken today by the United Nations Security Council in unanimously adopting Resolution 2014, which addresses the ongoing crisis in Yemen. The United States co-sponsored the resolution, which calls for President Saleh to sign and implement a political settlement on the basis of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative without delay, demands all parties refrain from violence, and urges authorities to protect the universal rights of Yemen's citizens.
Over the past nine months, the Yemeni people have braved repression and violence to demand a more just, accountable, and democratic government. Today the international community sent a united and unambiguous signal to President Saleh that he must respond to the aspirations of the Yemeni people by transferring power immediately. Each day that passes without a political solution plunges Yemen deeper into turmoil. We continue to believe that only a Yemeni-led process will stop the bloodshed and allow the country to confront its serious economic, humanitarian, and security challenges. The United States stands with the Yemeni people, and we will work with international partners to provide much-needed assistance to Yemen upon implementation of a political transition.
Statement by President Obama on Elections in Tunisia, October 23, 2011Footnote 7
President Obama. Today, less than a year after they inspired the world, the Tunisian people took an important step forward. I congratulate the millions of Tunisians who voted in the first democratic elections to take place in the country that changed the course of history and began the Arab Spring. Just as so many Tunisian citizens protested peacefully in streets and squares to claim their rights, today they stood in lines and cast their votes to determine their own future. Now, Tunisia begins the hard work of forming an interim government, drafting a new Constitution, and charting a democratic course that meets the aspirations of all Tunisians. The United States reaffirms its commitment to the Tunisian people as they move toward a democratic future that offers dignity, justice, freedom of expression, and greater economic opportunity for all.
Readout of President Obama's call with Egyptian Field Marshal Tantawi, October 24, 2011Footnote 8
President Obama called Egyptian Field Marshal Tantawi today to reaffirm the close partnership between the United States and Egypt and to underscore his full support for Egypt's transition to democracy. The two leaders agreed that Egypt's upcoming elections must be free and fair and be held in accordance with democratic standards. The President underscored that the United States supports a strong, peaceful, prosperous and democratic Egypt that responds to the aspirations of its people, and that the outcome of the election is for the Egyptian people to decide. He welcomed Egypt's willingness to accept international election witnesses and urged that Egypt lift the emergency law and end military trials for civilians. The two leaders also discussed Egypt's economic situation. The President emphasized his support for full funding by the Congress of the Administration's request for assistance for Egypt, without conditions, and stressed his commitment to help Egypt secure international assistance to address its economic needs. The President and the Field Marshal also underscored their intention to continue to cooperate closely on counter-terrorism and regional security. They agreed to remain in close touch in the months ahead as Egypt moves forward with its transition to democracy.
Statements by Secretary of State Clinton and Bahraini Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa, October, 26, 2011Footnote 9
Secretary Hillary Clinton made these remarks with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa in Washington, DC
Secretary Clinton. Good afternoon, everyone, and it's a pleasure once again for me to welcome my colleague and counterpart, the foreign minister of Bahrain. He's been here in consultations with many officials of our government, members of Congress, others who care deeply about Bahrain and our important relationship. And I'm looking forward to a wide-ranging, comprehensive discussion of our full agenda, sir.
Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. I'm here to meet with my colleague, my friend, Madam Secretary. And I'm here—I've met with so many friends all over Washington and the government, on the Hill, both sides. Bahrain has many friends who are interested in what's happening in Bahrain. A lot of them have concerns of what's happening in Bahrain. It's incumbent upon us to come and explain to our friends what's going on and what we intend to do. And I'm confident that our talks today will also be of that direction. Thank you very much.
Statement by the President on the Selection of Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz as Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, October 28, 2011Footnote 10
President Obama. I congratulate King Abdullah and the Saudi people on the selection of Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud as Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Nayif has served his nation with dedication and distinction for more than 35 years as Minister of Interior, and as Second Deputy Prime Minister since 2009. We in the United States know and respect him for his strong commitment to combating terrorism and supporting regional peace and security. The United States looks forward to continuing our close partnership with Crown Prince Nayif in his new capacity as we strengthen the deep and longstanding friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Statements by Secretary of State Clinton and Nobel Peace Prize Winner Tawakkul Karman, October 28, 2011Footnote 11
Secretary Clinton delivered these remarks with Ms. Karman in Washington, DC
Secretary Clinton. Good morning. Well, I am extremely honored to welcome here to the State Department a woman that I had the privilege of meeting for the first time during my visit to Yemen. Tawakkul Karman has now been recognized by the Nobel Prize Committee, along with two other extraordinary women, for her commitment to democracy and human rights and for a better future for the Yemeni people.
And as I just told her and her husband and delegation who are here, the United States supports a democratic transition in Yemen and the rights of the people of Yemen—men and women—to choose their own leaders and futures. And the United States wants to be a good partner for the Yemeni people as they fulfill the aspirations of the revolution of the youth of Yemen, and then to continue to support the creation of a new Yemen with political and economic opportunities for all its citizens.
Welcome.
Ms. Karman. Thank you very much, Mrs. Clinton. Thank you very much. I want to say thank you for all American people, thank you for American administration. We in the youth revolution came to America to send them our voice, to tell them that we are the future. You have to be—(inaudible) with the future. Ali Saleh and his regime (inaudible) is over.
And we pledge to work together to have a democratic Yemen and that is where—with the vibrancy of a society, and we pledge to continue to work together in the future. You will see that the Yemeni youth and the Yemeni people are able to turn Yemen into a strategic (inaudible) for security around the world. And just like we surprised you with our revolution, we will surprise you with a state that we're going to build.
We will work together a lot, and I think we can build the world together. Thank you very much.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you so much.
Ms. Karman. Thank you. Thank you.
Q. Could we get your reaction to those groups of Yemeni women that were burning their veils?
Ms. Karman. It's an expression of rejection of the injustice that the Saleh regime has imposed on them. And this is a new stage for the Yemeni women, because they will not hide behind veils or behind walls or anything else.
Statement by Secretary of State Clinton, October 31, 2011Footnote 12
Secretary Hillary Clinton made these remarks in Washington, DC
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Secretary Clinton. Tonight, I want to focus on an aspect of our relationship that sometimes receives less attention but is increasingly central to our future together; that is, U.S.-Turkish economic ties and Turkey's growing economic leadership in the region. As I explained in a speech earlier this month in New York, the Obama Administration is elevating economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy so we can continue to lead in a world where power is often exercised in boardrooms and on trading floors as much as in battle space.
The context for this discussion is the remarkable growth that Turkey has experienced in recent years. The Turkish economy tripled in size over the past decade. More people found jobs, started businesses, bought homes. And when I talk with Turks, from students to entrepreneurs to government officials, I see a confidence and optimism—and it is for a good reason. Turkey can be proud that it has become the 17th largest economy in the world, with ambitions to reach the top 10 in the coming years.
This story—sometimes called the Turkish Miracle—is well known. But its strategic implications are perhaps less well understood. So I would like to make four points: first, that a strong U.S.-Turkey relationship has contributed to Turkish prosperity; that, in turn, Turkey's economic growth should further strengthen our partnership; that for Turkey to take full advantage of its new opportunities, it will have to consolidate democratic progress at home and peace and stability in its neighborhood; and finally, that Turkey's economic leadership can be a powerful force for progress across the region.
First, the role of our alliance in supporting Turkey's prosperity. There is no doubt that the lion's share of the credit rests with this generation and preceding generations of Turkish people whose talent, ingenuity, and hard work made it possible. Over the last decade, successive Turkish governments made important economic reforms that paid off. They opened the economy to foreign investment, curbed inflation, sought closer economic integration with Europe, and extended development beyond the major cities. These steps were crucial. But I would argue that a strong partnership with the United States also played a role.
This starts with security, which, after all, is the foundation of stability and prosperity. Our work together in NATO has helped keep the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean open and safe. We faced down aggression in the Middle East. We helped bring stability and prosperity to the Balkans and Central Europe, allowing Turkey to establish profitable new trade and investment relationships.
Our expanding cooperation on counterterrorism, our work together on 21st century threats through the new NATO Strategic Concept, and the new missile defense radar that NATO will deploy are reminders of the continuing contributions that the alliance makes to Turkey's security and that Turkey makes to the security of the alliance.
But it's not just security. It's also access to a global economic system that is open, free, transparent, and fair—one that the United States pioneered and continues to protect. Turkey has thrived in this system as a member of the G-20, which the Obama Administration has helped to elevate as the premier forum for international economic cooperation and for greater involvement in the global marketplace as well. In the long run, we believe that Turkey would enjoy even greater prosperity if it one day joins the European Union—a step that the United States has consistently supported.
My second point is that just as our alliance has contributed to Turkey's prosperity, that prosperity can in turn strengthen our alliance. For too long, our economic relationship has lagged behind our security partnership. But there is reason to hope that is starting to change. In the first eight months of this year alone, our bilateral trade grew by nearly 50 percent. Members of the American-Turkish Council, such as Boeing, Sikorsky, Raytheon, are doing more and more business in Turkey. That has benefited workers and consumers in both countries. But I believe we can do even better. With the help of those of you in this room, we can take this relationship to the next level and build a partnership for prosperity as durable and dynamic as our security alliance.
That is why, under the leadership of President Obama and President Gul, we have intensified our diplomatic engagement, including through our joint Economic Partnership Commission, which brings together experts from across both governments to discuss everything from protecting intellectual property rights to boosting energy trade along the southern corridor, to positioning Istanbul as an international financial center. And I would applaud the recent signing by Prime Minister Erdogan and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan of a very important energy agreement. We are exploring the ways the United States can help Turkey take advantage of advanced bond and capital markets in a way that would have been impossible only five years ago.
The Obama Administration also puts a premium on reaching beyond traditional diplomacy to engage directly with the private sector, civil society, and diaspora communities. We believe that these partnerships can help us leverage new energy, innovation, and resources. President Obama hosted the first Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Washington last year, and we are pleased that Prime Minister Erdogan will be hosting the second summit in Istanbul this December. And in fact, Vice President Biden will be representing our government there. The Global Entrepreneurship Program we launched last year is already working with the Turkish business community to train and support the next generation of entrepreneurs there.
And we are pleased that, just last month, the new U.S.-Turkey Business Council held its first meeting. And on my last visit, in July, I met with the Istanbul chapter of Partners for a New Beginning, a public-private initiative that the United States helped launch to build new ties between businesses, NGOs, and communities. Under its auspices, the Coca-Cola Company, Cisco, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, and other partners are working with Turkish women entrepreneurs to provide new seed grants, training, and mentoring. Intel is promoting technology entrepreneurship at Turkish universities, and numerous other joint ventures are underway. The more Turkey grows, the more we can trade, build, and prosper together. And for Americans, eager to drive our own economic recovery, that is vitally important.
The third point is that Turkey's ability to realize its full potential depends upon its resolve to strengthen democracy at home and promote peace and stability in the neighborhood. The ongoing constitutional reform process is a valuable opportunity, and I've had very productive conversations with President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and others about this process, about its inclusivity and transparency that results in a document that deepens respect for human rights for all Turkish citizens, including the right to speak and worship freely. All minority groups need to have their voices heard and their concerns addressed. I was particularly impressed by Prime Minister Erdogan's statement during Ramadan that property would be returned to religious minority groups, and we also hope to see other positive steps, such as reopening of the Halki Seminary.
A vibrant economy depends upon the free exchange of ideas, the free flow of information, and the rule of law. Strengthening due process, cracking down on corruption, helps any country grow more rapidly, and also protecting a free and independent media, which plays a role that is very important. And of course, true prosperity must be shared widely. And for me, that means that all of the strong and accomplished women leaders in government, business, and civil society in Turkey should be given the opportunity to fully participate, and, in turn, they, along with their male counterparts, should further empower all women that will be critical for Turkey's continued development. This requires, as we know from our own experience, unrelenting effort.
Looking beyond Turkey's borders, there are concerns, and we have worked closely with our Turkish counterparts, because we know that Turkey has a unique opportunity in this time of great historic change, with the so-called Arab Awakening, to demonstrate the power of an inclusive democracy and responsible regional leadership. For example, we have worked closely with Turkey on supporting the central institutions of Iraq and helping to integrate Iraq economically into a larger region. Turkey has been vocal in its condemnation of President Asad's brutal campaign of violence against its own people, and Syrian opposition groups have met and organized in Turkey. And Turkey has opened its arms and hearts to more than 7,000 Syrians who have found refuge across the border. The Turkish Government understands that the longer President Asad stays in power and oppresses his own people, the more the risk rises that Syria descends into chaos and conflict that threatens not only Syrian but those beyond its borders.
The United States is also encouraged by the signs of progress between Turkey and Greece, including last year's joint cabinet meeting and the establishment of a strategic cooperation council. But we have been concerned by the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel. We believe this relationship has served both countries well over the years, and it is positive that both governments have left the door open to reconciliation, and we continue to urge both countries to look for opportunities to put this important relationship back on track.
We also are focused on Cyprus. All parties agree on the fundamental goal of achieving a lasting settlement on the island that results in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The United States supports the UN's mediation on the Cyprus issue, and we believe that public rhetoric on all sides must be kept to a minimum to give the parties space needed to achieve a solution. And while we recognize the right of the Republic of Cyprus to explore for natural resources in its exclusive economic zone, including with the assistance of U.S. companies, we look forward to both sides benefiting from shared resources in the context of an overall agreement.
Similarly, improving relations between Turkey and Armenia would be a positive step, and we hope that the Turkish parliament will ratify the protocols during its current session and normalize ties with Armenia. These festering conflicts hold back progress and development in the region. Reducing tensions with neighbors, increasing stability, is a recipe for expanded growth and influence. Turkey's leaders understand this, which is why they have been reaching out over the last years. But it does take bold choices and strong political will, not only on the part of Turkey, but on the part of all of the countries.
Now, the final point I want to make—and it is related—is that we believe Turkey's economic leadership has the potential to support positive change far beyond Turkey's own borders or own neighborhood. Turkey sends more than a quarter of its exports to nations in the Middle East and North Africa. Its companies are, therefore, investing heavily across the region. Turkish businesses are helping to rebuild Iraq. They are one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment in Egypt. And Turkish planes have already resumed flights to Libya. Along with political change and reform must come economic reform in this region. To succeed, the Arab political awakening must also be an economic awakening.
Turkey's growing influence is key to helping integrate and modernize the economies of the Middle East and North Africa. This vision is, we believe, what should be the hallmark of our partnership in the years ahead, because if we look at this important relationship through an economic lens, we see even more promise than we have seen in the past.
In fact, we see Turkey's growing leadership holding great potential benefits—yes, first and foremost for the people of Turkey, but then far beyond your borders. For the United States, this is reason for optimism. As I leave you here and set out again for Turkey, I am confident about the state of our alliance and the alignment of our interests, proud of what we have accomplished together, and hopeful for what we will achieve in the future together.
Special Briefing by Ambassador Taylor, Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, November 3, 2011Footnote 13
Ambassador William Taylor gave these remarks in Washington, DC
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Ambassador Taylor. I've been appointed to a position here in the Department—it's a new position. We didn't have this before. It's a recognition, it's a demonstration, of the importance that the Secretary places on success of these transitions in the Middle East. And as Toria said, right now we are focused on Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
She told me—the Secretary told me that she wants someone who will be thinking about how we can support these transitions 7 days a week, 365 days a year. I have been doing that with a small group of staff that we have that are focused exactly on this. This is important, we think. The Secretary has taken this step because it matters to us if these transitions succeed. It matters for all kinds of reasons that we've talked about, I'm sure, with you over the weeks.
So what I'm to do is to coordinate the response of the United States Government, in particular the State Department and USAID. I will be working with the international donors as well. I'll be—as Toria said, I've spent some time in the region last week, the week before, in Tunisia and Egypt. I will be in Libya early next month—is my current plan—as soon as Ambassador Cretz says that they've got room for me to come out there. So I am looking forward to being very active in this area, and I look forward to your questions.
Q. Hi. I'm Kim Ghattas with the BBC. I have two questions. I was wondering: How well do you feel you understand the region and the changes that are underway? And my second question is: How do you think that U.S.—the U.S.'s ability to help influence, shape those transitions compares to other countries that perhaps have a lot more money that they can use? And I'm thinking particularly Gulf countries that are simply flooding some of those countries like Egypt with a lot of money.
Ambassador Taylor. Two good questions. I work for the Secretary and report directly in to the Deputy Secretary, Secretary Burns, but I'm also working for the Assistant Secretary for Near East Asia, with Jeff Feltman. In that regard, I am part of that Bureau and have the access, have the resources, that that Bureau brings in terms of, of course, the Embassies out there, but also the desks that are here. So I am a participant every day in all of these kinds of activities and communications with the field.
I am in touch with all three ambassadors regularly on these things. So I am trying to understand, in response to your first question, what they need. I mean, that's really the question. This is going to be a demand-driven exercise here. We are going to be providing assistance in areas that these governments want. And so it's our ambassadors and their staffs in the field who will help identify those needs, and then I will see how we can respond. So it's going to be demanding.
And that then leads into your second question. You're right; this is tight time on budgets here, as we all know. And when Toria and I worked together earlier, we had a lot more money to put in to the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe. Today's fiscal situation is obviously different, but also these countries need different things than others needed; that is; they need some things that we can provide in terms of trade. If we are open to their trade, to their products, that will be as big a boost as anything that we can provide in terms of cash.
Now, that having been said, we recognize that there are other countries that are eager to provide support, and we support that. We support that as long as, again, we are encouraging and other nations are encouraging the success of these transitions in terms of a democratic transition where people come out with the kind of rights and expectations and dignity that the revolutions began with. That's the kind of support we're glad to see other nations provide.
Moderator. And we could also highlight the fact that you are also charged with organizing how the U.S. work fits in with international support and working with donors around the world.
Ambassador Taylor. Exactly. I mentioned donor coordination. That's also part of my responsibilities. Exactly.
Q. Thank you. So in his May 19th speech, President Obama talked about $2 billion for Egypt and Tunisia. So is that no longer the operative plan? Is that—
Ambassador Taylor. No, no, no. That's definitely the operative plan. What we have—there are a couple of big pieces of this work that we're doing for Egypt and Tunisia. One is, on Egypt—there are a couple pieces. One, OPIC is about to provide loan guarantees in the range of a billion dollars. Number two, if the Congress agrees—and the Congress so far has been interested and the Senate at least has been—has put this in their bill—we will have the authority to forgive and swap the debt payments so—of about a billion dollars, another billion dollars.
So the way that will work is the Egyptians right now owe us about a billion dollars in interest on previous loans. If the Congress agrees, both houses of Congress agrees, then we will say to the Egyptians, don't send us that check for a billion dollars, which is actually 300 million over three years, keep that there, but we will agree with you—we, the United States Government, will agree with you, the Egyptian Government, on how to spend that billion dollars in Egypt. But it won't come here. It won't come back to the Treasury. It'll stay there and do projects that we are working on right now.
Q. So that's going to be some sort of an endowment or—
Ambassador Taylor. Not endowment; I wouldn't say endowment, but will be an identifiable project that Egyptians can see, that Americans see, that you will be able to go take a look at. This joint project between Egyptians and Americans, worth about a billion dollars over three years, will be something significant that will demonstrate to the Egyptians that, yes, we do care if that—if your transition works.
Q. A quick follow-up. A lot of the money being spent right now in Egypt is going to aid groups that are preparing for the election. There have been several reports that this money is going to both what we call liberal democracy groups and groups that are Islamist in nature. So is—how do you view the spending of U.S. taxpayer money—
Ambassador Taylor. U.S. taxpayers’ money—as you say, there are a lot of different—a lot of pieces of the support that we've been giving to Egypt over years, but we've now changed it, to a large degree, based on the events there now. So over the years, we have provided a big military portion to the Egyptians, but we also have had a large bilateral economic thing.
Since—in addition to that, on top of that, we are providing support for the preparation for their elections which begins this month. And we are providing support not to any party. There's no individual party out there that we—in Egypt that—or in Tunisia, for that matter or in Libya—that we are supporting. We don't do party support. What we do is party training. So we provide training for political parties to help them use polling, for example, or help them do constituent services or preparation—election preparations, these kind of things. And we do it to whoever comes. I mean, we'll provide this training and tell them where it's going to happen, when, and if parties show up, it's fine. So NDI, for example, the National Democratic Institute, they have trainings, and they will invite a range of parties, including—all across, let's just say all across the spectrum. Sometimes, Islamist parties show up; sometimes they don't. But that's—it has been provided on a nonpartisan basis, not to individual parties.
Q. Are you doing anything specific regarding the support to the transition in Syria?
Ambassador Taylor. No. So far, my area of responsibilities are Egypt, Libya, Tunisia. And so if—we can hope that Syria will begin a transition to a democratic form of government and—with full respect to human rights, minority rights, women's rights, but they haven't yet. And so until they do, they're not in my area. I hope for the time that it will be in my area.
Q. Elise Labott, CNN. Thanks for doing this. In each of the countries that you're charged with, there's a lot of concern that this kind of next phase of the revolution, so to speak, is going to be a lot of mess; it's going to be kind of messy. There's going to be chaos, infighting, and violence. And I'm wondering how you balance U.S. assistance with the idea that you may not be so pleased with the way—the direction in which these countries are managing their transition.
Ambassador Taylor. Thank you, Elise.
We hope by our engagement that we can affect the outcomes of these things, not directly and not interfering with the political processes there, but we think by engaging, talking with, having discussions with all of the parties who are in the various stages—and you're absolutely right, the stages will change over time. Right now, we are in an early stage before they're even drafting their constitutions. We're in the interim stage, when—in the TNC stage. It's important, we think, to demonstrate to the Tunisian people, Egyptian people, Libyan people that we are supporting them.
And so we have done a lot of humanitarian work. Many of you may have seen we brought some of the wounded warriors from Tripoli to Boston, to the Spaulding Hospital in Boston, this last weekend. We are trying to demonstrate to the people that (a) the United States is part of the solution, that the United States supports them in their attempt to move toward a democratic, dignified government, and what we don't want to do is wait until those governments are in place, (a) because that may take years, and we want to—and (b) because we want to influence where they end up. And so we think that dealing with these people, these governments, on an interim step-by-step, phase-by-phase basis, as you say, is the important thing to do.
Q. Okay. Just your overall assessment of how committed the Egyptian military is to pursuing the democratic transition. There are a lot of doubts, I understand, from Egyptians.
Ambassador Taylor. I had a long discussion with many Egyptians while I was there, including with the SCAF. Had three major generals sitting there on the other side of the table. They were at pains to emphasize how eager they were not to be governing. They were—they wanted to make it very clear to this American sitting on the other side of the table that they didn't like the governing business. And they are looking—they have a well-established timeframe. It may be a long time frame from many perspectives. But there is a well-established timeframe that will get them out of the governing business. What they did tell me was they are eager to handoff, and perfectly prepared and ready to hand off the legislative authority, which they now have, as soon as these legislative elections, these parliamentary elections, are completed in late-March. And in early-April when the Parliament sits, the SCAF knows that they will no longer have, and welcomes the day, when they no longer have their legislative responsibilities.
They will maintain the executive responsibilities which, again, they were at pains to tell me they don't like. This is not what they do. This is not what the military is trained to do, but they will maintain that executive authority and responsibilities through the drafting of the constitution. And then at the end of that there's a referendum and that is followed by, in their view, by a political campaign—presidential campaign, at which time they are looking forward to handing off, they say, their responsibilities to the newly elected president.
Now, if your question is, do I believe all that?
Q. Right. Did they tell you what you want to hear?
Ambassador Taylor. I'll tell you what. I do believe that they are uncomfortable governing. Some would say they're not doing a great job of it. But I think they recognize that they've got these problems. I mentioned the problems of the finance minister. The finance minister went to the SCAF, and the SCAF doesn't know a whole lot about government finance, this is not what they're trained to do, and so they made initial decision not to accept IMF and World Bank support, even though the finance minister says we have a big cash flow problem. He went back to them later, has gone back to them more recently, and has reemphasized the problem and says, look, we're not getting these checks from the Gulf like we thought we were going to do, and we have these large subsidies that we continue to pay, and we have people demanding pay increases. The police are the latest ones to go one strike because they want a 200 percent pay increase. The finance minister was able to go to the SCAF and educate them, I believe, and now he—the finance minister is more optimistic that he is going to be able to accept these loans from IMF and World Bank. So they are learning on this job. I hope they—we hope, of course, they turn it over sooner rather than later.
And on the sooner rather than later question—sorry I'll go on this one—it was interesting that there was a debate, both in the private—in the, kind of, the nongovernmental world—but even within the government as to this timeline. There are two options. One, I put it—I called in series, which I just described. In series, so they do the constitution, they do the referendum, and then they do the presidential. There's also in parallel version, which people are urging them to do, which would be start the presidential campaign right when the constitutional committee starts writing the constitution. So that would be done in parallel.
The difference between those two scenarios is probably about a year. So under the parallel system/regime, you could have a turnover of executive authority from the SCAF to the newly elected president a year before the scenario where you have it in series. I still—I think that the current plan, and certainly when you talk to the SCAF, they—you're still talking the series scenario. But there is a debate on earlier rather than later.
Statement by Assistant Secretary Feltman, November 9, 2011Footnote 14
Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary Feltman. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, Distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss our goals with regard to Syria and the strategy we are implementing to achieve them.
Much has changed both within Syria and in the international response to what is happening inside Syria since the unrest began eight months ago. Protests that started in the provincial village of Dara'a have spread to every city and every major town in the country. The Syrian people have demonstrated an irrepressible hunger for a change in the way their country is governed. They are no longer willing to tolerate the blatant denial of their universal rights and trampling of their dignity. They are no longer willing to remain quiet about the rampant corruption, brutality, and ineptitude of the mafia-like Assad clique that has hijacked the Syrian state and transformed it into an instrument whose sole purpose is to retain power in the hands of a small group of self-interested elites.
The protestors in Syria have overcome the barrier of fear. They are out on the streets of cities and towns all over Syria every single day despite the relentless and indiscriminate violence that the regime has deployed against them. According to the estimates of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, over 3,500 Syrians have been killed since the protests began. Tens of thousands have been detained, and many of those have been tortured. In a report of her findings in August, the High Commissioner noted “a pattern of human rights violations that constitutes widespread or systemic attacks against the civilian population, which may amount to crimes against humanity.” The violations included murder, forced disappearances, summary executions, torture, deprivation of liberty, and persecution. But the regime's overwhelming use of force has not been able to suppress the street protests. Peaceful street protestors have passed the point of no return. They will not stop until Bashar al-Assad and his clique are gone.
The Syrian army has been forced to occupy its own country. Even small towns are continuously occupied by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and battalions of foot soldiers along with plain-clothes intelligence personnel and regime-sponsored armed groups who do much of the dirty work. The pressure is starting to wear on the army. It is not just the fast, unsustainable tempo of operations and unending redeployments ordered to quell every manifestation of dissent—the soldiers of the Syrian army are increasingly rejecting a mission that calls for them to kill and brutally repress their own countrymen, in some cases people from their own tribes and hometowns. Military defections, primarily by conscripts and junior officers, are on the rise, and the pressure on senior officers continues to mount.
The violence is still continuing. In its desperation, the regime is executing a deliberate and bloody strategy of channeling peaceful protest into armed insurrection. It is stoking the fears of Syria's minority communities with blatant propaganda about foreign conspiracies and domestic terrorism while cynically claiming that the regime is their only protection from sectarian violence. Make no mistake: the regime is driving the cycle of violence and sectarianism. The Syrian people are resisting it, but the regime is working diligently to fulfill its own prophecy of intercommunal violence.
Assad and his inner circle know they cannot contain or manage peaceful opposition, so they assault it with violence and with terror. They believe they can handle a violent resistance because violence is a medium they know well. Mass arrests, shabiha thuggery and outright regime violence have forced peaceful protestors to adapt their methods. They now arrange gatherings of smaller groups on short notice and disperse before security forces are able to respond. And as they are literally beaten off the streets, protestors are learning new forms of peaceful resistance such as boycotts and strikes. Security forces have responded to civil disobedience such as last week's general strike in Dara'a with intimidation and vandalism.
While, for the most part, the opposition has thus far refused to be baited into responding with violence, armed resistance to the regime is on the rise, with some taking up arms in self-defense. This is not surprising given that they are faced with increasingly brutal repression and are still denied the political space to organize and make their voices heard peacefully. But it is potentially disastrous to their cause. Forcing the opposition to become violent is the deliberate strategy of the Assad government. The regime is confounded by protestors chanting “peaceful, peaceful” and shopkeepers who shutter their stores in solidarity with those killed and arrested, but it knows precisely how to handle armed insurrection: with brutal and overwhelming force. By working diligently to channel non-violent opposition into a proto-insurgency, the regime seeks to discredit the opposition, scare minorities into submission, unite security forces against a common enemy, fragment international consensus and tear Syria apart along sectarian lines. This must be resisted.
On the economic front, the regime's financial situation is growing increasingly dire. Tough, targeted sanctions from the United States and the European Union have squeezed the regime's cash-flow. Oil revenue, which used to make up about a third of government revenue, is drying up. Europe used to buy more than 90% of Syria's crude. Today it buys none. As a result, the Syrian government has had to dramatically cut oil production. All its storage tanks are filled to capacity. Despite months of desperate efforts to entice potential new buyers with offers of deep discounts, the regime has been unable to find alternative customers.
Meanwhile, we have required U.S. persons to block Syrian regime property and the EU has frozen assets of two Syrian banks for their role in facilitating the regime's access to the international financial system. Even non-U.S. and non-European companies that are not directly affected by our sanctions have come to the conclusion that it is not in their interest to do business with this regime. And it is not just the United States and EU that are tightening the financial noose around the regime. Canada and Japan have deployed sanctions of their own.
But more than sanctions, it is the financial ineptitude of the Syrian government that is driving Syria's economy over a cliff. The Syrian economy was already in a precarious state before this crisis. The regime's mismanagement and attempts to buy its way back into political favor have vastly exacerbated the problem. This is why we have urged our Arab and European partners to increase their pressure on the regime now, before Bashar al-Assad precipitates a complete collapse of the Syrian economy.
Turning to the Syrian opposition, one of the more promising recent developments is the establishment of the Syrian National Council, a coalition including secularists, Christians, Islamists, Druze, Alawis, Kurds and other groups from both inside and outside Syria who have joined together to form a united front against the Assad regime. When you consider that for the past forty years, the Syrian people have been prevented from engaging in any political activity or even political discussion, it is truly remarkable that in a matter of just a few months, the SNC has managed to bring together such a broad array of groups into a united coalition, despite the regime's relentless attempts to thwart their efforts. We have not endorsed any specific opposition group—only the Syrian people can decide who can legitimately represent them. But we take the advent of the SNC very seriously, and we support the broader opposition's efforts to focus on the critical task of expanding and consolidating its base of support within Syria by articulating a clear and common vision and developing a concrete and credible post-Assad transition plan.
There are still many Syrians who, while they are appalled by Bashar al-Assad, see his continued rule as preferable to alternatives they fear will be worse. It is up to the opposition to convince those Syrians that a credible alternative exists and that Assad's departure will not mean chaos, civil war, or a new form of tyranny, but rather a representative, pluralistic, secular and accountable government that will operate by rule of law, respond to the needs of its people, and uphold and protect the rights and interests of all Syrians, regardless of sect, ethnicity, gender or class. The United States understands Syrians will determine their own formula for government by the consent of the governed, but we will not support an outcome that replaces one form of tyranny or repression with another.
We continue to meet regularly with members of the opposition, including, but not exclusively, many SNC members, and we encourage other governments to do the same.
The positions of Syria's neighbors have changed dramatically since March. Whereas, the initial inclination of many leaders in the region was to support Assad as the “devil they knew” and putative guarantor of stability, nearly all of the regional leaders with whom I engage now recognize that Assad and his regime are driving the instability. They recognize that Assad is part of the problem, not the solution and—some quietly, some not so quietly—admit to wanting him gone. They recognize that if Assad is allowed to continue, he will precipitate their worst nightmare: the collapse of the Syrian state with violence spilling over into the rest of the region. This crisis could easily spread beyond Syria's borders; Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon already host thousands of refugees.
The Gulf Cooperation Council has described the Syrian regime as a killing machine. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said he believes the opposition will be successful in their “glorious” resistance to the ongoing government crackdown. During a September visit to Libya, he said, “Those who repress their own people in Syria will not survive. The time of autocracies is over. Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The
Overall, the Administration is following a careful but deliberate and principled course… The way forward includes supporting the opposition while working with our international partners to further isolate and pressure the [Syrian] regime through diplomatic and financial means.
rule of the people is coming.”
The continuous coverage of the Assad regime's brutality in the pan-Arab media has decimated Assad's standing on the Arab street. A recent poll by the Arab American Institute suggests that Assad has become a pariah in the Arab world. The poll, conducted in early October surveyed over 4,000 Arabs in six countries. Just three years ago, a region-wide poll of the same six countries asked respondents to name a leader, not from their own country, that they most respected. Bashar al Assad scored higher than any other Arab head of state. Today, however, the overwhelming majority of Arabs side with those Syrians demonstrating against the government (with support for them ranging from 83% in Morocco to 100% in Jordan). When asked whether Bashar al Assad can continue to govern, the highest affirmative ratings he receives are a mere 15% in Morocco and 14% in Egypt, with the rest in low single digits.
The Arab League has repeatedly condemned the regime's violence and called for a peaceful political solution while insisting that the Syrian regime meet a set of reasonable conditions before any negotiations begin. The League dispatched its Secretary General to Damascus on September 10 and a Ministerial-level delegation on October 26. After strenuous efforts to wiggle out of or dilute the League's conditions, on November 2, the Syrian government accepted the terms of an Arab League plan that includes: a cessation of violence, the release of political prisoners, the withdrawal of security forces from populated areas, free access for journalists and Arab League monitors, and an Arab League-hosted national dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition.
We welcome the efforts of the Arab League to stop the Assad regime's assaults on the Syrian people, but success of the Arab League mission will depend not on what the regime says, but on what it does. The regime must comply with each of these obligations fully—not within weeks but within days. It must not be allowed to exploit this process to buy time through half measures, token gestures, and endless discussion of technicalities, while more Syrians are killed and imprisoned. We strongly support free and unfettered access to Arab League monitors throughout Syria, but they should be complemented by internationally recognized professional human rights monitors as well as journalists. Syria needs credible witnesses throughout the country that can document and deter the regime's violent excesses.
As for dialogue, it is up to the opposition to decide whether or not it wishes to discuss with the regime the terms of Syria's transition from dictatorship to democracy. Under no circumstances should a dialogue be a precondition for ending regime violence against Syrian citizens. Nor should the regime be able to dictate which oppositionists should take part in discussions or where those discussions should take place.
Since the Syrian regime “agreed” to the League's conditions on November 2, scores of innocent Syrians have been killed. Security forces remain deployed in most cities and towns. Tanks and artillery continue to fire into residential areas in Homs. Thousands of peaceful protestors remain in detention. Arrests continued unabated. If the regime continues to spurn this most recent “last chance,” we hope that the Arab League will take additional, clear measures to express its condemnation of the Syrian regime and solidarity with the Syrian people while taking a leading role in building international pressure for a political transition in Syria, including at the United Nations.
The topic of Syria is consistently raised in diplomatic conversations with Arab leaders. And in those conversations, almost all the Arab leaders say the same thing: Assad's rule is coming to an end. Change in Syria is now inevitable. It is only a question of how long Assad will fight to hold onto power and how many more innocent Syrians have to die before his rule ends. Some Arab leaders already have begun to offer Assad safe-haven in an effort to encourage him to leave peaceably and quickly.
Iran continues to be complicit in the violence in Syria, providing material support to the regime's brutal campaign against the Syrian people. Cynically capitalizing on the Syrian government's growing alienation from its Arab neighbors, Iran is seeking to increase its influence in Syria and help Assad remain in power as a vital conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon. But public statements last month by President Ahmadinejad calling for Assad to stop the violence and enact reforms might indicate that even the Iranians doubt the sustainability of Assad's rule. Still, Iran has provided political, financial, and material assistance in support of the regime's brutal crackdown against the Syrian people.
We remain actively engaged in ratcheting up the pressure on Assad bilaterally and multilaterally. Following President Obama's statement on August 18, governments from every continent echoed the President's call for Assad to step aside. Since the beginning of the Syrian unrest, we have pursued targeted financial measures to increase pressure on the Syrian regime and its enablers. We have specifically targeted those responsible for human rights abuses, senior officials of the Syrian government, and the regime's corrupt business cronies. The Executive Order signed by the President in August blocks the property of the Syrian government, bans U.S. persons from new investments in or exporting services to Syria, and bans U.S. imports of, and other transactions or dealings in, Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products. These measures represent some of the strongest sanctions the U.S. government has imposed against any country in the world.
In addition, European sanctions banning the purchase of Syrian petroleum products—the regime's most important source of foreign exchange—and freezing the assets of select Syrian banks in Europe have had an arguably greater impact given the larger volume of Syrian trade with Europe. We are also working with our international partners, including our Arab allies, to block efforts by the Syrian regime to circumvent American and European sanctions. The United States and European Union will continue to deploy new sanctions against key regime figures, regime enablers (including the regime's corrupt businessmen cronies), and companies and organizations that support the regime. These sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans targeted to affect the regime while sparing the broader economy to the greatest extent possible.
We have led the effort to hold two special sessions of the UN Human Rights Council on the situation in Syria. At the second special session, we worked closely with many of Syria's Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan, to ensure unified regional condemnation of the Syrian regime and to establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the on-going human rights violations. We expect the Commission of Inquiry to be permitted to carry out its mission without restrictions. We believe that the introduction of more witnesses will play a critical role in proving to the world what is really happening in Syria and mobilizing fence-sitting nations to join us in bringing greater pressure to bear on the regime.
Despite the October 4 veto of the EU-sponsored draft resolution on Syria, we remain committed to pursuing multilateral sanctions at the Security Council. But if Russia and China cynically continue to stand in the way of international efforts to end the violence in Syria, the United States and other allies of the Syrian people will consider other steps to ensure the Syrian people are protected. The UN is one important channel but not the only one. Nevertheless, we will continue our efforts to convince Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to change their positions regarding sanctions against Syria, and we will encourage our Arab allies and the Syrian opposition to aggressively engage with those countries as well.
In the meantime, we would suggest that these countries ask and answer some basic questions. Does the regime permit peaceful protest? Does it allow the peaceful opposition to organize, discuss and deliberate without fear of assassination or arrest? Does the regime permit the UN commission of inquiry to enter Syria and do its internationally-mandated work? Does it allow human rights monitors and journalists to witness the situation on the ground? Has the regime met any of its self-imposed deadlines for reform or for ending violence against civilians? The answer to all of these questions is obviously no.
Complementing our international efforts, Ambassador Ford has been doing exceptional work in providing Washington policy makers with a clear perspective of what is happening in Syria. Thank you for confirming him. He has boldly delivered strong messages to the Syrian regime and met repeatedly with opposition figures and civil society. His courageous efforts show our resolve to pressure the Syrian regime to end its senseless killing, demonstrate our solidarity with the Syrian people, and help to shine an international spotlight on the gross abuses of the Assad regime. This Administration's principled stand against Assad's brutality, and the Ambassador's own actions to show solidarity with the Syrian people, have led to attacks and intimidation by the regime against Embassy Damascus and Ambassador Ford himself. He is currently in the United States on leave, and we expect that he will return to his post before long. For as long as we are able, we will maintain an embassy and an ambassador in Damascus. Robert Ford will continue to interact with the Syrian people and the Syrian government.
Overall, the Administration is following a careful but deliberate and principled course. This is necessary given Syria's complex and unique circumstances. We do not seek further militarization of this conflict. Syria is not Libya. Nor, for that matter, is it Tunisia, Egypt, or Yemen. The way forward includes supporting the opposition while working with our international partners to further isolate and pressure the regime through diplomatic and financial means. We will work with the Syrian people and our international partners to do what we must to ensure that Assad and his regime are prevented from murdering Syrian citizens and tearing the Syrian state apart.
The Syrian people are entitled to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, basic rights enshrined in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Syrian republic is a signatory. The Syrian people are seeking a government that abides by these principles, and which governs only with the consent of its citizens. The emergence of such a government in Syria is in the interest of the Syrian people and in the interest of the United States.
We ideally seek a peaceful Syrian-led political transition that includes the end of Bashar al-Assad's rule and the replacement of the corrupt, incompetent and violent regime he built and tolerated with one responsive to the needs of the Syrian people. One thing I have learned from the events of the Arab world in the past year is humility regarding my own ability to predict the outcomes or timelines of these convulsive and transformational processes. I cannot tell you exactly how long it will take to achieve this outcome in Syria. It has the potential to be a long, difficult process, but the sooner the better for Syria and the region.
While the United States sympathizes with Syrian military defectors and average citizens attempting to protect themselves, we urge them to think strategically about how best to accomplish their goals. We still believe that violent resistance is counterproductive. It will play into the regime's hands, divide the opposition, and undermine international consensus against the regime. We urge the opposition, and our regional allies, to continue to reject violence. To do otherwise would, frankly, make the regime's job of brutal repression easier. At the same time, all Syrians must know that they have the support of the international community.
How do we stop spiraling violence? As a means of creating greater protection for civilians, documenting human rights abuses, and ensuring that undecided governments have a clearer view of what is really happening inside Syria, we continue to press for immediate, unfettered, and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights monitors, the UN Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry, and independent journalists. If skeptics on the Security Council still believe Assad's propaganda about armed gangs, let them join the call for monitors and journalists who could prove it. The introduction of credible witnesses throughout Syria would both deter and ensure documentation of the regime's worst excesses. And it would diminish the temptation for protestors to put down their placards and pick up weapons. The Arab League has already insisted that Syria accept monitors as part of its plan to end the violence. The United States strongly supports European-led efforts to introduce a resolution in the UN General Assembly's Third Committee that would insist on the same.
Bashar al-Assad is desperate to convince himself and others that Syria is fine. In the relative calm of central Damascus, he may actually believe it. But when the money runs out, he and his inner circle will be forced to face the desperate reality of their situation and ideally will head for the exits voluntarily.
What we have to say to President Assad can be summed up very briefly: step aside and allow your people to begin the peaceful, orderly transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Bashar al-Assad has proven that he is incapable of reform. Our advice is to President Assad is that he leave now. He may want to study the recent examples of other Arab autocrats who have been confronted by populations that have overcome the barrier of fear to demand their universal rights. If Assad truly has Syria's interests at heart, he will leave now. We will relentlessly pursue our two-track strategy of supporting the opposition and diplomatically and financially strangling the regime until that outcome is achieved.
Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Posner of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, November 15, 2011Footnote 15
Assistant Secretary Michael H. Posner gave the following testimony before the Helsinki Commission in Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary Posner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important hearing on the situation faced by Coptic Christian community in Egypt, and for inviting me to testify.
As you know, this is a time of substantial transition in Egypt as Egyptians strive to move their country towards democracy. This is not an easy process and it will not happen overnight. Egypt is only starting on a path from the temporary stewardship of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), through parliamentary elections that will begin in two weeks, then the process of drafting of a new constitution and finally presidential elections. As they move toward these milestones, millions of Egyptians hope to see the emergence of a democratic civilian government that respects the universal rights of all of its citizens.
As part of this vision, it is vital that there be a place in the new Egypt for all citizens, including all religious minorities, of which the Coptic Christian community is the largest. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made clear their deep concern about violence against Coptic Christians, most recently during the October 9 tragedy in front of the Egyptian radio and television building in the Maspiro area of Cairo. At least 25 people died and more than 300 were injured. We have urged the Egyptian government to investigate this violence, including allegations that the military and police used excessive force that was the cause of most of the demonstrator deaths. We also have urged that those responsible for these deaths and injuries be held accountable.
While the focus of my testimony is on the situation of the Copts, I would like to point out that other religious minorities also suffer official discrimination. While non-Muslim religious minorities officially recognized by the government—namely Christians and the tiny Jewish community—generally worship without harassment, members of the Bahai Faith, which the government does not recognize, face personal and collective discrimination. The government also sometimes arrests, detains, and harasses Muslims such as Shia, Ahmadiya, and Quranist, converts from Islam to Christianity, and members of other religious groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons. The Government continues to refuse to recognize conversions of Muslims to Christianity or other religions, which constitutes a prohibition in practice.
I would like to set this testimony on the Copts in a broader context. Last week Secretary Clinton gave an important policy address in which she outlined our overall policy on democratization in the Middle East and beyond. She described the US government's principled engagement in the Middle East. We support the aspirations of citizens to live in societies that guarantee freedom, including freedom of expression, assembly and religion. We also believe strongly in systems that allow citizens a say in how they are governed and that will provide economic opportunities for all. These are the demands that we heard in Tahrir Square, where Copts and Muslims joined hands to protest and to pray in the weeks leading up to the downfall of the Mubarak regime. We have heard similar demands echoing throughout the Middle East and even far beyond that region in the ensuing months.
Secretary Clinton also has spoken out consistently about the importance of religious freedom and religious tolerance, both of which are fundamental to human dignity and peaceful transitions to democracy. Religious freedom is a human right, guaranteed by international human rights law. At the release of the State Department's report on International Religious Freedom in September, Secretary Clinton emphasized the role that religious freedom and tolerance play in building stable and harmonious societies. She said:
“Hatred and intolerance are destabilizing. When governments crack down on religious expression, when politicians or public figures try to use religion as a wedge issue, or when societies fail to take steps to denounce religious bigotry and curb discrimination based on religious identity, they embolden extremists and fuel sectarian strife. And the reverse is also true: When governments respect religious freedom, when they work with civil society to promote mutual respect, or when they prosecute acts of violence against members of religious minorities, they can help turn down the temperature. They can foster a public aversion to hateful speech without compromising the right to free expression. And in doing so, they create a climate of tolerance that helps make a country more stable, more secure, and more prosperous.”
This is the basis for our belief that in order to succeed and prosper, Egypt, and its neighbors, must protect the rights of all citizens and all minorities, including its Coptic population. The corollary is also true: successful democratic transitions are the best way to safeguard those rights.
Mr. Chairman, the Copts in Egypt have faced discrimination for many years. Christians face personal and collective discrimination, especially in government employment and the ability to build, renovate, and repair places of worship.
Although they represent about 10% of the population and play an important role in Egypt's economy, Copts have suffered from widespread discrimination and remain underrepresented in prominent positions in Egyptian politics and society.
The headlines—and the trend lines— continue to tell a disturbing story.
I was in Egypt just days after the January 2010 attack on the Nag Hammadi Church in Upper Egypt, when gunmen shot and killed seven people as worshippers were leaving a midnight Christmas mass. At that time, I called for an end to impunity for such crimes and full accountability for those who attacked this holy place. One suspect, Hamam al-Kamouny was tried under the emergency law in a state security court, convicted on January 16 and executed on October 10. The other two defendants, Qoraishi Abul Haggag and Hendawi El-Sayyed, were acquitted by the court, angering many Coptic activists. Yesterday, November 14, Egypt's official news agency announced that Abol-Haggag and El-Sayyed are to be retried on December 19 under the Higher Emergency State Security Court, for crimes including premeditated murder and terrorism with the use of force and violence. We applaud the pursuit of accountability in this case, although we would prefer that these types of crimes be dealt with in civilian courts with full due process of law.
Almost exactly a year after the Nag Hammadi attack, on January 1, 2011, a bomb exploded at the Coptic Orthodox Church of the Two Saints in Alexandria, killing 23 people and wounding around 100. There are no suspects in custody for that crime, although the Government of Egypt reports that its investigation is ongoing.
These two incidents, and others like them, took place before the fall of President Mubarak on February 11. We have since received reports of an increase in sectarian violence and tensions, including at least 67 people killed in religious clashes—most of them Coptic Christians. This brings the total number of reported deaths this year to more than 90. There have been at least six recent major incidents of violence against Copts:
On February 23, the Army used live ammunition, including rocket propelled grenades, against unarmed Copts during a land dispute at a monastery. A monk, one of the six shot, later died. To our knowledge, no one has been held accountable for these attacks.
On March 4, in the village of Sol, a large group of Muslim villagers destroyed the Church of Saint Mina and St. George after the army failed to stop them. To our knowledge, there has been no investigation and no one has been charged despite videos of the perpetrators.
On March 8, 13 people were killed when Muslims and Copts clashed in the Mukkatum area of Cairo. Some of the Copts had been protesting the slow government response to the destruction of the church in Sol. One Coptic bishop claimed that though news reports listed seven Christians and six Muslims. To our knowledge, there has been no investigation and no one has been charged in the deaths.
On May 8 in Imbaba, a poor neighborhood of Cairo, two churches were attacked and one burned during sectarian riots. The clashes resulted in 23 deaths and 232 injuries. That month, the official media reported that the government referred 48 suspects to trial. Approximately half of these suspects have been arrested, including a prominent Salafist leader, while half remain at large. The High State Security Court in Giza has adjourned the trial until December 4, when it expects to hear testimony from the remaining witnesses.
On September 30, in Merinab village in Edfu, Aswan governorate, an estimated crowd of 3,000 Muslims looted and burned the St. George Coptic Orthodox Church, in addition to some Copt-owned homes and businesses, following reported incitement by village imams. Local media reported that a Ministry of Justice fact-finding committee traveled to Aswan on October 12, in the aftermath of the Maspiro violence, to investigate the church burning. The status of this investigation is unclear.
And finally, on October 9 in Cairo, violence erupted in front of the Egyptian television building known as Maspiro, at a demonstration by Copts protesting the government's failure to investigate the burning of the church in Merinab in Aswan governorate. At least twenty-five people were killed and more than 300 injured.
On October 11, Secretary Clinton addressed the October 9 violence at Maspiro and called for an immediate, credible, and transparent investigation of all who were responsible for the violence, with full due process of law. The White House issued a statement urging Egyptians to move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt and reaffirming our belief that the rights of minorities— including Copts—must be respected, and that all people have the universal rights of peaceful protest and religious freedom.
The government of Egypt has stated publicly that they are conducting two investigations. The Egyptian Armed Forces are reviewing the conduct of Military Police, who eyewitnesses and video evidence suggest ran over and shot at demonstrators. The Ministry of Justice has been tasked by the Egyptian Cabinet with a full investigation of the incident. Separately, military prosecutors are investigating about 30 demonstrators, including one prominent blogger, who were detained during the violence. They are accused of inciting violence, stealing firearms, and attacking security forces. They will be tried in military courts.
On November 2, a fact-finding committee established by the National Council for Human Rights issued an initial report on the Maspiro violence. (NCHR is a quasi-governmental watchdog body, but the committee was led by respected human rights advocates). The report found that the march by Copts and their Muslim allies began peacefully at Shubra and moved toward Maspiro in downtown Cairo. According to the report and several corroborating accounts, as the marchers approached Maspiro, they were attacked by civilians throwing rocks and chanting Muslim extremist slogans. According to the same sources, military police then confronted the marchers and attempted to keep them from reaching the building. The MPs used shields and batons, and fired blanks. Marchers began fighting back against the violent civilians and military police. The NCHR report acknowledged that 12 or more civilians were killed when they were run over by military vehicles. The committee said it could not determine who fired the bullets that killed at least seven demonstrators.
During the height of the clashes, state TV anchor Rasha Magdy called on “honorable Egyptians” to defend the Army against “attacks by violent demonstrators.” Twenty-one prominent Egyptian human right organizations criticized the “inflammatory role played by the official state media,” charging that a “direct link can be traced between the outright incitement against demonstrators by state media and the events at Maspiro.”
On October 13, the head of Egypt's military justice system, Adel al-Morsi, said that the military would lead the official investigation into the events. According to Human Rights Watch and local media, the military has arrested approximately 30 individuals. The government has said it will try suspects in military courts, since the crimes involved attacks on military personnel and equipment.
The Coptic community is concerned, as we are, about the severity and frequency of sectarian attacks against their community, and while they recognize that the government has nothing to do with most of these attacks, they are greatly concerned about the need to hold perpetrators accountable. I want to make clear that most of these clashes have involved both Copts and Muslims, and members of both communities have been the perpetrators and victims of the violence. It also is important to emphasize that many Muslims have stood up to defend members of the Coptic community against extremist violence.
The United States Government condemns this sectarian violence and continues to urge the Government of Egypt to take all necessary and available measures to reduce these tensions.
In raising our concerns about the Coptic community, we are also aware and very supportive of the positive steps the Egyptian government has taken on behalf of the Copts. On March 8, by order of the Prime Minister, Coptic priest Mitaus Wahba was released from prison where he was serving a five year sentence for officiating at a wedding of a Christian convert from Islam. On April 14, the SCAF fulfilled its commitment to rebuild a church in Sol that had been destroyed on March 4 by mob violence. And as I noted earlier, the government also took steps in response to the May 8 Imbaba violence; in addition to re-opening dozens of churches, the government is prosecuting 48 individuals charged with murder, attempted murder, and a variety of other crimes. The trial is scheduled to resume on December 4.
The government also has pledged to adopt a Unified Places of Worship Law, which would guarantee all faiths the ability to construct and maintain places of worship. The Cabinet sent the draft law to the military council in October. We urge the SCAF to endorse this provision as soon as possible. The Government of Egypt has promised to consider this measure for several years, including twice in the last five months. Numerous cases of sectarian violence in recent years have stemmed from disputes over church construction. The prompt adoption of this provision now would send a very strong signal of the government's commitment to protect religious freedom. It would recognize the right of all Egyptians to freely build places of worship they need to conduct religious activities. As the government reviews this proposal it should take into account the concerns expressed over earlier drafts that the suggested multistage process of applying for permits to construct and repair churches is too convoluted, cedes too much authority to governors to grant permits, and imposes onerous restrictions on the number and location of houses of worship.
Finally, in the aftermath of the Maspiro violence, we welcome steps that are being taken by the Government of Egypt to reduce discrimination in the penal codes. On October 15, the SCAF issued a decree amending Egypt's penal code to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, language, faith, or race. The decree also delineated prison sentences and specific fines for acts of discrimination, as well as failure to prevent discrimination. These included more severe penalties for government officials found to be complicit in discrimination.
The new penal code provisions bolster the Egyptian constitution's ban on discrimination. Article 7 of the March 31, 2011, constitutional declaration states that “all citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, language, religion, or creed.” We urge the government to enforce these and other anti-discrimination laws and hold violators accountable so that all minorities, including Copts, can enjoy equal protection.
Like Egyptian Muslims, Egyptian Copts are concerned about their country's future and their own place in it. In addition to security from sectarian violence and equal treatment under the law, they want equal representation in parliament and a proportional voice on the committee that will draft Egypt's new constitution. Like moderate Egyptian Muslims, the vast majority of whom support religious freedom, Copts and other religious minorities consider themselves full partners in a new Egypt.
As Secretary Clinton said last week, “If—over time—the most powerful political force in Egypt remains a roomful of unelected officials, they will have planted the seeds for future unrest, and Egyptians will have missed a historic opportunity.” The door to real democratic change is only beginning to open. We hope Egyptians will walk through it together to a more peaceful and prosperous future.
Thank you.
Statement by Deputy Secretary Burns, November 22, 2011Footnote 16
Deputy Secretary William J. Burns made these remarks in Kuwait City
Deputy Secretary Burns. Let me begin by thanking our gracious host and co-chair, Kuwait. It is fitting that, in this transformative year, the Forum takes place in a country with a vibrant civil society, and that has been a pioneer of participatory democracy for all of its citizens.
I would also like to thank France for its leadership of the G8—and especially for launching the new Deauville Partnership to respond to the wave of historic change across the region.
Nearly one year ago, Secretary Clinton spoke with urgency to the ministers gathered at the Forum for the Future in Doha. She warned that, unless governments undertook reforms to meet the aspirations of their people, the region's foundations risked “sinking into the sand.” We recall this with humility, because anyone who had read the Arab Human Development Reports over the past decade could see the structural problems that were accumulating. None of us knew how quickly change was coming, or what form these changes would take.
And yet, one year later, we find ourselves at a new moment—one of enormous promise for citizens demanding more freedom, more opportunity and more dignity, and also one of uncertainty and risk for the entire region. The question of this moment is no longer whether or when or how fast the region needs to undertake political and economic reforms. Today, the question is how we can mobilize to support successful democratic transitions for people and societies who will no longer accept an untenable status quo.
Today, our hearts are with Egypt and its brave people, who have sacrificed so much for their freedom. We grieve the loss of life and injuries there. Egyptians will determine their own future. But it seems clear that Egypt will only achieve stability through completing its transition to civilian rule, and we hope they can achieve this goal as quickly as possible.
The truth is that the stability and prosperity that we all seek across the region will only flow from a process of sustained, meaningful democratic and economic reform—one that redefines the relationship between rulers and ruled.
Secretary Clinton has described representative government, economic opportunity and vibrant civil society as three legs of a stool that, together, lift and support nations as they reach for long-sought progress and prosperity. I would like to talk briefly about all three—with a special emphasis on civil society, which is at the heart of the BMENA initiative.
I. Civil Society Civil society gives voice to peoples’ aspirations, needs, interests and concerns. It helps us create a functioning marketplace of ideas. Governments and civil society should work together as partners—not competitors—to ensure sustainable, legitimate, inclusive reform. Governments that draw on the talents and creativity of civil society are better at identifying and solving problems.
Creating a mutually beneficial relationship between government and civil society Starts with dialogue, but cannot end there. Talk of reform must be translated into concrete action that delivers tangible improvements in people's lives—the only way to bring the long-term stability that all of us seek for the region. We've heard today the voices in civil society demanding a focus on accountability and follow-up. And we share your commitment to deliver results.
Partnership with civil society must extend to the public square—to bloggers who criticize public officials; to peaceful protestors; to those advocating for equality and inclusion for all, including women and religious minorities. America strongly supports the rights of all individuals to join together in associations, to speak freely and to work with government and with each other to build a better future.
That is what is happening in Tunisia, which held the first truly democratic elections in its history last month—thanks in no small part to close cooperation between government and civil society in organizing elections and educating voters.
Today we are very pleased to join Tunisia as our BMENA co-chair for 2012. Tunisia has led the region into a new era of personal, political, and economic freedom. We are proud that Tunisia will take on this important leadership role over the coming year.
During our G-8 presidency, we intend to take a pragmatic, results-oriented approach and focus on the priorities identified by citizens across the region—issues like rule of law, anti-corruption, expanding educational opportunity, and strengthening our civil societies. Toward that end, I am pleased to announce that the U.S. during our G-8 presidency will make available $1 million in grants specifically for civil society groups participating in the Forum process. Our focus on civil society reinforces our efforts to achieve progress on the other two legs of the stool I described earlier: democratic freedoms and economic opportunity.
II. Supporting Political Openness and Democratic Transitions When it comes to supporting democratic freedoms, our position is clear. Where countries are attempting transitions to democracy, we will support them. And when we see groups attempting to subvert democracy, we will work to safeguard hard-won rights and freedoms. Where countries are moving more slowly, we will urge leaders and citizens to stay ahead of the wave of demand for democratic change. And where leaders attempt to hold back the future at the point of a gun, these regimes will face increasing pressure and isolation.
Nowhere is this more clear than Syria, where the United States and most of you here today have condemned the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime and made abundantly clear that its brutality will no longer be tolerated. And nowhere is the disconnect between rulers and ruled greater than it is today in Iran.
III. Economic Opportunity Finally, let me briefly address the third leg of the stool. Political transitions cannot succeed without confidence in a better economic future. It is essential, for all of us, to nurture economic systems where talent is cultivated and rewarded, where entrepreneurs and innovators are unleashed to enrich their societies, where nations can trade with their neighbors and compete in the global economy.
I urge all of us in this room to think creatively and ambitiously about the path ahead. Conventional foreign assistance will not be enough. Nor will a short-term approach. We must work together to empower individual citizens to make their own economic as well as political choices, to build their own businesses, and to grow a real middle class. And we know that economic liberalization that fails to achieve inclusive growth is a false path to prosperity.
This kind of genuine economic reform will require that leaders have visions compelling enough to drive what will be tough and sometimes unpopular choices. Those of us who are here from the G8 must think, and act, more ambitiously to open up trade and investment across the region. Through the Deauville Partnership, we are mobilizing the world's leading economies and international lending institutions to support the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, as well as the major reforms underway in Jordan and Morocco. As G8 President next year, we will keep high-level attention on these transitions, and also on the imperative of regional economic integration across the Middle East and North Africa.
It is a fact that the Middle East is a place where pessimists rarely lack for either company or validation. And it is a fact that the future of the region holds more than its share of problems and uncertainties. But it is also filled with much promise, and hopes and possibilities that were hard to imagine when we last met at this Forum one year ago. I urge those of us gathered today—governments, civil society, partners and friends—to treat a time of uncertainty as a moment of opportunity, and to work together to bend the arc of history toward peace, dignity and a better future. Thank you.
Statement by the White House Press Secretary, November 23, 2011Footnote 17
We welcome today's report by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, which provides a thorough and independent assessment of events in Bahrain since protests first erupted in February. King Hamad's decision to establish the Commission was a courageous one, and we commend him for it. We commend the chairman of the Commission, Cherif Bassiouni and the other commissioners for their thorough and painstaking efforts over nearly 5 months. The report identifies a number of disturbing human rights abuses that took place during this period, and it is now incumbent upon the Government of Bahrain to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations and put in place institutional changes to ensure that such abuses do not happen again.
We welcome King Hamad's commitment to carry out the report's recommendations and will closely follow the implementation process. More broadly, we believe the Commission's report and subsequent steps taken to implement its recommendations can serve as a foundation for advancing reconciliation and reform. Bahrain is a long-standing partner of the United States, and we urge the government and all parties to take steps that lead to respect for universal human rights and to meaningful reforms that meet the legitimate aspirations of all Bahrainis.
Statement by President Obama, November 23, 2011Footnote 18
President Obama. I welcome today's action by the Yemeni government and the opposition to sign a political agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council to form a government of national unity within 14 days and hold early presidential elections within 90 days. In particular, the United States welcomes President Ali Abdullah Saleh's decision to transfer executive powers immediately to the Vice President in accordance with the agreement. This represents an important step forward for the Yemeni people, who deserve the opportunity to determine their own future.
For ten months, the Yemeni people have courageously and steadfastly voiced their demands for change in cities across Yemen in the face of violence and extreme hardship. Today's agreement brings them a significant step closer to realizing their aspirations for a new beginning in Yemen. The United States urges all parties to move immediately to implement the terms of the agreement, which will allow Yemen to begin addressing an array of formidable challenges and chart a more secure and prosperous path for the future. The United States will continue to stand by the Yemeni people as they embark on this historic transition. We also acknowledge the important work done by our GCC partners in supporting this step forward.
Statement by NSC Spokesman Tommy Vietor, November 30, 2011Footnote 19
Spokesman Vietor. We commend the Turkish government for its announcement of economic sanctions and other measures against the Syrian regime. The leadership shown by Turkey in response to the brutality and violation of the fundamental rights of the Syrian people will isolate the Assad regime and send a strong message to Assad and his circle that their actions are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. The measures announced by the Turkish government today will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the Syrian regime, and we continue to call on other governments to join the chorus of condemnation and pressure against the Assad regime so that the peaceful and democratic aspirations of the Syrian people can be realized. President Obama has coordinated closely with Prime Minister Erdogan throughout the crisis in Syria and will continue to do so going forward.
Press Release from the Department of the Treasury, December 1, 2011Footnote 20
The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of two high-ranking Syrians pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13573 and identified the Military Housing Establishment and Real Estate Bank as entities owned or controlled by the Government of Syria pursuant to E.O. 13582, as the Government of Syria continues to employ brutal tactics against peaceful protestors across the country.
Today's action, along with recent measures announced by the Arab League, Turkey and the EU, demonstrate a commitment by the United States and its partners to work in close coordination to bring pressure to bear on the Assad regime, its agencies and instrumentalities by denying them access to the U.S. and international financial system.
“It has never been more critical to escalate pressure on the Syrian government to immediately cease all violence against its own people and isolate the regime from the international financial system,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to work closely with our partners in Europe and around the world to hasten a transition to democracy in Syria.”
As a result of today's action, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with Muhammad Makhluf and Aus Aslan and any assets they might have under U.S. jurisdiction are blocked. In addition, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with the Military Housing Establishment and Real Estate Bank pursuant to E.O. 13582, which blocks all property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction of the Government of Syria. Today's identifications are intended to aid U.S. persons and others in meeting their obligations under E.O. 13582.
Remarks by Assistant Secretary Glaser, December 2, 2011Footnote 21
Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser gave the following remarks in Washington, DC at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Assistant Secretary Glaser. From Tunisia to Syria, the people of Arab nations are demanding political change, better economic opportunity, and a greater say in determining their future. As repressive regimes crumble under popular pressure or respond with violence against their own people, the international community has responded nimbly, seeking to address each distinct situation with a distinct, tailored approach that best supports the transition to responsible, representative democracy.
In previous decades, it would have been unheard of for a Treasury Department official to be asked to speak before the Washington Institute to discuss the U.S. Government's and the international community's response to such events. Yet throughout the Arab Spring, the Treasury Department has been at the forefront of the international community's response to these challenges on two fronts.
Treasury has, of course, been at the center of U.S. efforts to marshal international assistance and support for the transitions underway in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and to aid in fostering inclusive economic growth in the region. But today, I'd like to focus my remarks on Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, which has crafted strategies for applying sanctions and other financial measures tailored to the unique circumstances of each situation we have faced. Along with the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and our partners in Asia and the Middle East have all increasingly turned to targeted financial sanctions in response to repression and violence. And in a truly remarkable development, both the Arab League and Turkey have in recent days announced far-reaching measures of their own, making financial pressure the centerpiece of their respective efforts to end the bloodshed in Syria.
Before I turn directly to a discussion of the Arab Spring, I'd like to step back to offer some of the context in which we at Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence view these events. We have witnessed a dramatic change, globally, in the way financial measures are integrated into the international security toolkit. And these developments—the international community's embrace of targeted financial measures, and the effectiveness of those measures—are to a large extent the result of the Treasury Department's efforts over the past decade to create an institutional framework and to develop a strategic model for using financial tools to advance national security objectives.
The Treasury Department's Strategic Approach to Developing Financial Measures
Within the Treasury Department, the mission of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, known as TFI, is to marshal the Treasury Department's policy, enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions to sever the lines of financial support to international terrorists, WMD proliferators, narcotics traffickers, and other threats to our national security. We seek to meet this responsibility by striving to achieve two overarching goals: First, to promote financial transparency by identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities that make the domestic and global financial system susceptible to abuse by illicit actors.
Second, to identify, disrupt and dismantle the financial networks that support those who threaten U.S. and international security.
Promoting financial transparency is the key to creating a rules-based, global financial system that is hostile to illicit finance. Our efforts focus on both the formal and informal financial sectors, in both the U.S. and internationally. Indeed, a great deal of our work is aimed at strengthening global standards and facilitating implementation of anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing regimes, also known as AML/CFT, in countries around the world through the Financial Action Task Force or FATF, and other multilateral bodies.
In conjunction with our effort to promote financial transparency through a global AML/CFT architecture, we have also developed a strategic approach to target the financial networks of those who support terrorists, engage in WMD proliferation, and foment regional instability. This approach combines unilateral and multilateral measures—often but not always built upon UN Security Council Resolutions—and consistent outreach to and dialogue with the private sector.
We first began to put this strategy to the test in 2005 and 2006 against North Korea and Iran, respectively. Beginning with unilateral targeted financial measures, we launched an unprecedented effort to engage the private sector and raise its awareness to the risk of doing business with these jurisdictions. And, most important, we engaged with our international partners to build a multilateral coalition that supports our strategy of financial isolation.
Today, as a result of this multi-front, multi-year campaign, Iran and North Korea have been almost entirely cut off from much of the world's largest financial sectors. Iranian banks have been deprived of much needed access to financial services in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and the Iranian government struggles to manage its economy in the face of ever-tightening financial sanctions.
These two case studies demonstrated that we could craft financial strategies tailored to the unique circumstances presented by particular international security challenges. The success of our targeted measures was linked in no small part to the less public but no less significant systemic work of promoting financial transparency and building AML/CFT regulatory regimes. And the work that we did in both areas—targeted and systemic—laid the groundwork for the international community's response to the Arab Spring.
Responding to the Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt
In the early days of the Arab Spring, we witnessed the rapid growth of popular movements calling for the ouster of undemocratic rulers in Tunisia and Egypt. These popular movements were able to achieve relatively quick leadership changes. In these scenarios, our goal was to ensure that the outgoing regime elites did not undermine the political transition by looting their nations’ treasuries.
To achieve this, we engaged our interagency and international partners to apply a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to identify illicit holdings, protect against illicit asset flows, and assist in repatriating assets stolen from the people of Tunisia and Egypt. The strategy relied on and benefitted from our prior experience in leading global efforts to trace and repatriate Iraqi assets stolen by the former Hussein regime, as well as longstanding efforts to create a global framework for combating kleptocratic asset flows. And, again, the strategy also relies upon our longstanding efforts to develop a global framework for the implementation of AML/CFT standards—which includes a focus on specific risks of foreign corruption, such as by highlighting the need for financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence against foreign politically exposed persons and to recognize the potential for asset flight on behalf of deposed regimes.
Our strategy also includes supporting the efforts of the Justice Department to confiscate and repatriate stolen assets, including by working with the joint World Bank and United Nation's Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, which provides critical assistance to countries that require technical assistance in understanding how to engage the international financial system to recover assets stolen by corrupt elites. And it includes supporting the efforts of the State Department to strengthen the global commitment to developing and implementing a comprehensive anti-corruption regime through a variety of means, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the OECD's Anti-Bribery Working Group, and the G20 Kleptocracy Working Group.
In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, Treasury alerted the international financial sector to the possibility of large scale embezzlement on the part of the ousted leaders and their close associates. In both cases, Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network—or FinCEN—issued advisories to warn U.S. financial institutions of the possibility of asset flight by senior Egyptian and Tunisian government officials. The advisories called for enhanced due diligence and scrutiny of transactions that could possibly represent misappropriated or stolen state assets. Treasury shared its advisories with counterparts in other financial centers, many of which took similar actions, globalizing the effort to identify, restrain and repatriate proceeds of corruption.
Libya
In the case of Libya, we faced a fundamentally different challenge. Our primary goal was not to prevent an ousted regime from looting the nation's coffers, but rather to deprive a sitting regime of the resources it needed to sustain a campaign of violent repression. Our aim was to increase the financial pressure on the Qadhafi regime and hasten its downfall.
As we deployed our financial tools to isolate the Qadhafi regime, we were fortunate to be dealing with an unusually favorable set of circumstances. We had broad international support for sanctions, a strong mandate from the United Nations Security Council, and a NATO-backed military effort. Following closely on the heels of President Obama's issuance of Executive Order 13566, imposing broad financial and other sanctions, the U.S. and its partners secured the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which required all UN member states to freeze without delay the assets of Qadhafi, his family, and key individuals and entities affiliated with the regime, and to prohibit transactions with them.
The effect of these measures was magnified by the fact that the Qadhafi regime was relatively well-integrated into the international financial system, with a large amount of wealth held in foreign holdings and investments susceptible to the application of sanctions under U.S. and European jurisdiction. Just three days after the President issued the Executive Order, more than $30 billion of Government of Libya assets had been frozen under U.S. jurisdiction. Since March, this total has swelled to more than $37 billion.
This combination of factors—speed, coordination, and comprehensiveness— led to the implementation of one of the most successful sanctions regimes ever put in place.
In reacting so quickly to the events unfolding in Libya, the international community safeguarded the wealth of the Libyan people from misappropriation by Qadhafi and prevented him from accessing a massive war chest to fund new violence. At the same time, the ban on transactions and business with the Qadhafi regime isolated it from the global financial system and key trading partners, restricting its ability to obtain desperately needed goods and services at crucial junctures in the conflict. These sanctions ultimately helped hasten the collapse of Qadhafi by preventing him from accessing the financial resources and channels of commerce necessary to purchase weapons, pay mercenaries and fuel tanks and planes.
The implementation of financial sanctions against Libya was not, of course, without its challenges. The principal challenge we faced in this context was facilitating and coordinating the effective implementation of sanctions in a sophisticated global financial system where the assets of concern were largely held in complex capital market arrangements across multiple financial centers. Treasury's expertise in implementing targeted financial sanctions and its relationships with the private sector and with international counterparts were instrumental in ensuring effective global action.
And although the sanctions regime contributed to our initial policy goals, our work is far from finished. As articulated in Security Council Resolution 2009, we must now turn our attention to making blocked assets available transparently and responsibly, in a manner consistent with the wishes and needs of the Libyan people. Doing so will require significant coordination among nations holding frozen assets and the new Libyan government. We look forward to the day when we will responsibly turn over the Qadhafi regime's frozen assets to and for the benefit of the Libyan people.
Syria
Syria presents a more complicated set of challenges. In Syria, our policy goals are largely the same as in Libya—to deprive the Assad regime of access to resources that can be used to fund its violent oppression and ultimately to hasten Assad's downfall. However, in the case of Syria, our challenge has been to develop and advance a strategy to apply financial pressure to the Assad regime in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution. Such a strategy must combine effective unilateral action with strategic outreach to international counterparts and the private sector.
Since the start of the uprising, the U.S. has led through example in achieving a significant multilateral increase in pressure on the Syrian government to stop its campaign of violence against civilians. Though the U.S. has sought to use sanctions to shift the behavior of the Syrian regime and its insiders long before the beginning of the uprising in March 2011, we have imposed a series of new measures in recent months that are designed to ratchet up pressure on the Syrian government.
President Obama has signed three new Executive Orders since March, each serving as a response to Assad's escalation of violence. E.O. 13572 targets individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. E.O. 13573 expanded this further by targeting President Assad and other senior regime officials. In August, the Administration took the strongest step yet with E.O. 13582, which prohibits transactions between U.S. persons and the Government of Syria, bans the export of U.S. services to and new investment in Syria, and targets a crucial revenue stream for the Syrian government by banning all dealings by U.S. persons in Syrian-origin petroleum products. In addition to these new measures, we continue to hold Syria accountable for all of its illicit behavior and took the important step of designating the Commercial Bank of Syria as supporter of WMD proliferation under Executive Order 13382.
These domestic measures have helped deny the Assad regime access to the resources it needs to continue financing its repression. But the defining element of our Syria strategy—and what has made our strategy effective—has been our close coordination with our partners in Europe and elsewhere and our aggressive outreach to expand the coalition of countries willing to take complementary action.
When President Obama announced the government blocking program under E.O. 13582 and called for Assad to step down on August 18, many of our international counterparts echoed his call. A number of these countries, including Japan, Australia, Switzerland, and Canada, have issued sanctions of their own against Syria. Most notably, the EU implemented a ban on the importation of Syrian oil and gas and prohibited new investment in the Syrian energy sector. Furthermore, following the U.S. designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria for proliferation activity, the EU froze Commercial Bank of Syria assets in Europe. And this week, the EU announced the decision to implement new measures against Syria's energy, financial and trade sectors, including listing additional individuals and entities that are involved in the violence or directly supporting the Assad regime.
Without question, U.S. and EU financial measures have successfully undermined the financial underpinnings of the Assad regime. Our actions against the Commercial Bank of Syria have helped to constrain the Assad regime's primary facilitator of foreign transactions. More importantly, since the EU previously accounted for more than 90 percent of Syria's crude exports, U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions on the Syrian petroleum industry have effectively eliminated the Assad regime's revenue from the petroleum sector, which accounted for one third of its total revenue prior to the imposition of sanctions.
Additionally, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the Arab League's and the Turkish Government's unprecedented decisions earlier this week to implement wide-ranging sanctions against the Syrian Government. The Arab League's resolution includes a full slate of aggressive financial measures that include calling on member states to cease transactions with the Central Bank of Syria and the Commercial Bank of Syria. The Turkish Government also announced a similarly strong set of measures that includes the freezing of all Syrian Government assets and prohibits dealings with the Syrian Central Bank. Taken together, the Arab League's and Turkey's announcement of sanctions represent a significant step on the road toward ending the bloodshed in Syria.
We have arrived at this current state of affairs in no small part because of the U.S. Government's persistent engagement with its foreign partners. The Treasury Department has played a leading role in emphasizing the power of financial measures, in particular in the Syria context. In recent months, senior Treasury officials have traveled extensively to places like Turkey and the Gulf to deliver this same message.
We recognize that the Assad regime will seek to use the international financial system to evade sanctions whenever possible. Coordinated, multilateral action is therefore critically important to identifying and disrupting potential avenues for the Syrian government to evade sanctions. Equally important is our strategic dialogue with the private sector, particularly in regional financial centers that are potential destinations for Assad regime assets. In the past month, I've travelled to Lebanon and Jordan to engage with public sector officials and caution financial institutions to exercise vigilance against potential sanctions evasion.
We will continue to encourage all of our partners around the world to move without delay to increase the pressure on the Syrian government through targeted financial measures, in the hopes of bringing an end to the violence in Syria and pushing for Assad to step down to allow for a peaceful and democratic transition. Just yesterday we announced the designation of two Syrian individuals, and the identification of a public works company called the Military Housing Establishment, which provides funding to the regime, and
Real Estate Bank—which is Syria's second largest bank. And the Administration will continue its efforts to press for a resolution at the UN that will help to further isolate the current Syrian government.
Conclusion
As we continue to respond to developments across the Arab world, we stand ready to take action where needed, and will be ready to apply financial measures in support of our national interests.
We continue to witness the uncertainty of a tumultuous, historic time, however, one thing is certain: Financial tools will continue to play a central role in our nation's and the international community's response, and we will continue to work multilaterally where possible, and unilaterally when necessary, to achieve our policy aims in the context of the historic changes sweeping the Arab world today.
Thank you.
Press Statement from the Department of State, December 2, 2011Footnote 22
Today, the Human Rights Council in Geneva took decisive action to reinforce the Syrian Government's isolation and draw attention to the Asad regime's unacceptable and brutal treatment of the Syrian people, including its many peaceful protestors. The United States worked with over 50 countries on this special session, which was co-sponsored by 29 members of the Human Rights Council—by far the largest number of co-sponsors for any special session since the Council was created.
The special session endorsed a report released earlier this week by the independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which catalogued the Syrian Government's brutal abuse of its citizens that are seeking to exercise their basic rights and transition their country to a democracy. According to the report, the Asad regime is killing Syrian citizens, arbitrarily detaining and torturing protestors, and in several cases sexually assaulting children while under police custody.
It is clear that the Syrian Government is willing to do anything to strangle the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. The United States strongly supports the Commission's efforts to expose the abuses by the Asad regime and help bring the human rights violators to account.
Today's action, along with the UN General Assembly's condemnation of the human rights violations in Syria and the League of Arab States’ historic steps, shows that the Asad regime is now more isolated and under greater international pressure than ever before. Our message is clear: to the people of Syria, the world stands by you, and we will not ignore your plight in the face of ongoing violence; to the Syrian Government, the time has come to end the flagrant human rights violations and step out of the way of the democratic transition that the Syrian people are yearning for.
Statement by the White House Press Secretary, December 6, 2011Footnote 23
Ambassador Robert Ford returns to Damascus today with our full confidence and support. His return demonstrates our continued solidarity with the Syrian people and the value we place on Ford's efforts to engage Syrians on their efforts to achieve a peaceful and democratic transition. We believe his presence in the country is among the most effective ways to send a message to the Syrian people that the United States stands in solidarity with them. We expect the Syrian government to uphold its obligations to protect diplomatic personnel and facilities under the Vienna Convention and allow our Foreign Service officers to conduct their work free of intimidation or obstacles.
Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, December 6, 2011Footnote 24
Secretary Hillary Clinton gave these remarks in Geneva, Switzerland
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, let me begin by saying that it's an honor to meet with all of you, the president and senior members of the Syrian National Council. I look forward to our discussion and hearing from each of you. I am particularly interested in the work you are doing about how a democratic transition would proceed. Fred Hof, my special coordinator, has told me that you've put a lot of work into that paper, and there are many very constructive ideas in it, because obviously, a democratic transition includes more than removing the Asad regime. It means setting Syria on the path of the rule of law and protecting the universal rights of all citizens regardless of sect or ethnicity or gender.
Second, we will discuss the work that the Council is doing to ensure that their plan is to reach out to all minorities, to counter the regime's divide-and-conquer approach, which pits ethnic and religious groups against one another. The Syrian opposition, as represented here, recognizes that Syria's minorities have legitimate questions and concerns about their future, and that they need to be assured that Syria will be better off under a regime of tolerance and freedom that provides opportunity and respect and dignity on the basis of the consent rather than on the whims of a dictator.
And we certainly believe that if Syrians unite, they together can succeed in moving their country to that better future. We are well aware that there is a lot of hard work to be done. There are many Syrians in exile who are committed to helping their country make this transition. And there are many Syrians in their homes and neighborhoods and communities who are struggling against the violence and the repression to realize that better future as well.
I think Syrians both in exile and inside Syria are behaving with great courage and commitment and are inspired and motivated by the aspirations of freedom and democracy that are sweeping the Arab world.
So I look forward to hearing from each of you in our time together this afternoon. Thank you very much.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton and Danish Foreign Minister Søvndal, December 15, 2011Footnote 25
Secretary Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal gave the following remarks in Washington, DC
Secretary Clinton. Good afternoon, everyone. It's a great pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Søvndal for our first meeting here in Washington in his new role. And it is also clear that for me, even in this age of video conferencing and, obviously, telephone calls, and email, that there's nothing to replace face-to-face meetings and diplomacy. And so I thank you very much for coming, Minister.
Our friendship between our two countries dates back more than two centuries and we share a common bond that is our fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. We are working in a number of areas throughout the world to advance our common interests and we will continue to do so. And in fact, we are going to be discussing ways we can even build on our already deep and important work. Let me just mention a few of the issues we discussed.
First, the transition in Afghanistan: I expressed my admiration and appreciation for all that the Danish people have done to support the people of Afghanistan. Danish troops are deployed throughout the country serving shoulder-to-shoulder with American and other allied forces. I know that Danish forces have suffered terrible losses, but I want to express our gratitude for their sacrifice, which is helping to create conditions for a safe and orderly transition to Afghan security lead in Helmand province.
We discussed a number of the issues that are necessary to fulfill the potential of a transition that will help Afghanistan as well as the transformation that needs to continue well beyond 2014. We will be discussing these issues in the lead up to the NATO summit in Chicago next May, and I look forward to working with our Danish partners to shape the agenda for that meeting, as well as other NATO efforts.
I know we can count on Denmark's continued leadership, especially when it comes to committing long term funding beyond 2014 for Afghanistan. International cooperation has been key to the successes we've seen so far, and as we all agreed in Bonn, we need to continue that up through 2014 and beyond.
Now more broadly, stabilizing fragile states is an area where we have an opportunity to expand our work together. Denmark has made its commitment clear by strengthening its stabilization and security departments, and by increasing its support in 2012 for peace and stabilization efforts not only in Afghanistan, but also the Middle East and throughout Africa. At a time when every budget is stretched thin, Minister, that sends an important message. And the State Department recently created a Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and we look forward to working with you and pursuing an agenda to enhance global security and development.
Foreign Minister and I also discussed Denmark's role as president of the European Union in 2012. We both recognize the need to maintain and intensify our close cooperation on the full range of U.S.-EU issues, including security and development. Naturally, we discussed decisions regarding Europe's debt crisis. We all have a stake in a speedy resolution. The United States supports efforts to enact pro-growth reforms, and we will continue to support the work being done by our European partners.
And finally, I thanked the foreign minister for Denmark's effective leadership on Arctic issues. As climate change progresses, the matter of preserving freedom of navigation and other issues in the Arctic will only grow more pressing. Earlier this year, Denmark's leadership on the Arctic Council resulted in the conclusion of an Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the first legally binding agreement among the eight Arctic states and observers. This was an important early step and I look forward to collaborating with our Danish colleagues on more issues related to this vital region.
So, Foreign Minister, let me conclude by thanking you and the people of Denmark once more for your invaluable partnership and your leadership on so many issues from counterterrorism to Green Growth. I look forward to many other fruitful discussions and I appreciate your coming at such a busy time to begin that conversation.
Foreign Minister Søvndal. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your warm welcome, thank you very much for your hospitality. Denmark's relationship with the EU is of great importance, I think, for both of us. We—it's very important also for us, first, to have a friendly and also an honest dialogue about two close allies as our countries. We appreciate very much the multilateral approach you have to the global questions. We cooperate in a lot of different areas, as you mentioned. I think it's very important these years to build up international relation on promoting human rights. There is a fight in a lot of places in the world about that, about democratic values, and rule of law.
As you mentioned, we are going to take the EU presidency. It's not in the most easy time we have to do that. We'll do what we can to make a successful presidency. We know that the economic question, the debt crisis of Europe, is playing a big role. Europe is taking steps to try to make answers to the economic challenges we face. One of the important things for the new Danish Government is to increase what we call Green Growth. We think that's one of the common ways out of this crisis, to be better at green technology.
As mentioned, we also discussed the Arab Spring, its situation with a lot of hope and some concern about the changes taking place. We are very much encouraged by what's happened in Libya. We're very much encouraged about the elections taking place in Tunisia. We looked at some concern about Egypt, but we'll stay there. And I think the important thing is if we are most to hope or most to concern that we stay there not to take over the developments they're going to make, but to be at their side and help.
We also confirmed today our common work to be done in Afghanistan. We're going to stay there also after 2014, not in the hard combat mission, but with assistant aid, and we're also helping financing the Afghan national forces. As you mentioned also, I think we can also help each other trying to stabilize some of the fragile countries. We have a very big interest in doing that when—if we can secure these states.
And just to finish off, we have a common agenda about disarmament. We have a dream of a world free of nuclear weapons. We'd like to work also on that agenda together.
And finally about Arctic, it's a very— it's a region which is getting more and more important. And we think it's a good example also how states with difficult— different interests are able to work together in a way where its international law, its international rules, deciding the way we're going to handle also difficult questions in the region. So you could say from Arctic to the Arab Spring, it's a very broad agenda. It's because we are in a world with a lot of big agendas just now. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. We have time for four today. We will start with ABC, Kirit Radia.
Q. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary and Mr. Minister. Two questions, Madam Secretary. The first today being a milestone day in Iraq with the casing of the colors, do you have anything to say about that and some of the concerns that have been raised about the ability of diplomats to get out of the Embassy given these—lack of immunity for contractors?
And the second question I have, Russia has tabled a resolution at the UN today on Syria. I don't know if you've had a chance to see it yet, but there—it does contain some language about how the government has not enacted enough reforms, but it also says that it blames extremist groups in the country for some of the violence. Do you have any comment on that? Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, with regard to Iraq, as you all know very well, the end of our military mission was recognized yesterday with Secretary Panetta's visit. Prime Minister Maliki was here in Washington meeting with the President and many others to discuss the way forward. We have renewed our commitment under the Strategic Framework Agreement to work closely with the Iraqis to help them realize their own ambitions for a free and sovereign Iraq. We will continue to support them, and obviously the lead role in that now falls, as it does in our relations with countries all over the world, to the State Department.
We think we are well positioned for the 2012 transition to a civilian-led presence. We have a very robust presence that will demonstrate our commitment across the board in every area under the Strategic Framework Agreement with diplomats, business and development experts, security assistance staff, police trainers, law enforcement officers, and many others from across many civilian agencies within our own government. And we've made clear that we will have to be working closely with the Iraqis to ensure the security of our civilians. And we have had very strong commitments from the Iraqis that whatever assistance we need will be forthcoming. I think it's understood that this is one of the most challenging missions that the State Department has ever led. But we've had a great deal of thought given to what needs to be accomplished, and the team, both here in Washington and, even more importantly in Baghdad, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Basra, is very well prepared. So we're moving forward.
With respect to the point you just made about a Russian draft, I have not seen the draft. I've had it just briefly described to me, and there are some issues in it that we would not be able to support. There is, unfortunately, a seeming parity between the government and peaceful protestors and then other Syrians who are trying to defend themselves, but we're going to study the draft carefully. It will have to be shared with the Arab League, which has taken the lead on the response to what's going on in Syria. And hopefully, we can work with the Russians, who—for the first time, at least—are recognizing that this is a matter that needs to go to the Security Council. It's just that we have differences in how they are approaching it. But we hope to be able to work with them.
Ms. Nuland. Next question, Stefan Graham, Danish Broadcasting.
Q. Madam Secretary, your NATO ambassador recently said that with under investment in NATO over the coming years NATO would be unable to launch any new actions similar to the one we've just experienced in Libya. To what extent does under investment in NATO threaten NATO?
And Mr. Foreign Minister, Denmark is planning substantial cuts in defense. How are you able to convince critical allies that we are going to pay our fair share for the future of NATO and to sustain NATO capabilities?
Secretary Clinton. Do you want to start, Minister?
Foreign Minister Søvndal. Shall I start? I think we are in the position like all the European countries are, like U.S. also are, that we don't have the money we had once, also not the military spending. The former government and the present government is (inaudible) the same goal as how much could be taken out of the military spending and still remain a strong military. We have some structural reforms we can make on Danish military. They have not been published yet.
But I'm sure—to answer your question—that Denmark will be able to do the kind of missions we did like the one in Libya. And if there might be someplace else in the future we have to participate, we are going to participate also on the (inaudible) side of the military mission. That's one side. The other side of Danish defense policy is to build up fragile states, to be able also to prevent conflicts which might—if not intervening be developing into something where we have to react, military may be too late. So you could say we are trying to walk both on the one leg and also on the other leg. And I think that's a good way of walking actually.
Secretary Clinton. We agree. I think you've heard not only from our NATO ambassador but also from defense secretaries and others that we do have a concern about the sustainability of our NATO forces and deterrent. It's something that we have discussed very openly in NATO. We will continue to do so.
We believe that the alliance that has stood the test of time since the end of the Second World War is the premier military alliance in all of history. And there is no indication that it will be less needed in the future. There will be new challenges and threats, but the environment is certainly not one yet that we would like to see, where the collective defense that we've all pledged to under NATO will never be needed again.
In addition, the role that NATO has played in Libya most recently, in Afghanistan, has been instrumental to a lot of the values that we share. Denmark alone flew nearly 600 missions and was highly regarded in the professionalism of your military in doing so.
So we will follow closely developments in Europe. The minister is right, that we also have our own budgetary challenges. So we have to get smarter. I mean, let's be—let's pursue smart defense. And smart defense, which is a part of smart power, requires us to be looking for ways that we can cooperate more, where we can come up with new approaches to meeting our strategic and tactical requirements. So this will be a subject of a lot of conversation in the upcoming year.
Press Statement from Acting Spokesperson Mark Toner, December 27, 2011Footnote 26
We condemn the Syrian military's escalation of violence in Homs, Daraa and other cities prior to the deployment of the Arab League monitors. We have seen horrific pictures of indiscriminate fire, including by heavy tank guns, and heard reports of dozens of deaths, thousands of arrests, as well as beatings of peaceful protestors.
These repressive actions are not consistent with the terms of the Arab League initiative that the Syrian regime agreed to on November 2 or the protocol on observers that the regime agreed to on December 19. These agreements, designed to protect civilians, called for removal of military forces from the cities; allowing peaceful demonstrations; stopping violence by security forces, including the government's shabiha militia; releasing all political prisoners; and allowing Arab League monitors and members of the international media to report freely on events throughout the country.
In keeping with the Arab League agreement, we expect that Arab League monitors will be able to deploy and move freely within Homs and other Syrian cities as protestors peacefully gather in reaction to the regime's excessive violence. The monitors should have unfettered access to protestors and to areas most severely affected by the regime's crackdown. They bear a heavy responsibility in trying to protect Syrian civilians from the depredations of a murderous regime.
The next steps that the United States and the international community take will consider the extent of genuine cooperation from Syrian authorities with the Arab League monitoring mission, and the government's degree of compliance with the other elements of the Arab League initiative. If the Syrian regime continues to resist and disregard Arab League efforts, the international community will consider other means to protect Syrian civilians.
Press Statement from White House Deputy Press Secretary Joshua Earnest, December 29, 2011Footnote 27
The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have signed a government-to-government agreement under the Foreign Military Sales program to provide advanced F-15SA combat aircraft to the Royal Saudi Air Force.
Valued at $29.4 billion, this agreement includes production of 84 new aircraft and the modernization of 70 existing aircraft as well as munitions, spare parts, training, maintenance and logistics. These F-15SA aircraft, manufactured by The Boeing Company, are among the most sophisticated and capable aircraft in the world.
This agreement will positively impact the U.S. economy and further advances the president's commitment to create jobs by increasing exports. According to industry experts, this agreement will support more than 50,000 American jobs, engaging 600 suppliers in 44 states, and providing $3.5 billion in annual economic impact to the U.S. economy.
This agreement reinforces the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a strong Saudi defense capability as a key component to regional security.
Excerpts of Remarks by Assistant Secretary Shapiro and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Miller, December 29, 2011Footnote 28
Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dr. James Miller gave these remarks in Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. As you may recall, in October 2010, I officially announced the Administration's plan to sell to Saudi Arabia a significant defense package that would include advanced F-15 fighter aircraft and helicopters. We are pleased to announce that over this past weekend, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a letter of offer and acceptance for the sale of up to 84 advanced F-15SA fighter aircraft. It also includes upgrades to its current fleet of 70 F-15 aircraft, as well as munitions, spare parts, training, maintenance, and logistics.
This sale is worth $29.4 billion. These F-15SA aircraft, manufactured by the Boeing company, will be among the most sophisticated and capable aircraft in the world. This agreement serves to reinforce the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a strong Saudi defense capability as a key component to regional security.
Since announcing in June—in 2010 our intent to conclude this sale, the Departments of State and Defense have worked closely with the Saudi Government and industry to finalize the particulars of the deal. Jim and I both recently made separate trips to Saudi Arabia, in part to discuss the sale.
Let me outline a few of the reasons why this defense package is so important and historic, and how it will advance U.S. national interests. This sale will send a strong message to countries in the region that the United States is committed to stability in the Gulf and broader Middle East. It will enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against external threats to its sovereignty. It will advance interoperability between the air forces of our two countries through joint training and exercises. And lastly, this agreement will positively impact the U.S. economy and further advance the President's commitment to create jobs by increasing exports. According to industry experts, this agreement will support more than 50,000 American jobs. It will engage 600 suppliers in 44 states and provide $3.5 billion in annual economic impact to the U.S. economy. This will support jobs not only in the aerospace sector but also in our manufacturing base and support chain, which are all crucial for sustaining our national defense.
I also wanted to note that this sale was carefully assessed under the U.S. Government's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. This policy requires such sales be deemed in the national security interests of the United States, are consistent with the country's legitimate security needs, and support U.S. regional security objectives. With this agreement, the United States and Saudi Arabia have accomplished a historic achievement in our longstanding security partnership, a partnership that furthers security and stability in the Gulf region. Our longstanding security relationship with Saudi Arabia and other partners in the region has been a primary pillar of regional security for decades. And this sale further illustrates the firm commitment of the United States to the security and stability of the Gulf region.
I'll now turn it over to Jim Miller, who has more to say on the details of the sales package and how it advances U.S.-Saudi military-to-military interests. After that, Jim and I will be happy to take your questions. Jim.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Andrew. And good afternoon and happy holidays to everybody.
Let me start by reiterating that the United States is firmly committed to the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as we have been for nearly seven decades, and that more broadly, the United States and Saudi Arabia have a strong mutual interest in the security and stability of the Gulf. Close cooperation between our militaries is central to that security and stability, and we are really announcing today the most recent example of that cooperation.
On December 24th in Riyadh, the United States and Saudi Arabia finalized the letter of offer and acceptance, or LOA, for the purchase of 84 F-15SA aircraft and, as Andrew said, for the upgrade of an additional 70 F-15SA aircraft to this SA configuration. And this government-to-government or foreign military sale is valued at $29.4 billion.
I'd like to say just a few words about the capabilities that are under consideration. This aircraft, the F-15SA, will be the most capable and versatile aircraft in the Royal Saudi fighter inventory. And indeed, it will be one of the most capable aircraft in the world. The F-15SA will have the latest generation of computing power, radar technology, infrared censors, and electronic warfare systems. As one example, the F-15SA will be equipped with an active electronically-scanned array radar, or AESA. This radar includes the latest technology and will ensure that Saudi Arabia has the capability to operate against regional air threats. This sale also includes AMRAAM and AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, which provide both radar and infrared guided capability. The F-15SA will be able to strike targets day or night in all weather with a variety of precision-guided munitions. The air-to-ground weapon capability includes laser-guided and GPS-guided weapons, along with missiles that can attack ground-based radars and missiles—the Harpoon in particular specialized for maritime attack capabilities.
The communications systems of the F-15SA will allow the U.S. Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Force to operate effectively together in the same airspace. And the system's interoperability will also allow both countries to—excuse me—to participate in coalition training, which is a priority for both of our countries. And in fact, this F-15SA package includes not just aircraft and munitions but the training and logistics support that Andrew talked about, and it's a very robust package. Much of the Saudi training in the F-15SA will occur alongside U.S. forces. This will enhance our already strong defense relationship. And approximately 5,500 Saudi personnel will be trained through 2019— 5,500 through 2019, further strengthening the bonds between our forces and between our countries.
I've provided just a very high-level overview of the F-15SA's impressive capabilities, and I know that the Air Force and the Boeing company will be glad to offer a lot more details. As Andrew said, the U.S.-Saudi security relationship has been a pillar of regional security for decades. And this F-15SA sale demonstrates the firm commitment of the United States to the kingdom, and reinforces our mutual commitment to security and stability in the Gulf.
And with that, Andrew and I would be pleased to take your questions.
Q. Yeah. So, Andrew, you said that it sends a strong message—this sends a strong message to countries in the region the U.S. is committed to security. You didn't mention any—I presume you mean both friends and foes. I'd like to talk—ask you about two countries that are not mentioned, both of which begin with “I”, Israel and Iran. One, on Israel, how did—how easy was it to overcome any sensitivity that they might have about this sale? Does it affect their advantage that you seek to preserve? And then, on Iran, you didn't mention it, but presumably that is the biggest threat to the Saudis in the region. Is that your thinking? Do these planes come equipped with, like, a map leading to Iran and have Israel, like, blacked out? What's the thinking— what's the specific message to Iran that the sale sent?
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. Well, I'll let Jim talk about what maps are equipped on the aircraft. But on the Israel point, let me just say that by law, all sales to the region must be evaluated for the impact on Israel's qualitative military edge. We conducted that assessment, as I mentioned during the congressional briefing—during the briefing last year to discuss the congressional notification. We conducted that assessment, and we are satisfied that this sale to Saudi Arabia will not decrement Israel's qualitative military edge.
As far as regional threats, aircraft are a platform that lasts for decades. So they're designed to address both current security threats as well as threats that may emerge down the road as well. So these aircraft will be delivered over the coming years and are a long-term commitment of the United States to Saudi Arabia's security.
Q. So I can't get you to use the word Iran? It's only four letters.
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. As I mentioned, it's designed to allow Saudi Arabia to address threats to its sovereignty, and we believe this aircraft is able to provide that capability (inaudible).
Q. But where do you see that threat coming from right now at this specific moment in time.
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. Well, as you know, the Middle East right now, there's a number of threats. They've had border security issues. They have threats in the Gulf as well. And clearly, one of the threats that they face as well as other countries in the region is Iran. But it is not—this is not solely directed towards Iran. This is directed towards meeting our partner Saudi Arabia's defense needs.
Q. Just the same question, but a little bit differently. The timing of this. Obviously, you said the deal was struck, I think, December 24th. Today is a day where there's a lot of news about this standoff with Iran, the Strait of Hormuz. Can you definitively say that there's no connection even in the announcement today?
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. Well, we've been—I'll be perfectly honest. We've been planning this announcement since the deal was struck, before the latest tensions in the Straits of Hormuz, and so—and this deal was—first, we've been talking with the Saudis about how to provide for their air power needs for a number of years. And as I noted, I announced this congressional notification of this package last year. So we did not gin up a package in response to current events in the region, but this is part of a longstanding discussion with our Saudi partners about how to best meet their needs, and we are announcing it because the LOA was signed on Christmas Eve, which wouldn't have been the right time to announce it.
Ms. Nuland. Let's go here. One more Pentagon, yes.
Q. Amy Butler from Aviation Week. I'm curious if you can say for us, did they decide to go with a GE engine or did they go with a Pratt engine? Also, what is the delivery timeline? And has Saudi Arabia expressed any interest in some of the add-ons that Boeing has proposed that add potential internal weapons carrying stealthy characteristics for the future for their fighter fleet?
Dr. Miller. Let me take the question about delivery first. We expect the first delivery of the F-15SA of the new aircraft in early 2015 and expect the upgrades of the F-15S to the SA configuration to start in 2014. That's the expectation now. Of course, schedules are as schedules are.
With respect to the internal capability of the aircraft, it has very substantial capabilities. I'll give you just a little bit more in terms of the—I mentioned the—some of the munitions—the HARM anti-radiation missile that goes against radars for precision strike capabilities. We've got the Joint Direct Attack Munition, JADM; also the Paveway, which has an analogous capability, the Harpoon anti-ship missile; a very capable system called the Sensor Fuzed Weapon; and for the Defense people in the room, with the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, which is just an incredibly capable system against moving vehicles; and of course air-to-air AMRAAM and AIM-9X capabilities as well. So very significant capabilities.
There's always the possibility that the Saudis would ask for more. This provides them everything that they asked for in their letter of request, and I know we have ongoing discussions that—where something else could be provided in the future.
Q. I wanted to ask you about any conditions were put on this sale considering Saudi Arabia is an important member of the GCC countries, considering the situation that happened in Bahrain recently, whether this use can also be applied to other countries that Saudi Arabia is part of or this purely for the use of Saudi Arabia just in case for its own defense?
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. This was a sale to Saudi Arabia, and it is designed for Saudi defense needs. That being said, we are interested in working with all the Gulf nations in developing a regional security architecture that will enable them to meet the challenges and threats posed in the region. However, this is a sale to Saudi Arabia that will be used by the Saudi air force in order to defend its sovereignty and borders.
Q. Well, I think the question, though, is related to the fact that the Saudis, as part of the GCC, sent people into Bahrain to put down—so I think her question is: Are there restrictions on this so that the Saudis can't kind of, I don't know, loan them out or send them for use against protestors in allies of Saudi?
Assistant Secretary Shapiro. Under U.S. law and regulation, any attempt to transfer weapons to any other country requires our approval. So they have—and they—since they've not obtained these aircraft yet, there has been no such request made. And indeed, if they wanted to transfer these aircraft to any other Gulf partner, they would need our approval to do so.
Q. [Y]ou mentioned the first delivery is in early 2015. When is it completed? When is the—when do the last planes get there, or the last upgrades finish arriving?
Dr. Miller. It will be several years after that.
Q. So five, ten? I mean, how many— how—we're talking—the reason I'm asking is that because it goes without— I think it goes without saying, but I want you to say it anyway, that this is a sign or an indication that you have faith in the stability of the Saudi monarchy and think that it's going to be around for at least a little while longer.
Dr. Miller. Look, this is—we have a nearly seven-decade-strong relationship and partnership with the Saudi Government.
Q. Yeah, but as you know—
Dr. Miller. We expect it to continue for the long term.
Q. So—yeah, so you have faith in the stability of the Saudi monarchy—
Ms. Nuland. I think he's answered that question.