America, according to many, is an empire in decline. Whether this will prove will to be true is unclear.Footnote 1 What ought to be recalled, however, is that perceptions of America's (or more exactly the Massachusetts Bay Colony's) decline began appearing as early as the texts of the second-generation Puritan ministers (i.e., in the second half of the seventeenth century) and thereafter became a common theme in American writing. Historically, decline discourses often found America to be in a state of spiritual decline, a fall perceived to be caused by the rise and pervasiveness of material concerns and desires. By “spiritual” I mean moral and religious principles and practices which, for the Puritans, meant adherence to a specific brand of English covenant theology. As American culture developed, however, the spiritual incorporated alternative moral principles and practices as well as, broadly speaking, the aesthetic (e.g., in Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman). Today, many discourses of decline fear the material decline of America, by which I mean those practices that fall under the categories of the economic, the military, the political (in its institutionalized sense), and so on. To be sure, as Andrew Murphy has shown, the traditional fear of moral decline and the discourses employed to describe and respond to it persist in contemporary American politics.Footnote 2 I would argue, though, that these discourses, powerful as they are, fail to come to terms with the geopolitical limitations and conditions that intensify America's current material crises: for example, global climate change, peak-oil concerns, transnational capital flows and labor migrations, new tactics and technologies of warfare, and so on. They also tend to ignore the changing domestic economic, social, and political circumstances of the most pressing contemporary problems: large numbers of Americans living in or near poverty; rising costs for higher education; dilapidated infrastructure; and new forms of racial discrimination, both de facto and de jure. The most powerful and provocative jeremiads of today and the political contests in which they are employed rest on different assumptions, and respond to different concerns, than the jeremiads of the past.
If the perception and problem of American decline today is characterized by both continuity and difference, then this might be an ideal moment to reread Hannah Arendt's On Revolution. I will argue that those parts of On Revolution that tell the story of America's founding—and only those parts that tell the story of America's founding (thus, unless otherwise stated, when I refer to On Revolution I am referring to those parts of the text concerned with the American Revolution)—should be read generically as a jeremiad that both repeats and problematizes the spiritual/material opposition of the classic American decline narrative. The jeremiad is a traditional literary form commonly employed in Puritan sermons and histories and subsequently central to American politics and letters. It is dominated by a mood of despair and lamentation over (spiritual) decline and often issues in a positive call to remembrance and action. Seeing On Revolution as a jeremiad enables us better to account for a consistently misunderstood feature of Arendt's argument: the place of the “social question” in the American Revolution.
Most of the secondary literature on On Revolution takes at face value Arendt's claim that the social question was absent in revolutionary America. The “social question,” as we will see in detail below, refers to the existence of abject poverty and material deprivation, but it alludes to the category of the “social” in The Human Condition. The social is a “hybrid” sphere of the vita activa in which the putatively private material needs of life itself are publicized, addressed, and administered in a grand process of “housekeeping” necessitating the creation and expansion of a variety of bureaucratic government agencies. Arendt's claim that the social question was absent in revolutionary America has led many scholars to argue that she commits a historical error; that the social question was present in the form of a slave system Arendt can acknowledge but does not respond to seriously; that the claim is true and, for Arendt, the Constitution ruined America; that this claim, whether true or false, shows Arendt's antidemocratic elitism; and so on.Footnote 3 Indeed, Hanna Pitkin, keenly aware of the shifting status and explanatory function of the social question in On Revolution, judges the text to be “extraordinarily confusing and confused . . . almost enough to make one dismiss the book—and Arendt as a theorist.”Footnote 4 In showing that On Revolution is a jeremiad, I will show that the text relies on and mobilizes the spiritual/material distinction throughout its analysis of the social question in the American Revolution. The ambiguity Pitkin rightly identifies will be revealed not as a confusion, a flaw of the book, but as both a cause and symptom of the multiple aims and real ambiguities any jeremiad must both maintain and resolve.Footnote 5 My claim here is not that Arendt wrote On Revolution as a jeremiad or that it perfectly fits a set of agreed-upon criteria determining what is and is not a jeremiad, although I provide textual evidence for my interpretation. Rather, in addition to textual evidence, reading On Revolution as a jeremiad enables us to engage Arendt's text more creatively and critically.
There are at least two good reasons to clarify the place of the social question in On Revolution. First, and most importantly for my argument, if the social question plays a central and much-criticized role in On Revolution, then our understanding of and critical responses to that text require us to sort out whether, in fact, Arendt is indeed “confused,” or wrong, or a bad historian, as so much of the secondary literature has claimed. The majority of my essay is devoted to clarifying the place and role of the social question in On Revolution, by interpreting it within the generic possibilities and constraints of the jeremiad.
A second reason—one I will not address in detail here—is that if the “social question” is a thoroughly ambiguous concept marking an equally ambiguous reality, then by reversing an argument made recently by J. M. Bernstein—who claims that many of the “modernist” concepts deployed in The Human Condition only take on their “appropriate shapes” in On Revolution—we may be able to further recent attempts in Arendt scholarship to challenge and appropriate Arendt's oft-criticized conceptual distinctions.Footnote 6 If On Revolution reveals the power and limitations of Arendt's concept of the social in all of its ambiguity, this can open new paths for rethinking the place of the social throughout Arendt's work. My hope is that this essay contributes to ongoing attempts to rethink Arendt's seemingly strict conceptual distinctions and her work more broadly.
In the first section of the essay I briefly examine generic features of the jeremiad through attention to two of the most important interpreters of that form: Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch.Footnote 7 By analogy with the classic jeremiad, I then examine in more detail the formal features of On Revolution and how they manifest some of the attributes of the jeremiadic form in order to argue that the text is best read, both interpretively and politically, not as a tragedy—a seemingly plausible and more common reading—but as a jeremiad.
In the second section, I show how the spiritual/material opposition unfolds and unworks itself in Arendt's account of the American Revolution and America's decline. Arendt describes a fundamental ambiguity between the spiritual and the material in the “origin” of America, revealed in the ambivalent place of the social question and the opposed, but equally tenable, interpretations of the phrase “pursuit of happiness” in the Declaration of Independence. The social question—i.e., as always for Arendt, the material: life, the body, necessity, economy, administration, etc.—is both present and absent in America; and the “pursuit of happiness,” both in its public and private, its spiritual and material senses, is equally present. The classic jeremiad reflects, but also relies on, ambiguity, and On Revolution is no different. It is driven by productive tensions emerging from three competing projects within the text: (1) “saving” the phenomena of the American Revolution from its neglect or distortion by the revolutionary tradition, a task requiring (2) a (re)conceptualization of the American Revolution in order to serve (3) a political project of remembrance necessary to reactivate a revolutionary spirit lost to the pursuit of material interests and private felicity. The problem is that these three projects cannot be neatly knotted together and thus, like any jeremiad, ambiguities, tensions, and contradictions emerge.
On Revolution: Tragedy or Jeremiad?
For good reasons, scholars have been interested in Arendt's “storytelling” mode of political theory as well as the influence of (especially Greek) tragedy on her thinking and the place of tragic motifs within her writings.Footnote 8 However, I argue that those parts of On Revolution that concern the American Revolution are best understood not in terms of the genre of tragedy, but of the American jeremiad, in spite of the presence of tragic themes and references to tragedy scattered throughout the text. If the story of the French and every subsequent revolution is, for Arendt, tragic, the American Revolution is never described as, nor accounted for in terms of, tragedy. On the other hand, Arendt never explicitly claims for her story of America the form of the jeremiad. However, there is evidence for seeing the text in that way as well as good scholarly reasons for such a reading.Footnote 9 In order to tease out the jeremiadic features of the text and show how it avoids tragedy, I would like to turn briefly to the formal structure of the jeremiad.
Perry Miller, summarizing the many jeremiadic texts prominent in mid-seventeenth-century New England, writes: “They tell the story, and tell it coherently, of a society which was founded by men dedicated, in unity and simplicity, to realizing on earth eternal and immutable principles—and which progressively became involved with fishing, trade, and settlement. They constitute a chapter in the emergence of the capitalist mentality, showing how intelligence copes with—or more cogently, how it fails to cope with—a change it simultaneously desires and abhors.”Footnote 10 Jeremiads told a tale of decline in which the Puritan covenant was threatened, in large part, by the social effects of the very Puritan devotion to work that enabled capitalism to develop. The sermons, rhetorically and politically understood, utilized scripture to reveal the consequences of worldly concupiscence and the saving possibilities left to a sinful community. Central to the jeremiad, on Miller's account, is that the religious (spiritual) injunction to work hard and toil at a calling led to the unexpected worldly (material) consequences of economic growth and the social antagonisms and fluidity characteristic of capitalist societies, such that the jeremiads were “professions of a society that knew it was doing wrong, but could not help itself, because the wrong thing was also the right thing.”Footnote 11 Or as Andrew Delbanco writes, locating an analogous paradox in the daily lives of individuals, “there seemed no way to tend to the self without dirtying it.”Footnote 12 Both the Puritan individual and his society were required to engage in practices that almost inevitably produced and reproduced the structural conditions for, and temptations of, worldly prosperity and sinfulness.
Sacvan Bercovitch, in a forceful critical response to Miller, argues that the American jeremiad reveals an “unswerving faith,” for its distinctiveness lies “not in the vehemence of its complaint but in precisely the reverse. The essence of the sermon form . . . is its unshakeable optimism. In explicit opposition to the traditional mode, it inverts the doctrine of vengeance into a promise of ultimate success, affirming to the world, and despite the world, the inviolability of the colonial cause.”Footnote 13 If we accept—as I think we should—both sides in the Miller/Bercovitch debate, we can see that jeremiads were both denunciations of religious decline in the face of economic and political changes (themselves brought about by the spiritualization of material life) and announcements of the possibility, need, and sometimes certainty, of reform. The jeremiads were calls to action, to remembrance of the meaning of the Puritan mission and to the reconstruction of both individual and communal life.Footnote 14 For both Miller and Bercovitch—however differently they understand this fact—the Puritan jeremiads, and the Puritan culture as a whole, were fundamentally, and productively, ambiguous, presenting different modes of thought and action as both necessary and opposed, reconcilable and in tension. As Bercovitch argues, the logic of ambiguity in Puritan jeremiads is “both/and” rather than “either/or.”Footnote 15 Analogous ambiguities, as we will see, are present throughout On Revolution.
The tropes and traces of the jeremiad persist as a set of themes and topoi in American literature.Footnote 16On Revolution shares with Puritan jeremiads and many of the works of the American Renaissance (and beyond) a sense that the founding of America—whether it begins with the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the Declaration of Independence, or the Constitution—introduced something new into the world. At the same time, it also shares a deep anxiety that the real “spiritual” meaning of the American founding, its import and possibilities, has been undermined by an aspect of that founding just as coprimordial, just as “American,” but nonetheless opposed to the “true” America: material wealth and prosperity.Footnote 17 The fact and politico-philosophical problem of founding is so central to On Revolution that much of the literature on the text concerns Arendt's account of founding, her reading of constitutive and constituted power, and the (failed) American solution to the foundational problem: how to found, without God, what can only be self-grounded. However, for my purpose here the centrality of founding in On Revolution can be understood as a condition of possibility for reading the text as a jeremiad and distinguishes the text even where it shares themes and concerns with Arendt's other writings.
For example, The Human Condition, the text in which Arendt develops her account of modernity most extensively, does exhibit formal narrative similarities to On Revolution. However, The Human Condition is “an analysis of those general human capacities which grow out of the human condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretrievably lost so long as the human condition is not changed.”Footnote 18On Revolution is an analysis of a uniquely modern political phenomenon contingently emerging from specific historical events in America and France. Thus, in order to understand “what a revolution is . . . we must turn to those historical moments when revolution made its full appearance.”Footnote 19 The capacities analyzed in The Human Condition, on the other hand, are “within the range of every human being” and are more or less permanent; for this reason, they cannot be destroyed unless the human condition itself changes or is changed.Footnote 20The Human Condition is an account of general, almost permanent human capacities. On Revolution narrates a story about contingent origins, about the genesis or beginning of something: throughout it is explicitly concerned with beginning, founding, and origins, “because revolutions are the only political events which confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning.” Arendt's story of America can be understood as a jeremiad because it concerns a specific, contingent fall away from a specific, contingent origin.Footnote 21
The jeremiadic structure of On Revolution becomes more apparent when we note four related features of the text: (1) it responds to a contemporary political event that has induced a politically fateful forgetting; (2) it claims that the cause of the forgetting of the “spiritual” is something “material”; (3) it suggests that nonetheless there is still hope, however bleak, and time, however fleeting, for renewal; and (4) it shows that the revolution succeeded in producing the historical and political stability necessary for telling the story of America as a decline narrative.
The first and second formal jeremiadic features of the text are apparent from the opening pages of On Revolution as it begins, like many Puritan jeremiads, by addressing a specific, often disturbing event (an election day, a loss in “King Philip's War,” the accidental deaths of two students), often caused by or linked to material concerns and in response to which we must counter our cultural amnesia.Footnote 22 The cause of the horrific present and future, for the Puritan minister, is the replacement of the religiosity of New England by a worldly, materialistic culture (famously captured in the Results of the General Court Synod in 1679, which excoriated among other things “Laying out of hair, Borders, naked Necks and Arms, or, which is more abominable, naked Breasts, and mixed Dancings”). In On Revolution, the proximate and provocative event was the role nuclear weapons played in the logic and practice of the Cold War. Recall that between 1959—when the ideas for On Revolution first emerged in a seminar Arendt taught at Princeton—and the publication of the book in 1962, the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests by both the United States and the Soviet Union came to an end. Although negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty were ongoing, nuclear testing both by the United States, the Soviet Union, and then France had taken place. Arendt signed the acknowledgments of her book in September 1962, and the next month the Cuban missile crisis erupted. These recent events led Arendt to think more broadly about the relationship between war and revolution in the age of total, then nuclear, war. Arendt calls us to reconsider this relationship, one so prominent that we have forgotten that “the aim of revolution was, and always has been, freedom.”Footnote 23 The technological capacities of nuclear warfare cleave the traditional connections between war, revolution, and freedom, causing a generalized forgetting of the meaning and connection between these terms. We are left, finally, with thinking the meaning of revolution on its own, without its previously obvious connection to the concepts and strategies of war.
Arendt's text begins with a loss of meaning induced by the rise of modern technologies of warfare and the mass societies such warfare is designed to deter and, if necessary, destroy. Just as the Puritan minister was provoked into a broader critical engagement with contemporary thought and practice by the events of the day, Arendt moves from the particular material conditions and tactics of Cold War foreign policy to a more general analysis of revolution (promptly neglecting further discussion of nuclear war). The meaning and experience of (revolutionary) freedom, of the revolutionary spirit, is shown to be lost in the face of material concerns and capacities dominant within contemporary politics, and the future of America (and the rest of the world) depends upon recovering the meaning of that freedom. That Arendt calls our loss the “revolutionary spirit” and identifies the cause of that loss as the private pursuit of material gain, and further, that the material/economic situation of America is both its blessing and its curse, are key reasons for calling On Revolution a jeremiad (I return to the second feature in detail in the next section).Footnote 24
The third jeremiadic feature outlined above emerges toward the end of the text insofar as On Revolution, while clearly not infused with the “unshakeable optimism” of the Puritan sermon, nonetheless ends by countering its continuous, if sometimes muted, shifts between tones of irony and despair with the always-present possibility of renewal and recovery. In the last chapter, “The Revolutionary Tradition and the Lost Treasure,” Arendt details how all revolutions reveal a novel form of freedom-enabling political organization—the revolutionary societies, council systems, wards, and other voluntary associations—that are eventually overwhelmed and destroyed by the almost coeval emergence and success of the party system (itself, as we will see, metonymically linked to the material). Arendt reveals the full extent of our loss and ends the text by citing the sobering wisdom of Silenus, but then immediately recalls the Sophoclean hope, in Oedipus at Colonus, that what makes our birth meaningful and worth the suffering that existence promises all of us is action in the space of freedom.Footnote 25 Our failure to remember and to institutionalize the revolutionary spirit is yet another missed opportunity to act politically, thereby affirming our natal existence and countering the nihilism always made possible by our groundless being-in-the-world. This is surely a momentous loss, and yet, so long as the human capacities for action (with all of their conditions) are not entirely destroyed, the possibility of reincarnating the revolutionary spirit remains (hence the import of Theseus's words). If renewal is not certain, it is possible. For America, given its rich history of political action, the return of the political is an even greater possibility (though still nothing more than that): America embodies, almost uniquely, a modern tradition of spontaneous political action (which Arendt will emphasize again in her justifications of civil disobedience in the 1960s and 1970s).
The reference to Oedipus at Colonus, placed as it is in the crucial closing paragraph of On Revolution, raises the question of why the text is not best understood as a tragedy. As noted above, many readers of Arendt have, either in passing or in detail, suggested that Arendt's mode of storytelling is tragic, and Robert Pirro has provided a persuasive argument for the place of tragedy in Arendt's work more broadly.Footnote 26 Arendt herself sometimes agrees, for she enthusiastically concurs with Jaspers's description of On Revolution as invoking a tragic perspective; the word “tragedy” appears in several places in the text; and the text ends with the reference to Oedipus at Colonus.Footnote 27 More generally, On Revolution clearly engages with and mobilizes prominent tragic themes: ambiguity, fatedness, violence in its relation to the natural, and so on.
However, Arendt herself consistently claims the exceptional, that is, nontragic, status of the American Revolution. The only passage in which Arendt uses “tragedy” or its adjectival form in reference to the American Revolution occurs in a citation from Lewis Mumford, in which he describes the failure to incorporate townships into the state and federal constitutions as “tragic” (in the sense of “terribly unfortunate”).Footnote 28 When Arendt refers to the “tragedy of Western revolutions in the modern age” in “What is Authority?” she excepts the American Revolution, for “of these attempts, only one, the American Revolution, has been successful.”Footnote 29 Arendt's allusions to Büchner's Dantons Tod throughout On Revolution—the image of a revolution devouring its own children—always refer to the French Revolution; Arendt explicitly distinguishes the American Revolution as one where the children were not devoured.Footnote 30 In fact, one defining feature of the American Revolution—as opposed to all other revolutions and to the other tragedies Arendt narrates (e.g., totalitarianism)—is that there is no traumatic, violent, unnatural, or horrifying act of violence or conflict or suffering that generates a consequential and fated tragic conclusion.Footnote 31 Finally, when Arendt turns to Hegel's philosophy of history as the “most far-reaching consequence of the French Revolution,” this concept of history introduces the narrative assumption of “historical necessity” or “destiny” into the revolutionary tradition, thereby taking on the same role as the Fate that produces the conflicts and results of Greek tragedy.Footnote 32
Pirro interprets Arendt's reference to Oedipus at Colonus as an argument for the necessity of a tragic “Greek” augmentation to the “Roman” foundations of the modern revolutions, an augmentation that enables citizens to act anew with the aid of tragedy's capacity to make the burdens of action livable.Footnote 33 While I am sympathetic to such a reading, if what is at issue is the narrative or genre of On Revolution, then it is possible to read Arendt's reference as Pirro does and deny that On Revolution tells a tragic tale. Oedipus at Colonus is not, narratively, a tragedy at all although it substantively engages with tragic themes. Arendt does not narrate (or “emplot,” to use the term Pirro borrows from Hayden White) the American Revolution as a tragedy. If, for White, a mode of emplotment is, in conjunction with a mode of explanation and an ideological commitment, a structural feature of historical writing, then Arendt's narrative of the American Revolution is certainly not emplotted as a tragedy, either in White's sense of the genre as producing a “gain in consciousness for the spectators of the contest” consisting in the “epiphany of the law governing human existence” or in a Greek or Hegelian sense.Footnote 34 Arendt does not tell a tale of individuals or communities testing or challenging a law of the natural world, imploding in fratricidal violence, violating foundational human taboos, or, in Hegel's words, showing a “collision” between actors “with equally justified but distinct ethical powers which have unfortunately come into collision.” However, with the exception of violating incest taboos or cannibalism (except when understood poetically as a revolution devouring its children), Arendt does narrate the French Revolution along these lines.Footnote 35 Arendt's work undoubtedly draws on a fairly wide range of literatures—including Greek tragedy—but to show that On Revolution is, generically, a tragedy requires far more evidence than is available.
There is another possible understanding of On Revolution that can draw support from a tradition of thinking obviously present in Arendt's work. Rather than tragedy or jeremiad, On Revolution might be best read as a continuation of a set of themes emerging out of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century German thought, contained under the heading Verfallsgeschichte. Given the obvious, albeit deeply critical, inheritance of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Heidegger, Benjamin, and other canonical philosophers and writers in Arendt's work (especially in The Human Condition and The Life of the Mind), and given that most of these thinkers were profound and critical theorists of a modernity characterized by decline and disintegration, why should we understand On Revolution formally in terms of the genre of an American literary tradition that itself has its roots in Europe? For several reasons.
First, Bercovitch argues that the American jeremiad is importantly different from the European jeremiad in both its optimism and its completely different view of historical process (as against the static, hierarchical view of society in the earlier European jeremiads).Footnote 36 Given Arendt's attention to contingency and social fluidity, and her restrained hope, the European jeremiad cannot make sense of Arendt's text.
Second, it is no doubt the case that Arendt's understanding of the social question is shaped by her understanding and criticism of the hybrid realm of the social that we find in The Human Condition. Arendt's conception of the social is in turn shaped by her (perhaps unfair) interpretation of Marx as well as (far less explicitly) by Weber's analysis of the administrative state.Footnote 37 Moreover, although Arendt's “authentic” public realm is a response to Heidegger's criticism of das Man, Gerede, fallenness, and other features of public life (as well as his suggestion of what an authentic Volk would be), it is also surely the case that her criticism of the everyday realm of the social is partly shaped by Heidegger's putatively nonnormative analyses of everyday sociality.Footnote 38 Finally, Arendt's historical method is shaped, again in part, by Benjamin.Footnote 39
However, On Revolution, unlike most of Arendt's earlier writings, deals intensively and consistently with American writers: the Puritans Winthrop and Cotton; founders such as Adams, Madison, and Jefferson; Melville; and Tocqueville, who, although French of course, wrote his most famous work on America. When Arendt focuses on America, non-American writers are almost never referred to or employed. This changes with her analysis of the French Revolution, for Hegel, Rousseau, other French writers and actors involved in the French Revolution, and Dostoyevsky all make an appearance. The usual Arendtian inheritances are nowhere mentioned or even alluded to in Arendt's story of America, even when one would expect such an appearance (for example, Weber on the Puritans).
Third, the thinkers who might have served the purpose of providing a general critique of the decline of a culture—especially Nietzsche, Weber, and Heidegger—do not, and cannot, serve Arendt's purposes in the text. It would be odd, to say the least, to read Arendt's decline narrative of the American Revolution in terms of nihilism, where the highest values devalue themselves. The hitherto highest values devalue themselves, for Nietzsche, largely because one of those values—truth—when obediently pursued, undermines the other values with which truth is linked. This self-devaluation is the logical consequence of the values themselves, that is, they are necessary consequences, as Nietzsche makes quite clear in the Will to Power.Footnote 40 Now, if it is true that nihilism has a historico-philosophical origin in Socrates, Plato, Euripides, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it is also true that for Nietzsche the origin determines the end. Nihilism, in other words, is the necessary conclusion of the fulfillment of the logic of Greek and Judaeo-Christian thought.
However, there is no analogue for this in Arendt's story of the American Revolution. Rather, an ambiguity in the origin of American values, for example, freedom, is persistently hidden or repressed by the single-minded pursuit of one aspect of that value (call it “negative liberty”) over another (call it “political freedom”) as a result of the contingent thoughts and actions of individuals and communities. Nothing logically necessitates this repression, which is why the story of America Arendt tells is a jeremiad: the jeremiad acknowledges the possibility of things being otherwise in the origin, now, and at any time in the future.
For reasons of space, I cannot address related problems with reading On Revolution in Weberian, Heideggerian, or Benjaminian terms. Suffice it to say that Seinsgeschichte, Seinsvergessenheit, errancy, destiny, a Fall, and so on are too politico-theological or ontological to serve Arendt's narrative purposes, too determined, necessitated, inescapable, and effected by a power beyond human agency. Arendt's German-Jewish inheritance does explain her reading of the history of the West since the Greeks in her other works, and it also explains some of the concepts in On Revolution (e.g., the social). However, Verfallsgeschichte cannot provide the narrative tools for Arendt's emplotment of the American Revolution.Footnote 41
Finally, and most importantly, neither Verfallsgeschichte nor a tragic reading can account for the fourth jeremiadic feature of the text: although the loss of the revolutionary spirit is a feature of all revolutions, the fate of the American Revolution is a process of contingent, reversible decline (rather than necessary fall or self-destruction) because unlike the French Revolution the American Revolution succeeds … almost. The loss of the revolutionary spirit in America can be told as a jeremiad precisely because of the stability of the American founding. The tragic end of the French Revolution, for Arendt, was ineluctable, fated. As soon as the biological forces of necessity entered the public space the Revolution was destined to end in violence and terror and self-destruction, for once the French revolutionaries attempted to lend their “voice to suffering itself” that voice had to call for “swift and direct action, that is, for action with the means of violence.”Footnote 42 The need of the poor was “violent and, as it were, prepolitical; it seemed that only violence could be strong and swift enough to help them.”Footnote 43 As elsewhere in Arendt's work, violence—in part because of its intimate connection with the material conditions of biological life—is opposed to politics, and necessity can only be effectively confronted with violence: hence the tragedy of the French Revolution lies in its political violence, for Arendt a contradiction in terms (and in reality). There can be no jeremiadic account of the French Revolution precisely because it was never stable enough to allow for a process of decline. In the tragedies Arendt most often cites—especially the Oedipus trilogy—the end is inherent in the beginning, the unfolding of the story the actualization of Fate's (however we understand it) determination. The French Revolution was doomed from the start. Just as Oedipus's various attempts to prevent the parricide to which he mistakenly understood himself to be fated only led him to his tragic fate, the attempts of the French revolutionaries to solve a problem of necessity with political means was destined to end in the violence of the Terror. Revolutionary France didn't decline, on Arendt's account: it (almost immediately) imploded.
On the other hand, American revolutionaries managed to write, enact, and sustain a constitution guaranteeing certain rights to the people and organizing the powers of each branch of government. However, just as the processes through which the Puritans succeeded in establishing an enduring society contributed to the loss of its original purpose, America's stability came at the price of a deviation from the revolutionary spirit emphasizing public freedom and public happiness towards the development of the preeminent capitalist culture, with a representative government and party system to match. As we will see in more detail, the reason for that swerve is, at the same time, the reason for the stability and success of the American founding itself: the unique form in which the social question existed in America. Much as the Puritans found that ambivalent, perhaps contradictory, elements essential to their theology led to both material success and spiritual decline, the American blessing of freedom from poverty laid the conditions both for the success of the country and the loss of the revolutionary spirit.
Thus, whatever the overlaps between the themes and motifs of tragedy and the jeremiad—and they include ambiguity, tension, irreconcilability, betrayal, pharmakons of all kinds, etc.—On Revolution is an account of the American Revolution best read as a jeremiad because it is a story in which an originary tension between the material and the spiritual produces a complicated narrative of decline rather than a fated implosion. France, like Oedipus, could not avoid its fate; America, on Arendt's account, not only could have, but still might avoid not its fate but its forgetting of its best self, its spiritual promise. This is not tragedy; it is the jeremiadic mode of prophetic speech identified by George Shulman as a recurrent and pervasive feature of American political discourse. Arendt's text narrates “conduct as a decline from origins” in order to “address a community about its constitutive commitments and current difficulties” so that we can redeem America, deliver it from its self-betrayal and recover what has been lost.Footnote 44
For Arendt, the story of the American Revolution is the story of a founding generation uniquely committed to and capable of acting within the space of freedom they created in order to found a new polity. But it is also a story of those same founders failing to secure and institutionalize the freedom they experienced, in part because of a problem inherent in revolutionary beginnings (what is founded can continue to exist, it seems, only if revolutionary energy is contained), but also, and more importantly, because the revolutionary spirit was undermined by its congenital opposite: the American dream, the dream not, or not only, of liberation from poverty, but of riches. Or, at the very least, of material comforts often unachievable elsewhere in the world. The revolutionary spirit of America, its “true” promissory gift, was lost to the demands and opportunities of material desire. To recover that spirit requires a return to the phenomenon, to the “pearls” of the Revolution, the recovery of which requires an act of thought that can inspire a transformed political practice.
The Material and the Spiritual
Arendt's jeremiad is structured around a traditional (Americanized) binary in which the ascent of the material—for Arendt, primarily the pursuit of private wealth and felicity—endangers the spiritual possibilities gathered in the term “freedom.” The material/spiritual distinction in On Revolution—traditional as this opposition may be—alludes primarily to the phenomenological distinctions Arendt draws between the realm of necessity, the private, oikos; the realm of freedom, the public, the polis; and the hybrid sphere of the social. Arendt's famous distinctions, drawn primarily in The Human Condition, hardly need reiterating although they are, of course, problematic. It would be wrong simply to conflate Arendt's account of the political and of freedom either in On Revolution or elsewhere with any kind of religious or metaphysical concept of spirituality. But the term “spirit” in On Revolution clearly refers to the political and its activities (thus I will continue to refer, at times, to political freedom and public happiness as constituting the spiritual) and the term “spiritual”—sufficiently emptied of metaphysical and theological connotations—can name the phenomenological structures of the political in The Human Condition, most notably in Arendt's description of the “in-between” that is the “world” of politics.Footnote 45 Within On Revolution, the public/private/social distinctions and their correlative oppositional categories are often recast in spiritual/material terms and emphasized as key to the differences between the French and American Revolutions. Things public are aligned both literally and figuratively with the spiritual, whereas the private and, most prominently, the social become figures for and literal instances of the material.
In “The Social Question,” Arendt notes that Hegel's account of historical necessity had a basis in experience: “Behind the appearances was a reality, and this reality was biological and not historical, though it appeared now perhaps for the first time in the full light of history.”Footnote 46 It was the abject life of the multitude that appeared in the French Revolution: “what we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty. Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force.”Footnote 47 The full-fledged appearance of the social in human history coincides, perhaps, with the demands of the sans-culottes in the French Revolution. The tragic course the French Revolution follows is beyond the scope of this essay.
The social as abject poverty was not present, however, in America. For this reason, the success of the American Revolution was not only a matter of superior wisdom on the part of the American founders:
The point to remember is that the American Revolution succeeded, and still did not usher in the novus ordo saeclorum, that the Constitution could be established “in fact,” as “a real existence . . . in a visible form,” and still did not become “to liberty what grammar is to language.” The reason for success and failure was that the predicament of poverty was absent from the American scene but present everywhere else in the world. Footnote 48
The reason for success and failure was the absence of poverty, of the social question, of a most pernicious and destructive manifestation of the material. More specifically, what were absent in America “were misery and want rather than poverty. … Since the laborious in America were poor but not miserable … they were not driven by want, and the revolution was not overwhelmed by them.”Footnote 49 The absence of abject life in America gave rise to a twofold failure. On the one hand, the failure holds for the future of revolutionary thought and practice because the American absence of poverty was unique and could play no role in future revolutions. On the other hand, America itself is both a success and a failure because the enactment of the constitution failed to institutionalize the space of freedom at the very same time that it succeeded at erecting a stable system of governance and an enduring civil society. The absence of abject misery enabled the American revolutionaries to remain committed “to the foundation of freedom and the establishment of lasting institutions,” for the social question, once it appears in the full light of the public, makes a mockery of freedom.Footnote 50 The success of the American founding rested in large part on the material conditions of America, which, as it were, answered the social question—at least in the sense of abject poverty—in advance.Footnote 51 Yet, vis-à-vis the social question, Arendt claims that this reason for success was also the reason for the failure of the American Revolution (a failure that eventually contaminated the nonliberal republican possibilities of the revolution). The social question, Arendt admits, was present in America, i.e., although material necessity was solved as a problem, the social/material was not eliminated.
This originary ambiguity in the founding of America is detailed in “The Pursuit of Happiness,” where Arendt acknowledges the twofold meaning inherent in that famous phrase.Footnote 52 As Vivasvan Soni has argued, Arendt—and to some extent the American revolutionaries themselves—ignores the eighteenth-century “politics of happiness” in order to distinguish happiness as “public happiness,” i.e., on his (to my mind mistaken) reading of Arendt, political freedom. Soni argues that “as is the case with classical [eighteenth-century conceptions of] happiness, the Declaration leaves the content of the idea of happiness indeterminate, allowing the people themselves to decide, according to the appropriate political processes, what will constitute happiness for them.”Footnote 53 However, for Soni the founders were unable to pursue a politics of happiness (because they had no idea of what it might mean) and thus opted for a politics of freedom. Arendt, too, notes that the meaning of “pursuit of happiness” is indeterminate, but contrary to Soni, she does not depend upon a distinction between happiness and freedom on the basis of which she argues for a politics of freedom “named” public happiness.Footnote 54
Rather, for Arendt, the happiness referred to in the Declaration of Independence oscillates between the private happiness, liberty, pursuit of wealth, and self-interested felicity that the material conditions of American life (potentially) opened to the masses, and the public happiness equated with public freedom, participation in political affairs, and care for the world also dominant in the minds and present in the actions of many of the founders. For Arendt, the Declaration “still intends us to hear the term ‘pursuit of happiness’ in its twofold meaning. . . .But the rapidity with which the second meaning was forgotten and the term used and understood without its original qualifying adjective may well be the standard by which to measure, in America no less than France, the loss of the original meaning and oblivion of the spirit that had been manifest in the Revolution.”Footnote 55
But how, we must ask, can “public happiness” be the original sense of “happiness” in the phrase “pursuit of happiness,” as Arendt claims, if that term had, just as originally, a “twofold” meaning, both of which were equally present at the time of the Revolution and, “with the possible exception of John Adams,” were used without any awareness of the “flagrant contradiction” between them?Footnote 56 And how can one be satisfied by Arendt's distinction between the “outcome” of the American Revolution, which “has always been ambiguous” because “the question of whether the end of government was to be prosperity or freedom has never been settled,” and the apparently clear “purposes” that were present at the founding?Footnote 57
Ambiguity in the meaning of “happiness,” whether originary or not, reveals that “the social question interfered with the course of the American Revolution no less sharply, though far less dramatically, than it did with the course of the French Revolution. Yet the difference is still profound.”Footnote 58 The unique form in which the social question came to prominence in America was the real possibility not simply for overcoming want and misery, but for both desiring and sometimes acquiring riches: “it was the ‘fatal passion for sudden riches’ rather than necessity that stood in the way of the founders of the republic.”Footnote 59 Material gain and the abundance that prospect implied were not inimical to, or a deviation from, a properly American polity, one devoted to public freedom and happiness. Rather, along with the experience of—and possibility of institutionalizing—public freedom, there was the equally powerful and equally American temptation to cede politics to the government in order to protect the space in which material gain might be pursued. That the future course of American politics was to be determined by the pursuit of private happiness and liberty rather than the experience of public freedom meant that the material—which, to recall, was solved as a problem of necessity but not eliminated—challenged and overwhelmed the spiritual. The American revolutionaries—like all revolutionaries—failed to institutionalize the spaces of freedom spontaneously emerging in the revolutions themselves. The American exception, however, is that the cause of failure was an immanent undecidability or tension in the founding moment: America was founded in and for (public/spiritual) happiness and (private/material) happiness because the social question was both present and absent. This is not a confusion on Arendt's part, or a denial of the existence of the social question in America, or an antidemocratic elitism masked as historical objectivity: the social question in the founding period is a complex phenomenon that reveals a fundamental “undecidability” between the spiritual and material. The social appears in America not as biological force and necessity—the abject masses that appear in France—but as a contingent, tempting, desirable potentiality: the desire of and for the material, over and against the immaterial “treasure” of the revolutionary spirit.
The loss of the revolutionary spirit is the subject of the final chapter of On Revolution. In referring to the lost chance to institutionalize freedom, Arendt notes again that the best of the revolutionary tradition and its “perversion” spring “almost” from the same origin, for the council system that emerges in all revolutions coincides with the birth of the party system, which undoes and destroys the councils: “The historical truth of the matter is that the party and council systems are almost coeval; both were unknown prior to the revolutions and both are the consequences of the modern and revolutionary tenet that all inhabitants of a given territory are entitled to be admitted to the public, political realm.”Footnote 60 The “almost” Arendt attaches to the coeval emergence of the councils and the parties is elaborated in the next sentence: “The councils, as distinguished from parties, have always emerged during the revolution itself, they sprang from the people as spontaneous organs of action and order.”Footnote 61 In other words, the councils are more originary, authentic, proper, spontaneous expressions of the revolutionary spirit, whereas the parties are consequences of, destructive reactions to, revolution. As Arendt claims, “parties . . . have thus far never emerged during a revolution; they either preceded it, as in the twentieth century, or they developed with the extension of popular suffrage.”Footnote 62 Parties return us to representative government, to hierarchical control, to the principle of ruler and ruled and thus to the end of active participation in government. In Arendt's text “parties” is metonymically linked to the very same forces of necessity, of administration and of the rise of the social that Arendt finds pervading and undermining the origin and course of all revolutions. In other words, once again we are confronted with the material overwhelming the spiritual and a tension between Arendt's description of an originary ambiguity and an “almost” immediate distinction between what is properly originary and what perverts that origin. Thus, the “almost” coeval appearance of the councils and the parties should give us pause, for it forces us to ask whether the ambivalence and ambiguity of the social question and the meaning of happiness in the American Revolution is not, within Arendt's text, a mere appearance, one that hides the fact that for Arendt the pursuit of private happiness is a perversion by external forces of an originary revolutionary meaning (just as in every other revolution).
In order to show that this is no mere appearance but an important symptom of the jeremiadic form of the text, it is necessary to account for the repeated tension in Arendt's text between the recognition of an originary undecidability in the founding and an equally powerful recognition of—or desire to see—the “spiritual” America as the proper America. This tension between the acknowledgment of ambiguity and the desire for clarity is analogous to the Puritan tensions described above, and it is part of the jeremiadic background, and force, of On Revolution.
First, Arendt's story of America and its exceptionality would not make sense if it were an unambiguous narrative of a pure origin followed by a perversion of that origin by external forces. The latter is the story of every other revolution, which for Arendt always followed the script first written in France. Arendt's tragic narrativization of all other revolutions forecloses the desire to recover the “original” impulse of the French Revolution for it is precisely that impulse—to end abjection, to solve the problem of the material—that is the cause of the tragedy. Insofar as one crucial feature of the Puritan jeremiad was its recognition of competing impulses and principles in the individual, the theology, and the society, Arendt's account of the co-originarity of the two meanings of “pursuit of happiness” enables her to narrate the story of American politics in such a way that America's decline from its founding sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a story of outside forces of perversion upsetting a pure politics. Thus, there is a narrative necessity for showing ambiguity at and in America's founding, just as there is a narrative necessity for showing the fated, tragic plot of the French and other revolutions. This narrative necessity is so crucial to Arendt's jeremiad because without it the conceptual and theoretical differences between the French and American Revolutions could not be so easily drawn and the political lesson imparted.
Second, this jeremiadic account enables a project of recovery precisely because it avoids tragedy in promising a reappropriation of the origin without contamination. Undecidability in the founding moment ensures that Arendt's story is not tragic for, to repeat, there is nothing resembling the determining role of Fate in Arendt's account. That America swerved away from the spiritual—public happiness, political freedom, council government, etc.—was, for Arendt, a consequence of human choices, of failures to institutionalize the spiritual. For precisely this reason, then, such a swerve is—just as the jeremiad always teaches—reversible: creative recovery of the lost spirit of the revolution in thought and in practice is a possibility that always remains open even as the dangers of the material continue to overwhelm and undermine the spiritual. Thus, for political reasons Arendt must also deny that ambiguity or undecidability in America's founding is, as it were, itself fated, destined to work in subtle and obvious ways throughout American politics.
We can see, then, that the jeremiadic project of redemptive recovery gains its rhetorical force by denying originary ambiguity—so that the origin can be reactivated, reappropriated—even as it relies on that ambiguity, thereby denying tragic fatefulness. When Arendt asserts the historical priority of the councils in all revolutions this is not only a (debatable) historical claim but also a political act. And yet, the move does not make sense, within the American context, unless originary ambiguity is asserted, for the rest of Arendt's account of America requires that its decline is not a result of outside forces of perversion. No matter the historical inaccuracies of her narrative, Jason Frank is right that “Arendt is inaccurate for theoretically interesting and productive reasons.”Footnote 63
Third, the power of Arendt's story lies in its illuminating capacity to reread the story of the American founding as both a success and failure, as a discovery of the originary ambiguity of the American political experience captured in the Declaration of Independence, and also as a desire at times to cover over that revelation for the sake of countering America's decline, i.e., for an attractive “redemptive” political project. If it is historically true, to return to the question above, that the councils are originary and the parties secondary, this does not mean that the opposed metonymic chain of terms to which the councils on the one hand (freedom, participation, public happiness) and the parties on the other (liberty, administration, representative government, private felicity) link up are perfectly divisible into “originary” and “secondary,” for reasons we have seen.
The point of noticing these tensions between Arendt's descriptions of the mixed, contaminated, or ambiguous relations between the material and the spiritual in revolutionary America and the desire to find and describe a temporal and, as it were, ontological or political priority of the spiritual to the material is not simply deconstructive and not at all to show the “incoherence” of On Revolution. Rather, when read as a jeremiad Arendt's text becomes comprehensible in its ambiguity and is shown to be a complex political and theoretical action. The Puritan preacher aims, through the jeremiad, not only to inform his community, but to transform it. The same is true for Arendt, who announces the stakes of her project from the very first pages of her text: “In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution, while those who put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last resort of all foreign policy may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather obsolete trade.”Footnote 64 Seeing Arendt's text as a jeremiad explains the necessity and rhetorical power of the tensions in Arendt's text between the description and conceptualization of the phenomena of the American Revolution and the political project On Revolution announces and enacts: in short, we are able to see in a new way not only the politics of the text but, as it were, its political activity, the “how” of its disclosive speech.
However, noting these tensions and identifying how they are mobilized as political speech does not obviate the need to examine that speech critically, especially its treatment of originary ambiguity and its political project. For example, one conceptual and political aim of On Revolution is to remedy the “American failure to remember,” for “what was lost through the failure of thought and remembrance was the revolutionary spirit.”Footnote 65 In order to remember anything, Arendt argues, one must conceptualize one's experiences, and the failure to recognize and conceptualize what was new and important in the American Revolution is one cause of the decline of America. But Arendt is not simply recalling to us facts or information or texts that have been neglected; her task is much more difficult, for, on her account of remembrance and thought, Americans cannot have ever known or understood what they are supposed to have forgotten. The failure on the part of the revolutionaries properly to conceptualize their experience has meant that their deeds and actions, while endlessly discussed, have lacked the necessary “guideposts” concepts provide—or have been explained by misleading concepts borrowed from the French Revolution—and thus the stories told about the founding have been “futile” attempts to remember.Footnote 66 Arendt must create the conceptual terms in which to redescribe a “forgotten” past no one can have truly forgotten. Recovering the phenomena requires introducing conceptual distinctions—for example between public and private happiness, councils and parties, freedom and liberation, etc.—in order to distinguish what we, and even the revolutionaries themselves, have unknowingly confused. The problem is that Arendt's descriptions of the phenomena are often at odds with her conceptual distinctions, the public/private happiness distinction and the concept of the “social question” being cases in point (and cases important enough to merit entire chapters of the book).
Arendt complicates matters even further. For if the process of saving the phenomena of revolution from forgetting requires distinguishing conceptually ideas we and the revolutionaries have confused, then this process of conceptual distinguishing is at odds with the political project of recapturing the “lost spirit of revolution,” a project requiring “thinking together and combining meaningfully what our present vocabulary presents to us in terms of opposition and contradiction.”Footnote 67 After having distinguished conceptually what is descriptively ambiguous in order to remember what we could not possibly have forgotten, Arendt then claims that we must think together what postrevolutionary political thought has known as contradictory and kept apart, i.e., the revolutionary ethos and pathos of the new and the conservative ethos and pathos of stability.Footnote 68 We must, in other words, think the possibility of a stable institutional space for the always unpredictable effects of free action, a task Andreas Kalyvas has undertaken in his attempts to use Arendt's concept of a “principle” to define stabilizing and guiding norms immanent in free action.Footnote 69 Of course, Arendt is not claiming that we must confuse and think together the very things she claims we must keep separate and distinguish; this is no simple contradiction. But the dual task of recalling what we have never known through creative conceptual distinguishing, and thinking together what we currently think as conceptually distinct, raises, to say the least, a series of “methodological” questions, notably about how to justify clarification or deliberate confusion in a particular case.Footnote 70
Like other (especially Puritan) jeremiads, On Revolution derives its energy and power from its capacity to embrace these contradictions and soldier on. Arendt's descriptions of the phenomena of the American Revolution present an ambiguous picture of the founding period; her conceptualization of the phenomena, especially the concept of the “social question,” leaves both the definition of that concept and its applicability in the United States ambiguous; and the political task of thinking together what we have for too long thought apart—the stability-creating institutionalization of what destabilizes and resists institutionalization—relies on a deliberate contamination of what is taken to be conceptually opposed. Arendt's text, entwining these related but often contradictory projects, responds to a problem that would be familiar to a second-generation Puritan minister: how to remain faithful to, augment, or reactivate a founding or origin that is itself ambiguous.Footnote 71
Michael Kammen notes an “enduring element of ambiguity in American historical writing—not at all surprising in a culture particularly perplexed by ambivalence and contradictory tendencies.”Footnote 72 Arendt's jeremiad follows in this tradition, but however ambiguous, it is neither a confused nor an incoherent text. Rather, it is engaged in a series of contradictory tasks of recovery, remembrance, creation, and exhortation, tasks responsive to ambiguities and ambivalences actually present in the context, thought, and practice of the American Revolution. To deny the ambiguity would be to fail at the task of remembrance, to be untrue to the phenomena; to affirm the ambiguity would endanger the point of remembering in the first place.
Arendt's text is confounding, then, but neither confusing nor confused. However, both those sympathetic to On Revolution and critical of it have not sufficiently appreciated either the complexity of Arendt's interpretation of the American Revolution—specifically her interpretation of the social question and the spiritual/material opposition more broadly—or the generic form in which that complexity is both revealed and hidden. Thus, reading On Revolution as a jeremiad that both appropriates and challenges the originary ambiguity of the spiritual and the material in America enables us to better understand, and thus more fruitfully criticize, Arendt's most sustained writing on American politics.
