In this new text, Lansley takes a number of important topics and weaves together a narrative of how rising inequality is linked both to the recent international crash, and how it is more generally associated with heightened economic instability.
The book starts with analysis of trends in inequality, and is particularly focused on the UK and the US. It notes (along with others) that inequality peaked before the crash of 1929 as well as prior to the great recession of 2008–09. Later chapters look at the different balance of wages and profits, and how these have changed over time, with wages increasingly squeezed in favour of higher profits. Among workers, the middle has been particularly badly affected, with the demise of traditional well-paid manufacturing jobs. The New Labour Governments Lansley documents did little or nothing to address these longer-term trends, instead preferring a `Faustian pact’ with the City of London − limited regulation in return for high tax revenues. Large personal fortunes were made in the days of corporate takeovers with high fees and an emphasis on stripping assets at the expense of the workforce and of longer-term prospects.
The groups identified as being the key beneficiaries of these changes are described as being the `top corporate executives, financiers and bankers’. This does exclude some groups with very high incomes, such as sporting and other celebrities, those with inherited wealth and some entrepreneurs. However, it is argued that the key developments in the big picture have been among these three key groups.
The book moves to look more directly at the role of inequality in economic crises and instability at about the half-way point (page 157 onwards). Four different causal mechanisms are outlined. First, that the stagnation of middle and lower incomes through the crackdown on labour power led to many people taking on higher levels of debt, in order to maintain levels of consumption. This trend, backed for a time by equity withdrawal from rising property values, was not sustainable. Second, that riches were increasingly to be found in the financial sector, rather than in the real or productive economy. This drew in disproportionate talent, and generated an over-emphasis on finance rather than industry. Third, that there was an effect linked to accumulation of large deposits among both individuals and firms, money that was increasingly free to flock to activities and countries in search of the highest monetary returns. Fourth, that the concentration of economic resources (wealth and income) led to a concentration of political influence, leading to a malign influence on policy making.
Having outlined these four main explanations, the remainder of the book develops these and other points in greater detail. There is a strong discussion of increases in personal debt, and the role of sub-prime mortgage lending in deregulated credit markets as integral to the problem. There is also an interesting discussion of the possibility of `under-consumption’, the idea that people simply do not have the spending power to consume all that which is produced. This remains a controversial idea, with a long intellectual history. Where there is quite strong evidence is in the de-coupling of earnings from productivity. In the 1950s and 1960s, earnings tended to track gains in productivity, but from the 1980s, as labour power was weakened, more of the productivity gains have gone to profits, which have surged ahead despite recession. The fourth causal route identified − how the concentration of economic resources leads to a concomitant concentration of political power − was not as well developed as some of the other themes. For a more detailed analysis, Gilens (Reference Gilens2012) considers this theory for the US.
The end of the book (p. 288 onwards in particular) identifies a number of policy prescriptions designed to build a more stable economy, and which require tackling the systemic causes of inequality. These are aimed at protecting and increasing the share of wages in total incomes, greater controls over corporate behaviour and a more progressive tax system. Tax avoidance must also be tackled, plus specific action on banking bonuses and pay, perhaps also a `Tobin tax’ on financial transfers. In short, these proposals can perhaps be reduced to two key aims: re-linking pay to productivity, and ensuring that finance does not crowd out more productive economic activities.
I welcome this book. It will perhaps be of greatest benefit to those who have not read some of the other books analysing the reasons for the great recession, although even for them the focus on inequality as a key underlying cause may be important. It is well-written and presented, clear in its analysis and recommendations. It draws on a wide range of sources (cited in 440 endnotes), and has a short index. Most of the work is devoted to the UK and to the US, although there are some references to other countries, particularly European, when comparisons of relative performance at different time periods are being made. It establishes the key trends on inequality, sets out a number of causes for this and persuasively argues for the negative effects that rising inequality has created for economies and societies. I fear that his final concern that the 1929 depression changed economic and policy thinking to a much greater degree than after 2008–09 has a high chance of remaining true.
