I. INTRODUCTION
Many of us have the privilege of teaching the works of Adam Smith, and know all too well those graphic passages in the Theory of Moral Sentiments about the torture of an Aboriginal prisoner of war. Smith praises the prisoner’s self-command and courage in the face of death, and tells us that this prisoner “is said to prepare himself from his earliest youth for this dreadful end. He composes, for this purpose, what they call the song of death, a song which he is to sing when he has fallen into the hands of his enemies” (Smith Reference Smith, Campbell and Skinner1976, p. 206). Well, I cannot mark the year I thought I might be standing here, singing for my supper, but I suppose I knew once my first book was published that it was not out of the question, and, in that spirit, I have been preparing myself for many years. But I trust I have not fallen into the hands of enemies, but rather of those wishing me only the best. Coming to these meetings is akin to a family wedding where one sees relatives but once a year. It is always a celebration of what we have in common, and the forging of yet deeper bonds as the years go on.
Most, if not all, of us in this room share the view that contemporary economic theory does not deliver an adequate understanding of the economy or, more generally, the human condition, and that some wisdom might be gleaned by going back to previous contributors to economic discourse.Footnote 1 In my case, the tug is strongest to the eighteenth century, particularly to David Hume (1711–76), whom today I pair with Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733). I must thank Harro Maas of the University of Utrecht for organizing a workshop held in Rotterdam on June 6, 2014, to commemorate the tricentenary of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. Harro’s invitation to speak there prompted me to revisit Mandeville’s work in much greater detail, and to see that there are more significant points of similarity to the work of David Hume than I had previous discerned. Hume was clearly influenced by Mandeville, both positively and negatively. Scholars, however, have mostly focused on Hume’s moral philosophy, and not economics per se (see Gill Reference Gill2000). There is also a dearth of scholarship on Mandeville as a contributor to economics, but even a brief immersion would convince any careful reader that Mandeville had a far-reaching command of economic relata for his day. My objective with this address is to draw out some of the links between Mandeville and Hume as contributors to economic discourse and, more generally, to the human sciences.
II. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ECONOMICS
Mandeville published (anonymously) his satirical poem, The Grumbling Hive, in 1705 and reissued it with extensive commentary in 1714 as The Fable of the Bees. It was the second and much expanded edition of 1723, however, that became most widely known. It included an additional essay entitled “A Search into the Nature of Society.” In 1728, Mandeville released a dialogue entitled The Fable of the Bees: Part II. By the Author of the First. It was joined with the first version in a 1733 edition, the year he died. It was also in the 1730s that Mandeville’s work gained much greater notoriety, with recognition by Jean-François Melon and Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu.
It is unlikely that Hume had read Mandeville while he was a student at the University of Edinburgh in his teens, but we know that he had read some or all of Mandeville’s Treatise on Hypocondriak Passions while suffering from depression in his early twenties, and that he most surely read the Fable of the Bees by his mid-twenties when, in 1738, he completed the first two books of his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40).Footnote 2 In the opening introduction, Hume cites five philosophers whom he thinks have helped to forge a science of man, and Mandeville is one of them (Hume 2000, p. 5).Footnote 3 And it is also quite likely that his friendship with Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith prompted Hume to return to Mandeville in the 1740s, particularly as Hume’s interest in the human sciences deepened and intensified over the course of that decade.
Hume’s Political Discourses (1752), a set of twelve essays, contain the most concentrated offering of his economic thought, but there are interesting contributions to be found in virtually all his books and remaining essays. Eugene Rotwein (Reference Rotwein and Rotwein2007) recognized, in his lengthy and excellent Introduction, the broad sweep of Hume’s economic thinking, but, ironically, by selecting just nine essays, effectively directed scholars away from the rest of Hume’s writings. It took another two or three generations for scholars, such as Carl Wennerlind (Reference Wennerlind2001) and Istvan Hont (2007), to restore a rightful balance. An understanding of Hume’s economics demands a careful reading of virtually all his writings.
Hume wrote precisely when the moral sciences were taking hold as a separate and distinct body of knowledge. Although there were many contributions in the seventeenth century, it was the philosophers of the early to mid-eighteenth century, Giambattista Vico, Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hume, and Smith, who took pains to articulate the sense in which the moral sciences were analogous to the natural sciences (see Schabas Reference Schabas and Garrett2013).
In step with this, economic discourse grew dramatically over the eighteenth century. The number of economic texts doubled every five years in the mid-century, such that by the 1760s, economic tracts outpaced the issuance of new novels (see Thère Reference Thère and Faccarello1998, Reinert Reference Reinert2011). Hume was at the very center of this movement, and a leading contributor to the view that the “science of commerce,” as he called economics, was on an epistemic par with the natural sciences. This discourse studied specific phenomena, money, trade, the interest rate, and population, as well broader themes of civility, political stability, and economic development. The unifying idea of an economy, however, was still nascent.
As I have argued elsewhere (Schabas Reference Schabas2005), the term oeconomy continued to carry with it the ancient connotations of household management, but was also increasingly used in the early modern period to denote a system in which the parts were connected to the whole. Mandeville and Hume used the term in both respects, but were more drawn, as was Adam Smith, to refer to the oeconomy of nature. This term was widely used by contributors to the discourse of natural history at the time—John Ray, William Derham, or Carl Linnaeus, for example—and captured the idea of the balance of nature between the species and the overall conservation of matter in the sublunar region. The specific rates of propagation and predator-prey relations between species yielded an overall circulation and aggregate balance of vital substances.
The discourse of economics in the eighteenth century was thus primarily an attempt to understand specific features of the commercial and agrarian world, with the understanding that these phenomena (money, husbandry, manufacturing, trade, population growth) were imbedded in a larger system of nature and not the economy per se. Only gradually, over the course of the nineteenth century, were the appeals to the natural framing dismantled and replaced by the concept of a relatively autonomous and self-equilibrating economy with humans as the proximate cause (see Schabas Reference Schabas2005).
III. MANDEVILLE AND HUME AS METHODOLOGICAL HOLISTS
The point to anchor here is that neither Mandeville nor Hume were attempting to understand “the economy” in general. Insofar as they attended to specific features of the world, they were drawn much more to imbed them in terms of social wholes. They were inclined toward what we would now call “emergentism”; namely, that properties at the level of the whole are qualitatively different from properties at the level of individuals. For Mandeville, the theme of private vices transmuting into public virtues exemplifies this line of thinking. For Hume as well, the institutions are more robust and carry more weight than individuals, and often manifest unintended properties that emerge as a result of the ‘chemistry’ of the parts. To put it another way, Mandeville and Hume did not give priority to individuals as the unit of analysis; rather, to use John Davis’s apt phrase, they treated persons as “socially imbedded” and therefore saw the whole as more than the sum of its parts (see Davis Reference Davis2011). It is the hive, not the bees per se, that matters in their respective work.
By recognizing this, I hope in addition to suggest that economic thinking pre-Smith was more akin to sociology than our contemporary economics. Mandeville and Hume were more wedded to methodological holism, whereas contemporary economics is indisputably aligned with methodological individualism. Notwithstanding the appeals of Mandeville or Hume to self-love or self-interest, a closer examination of what is meant by the “self” brings out the view that individuals are fleeting instantiations of broader social customs and conditions.Footnote 4 I have already argued this in the case of Hume (see Schabas Reference Schabas2007), but need to challenge a number of scholars—for example, F. B. Kaye (1924), Nathan Rosenberg (Reference Rosenberg1963), and Edward Hundert (Reference Hundert1994)—who put much emphasis on the allegiance of Mandeville to individualism, or methodological individualism more specifically. It may well be the case that they used the term casually and did not adopt a more analytic definition; May Brodbeck (Reference Brodbeck and Brodbeck1968), for example, offers the definition that in carrying out the reduction of social wholes or facts, there should be no remainder. It may even be the case that they conflated Mandeville’s many appeals to human selfishness with methodological individualism (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, pp. 61, 78, 125). Nevertheless, the record needs correcting, as I seek to do with this lecture.
IV. MERCANTILISM AND LIBERALISM
The received view (Grampp Reference Grampp1952, Appleby Reference Appleby1978, Hutchison Reference Hutchison1988) points to two dominant threads in early-modern British economics. One is mercantilism, a discourse that surfaces in the late sixteenth century and is fully anchored by the 1620s with the writings of Gerard de Malynes, Edward Misseldon, and Thomas Mun. The other is economic liberalism that takes hold in the late seventeenth century and is exemplified by the writings of John Locke, Josiah Child, and Nicholas Barbon. Mandeville and Hume are invariably cast as drinking from both cups. My sense is that for both, the cup in the left hand, mercantilism, was closer to each of their lips than the cup in the right. One of my aims with this talk is to reposition Mandeville and Hume in early-modern economics, to revisit their respective standing vis-à-vis mercantilism and liberalism.
Needless to say, everything will depend on how one defines the terms, particularly since they were not in use until the nineteenth century. Easy definitions on offer are that mercantilism is the 'ism' of merchants, while economic liberalism is the 'ism' for persons who advocate free trade. Neither takes us very far, however. Decades ago, William Grampp (Reference Grampp1952), Nathan Rosenberg (Reference Rosenberg1963), and Terence Hutchison (Reference Hutchison1988) argued that they are false dichotomies. There was a strong liberal element in much of what might count as the mercantilist discourse, and there was still a strong appeal to merchant priorities in the emergent liberal discourse. Lars Magnussen (Reference Magnusson1994) carried forward this line of interpretation, and more recent studies by Sophus Reinert (Reference Reinert2011) and Carl Wennerlind and Philip Stern (2013) have conjoined mercantilism to an additional set of themes: emulation, underdevelopment, social capital, and the financial exigencies of war. In sum, mercantilism has come to be seen as a much more sophisticated body of thought than was once portrayed by Adam Smith (Smith Reference Smith, Campbell and Skinner1976, pp. 429–662).
Almost all the contributors to early-modern British economics, mercantilist or not, were inclined to restrict trade in more than one respect, whether to protect infant industries, to combat smuggling, or to reduce leisure and underemployment for the lower orders. Almost no one argued to dismantle many of the regulations in place that governed skilled and semi-skilled laborers. Many held government appointments at one time or another. Locke, for example, was Secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations; Hume and Smith both semi-retired to government posts that enforced regulations on trade and finance. Moreover, appeals to the concept of laissez-faire by French and Italian savants were primarily directed to the domestic grain market, and thus considerably removed from the problems that beset foreign trade.
Both Mandeville and Hume promoted the critical role of merchants in the new commercial era, particularly their utilization of specialized knowledge. Mandeville entreats us to “cherish the Merchant, and encourage Trade in every Branch of it [the Nation]” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 184). He even proposes, somewhat in jest, that it is our civic duty to consume imported goods (conveniences and luxuries). Hume also praised merchants as “one of the most useful races of men” precisely because they opened up new channels of trade that divided and subdivided our world into fine-grained commercial webs (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 300). Both celebrated the cultivation of new tastes and fashions. Most of all, they celebrated the shift of power from the landed gentry to the new commercial class of merchants and traders, that “middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 277).Footnote 5
Both Mandeville and Hume endorsed Mun’s famous argument for a favorable balance of trade. Mandeville advises the government to keep a “watchful Eye over the Balance of Trade” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 116). Merchants also monetize the world, and, for Mandeville, money is the great leveller and reinforcer of social ties. “Money obviates and takes away all those Difficulties, by being an acceptable Reward for all the Services Men can do to one another” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, p. 349). “Nothing is more universally charming than Money; it suits with every Station; the high, the low, the wealthy, and the poor” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, p. 354). Mandeville is quite explicit, however, that the policy of a favorable balance of trade is primarily in the service of national growth.
Hume also recognized that money is a great stimulus to growth and prosperity. It is only when merchants or manufacturers have imported full-bodied coins, from Cadiz, for example, that the same labor force can increase output. The weaver works with greater intensity and the farmer with greater alacrity. This transpires prior to the demand for higher wages or the concomitant rise of prices. The reason is that the coins both settle outstanding debts and enable new purchases of food and cloth that do not require the extension of credit. Coins have a vitalizing effect on the world, prompting industry and enterprise (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, pp. 286–289).
What, then, do we make of Hume’s so-called specie-flow mechanism that so demolishes the balance-of-trade argument? As I have argued elsewhere, the mechanism is broached as a thought experiment, prompted by the counterfactual of an overnight doubling of the money stock (Schabas Reference Schabas2008). Hume used this conceptual tool to isolate an underlying propensity for the global equilibration of specie, but knew very well that this would take place only under idealized—that is, perfect—conditions. He also articulated several qualifications that would delimit the full manifestation of this mechanism, as it later came to be known (he never used the term “specie-flow mechanism”). He addressed the problems of demand-elasticity, of non-transportable goods, of the imperfect fungibility of specie and paper money, and of the law of one price, although not using our terminology (see Cesarano Reference Cesarano1998).
Even granting the brilliance of the specie-flow argument, Hume had bigger fish to fry. His gaze was more directed to a global justice played out over many centuries, the theme Eugene Rotwein characterized as the migration of economic opportunity. He also celebrated the long-term decline of real as opposed to nominal prices, in tandem with economic growth. This also unfolded over centuries, but all that mattered to stimulate growth was a small washing up to shore, so to speak, of localized and unanticipated excess specie. In that sense, the favorable balance-of-trade argument was sustained. By challenging the claim that Hume was a quantity theorist, Carl Wennerlind (Reference Wennerlind2005) has established this even more fully.
More could be said about Mandeville’s and Hume’s respective celebrations of the merchant and of overseas trade, but they are more often portrayed as boats on the rising tide of liberalism. Certainly, both sought to dismantle archaic or restrictive laws that inhibit trade, and both welcomed greater liberties of expression and mobility. I do not wish to portray them as hostile to liberty. But there are some important respects in which they do not fit into the tradition of liberalism that runs from John Locke to John Stuart Mill.
Liberalism is a term that quickly fractures, as Gerry Gaus has aptly put it (Gaus 2010). There are many species of liberalism, as one might expect from a set of ideas that reach back to the seventeenth century. The species that apply most in the case of Mandeville and Hume are the political, economic, and metaphysical forms of liberalism. I will take up this taxonomy and proceed to address each one in turn as part of a way of coming to terms with the question of methodological individualism.
V. POLITICAL LIBERALISM
Political liberalism has its origin in social contract theory, starting with Thomas Hobbes and Locke. Both Mandeville and Hume were vehemently opposed to the idea that a social contract was struck in the past, let alone that it stemmed from an era of greater egalitarianism and was thus all the more justified. Where is that parchment, Hume asks in his essay “On the Original Contract”? It not only does not exist, but it is also clear that all political authority was born in violence, coercion, and inequality (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 468).
Both Mandeville and Hume offer a strongly evolutionary account of the gradual expansion of political unification. The reproductive bond ensures a sufficient degree of humanity between the sexes to discredit the Hobbesian world of one against all, but it takes much time for the sympathetic regard to expand into proper clans and polities. The craving for esteem is paramount and the mechanism of sympathy transforms us from mere animals into moral creatures with tools, language, and governance. Once out of the savage state, “if we examined [man] as a Member of a Society and a taught Animal, we shall find him quite another Creature” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, pp. 205–206).
Mandeville writes in detail about the origin of language replacing gestures but is clear that language is always about persuasion and hence power. It also engenders what we might today call “cognitive dissonance,” creating the means by which we ripple out, forming layer upon layer of self-deception and the masking of our true motives or desires. In the words of E. J. Hundert, “while the fundamental passionate repertoire of the human frame remained undiminished, these passions were now effectively harnessed, redirected from violent ends to seek ‘tokens’ of public esteem and, during the long course of the civilizing process, made largely unconscious to the social actors themselves” (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 70).
Mandeville relays the example of an awkward young girl who cannot yet speak, so perhaps age two, learning to curtsey. Her nurse “falls in an ecstasy of Praise,” echoed by her mother and the other women servants. She is deemed better at curtseying than her four-year-old sister, who immediately takes offence until she is told in a whisper that it is just to please the baby. Informed that she is now almost a woman, the older girl “grows proud at being let into the Secret, and rejoicing at the Superiority of her Understanding” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 53), and starts to flatter her baby sister as well. Words are thus replete with deception and false ascriptions from the get-go but are also the mechanism by which social ties are forged.
Both Mandeville and Hume emphasize our strong inclination to sociability, with urbanization as the end point of that propensity. Unlike Locke, who portrayed humans in a pastoral setting in a mostly empty landscape, Mandeville and Hume paint a world that is teeming with bodies. Both remark on the daily phenomenon of bumping into a multitude of strangers; fifty an hour was Mandeville’s estimate (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 128). Both also remark that as one travels further afield from one’s home, a bond with a stranger will be struck as long as there is a modicum of kinship. Mandeville notes that two traders on Change Alley in London who pass each other daily might act with “not much greater Civility than Bulls,” but were they to bump into one another in Bristol, they would “be glad of one another’s Company” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 343). For Hume, to meet a fellow Briton on the European continent, or a fellow European in Asia, would lead to companionship. At its extreme, he avers, we would embrace a fellow human being were we to meet one on the moon (Hume Reference Hume, Fate Norton and Norton2000, p. 310). In sum, the need to recognize our species-specific bonds increases as we are displaced. We seek out company and lower our expectations in accordance with what is on offer.
Sociability thus runs very deeply and intensifies over the centuries. As Hume observes in his essay “Of National Characters,” the emergence of a national type with pronounced similarities is a direct result of the fact that “the propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 202). Sociability also grows in step with population growth. A central moral of Mandeville’s Fable is that if men become too honest, the population will decline such that “few in the vast Hive remain” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 35). Before Jove granted the wish to eliminate vice, the hive was teeming with life, and it was “those vast Numbers made ‘em thrive; Millions endeavouring to supply” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 18).
Likewise, Hume observes in his essay “Of the Refinement in the Arts” that men “flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to show their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation or living, in clothes or furniture.” The more commerce and artisan activities advance, “the more sociable men become.... It is impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 271). Hume comments in several essays that in the modern commercial era, men are drawn to cities such as London, which has “perhaps, arrived at a greatness, which no city will ever be able to exceed (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 448; see also pp. 314, 354). Large and dense populations are thus cast in a favorable light.
In contrast to Locke, governance is still very far from perfect. For Mandeville, “it is the Work of Ages to find out the true Use of the Passions, and to raise a Politician, that can make every Frailty of the Members add Strength to the whole Body” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, p. 319). For Hume, “a century is scarce sufficient to establish any new government, or remove all scruples in the minds of the subjects concerning it” (Hume Reference Hume, Fate Norton and Norton2000, p. 356). “Law, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least, of commerce and manufacture” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 273). In his essay “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” Hume suggests no drastic reforms, but rather “gentle alterations and innovations” in the spirit of his conjectures (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 514).
In sum, it is difficult to place either Mandeville or Hume squarely in the Lockean tradition of political liberalism. They eschew the doctrine of the original contract, and neither do they make salient the agrarian sector or the virtue of cultivation. They portray a world of hustle and bustle, rather than one characterized by Locke’s tacit arrangements. Both Mandeville and Hume were more inclined to see commerce in the full sense of mental, bodily, and linguistic exchange, with eloquence of speech as one important emergent property of the modern era.
VI. ECONOMIC LIBERALISM
Let me now turn to economic liberalism. I think most of us know that appeals to free trade have never been taken literally. It is more a matter of degree than as an ideal to be attained. But a more fundamental way to capture economic liberalism, I would submit, is the observance of contracts, of which, as Mandeville discerns, money is just a by-product. Market contracts are, in principle, voluntary (non-coerced) agreements to swap rights that are, in principle, protected by the government. Or, as Hume observes, “one thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit of cloaths, in a very short time” (Hume Reference Hume, Fate Norton and Norton2000, p. 356), but the matter is in fact very complex. Mandeville and Hume both unfold the many respects in which the voluntary nature of contracts is distorted and rendered unequal, whether in the settlement of loans or the wage contract. Property is in essence a set of contractual rights, but, as Locke made plain, includes not just landed estate or capital holdings in stocks or bonds, but one’s own labor that is exchanged in the wage contract (see Sreenivasan Reference Sreenivasan1995).
More to the point, property requires an implicit theory of intergenerational exchange. As Hume warns his reader, “inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient” (Hume Reference Hume and Beauchamp1998, p. 25). It may be that mixing one’s labor with the land creates estate, but what matters more is the system of inheritance that preserves the rights created by that historical moment. Liberalism demands that there be some account that singles out hereditary lines. Reproduction is key in this case, but this in turn blurs the lines that make individuals salient.
Hence, my allusion, in the title, to Hume’s silkworms, which he contrasts to humans precisely because we do not all die en masse to pave the way for the next generation. Rather, we humans enter and exit in a continuous fashion. “One man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 476). Or, as Mandeville remarks, “Christenings are a proper Balance to Burials” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 250). The process of continual rather than punctuated reproduction instils the over-arching force of institutions and a tendency toward conservative institutions. Each “new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out for them” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, pp. 476–477). Institutions evolve slowly over time, but not by single-handed intervention. New practices emerge in tandem with a shift in customs and habits, as evident in the diminution of monkish virtues and the rise of the mercantile virtues of industry and probity (see Wennerlind Reference Wennerlind2002, Schabas Reference Schabas2014). This takes considerable time, which, for Hume, is all for the good, since it brings continuity and stability. As Hume muses, he would “be sorry to think that human affairs admit of no greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particular men” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 15).
Mandeville is more inclined to see coercion and deception at the core of all such contracts. Buyers and sellers strive to outwit one another; “Tradesmen are generally forc’d to tell Lies in their own Defence, and invent a thousand improbable Stories” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 81). Mandeville’s account of a lady of fashion purchasing silk from a London merchant captures well the layers of deception that beset pecuniary transactions (see Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, pp. 128–134). He extends this idea of the “continual bartering of one thing for another” to almost every avenue of life, including education and marriage (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, p. 348). Every person, as Adam Smith would later observe, had become “in some measure a merchant” (Smith Reference Smith, Campbell and Skinner1976, 1, p. 36). The bees may seem to live a simple life of foraging for nectar and buzzing freely like atomic particles, but Mandeville emphasizes that they are prone to illicit ways through and through, entirely duped, fungible, and beholden to the good of the hive.
We are deceived into thinking we are autonomous beings. “Everybody looks upon his own dear person, as an individual, if not independent being . . . very often forgetting they are members of society” (quoted in Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 179). As Hundert observes, Mandeville “sought to lay bare the social mechanisms which conditioned individual propensities” (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 18). The emergent line of thinking comes out even more with the following: “by Society I understand a Body Politick, in which Man either subdued by Superior Force, or by Persuasion drawn from his Savage State, is become a Disciplin’d Creature. . . . each Member is render’d Subservient to the Whole” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, pp. 346–347). There is a sense in which Mandeville foreshadows the Durkheimian treatment of individuals. The bees come and go, but the hive endures over many generations.
VII. METAPHYSICAL LIBERALISM
Metaphysical liberalism commits to the intrinsic equality of individuals and the general endorsement of enhancing individual autonomy. It can be spun both positively, as the expansion of the individual will, or negatively, as the reduction of coercive powers that would impede individual mobility, beliefs, modes of expression, etc. Gaus (Reference Gaus1983) sees this line best captured by John Stuart Mill, who advanced a concept of cooperative individualism. Individuals continually strive for perfection, and thus draw on the opportunities and ideas offered by others. To do this, they must cooperate, much as firms, Mill emphasizes, while competitive, also depend heavily on customs and cooperative institutions. Mill’s cooperative individualism is a far cry from the late twentieth-century liberalism of James Buchanan or Gordon Tulloch, who are strongly wedded to an atomistic picture of individuals. There is such a close association between liberalism and atomistic individualism at present that it takes work and effort not to project this farther back in time.
Mandeville and Hume, I propose, are not Millian. They are thus less aligned with metaphysical liberalism than is normally assumed. Perfectibility is a distant if impossible goal. But insofar as we embark on moral improvement, we do so not as autonomous agents but as socially imbedded persons at a given time and place (see Taylor Reference Taylor, Norton and Taylor2009). What beliefs or modes of expression we might seemingly adopt freely are, for the most part, the product of some prior authority, absorbed perhaps from social conditions that existed even before we enter the world. The thread of akrasia or weakness of the will is deeply woven into Mandeville’s Fable of the Bess. Hume tends rather to straitjacket our will by emphasizing the sense in which our personal characteristics are entirely shaped by the external conditions on offer, our family and cultural trajectory. He effectively robs us of anything more than a soupçon of the capacity for genuine character reform (see Russell Reference Russell1995, ch. 9).
Both Mandeville and Hume position their accounts of the human condition at the level of groups, qua sociologist. Mandeville divides our species into two classes, the “low-minded” who are “wholly incapable of Self-denial,” and the few who are “lofty” and esteem the “improvements of the Mind” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, pp. 43–44). Hume begins his essay “Of Commerce” with a similar dichotomy, between the many who are shallow thinkers and the few who are capable of abstruse thought (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 253). He then divides the state into two main groupings, husbandmen and manufacturers, and proceeds to ascribe traits to them as wholes, rather than as individuals (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 256; Schabas Reference Schabas2007). This accords with his broader account of the rise of arts and sciences, which “is not altogether a question concerning the taste, genius, and spirit of a few, but concerning those of a whole people; and may, therefore, be accounted for, in some measure, by general causes and principles” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 114).
Hume’s predilection to ascend up to the level of groups is bolstered by his appeal to the law of large numbers. “What depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance or secret and unknown cause; What arises from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 112). Hume uses this to great effect to establish the advantages of civilized monarchs over the Roman republics. He estimates that for the past 200 years, there have been about 200 absolute princes in Europe and that, if the average reign is twenty years, then, on average, there have been 2,000 per annum units of monarchs. But none, he claims, not even Philip II of Spain, have been as tyrannical as at least four of the twelve Roman emperors; namely, Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, or Domitian. The reasons are simple: in modern Europe, property rights are secure, and hence industry and the arts flourish. “Our modern education and customs instil more humanity and moderation than the ancient” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 94).
John Graunt had observed that more boys are born than girls, on average, but it was the physician to Queen Anne, Dr. John Arbuthnot, who used probability theory to make sense of the pattern. In a publication for the Royal Society, Arbuthnot (1710) demonstrated that an assumption of equiprobable sex ratios as the underlying distribution was virtually impossible, given the records taken from a London hospital over the span of eighty-two years. Mandeville refers to this pattern of the unequal birth ratios, and the fact that there is “fourscore years” of records to support it (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, pp. 256–258). Given the similarity of the numbers, it strains credulity that Mandeville did not know Arbuthnot’s findings, and was thus also beginning to think in terms of the law of large numbers.Footnote 6
It is unlikely that Hume had read Jacob Bernoulli (1713) or Abraham De Moivre (1718) on preliminary treatments of the binomial distribution (see Stigler Reference Stigler1986), but there is some circumstantial evidence that Hume would have known Arbuthnot’s study. There is good evidence that he had sought out Arbuthnot while passing through London in 1734, and he later cites Arbuthnot’s empirical work in his essay “Of the Balance of Trade” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 323). There is also reason to believe that Hume knew, indirectly, about the insights of Thomas Bayes and that these informed his devastating critique of miracles in his posthumous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) (Stigler Reference Stigler1986, Raynor Reference Raynor1980). These are good indications that Mandeville and Hume were inclined to think at the level of the whole and generalized using large sets of data.
Hume also exposes the false belief we have in our personal identity (Hume Reference Hume, Fate Norton and Norton2000, pp. 164–171). There is no corresponding impression to give rise to our idea of our personhood. To individuate ourselves is to arrive at a list of characteristics, none of which can motivate the container we would like to ascribe to ourselves as persons distinct from others. This sensory reductionism also feeds our deeply rooted human propensity for sociability, that “makes us enter deeply into each other’s sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 202). The starting point is a science of human nature, but with minds and bodies that belong to the collective. “The fabric and constitution of mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body” (Hume Reference Hume and Miller1985, p. 168). Individuals are mere way stations for these broader and more robust social conditions.Footnote 7
Hume’s essay “Of National Characters” exemplifies this point, as do his many remarks about rank or gender. In his economic essays, the prodigality of landlords, the frugality of merchants, or the laziness of peasants are some of the salient behavioral traits that explain, in part, the interest rate, the size of population, or the level of wages. Little to nothing was gained, analytically, by reducing the group down to the individual, as is a given for contemporary economists. Indeed, Hume discerned that it was important to resist drawing inferences from single actors, however powerful. Even all-powerful kings have been overblown by history; it is the institutions that trump human effort.
Mandeville argued a similar point: “there are very few [political laws] that are the Work of one Man, or of one Generation; the greatest part of them are the Product, the joint Labour of several Ages” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, pp. 321–322). We have been misled by Mandeville’s attention to selfishness, and self-love. The self is primarily a blurry container through which larger social tendencies flow. His project to “anatomize” the “invisible part of man” meant that he engaged in peeling away surface layers, particularly those provided by propriety and moral codes. As Hundert observes, Mandeville “sought to lay bare the social mechanisms which conditioned individual human propensities,” but the emphasis is on the social with the individual as just the residual outcome (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 18). Although persons appear to serve individual interests, they are driven by passions that are shaped entirely by social opportunities (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 20).
The body is also turned into a commodity, rather than preserved as a temple onto itself. We are not containers for the immortal soul, since only pride has prompted us to think we have a claim on the afterlife (Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 43). Rather, we are somatic sites for all sorts of commerce: sexual, mercantile, intellectual, or reproductive. We have the apt label, from Catherine Gallagher (2006, pp. 3–4), of somaeconomics. The body is a trading zone for pleasure and pain that is in constant reckoning with outside forces, and there is never a balancing of accounts. We are in a state of perpetual confusion, with stimuli coming from without, and processing from within. Indeed, Mandeville gives us a clear sense that we simply do not understand how our instincts and passions fit, even partially, with the complexity of the social world that has evolved. Language and other visual labels, such as fashionable clothing or aristocratic titles, only obscure matters all the more. Fashion is more tyrannical than any absolute ruler.
Mandeville accepts that, as humans began to live in groups and form larger polities, new and more complex passions took root, such as envy, avarice, and ambition, and these in turn reinforced social bonds (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 2, p. 271). Humans eventually became more civil and able to feign politeness in ways we do not fully understand. Trade is replete with a 1,001 tricks or devices. As Daniel Defoe remarked, the “lunacy in trade” is such that “no man can give a rational account of it” (quoted in Hundert Reference Hundert1994, p. 211). Not only are we beset with self-deception, falsely ascribing moral turpitude at every turn, but we also succumb to all the illusions of rank and place. We fail to see the invisible social chains that bind us to one another.
We are rife with imperfections: vanity, laziness, impatience, and contradictory beliefs. Most of all, we suffer from myopia. “The short-sighted Vulgar in the Chain of Causes seldom can see further than one Link” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Kaye1988, 1, p. 91). We do not comprehend the emergent properties at the level of the hive; our perspective and sensibility are entirely confined to the local level. “They are silly People who imagine that the Good of the whole is consistent with the Good of every Individual” (Mandeville Reference Mandeville and Dobrée1954, p. 49).
VIII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, Mandeville and Hume are not well aligned with the political or metaphysical liberalism that runs from Locke to Mill, or inclined toward economic liberalism, cast in terms of the essentialism of voluntary contracts. They single out the critical role of the merchant and overseas trade, and favor the crowded urban scene more than the rustic idyll that figured in the work of Locke, Rousseau, and Smith. They both frame economic ideas with modes of thinking drawn from natural history, reproductive continuity, and institutional evolution. They are, above all, proto-sociologists. Christopher Finlay (Reference Finlay2007) has advanced this reading of Hume’s Treatise. Edward J. Hundert (Reference Hundert1994) imposed a similar theme by flagging Mandeville’s “discovery of society.” The main modification I wish to make is that Mandeville and Hume were not engaging the analysis known more recently as methodological individualism. In this respect, Mandeville and Hume are kindred souls.
To return to my opening reference to that graphic account of torture by Adam Smith, we learn that after the prisoner has been “scorched and burnt, and lacerated in all the most tender and sensible parts of his body for several hours . . . [he is allowed] a short respite, and is taken down from the stake” to converse and smoke tobacco (Smith Reference Smith, Campbell and Skinner1976, p. 206). Let us do the same, bring out the wine and the cigars, and carry on the conversation.
