One might well ask why we should care whether Gustav Cassel may have been more famous than John Maynard Keynes for a period or whether Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy is now more widely cited than Keynes's General Theory. One answer is that questions of esteem, fame, and impact have been part of intellectual history since its inception—hence the canon, whether in literature, economics, political theory, or any number of other areas. One may agree or disagree with the notion of ascribing canonical status to particular individuals or sets of works, but both sides of the argument rest on explicit or implicit notions of import and prominence, with the opponents of the notion of a canon often resorting to the claim that those they feel unjustly left out are no less worthy of esteem and engagement than those included.
Perhaps the most well-known attempt, to date, to measure the fame or impact of economists is Mark Blaug's Who's Who in Economics,Footnote 1 where the standard for inclusion in the early editions was more or less being dead and famous, or being alive and having a citation count sufficiently high to allow one to leapfrog the vast swarms of punters in the profession and land a place in Blaug's tome.Footnote 2 There was no attempt to make a descriptive case for the inclusion of the chosen. Instead, Blaug was content to “let the data speak”: among the living, at least, citation counts from the Social Sciences Citation Index were the defining criterion for inclusion in the volume.Footnote 3
A similar and perhaps more ambitious exercise has recently been undertaken by Thomas Coupe, whose extensive analysis uses several different measures—such as citations, published articles, and published pages—to rank the world's economists.Footnote 4 The broad net cast by Mr. Coupe's different ranking schemes gave cheer to the heterodox as well as the orthodox, the historians as well as the mathematically or econometrically inclined. Economists from semi-obscure universities who fared well in Mr. Coupe's ranking trumpeted their standing on personal websites, in promotion decisions, and to support requests for salary increases, while those left out bemoaned the failure of the rankings to count a sufficiently large group of “important” published resources. “Eminence” is clearly in the eye of the beholder (and his or her data set).
Blaug and Sturges recognize that there are problems associated with basing eminence and impact on citation counts and note some of them while defending their practice in the introduction to the first edition of Who's Who:
We have chosen to define an economist as one who publishes more or less regularly in one of the hundreds of learned journals of economics. This is unfair to the many dedicated teachers of economics who publish little if anything, to business and government economists whose writings are never published, and to economists working for international agencies whose writings frequently remain anonymous. Our choice of the publication criterion for the status of “economist” was, however, dictated by our prior choice of a criterion of eminence in economics. The dictionary definition of “eminence” is “one who stands high as compared with others, especially in his own calling,” for which near synonyms are “distinguished,” “celebrated,” and “illustrious.” But who is to judge high standing as compared with others? Presumably, none other than the peer group, which is to say that eminent or major economists are those who receive prizes and honorary degrees, are nominated and elected to offices in professional associations of economists, and are very frequently cited in the writings of other economists. In fact, we may virtually reduce the concept of eminence to frequency of citations, because the citation counts of particular economists (number of times they are footnoted in economic journals over a period of time) have been shown to be highly correlated with the award of Nobel prizes and with election to offices in such leading professional associations …
(Blaug and Sturges Reference Blaug and Sturges1983, p. vii).Of course, this kind of citation data ignores both books and the literature of the more “popular” realm, and it counts only those journals that have been selected for inclusion in the Social Sciences Citation Index.
Some of the most prominent and influential economists of the post-WWII period would have had no shot at appearing in either of these citation-based rankings. John Kenneth Galbraith published almost exclusively in book form.Footnote 5 Aaron Director, the founder of the Chicago law and economics tradition and the approach to antitrust that has figured so prominently in academic and regulatory circles since the 1970s, published virtually nothing: his students were the ones who wrote up his ideas for publication.Footnote 6 Slightly further afield, Arthur Laffer's views on the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues became a cornerstone of supply-side economics and made him a very important figure in US economic policymaking during the 1980s, with influence going far beyond what would be suggested by his record of scholarly publication.
My comments to this point would lead the reader to wonder why this author, as editor, bothered to accept the Carlson and Diamond papers for publication in the first place. While I readily acknowledge that citation counts are flawed as measures of importance or influence, they are far from historiographically empty. They are one piece of the larger contextual milieu that goes into the construction of the history of economics. Recent efforts to move the subject beyond a history of theory to include a focus on the larger professional, intellectual, and social contexts in which ideas have been developed, the mechanisms for the dissemination and transmission of ideas, and the influence of these ideas beyond the strictly academic realm have provided a deeper and richer understanding of the history of economics. The Carlson and Diamond papers offer two illustrations of how citations can inform our understanding of this history.
Professor Diamond's analysis is very much in keeping with the approaches employed by Blaug and Coupe: using the Social Sciences Citation Index as his database, Diamond examines citations to Keynes's General Theory and Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy to gauge their relative influence over the fifty-year period running from 1956 through 2006. Carlson moves in a very different direction, examining mentions of Keynes and Cassel in The Economist from 1919 through 1930. In doing so, he nudges historians of economics away from their almost exclusive preoccupation with internalist history and the notion, expressed by Blaug and Sturges in the passage quoted above, that economists, via their citation practices, are the persons best placed to define who, among their tribe, is eminent.
This last point is of particular historiographic import. The transmission of economic ideas into the popular realm—for example, through the discussions that took place in Jane Marcet's nineteenth-century salons or through Leonard Silk's writings for Business Week Footnote 7—has been an increasing (though still small-scale) preoccupation of historians of economics in recent years. Carlson's examination of Cassel and Keynes offers another interesting blueprint for attempting to get at the transmission of economic ideas. One can like or dislike the idea of attempting to determine who is the foremost economist at a particular point in time, but the attempt to trace impact and influence on the popular mind, or business, or policymaking through treatments of economists and their ideas in the popular media of the day offers an interesting and potentially fruitful area for historians of economics to explore.
While historiographically interesting, this work does have its limitations, and it challenges the author to dig beyond the raw data. I note only three such issues here, doing so with reference to the articles by Carlson and Diamond.
First, in Carlson's article we meet Keynes before he was at the height of his powers; Cassel, meanwhile, was at his peak. It is less surprising to find that Cassel was more “famous” than Keynes in the 1920s than it would have been in the 1930s, 40s, or 50s.
Second, events and ideas are often intimately related, and Diamond's comparison of Schumpeter and Keynes is an excellent example of the potential impact of this on citation data. When one combines the collapse of Keynesian macroeconomics and the rise of rational expectations macroeconomics and real business cycle theory following upon the economic events of the 1970s, with the spike in interest in evolutionary economics that effectively began in the 1980s, there are some fairly obvious reasons why citations to Schumpeter would overtake those to Keynes during the 1990s. I expect that one would find similar results in performing this exercise on Keynes and Robert Lucas. That said, it would not be at all surprising to see a reversal of this trend in light of recent economic events and the scholarly and policy responses to them.
Third, one must confront the question of what citations actually indicate. In the two papers published here, we have very different fora for counting citations: one, a popular magazine, and the other the body of scholarly journals in economics and beyond. But what does it mean to be cited? In the academic journals, there is a danger in equating citations with influence, particularly when one cannot even be sure that the author doing the citing has actually read the work in question. That is, it is difficult to distinguish between an article that has actually impacted the work in which the article is cited and the “obligatory” citation to a prominent article in the area. One need only look to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations for an example of a work that is often cited but seldom read.
Citations in the popular media reflect something very different—a measure of the esteem or influence in the popular or business realm that may have relatively little to do with internal disciplinary prestige and influence as measured by scholarly output or citations. One might well get very different “importance” results, either absolutely or relatively, depending on whether the one was counting citations in popular or scholarly outlets. Consider the case of Lionel Robbins and Keynes in the 1930s and 40s. There is little question that Keynes's stature was greater in both the policy and academic arenas, and that citations in the popular media and academic literature would confirm this. But when one considers relative importance, things change somewhat. Robbins's influence in the policy realm was far greater—and much closer to Keynes—than in the academic literature, and Carlson's approach might well give Robbins a higher mark, relative to Keynes, than Diamond's method. Likewise, I expect that if one were to look at references to Leonard Silk, Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and John Kenneth Galbraith in both the scholarly and popular realms over the 1960s and 70s, some very interesting results would emerge. For those who care only for the history of economic “analysis,” measures of popular and policy influence may be of little concern. But the history of economics encompasses much more than the history of theory (and, recently, econometrics) and so must draw on resources far beyond the scholarly texts.
I am quite certain that Professors Carlson and Diamond would agree with my assessment that the analysis in their articles is far from perfect as a measure of fame or influence, and that it does not push the analysis of the data and the forces underlying it nearly as far as one might go. In the case of Carlson, we might wish to see greater effort devoted to teasing out the ways in which the ideas of Cassel and Keynes were used in The Economist and what this implies for the nature and substance of their influence, and less emphasis on the idea of who is more famous. In like manner, Diamond could go much further in exploring how the ideas of Keynes and Schumpeter were being used along the trend lines and how this feeds into their ascents and descents. That said, the methods employed provide one means to assess the dissemination and transmission of ideas and influence within and beyond the academy. In doing so, they enrich our understanding of the history of economics.
