First, a cliché: few topics are more pertinent, more intriguing, more confusing, and more contentious to contemporary scholars, policymakers, and media pundits than those concerning the triangular relationship—and crises—among the United States, Israel, and Iran. Yet, few scholars in recent years have attempted anything resembling what Trita Parsi has attempted to do in Treacherous Alliance—namely, recapturing within one unified framework the fundamental difficulties, paradoxes, and contradictions of the history of this relationship from the mid-20th century through the present. As Parsi observes in the preface, “it has been almost two decades since a book on Israeli–Iranian relations was published in English . . .” (p. xii); that book is Sohrab Sobhani's The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli–Iranian Relations, 1948–1988 (New York: Praeger, 1989).
By weaving together interviews with some 130 past and present decision makers in Iran, Israel, and the United States, Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, provides a fresh (even if not entirely new) view of this relationship, which has been obscured by rhetoric of the “clash of civilizations” and the “war on terror” type. In the process, he demonstrates with much clarity that the present conflict with Iran is the result of a complex web of miscalculations, misunderstandings, oversights, illusions, and, equally significant, the hubris of U.S. imperial designs.
Parsi's overarching argument is quite straightforward: the conflict between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other hand, “wasn't sparked by an ideological difference, nor is it ideological fervor that keeps it alive today.” The major transformations in these relations, he writes, “have all coincided with geopolitical rather than ideological shifts” (p. 262). Thus, as Parsi demonstrates, the Israeli–Iranian entente before the 1979 revolution, which took shape within the framework of the anti-Arab “periphery doctrine,” was rooted above all in mutual strategic interests and concerns emanating from these two states' position within the global balance of power during the Cold War era.
Likewise, despite the radical ideological reorientation of the post-1979 Iranian state (and that state's venomous anti-Israel rhetoric), Iran and Israel continued to collaborate secretly on security matters. This comes out most clearly in revelations stemming from the infamous Iran–Contra scandal. Still, argues Parsi, “the Iran–Contra affair wasn't an isolated incident. Contacts between Iran and Israel were frequent throughout the 1980s, all driven by the same forces—Iran's need for arms and Israel's hope of re-creating the Israeli–Iranian axis” (p. 127).
Indeed, expecting Iran's Islamic radicalization to be short lived—a “historical parenthesis” (p. 106)—Israelis hoped that Iran would soon reemerge as the Jewish state's natural ally. In other words, despite the escalation of Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric, Israel still had its eyes fixed on the periphery doctrine. It is little wonder that “throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about the Iranian threat—the word wasn't even uttered,” as an Israeli informant told Parsi. This is a correct observation, even if the rising Iranophobia that has taken hold of the Israeli public in recent years would make it seem quite implausible.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s changed the way Israel and the United States viewed Iran. In its new global position as the sole superpower, the United States refused to acknowledge Iran's emerging position as a regional power in the wake of the 1990 Gulf War and was not willing to reciprocate the Rafsanjani government's policy of moderating Iran's foreign policy. As a result, Americans excluded Iran from post-Gulf War decision making, including the Madrid summit on Israel's relations with the Arab states and the Palestinians. This act of American hubris was “a watershed moment”: it strengthened the hands of Iranian hard-liners, who “for the first time . . . seriously reach[ed] out to rejectionist Palestinian groups, in spite of the Shia–Sunni divide and their enmity dating back to the Iran–Iraq war” (p. 155).
The ascendancy of Rabin's Labor Party in 1992 and the ensuing Oslo peace process further pitted Iran and Israel against each other. Although in the 1980s Israel did not take Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric too seriously and even took pains to defend Iran in Washington, once peace with the Palestinians seemed within reach, all the tables were turned: to convince a skeptical Israeli public to accept peace with the Palestinians, Israel started to depict Iran as a threat to the region and the world. This, says Parsi, was an unprecedented shift in Israel's geopolitical outlook: “It completely contradicted the very heart of Israel's guiding strategy since the days of Ben-Gurion—the periphery doctrine. By seeking peace with the Arab states in Israel's vicinity and portraying the key peripheral state—Iran—as a threat, [Israel] turned the periphery doctrine on its head” (p. 160).
Given that representations of the world enter directly into its fabrication, it is not at all surprising that in reaction to this dramatic shift in Israel's outlook, Iran took additional steps to bolster its hold on the Lebanese Hizbullah and to further its penetration of occupied Palestinian territories. Put differently, the perception of the Iranian threat that was produced by Israelis became a reality: “the prophecy had been fulfilled” (p. 178).
To help turn the United States against Iran, Israel turned to “the king of lobbies” (p. 182), the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. This partially explains why, by 1994, Washington started to adopt the Israeli line on Iran. As a matter of fact, says Parsi, Israel and the pro-Israeli lobby constantly put political obstacles in the path of the United States and Iran each time these two states seemed inclined to cooperate or engage in a dialogue to overcome their outstanding disputes. Parsi's conclusions on this issue seem to converge with the argument recently put forth most forcefully by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007) that U.S foreign policy in the Middle East can be traced to the activities of the “Israel lobby,” which are detrimental to U.S. national interests.
Washington's cooperation with Iran during the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (2003) is a case in point, claims Parsi. Alarmed by the prospect that this cooperation would culminate in a historical rapprochement between the two states, the Israeli government and the Israel lobby mounted a powerful campaign to nip it in the bud. Parsi suggests that the Karine-A affair (named after the freighter the Israeli navy intercepted in the Red Sea in January 2002) was an instrument used by the Israelis to prevent a U.S.–Iranian engagement. Although Iran denied any connection to the ship, and some American officials even speculated that the affair was staged by the Israelis, the Karine-A affair contributed directly to Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, in which he named Iran part of an “Axis of Evil.” The Karine-A story thus doomed the fate of U.S.–Iranian dialogue and “gave new life to Israel's long-standing campaign to have the international community declare Iran as a state sponsor of terror” (p. 236).
There is much to commend in Treacherous Alliance. However, there are also two major limitations to the book, which raise serious questions about its overarching arguments. Parsi approaches source material quite unreflectively. As mentioned, the book is based on interviews Parsi conducted with “high-level decision makers from all three countries” (p. xiv). It is unfortunate that throughout the text Parsi takes his informants' words literally, as transparent reflections of past realities. He fails to recognize that memory does not always serve well, nor does he seem to care much about the likelihood that his informants' recollections of the past may be embedded in their present experiences and their specific location within present structures of power.
Equally problematic is Parsi's treatment of the domestic sphere and the foreign policy of each one of the respective countries as two distinct—not interdependent—entities. “My focus,” as he explains at the outset, “is on the relations between these states and not on internal developments that—while important—have little or no impact on their respective foreign policies” (p. xii). Needless to say, this kind of understanding is impervious to path-breaking interventions made by historians and anthropologists, who have demonstrated the link between domestic and foreign affairs in the manufacturing of imperial and nationalist projects, as well as the ways in which foreign policy depends on the understanding of how society functions at home.
Even so, Parsi's book is a valuable contribution, especially because it attempts to unveil the intricacies of U.S.–Iranian–Israeli relations that have thus far remained hidden beneath simplistic and virulent rhetoric. Despite its limitations, Treacherous Alliance is a timely and important book for anyone who would like to see the debate over the “Iranian threat” transcending the realm of essentialist ideologies and finding a proper place within that discipline of context we call history.
