With his latest book, Glenn Parker continues to take us along on his personal odyssey exploring the motivations of political officials and their consequences for our institutions and the quality of representation found in the American political system. Following his work that assumes legislators seek to maximize discretion and that explores how they structure their institutions to achieve that goal (Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of the Modern Congress, 1992) and his analysis of Congress in a rent-seeking environment (Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society, 1996), Parker, in this work, explores his concern for constraining the behavior of members of Congress who are increasingly “seeking material gain” (p. 12).

The brief argument Parker offers is that elected officials have a stake in preserving their personal reputations and, therefore, “self-police” when it comes to matters of integrity and of being faithful agents for their constituents. The value of their reputation to them comes in being rewarded at the ballot box and with prestigious postelectoral career opportunities. The question he explores is whether the desire to preserve one's reputation is enough to prevent politicians from acting opportunistically, that is, in an unethical or quasi-ethical manner.

The approach he uses to address this set of hypotheses is vintage Parker. He borrows heavily from economic theories, applies them creatively to politics, and is even more inventive when it comes to testing his hypotheses. Specifically, his theory is derived from branding theory, which has been extensively studied by economists. Both voters and politicians (or consumers and producers) operate in a rational environment whereby voters seek information shortcuts and politicians seek to provide each such shortcut by earning and preserving a positive reputation.

Parker demonstrates some connection between reputation and more objective evaluations of integrity before exploring why and how politicians might achieve a positive reputation. There are good theoretical reasons for reputations to be important to both voters and politicians, but he also carefully explores how the marketplace might fail when it comes to legislators. Few would deny that many individuals with less than sterling reputations get elected or reelected to public office.

Two key empirical tests of the author's theory are whether there is a relationship between reputation and acts of opportunism and whether reputational capital is an electoral asset. He is at his best in designing tests for hypotheses that might seem untestable by developing creative indicators and models that are varied and clever. As with his previous work, the reader may raise an eyebrow when Parker describes some of his tests, but after reading the argument and seeing the reasonableness of the results, that same reader may find some satisfaction in the test. Without elaborating on the multiple sources of data and models, it is worth mentioning that Parker uses survey data (including some for the state of Florida only) and election results, as well as examples of check kiting, honoraria, and foreign travel by members of Congress.

Parker also pays particular attention to postelective employment for two important theoretical reasons. First, knowing that the electoral accountability of one's reputation has shortcomings (in that it is ex ante and not overly effective), he argues that politicians will also want to protect their reputations so they can land attractive careers when they leave electoral office. Additionally, concern about postelective careers provides a way to address the last-period problem that we would otherwise experience once our politicians opt to no longer seek reelection.

Parker's exploration of postelective careers is, in my view, the most problematic part of the analysis. He argues that retiring members of Congress are not motivated by salaries and other material benefits but, rather, by the prestige of the opportunity. A member might prefer to become the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland rather than a $1 million-a-year director of an interest group. As the author points out, the number of such attractive opportunities is limited and, therefore, limits the effectiveness of this incentive. Even more problematic is imagining that a member who might be motivated to take a questionable $2,000 honorarium or an overseas junket would not find a high-paid position quite attractive. Further, there is no reason to believe that such lucrative opportunities are related to a positive reputation. Indeed, Parker suggests that the opposite relationship might be found (as an interest group might prefer someone willing to stretch the rules).

The second issue is whether the basis for a “good reputation” is the same for those whose opinion counts when making prestigious appointments as it is for voters. The president of the United States might evaluate the reputation of a member of Congress differently than would a constituent looking for his or her Social Security check. (And, certainly, an empirical assessment of one's reputation would seem to need to be different.)

I mention the postcareer aspect of Parker's analysis without meaning to quibble. (Nevertheless, some readers will quibble with every part of his analysis; others, though, will applaud his creativity and sound analysis.) But, if the model can be refined to bring into clearer focus the successes and shortcomings of reputations as a method of controlling opportunism, then that part of the analysis might be a fruitful starting point.

This brief review skates over a number of important issues that are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis. The findings are not particularly surprising: Positive reputations are an electoral advantage, they provide opportunities for prestigious jobs after electoral politics, and they deter unethical behavior; but, most of the effects seem limited and dominated by other factors. The strength of Self-Policing in Politics is in its careful theoretical application of branding theory to politicians and the thoughtful tests of interesting and important hypotheses.