Situating National Action Plans

There is a vast literature on NAPs that can be divided into three broad categories. First is the scholarship focused on what makes a high-impact or good quality NAP, which often draws on practitioner experience (see, for example, Jacevic Reference Jacevic, Davies and True2019; Miller, Pournik, and Swaine Reference Miller, Pournik and Swaine2014; Swaine Reference Swaine2009). Researchers at Inclusive Security, a prominent organization devoted to increasing women’s participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, evaluated NAP development and implementation processes in numerous different countries. They determined that NAPs are more likely to have significant and positive outcomes for gender equality and inclusive peace if they have: 1) strong and sustained political will supporting development and implementation; 2) an inclusive process for designing and implementing the NAP; 3) a results-based monitoring and evaluation system; and 4) adequate resources allocated to implementation (Amling and O’Reilly Reference Amling and O’Reilly2016, 4–6).

The second category of research on NAPs involves detailed analysis of NAP development and implementation in diverse contexts. This literature is too extensive to survey meaningfully here, but particularly interesting examples include an analysis of Resolution 1325 and women’s peace activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Farr Reference Farr2011), an analysis of the Central Europe’s anti-gender mobilization and the Czech Women, Peace, and Security agenda (O’Sullivan and Krulišová Reference O’Sullivan and Krulišová2020), and an indictment of NAPs as an obstacle to meaningful local ownership of UNSCR 1325 in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Basini and Ryan Reference Basini and Ryan2016). This literature speaks to the question of what WPS is, and whether there is a unified vision of its principles and the best route(s) to implementation. The diversity of findings demonstrates the difficulty inherent in evaluating success and failure in WPS implementation, not least because each context interprets and implements WPS very differently.

A third group of studies on NAPs takes an explicitly critical stance and explores how NAPs, as part of the broader WPS machinery, reproduce gendered, racialized, and colonial structures of power (see, for example, Achilleos-Sarll Reference Achilleos-Sarll2020, Reference Achilleos-Sarll2023; Haastrup and Hagen Reference Haastrup, Hagen, Basu, Kirby and Shepherd2020, Reference Haastrup and Hagen2021; Martín De Almagro Reference Martín De Almagro2018; Shepherd Reference Shepherd2016; Reference Shepherd2021). This literature reinforces the need to take a broad view of NAPs as part of the extensive WPS ecosystem. It highlights the importance of assessing not only how the on-paper provisions of WPS are documented in each NAP, but also how power operates in and through the WPS agenda, just as it does through any other policy agenda.

NAP Development and the Growth of the WPS Agenda

NAPs are both a part of how the WPS is implemented and a mechanism through which the agenda has developed and grown over time. There is very little consistency across NAPs. Some are close to 100 pages, while others are brief. Some include detailed budget allocations for every activity, while others barely mention the budget at all. Most, but not all, NAPs mention the four “pillars” of the WPS agenda (participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery). Yet, many also present further concerns under the auspices of WPS work. This growing diversity of WPS issues expands the remit of what WPS is and the activities to which WPS applies (for a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Kirby and Shepherd Reference Kirby and Shepherd2024, 61–84, 117–50). Figure 1 shows the frequency of mentions of “new” WPS issues — concerns that exceed the four “pillars” — in NAPs from 2005–20.Footnote ²

Figure 1.

Graph showing frequency of mentions of “new” security issues in NAPs 2005–20.

As shown in Figure 1, certain issues were embedded in NAPs long before they were articulated as WPS concerns in the Security Council resolutions that purport to anchor the agenda. NAPs, therefore, are an important locus of growth for the WPS agenda. Reproductive health needs were not mentioned in a resolution until the adoption of UNSCR 1889 in 2009, for example, but appear in NAPs as early as 2006. Similarly, “men and boys” were not enlisted as allies to the WPS agenda, nor recognized as potential survivors of sexual violence in conflict, in a WPS resolution until UNSCR 2106 in 2013, but mentions of “men and boys” appear in NAPs from 2006. Finally, LGBTQIA+ rights and concerns have not yet been discussed in a Security Council resolution but were first mentioned in NAPs in 2011 and then have appeared consistently in NAPs since 2014.

Given the diversity of NAPs and the inevitable gap between documented commitments and implementation, NAPs are an interesting lens through which to evaluate WPS “success” or “failure.” It is immediately apparent that every NAP contains its own vision of success, as each articulates its own objectives and priorities. There may be “family resemblance” to other WPS documents, such as invocation of the four central pillars, or repetition of key WPS language such as the “meaningful participation of women,” but each NAP is different and each NAP creates its own vision of WPS, both now and into the future. Some NAPs “succeed,” and some NAPs “fail,” but what success and failure look like and how each can be recognized also varies by context. With this in mind, we suggest that the future of WPS is best examined using an approach that enables analysts to capture the duality of the agenda as both an international policy agenda and an object of domestic politics.

Contexts of Implementation

At the time of writing, 112 UN member states have adopted an NAP. Despite insights regarding factors that lead to high-impact NAPs documented above, numerous issues continue to undermine the potential of the WPS agenda, including insufficient funds, a lack of meaningful engagement of women and women’s organizations, and failures to integrate NAP principles and objectives into broader domestic and security policies (Hamilton, Naam, and Shepherd Reference Hamilton, Naam and Shepherd2020; Newby and O’Malley Reference Newby and O’Malley2021; PeaceWomen 2023). In their review of NAPs, Newby and O’Malley (Reference Newby and O’Malley2021) highlight the systematic inability of states to address the underlying causes of women’s insecurity. This is exacerbated by the lack of coordinated efforts by state governments and international institutions to support civil society organizations (CSOs) implementation efforts in local contexts (Newby and O’Malley Reference Newby and O’Malley2021).

To understand the uptake and implementation of NAPs, WPS scholars have largely relied on theories of norm diffusion. This approach has treated WPS as a norm (or set of norms) and evaluated its diffusion across states (Asante et al. Reference Asante, Chilmeran, Shepherd and Tiller2021; Ruffa and Wibben Reference Ruffa and Annick2023; True Reference True2016), their domestic translation (Deiana and McDonagh Reference Deiana and McDonagh2017; Swaine Reference Swaine2017), implementation processes (Bellou and Chainoglou Reference Bellou and Chainoglou2022; Della Valle Reference Della Valle2022), and the obstacles to successful implementation (Drumond and Rebelo Reference Drumond and Rebelo2020). However, as Kirby and Shepherd (Reference Kirby and Shepherd2021, 19) argue, approaches “conceptualizing WPS as a norm do not adequately capture either the tensions or the complexity of the agenda’s development over time, nor do they resonate with the nonlinearity and multiplicity of its reproduction.” Such approaches thus limit our understanding of the impact of WPS within specific contexts. We therefore argue in favor of approaches that develop nuanced insights into specific policy contexts, acknowledging the complexity of each setting.

Policy studies approaches provide detailed examinations of the agenda’s reproduction, decision-making dynamics, allocated responsibilities, and context-specific tensions (Stone Reference Stone2008). Matland’s (Reference Matland1995) ambiguity-conflict model (ACM), for example, offers a matrix for analyzing the development and implementation of WPS NAPs across diverse contexts. The model provides insights into context-specific factors that either lead to the success or failure of NAPs based on the level of conflict and ambiguity present within the political environment. It involves interpreting the methods and factors influencing actor engagement, including CSOs, as well as identifying tensions and the impact of internal and external forces. Matland (Reference Matland1995) theorizes four implementation types: administrative, political, experimental, and symbolic. They provide a fine-grained way to assess “success” or “failure,” as determined by levels of conflict and ambiguity within political contexts. Administrative implementation is produced in contexts characterized by low conflict and low ambiguity; political implementation occurs in contexts with high conflict and low ambiguity; experimental implementation is marked by low conflict and high ambiguity; and symbolic implementation occurs under conditions of high conflict and high ambiguity.

The application of the ACM to political contexts shaped by low conflict and ambiguity (administrative implementation) will likely lead to successful WPS implementation outcomes according to the objectives of that context. During the NAP development process in Spain, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation collaborated with civil society networks, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Interior, allowing each actor to shape the objectives of the country’s WPS NAP. This collaboration reduced ambiguity, enhanced understanding of each actor’s roles, and provided clarity regarding its intended objectives. Combined with the low conflict achieved through adequate resourcing, targeted engagement of CSOs from specific regions, and the flexibility provided to these actors to consult with local women and external partners such as transnational CSOs, these factors created opportunities for CSOs to design and implement programs and initiatives aligned with the NAP’s objectives. These strategies and ongoing feedback mechanisms to improve processes and accountability fostered a collective sense of ownership and responsibility to ensure the NAP’s success.

In contrast, political contexts characterized by high ambiguity and conflict (symbolic implementation) are likely to lead to less successful WPS implementation. As seen in cases like South Sudan, these dynamics have contributed to limited implementation and continuous marginalization of women within peace and security activities. Limited awareness of the NAP among the population contributes to ambiguity, with some stakeholders unaware of its purpose and usefulness. The misalignment between the NAP’s principles and the values of patriarchal societies, which exclude women from political, social, and economic activities, is reinforced through cultural practices and customary laws, creating further barriers and high conflict amongst stakeholders. Uncertainty surrounding the social and political impact of implementation further affirms that implementation is largely symbolic, and a lack of funding contributes to slow and uneven implementation.

These examples underscore the need for academics and practitioners to recognize WPS as an object of domestic policy as well as a matter of international peace and security. Such an approach sheds light on the factors that facilitate or hinder implementation in and by UN member states, as well as potential context-specific solutions. While theories of norm diffusion often assume that NAPs are implemented in stable environments, applying a policy studies lens, as demonstrated here, provides further understanding of the risks, enablers, and contextual strategies that can increase the durability of WPS outcomes and improve effectiveness of implementation over time. Such approaches will only increase in importance as NAPs proliferate and the WPS agenda continues to grow as a result. Although expansion of the WPS agenda is crucial for capturing and addressing emerging security issues affecting women, it also increases the risks of states instrumentalizing NAPs to advance national interests and foreign objectives that do not align with the core principles and values of the WPS agenda.

Concluding Thoughts

The publication of NAPs for the implementation of the WPS agenda is not an indicator of the agenda’s success. Likewise, the absence of an NAP in a UN member state does not necessarily point to the failure of the WPS agenda in that context. NAPs capture both the present politics of the WPS agenda and the possibilities of what the agenda might become. This is shown both in the discussion of how NAPs serve as vehicles for the introduction of new issues into the WPS ecosystem and in the seeding of new trajectories of WPS growth in recent NAPs. We have aimed to show here that NAPs do more than simply reflect the settled priorities of a unified WPS agenda and that they are more than policy documents. They are an integral part of how the WPS agenda is given life and grows and changes over time. NAPs present and also generate the WPS priorities of UN member states, both domestically and in their foreign policies. NAPs are therefore not only a mechanism through which states fulfil their WPS obligations. These documents also produce and reproduce the agenda in accordance with state needs and interests. They are therefore deserving of close critical attention, especially in these globally precarious times.