In this innovative study of diplomatic relations between the Dutch East India Company, (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), and Tokugawa Japan, Adam Clulow contributes to revisionist scholarship that pushes back the ascendancy of Europe over East Asia to the nineteenth century. Indeed, he provocatively inverts the standard postcolonial historical narrative. Clulow argues that the VOC-Tokugawa encounter resulted in the “socialization” of a Western organization to an Asian one as, over the course of first half of the seventeenth century, VOC leaders voluntarily submitted to Japanese cultural, diplomatic, economic, and political “norms” (pp. 21, 261–62). Clulow rejects earlier treatments of the early modern VOC-Japan relationship as one of “cooperation” (p. 8), embraces Sanjay Subrahmanyam's perspective that early modern relations between Europe and Asia were characterized by episodic conflicts,Footnote 13 and follows interpretations of the VOC as a multifaceted, state-like organization that deployed violence to achieve commercial and political ends. Clulow helps us see the VOC as not only an agent of Western colonialism, but also part of a global group of border-crossing, autonomous maritime commercial and military organizations, which also included Japanese-pirate bands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the Zheng in the mid-seventeenth century. Chartered by the Netherlands in 1602 to establish trade with Asian states and combat the Catholic Iberian powers, the VOC claimed wide-ranging powers to autonomously conduct diplomacy, engage in military force, and exercise sovereignty over personnel and territories. However, in relations with Japan during the seventeenth century, Clulow argues that “[i]n each case, the same basic pattern is evident, with initial claims about the company's rights to diplomacy, violence, and sovereignty triggering a sequence of conflicts that were only resolved by VOC withdrawals, concessions, or outright surrender” (p. 16). Clulow thus intensifies our vision of Tokugawa Japan as an outward-looking regime capable of projecting influence overseas, even after the bakufu issued its maritime exclusion edicts in the late 1630s.
Clulow identifies several obstacles that the Dutch faced in trying to win commercial privileges in Japan. Orientalist notions of European superiority proved useless. VOC officials mistakenly assumed that the Japanese would accept their interpretations, based on European legal norms, of issues like privateering or sovereignty. The VOC encountered in the Tokugawa an archival power with its own sources of intelligence about the maritime world. The Tokugawa repeatedly constrained and outmaneuvered the Dutch with the power of precedent as well as military and economic might. And while the Tokugawa recognized that they risked unleashing a piratical power by overly antagonizing the Dutch, the Japanese authorities knew that the Dutch needed Japan more than the Japanese needed the Dutch. The Tokugawa preferred to rely on Chinese shippers for overseas trade goods. The Dutch thus chose further submission as the only way to retain trading privileges in Japan.
Clulow organized his book thematically, as case studies on one of the three powers initially claimed and then surrendered by the VOC in relations with Japan. He supports his analyses with evidence drawn heavily from Dutch archival research, augmented when possible with Japanese sources. Chapters 2–4 explain how the Tokugawa circumscribed the VOC as independent diplomatic actors. Clulow interweaves theoretical language of performance into his narration of Dutch embassies and Japanese receptions. The Dutch first appeared at the court of Tokugawa Ieyasu as representatives of a fictive “King of Holland” (the Dutch Stadhouder, the Prince of Maurits). The VOC failed in later attempts to conduct diplomacy as an autonomous organization headed by a governor-general based in Batavia because the Tokugawa perceived Dutch embassies as ceremonies in which agents of a king ritually recognized the centrality of Tokugawa Japan. In a groundbreaking interpretation, Clulow argues that, in order to remain in Japan, the VOC representatives elected to humble themselves as “vassals” (Jp. fudai, D. vassalen) (pp. 99–100) of the Tokugawa. Their leader, the Holland Captain, became lord of the tiny domain of Deshima. As vassals, the Dutch participated in the alternate attendance system by annually traveling to Edo for an audience with the shogun; fulfilled military obligations by participating in the Shimabara campaign; submitted annual intelligence reports; and even—like other daimyo—invented histories of service to Tokugawa Ieyasu.
In chapters 4 and 5, Clulow adds a legal-historical theme to the chorus of scholarship revising the early modern European military revolution thesis. He explains how the Tokugawa nullified the VOC advantage in naval warfare by denying it legal opportunities to engage in violence. Clulow explores how, over the early decades of their rule, the Tokugawa gradually, if contingently, projected sovereignty over the seas through anti-piracy legislation. Their laws variously treated vermilion-seal trading licenses, shipping lanes, and Chinese ships as vehicles for constraining behavior and imposing perceptions of the sea as a ruled space. The VOC had hoped to extend Dutch privateering campaigns against the Iberian powers to Asia and also found itself embroiled in conflict with various Chinese forces. Iberian and Chinese seafarers hamstrung the VOC by suing the Dutch in Japanese courts. The Tokugawa bakufu and its Nagasaki magistrates rejected Dutch claims and treated their privateering as illicit, as “piratical” (Jp. bahan) (pp. 165–67).
The final two chapters explain how the VOC retracted claims to sovereignty in relations with Japan, first over colonial territory, and then over its own personnel. Faced with Tokugawa instructions to destroy its citadel on Taiwan, Fort Zeelandia, for violating a ship bearing a vermilion-seal license, the VOC broke one of its cardinal principles of sovereignty—extraterritoriality—and surrendered a high-ranking official to Japanese justice.
Clulow concludes with a comparative survey of VOC encounters with Asian polities. From that vantage point, VOC subordination to the Tokugawa appears both distinctive and indicative of the degree to which Europeans voluntarily assimilated to East Asian political and cultural norms in the early modern period. Clulow's book should be of interest to many. His analyses of VOC “socialization” in Japan integrate and make important contributions to the scholarship on early modern cross-cultural encounters as well as European and Japanese political, diplomatic, and military histories.
