As Mrs. Herriton contemplates the fate and future of her wayward daughter-in-law, Lilia's baby born to the Italian Gino Carella in E. M. Forster's Where Angels Fear to Tread, she surmises reluctantly, “Let us admit frankly … that after all we may have responsibilities.”Footnote 1 Without limiting ourselves to Forster's responses to and articulations of these “responsibilities,” the notion nonetheless of having such responsibilities usefully encapsulates some of the central issues at the heart of political criticism both in Forster's time and in our own. Who is the “we” with responsibilities and for whom or what is that “we” responsible? What exactly are these responsibilities? How local or global are they? How do they bring together the ethical and the political, the moral and the legal, duty and obligation, redress and hope for the future? How do the past, present, and future come together within this matrix of responsibilities? What kinds of political stances, posturings, or attitudes are in play? And what is the desired outcome or aim of political criticism? “We may have responsibilities”: in Forster, an equivocal or subjunctive “may” coupled with a frank admission and an expansive claim to amorphous “responsibilities” not only captures how open-ended and contradictory such assertions can be but also how tenuous their very ground always is. After all, Mrs. Herriton's sense of responsibility is highly disingenuous, the baby a pawn in her own power games.
In our own time, these issues are no less alive nor urgent than they were in the long nineteenth century, a claim to which recent Victorian political criticism attests. Whether in analyses that ask us to rethink our basic suppositions about key concepts such as realism and liberalism, or the associations among the novel, liberal ideology, and regimes of power, or that challenge us to expand our readings of Victorian literature and culture to include a “geopolitical aesthetic” or the possibility of a vibrant “democratic imagination” within the Victorian novel, this new work within Victorian studies at once extends, amends, and reconceptualizes the political stakes of Victorian literature and reflects on our own critical practices. Why this critical heavy lifting now, we might ask—while first taking note (in the question itself) of the recent prevalence of “now.”
Illustrative of our current critical moment, the stress on “now” is perhaps best known from Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus's special issue of Representations in 2009, “The Way We Read Now”; but it also extends to Marxist literary criticism, with an issue of Mediations on “Marxism and Literature Revisited,” which includes essays on “Marxist Literary Criticism, Then and Now,” and “Marxism and Form Now,” as well as to a range of other reflections on the current state of the humanities and the pressing matter of how things have changed now.Footnote 2 As Mathias Nilges puts it in “Marxism and Form Now,” “There is much now-ness in contemporary critical discourse.”Footnote 3 Literary critics ask “What is literature now? How do we argue now? What is form now? What is genre now? How do we teach now?”Footnote 4 These invocations to an urgent present register our moment as one of critical and political crisis: the old ways seem to have become moribund; new critical strategies, new forms of reading, new political models are in order. Anxiety, panic, provocations, or various forms of ground clearing, all of which aim to shake up the field in one way or another, often attend this sense of urgency. One of the ten theses of the Manifesto of the V21 Collective, for example, declaims, “We must rigorously articulate what it is we are doing when we work within particular historical frames. We must break accepted frames, and perhaps break historicism itself. We must embrace new reflection and abstraction; we must seek new justifications for our work.”Footnote 5 Other critics call for specific kinds of reading, from distant reading and surface reading to descriptive or dialectical reading; others inveigh against theory or call for more of it; and all do so within the larger “frames” of institutional and political structures, from the classroom to the university and the state and beyond, which can seem to have it in for us humanists.Footnote 6
Three recent books address these shifting critical winds in ways that productively open up space for new readings of the political within the nineteenth-century novel (and beyond) and realism in particular.Footnote 7 Fully up to the difficult work required of criticism today, Amanda Anderson's Bleak Liberalism, Isobel Armstrong's Novel Politics, and Lauren Goodlad's The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic are equally attuned to the “now” and the “then”: they employ a range of critical, theoretical, and historical methods to highlight just how much we can (and need to) still learn from Victorian literature and culture. In contrast to recent attempts to simplify reading (“just reading”) or move away from contextualizing or historicizing literature, as Rita Felski's exclamatory “Context Stinks!” encourages us to do, their respective accounts are, if anything, more rather than less complex than the various forms of ideology critique under attack today—most notably in their attentiveness to questions of scale.Footnote 8 At the same time, each of these critics also aims to challenge the critical precepts of what became de rigueur in the period from the 1980s to the present. Collectively, they work to revive terms and concepts that have been the objects of substantial critique in contemporary critical and political discourse, including liberalism, democracy, and realism; in relation to realism, specifically, they all share a desire to challenge the break between the Victorian and Modernist novel and its attendant positioning of the Victorian period as less vital than its successor; and they all show how difficult, necessary, and “unfinished” the “historicist project” remains today.Footnote 9 To be sure, there are no magic bullets here; indeed, these works remind us that looking for such magic when it comes to politics and the novel is part of the problem, given the vexed nature of the “responsibilities” novelists of the long nineteenth century were grappling with, and the increasingly expansive nature of those responsibilities today.
Amanda Anderson's Bleak Liberalism aims to provide a more complex picture of liberal thought than current discussions permit, which in turn will allow for a richer history of liberal aesthetics to emerge. Against what she sees as the prevailing view of liberalism as an unconflicted endorsement of individual freedoms incapable of coming to terms with the social realities within which those freedoms are embedded, Anderson proffers a bleak liberalism cognizant of bleak conditions. The “bleak” in her titular “bleak liberalism” confutes liberalism's association with a blithe or simple hopefulness blind to the “persistent sociological and psychological barriers to the projects of individual actualization and collective betterment.”Footnote 10 Instead, she argues that the tradition of liberal thought has always contained a “split view” in which the moral and sociological aspects of social life and of our lived experience constitute an enduring challenge within liberalism rather than a blind spot. John Stuart Mill's contributions to the tradition are exemplary in this regard, balancing a “hopeful progressivism” with an awareness of the coercive and corrosive effects of power and social domination in works such as On Liberty and The Subjection of Women (36). This view of liberal politics stresses the “lived experience of political aspirations” (4), a lived experience that has been too easily dismissed in both older and more recent critiques of liberalism. A renewed focus on lived experience is also central to Armstrong's and Goodlad's books and speaks to a key shift within current Victorian criticism.
Anderson's other interlocutor here is contemporary theory. In her earlier book, The Way We Argue Now, Anderson questioned the precepts of poststructuralism and identity politics and argued that the alliance between the two “threatens to undermine the vitality of both academic and political debate insofar as it becomes impossible to explore shared forms of rationality” (2). Here, Anderson extends this critique, noting not only that “aesthetics is typically aligned with radical politics,” but that “within literary and cultural studies, across the liberal and radical camps, there is a kind of temperamental aversion to certain key values of normative philosophy and procedural theory—most especially normative explicitness, reason-giving argument, and transparency. Against these, the aesthetic temperament values the implicit, the tacit, the paradox, and a rich opacity” (7). If liberalism gets a bad name in the heyday of 1970s and 80s theory, identified as it was with the status quo and all things reformist rather than revolutionary, that same critical myopia remains alive and well today, according to Anderson. Additionally, the current tendency to collapse liberalism into neoliberalism further hinders our ability to see and assess the valuable critical and political tools liberalism has to offer. Falsely identifying liberalism with the failings of contemporary neoliberalism prevents us from seeing how these philosophical and political traditions are at odds and how the particular concerns of liberalism—“enfranchisement, injustice and harm, critique, argument, and deliberative debate” (13)—furnish the means to counter neoliberalism rather than aid and abet it. Anderson argues that her approach is more attentive to the political philosophy of liberalism and its attendant existential concerns; whereas earlier scholars have in some ways reinscribed liberalism's emphasis on the individual in their character-based focus on ethos, Anderson wants to tease out the tensions between the individual and the sociological or political. This renewed attention to structure or “systems perspectives” (in her terms) is ultimately for Anderson not a reconceptualization of liberalism so much as a correcting of the philosophical and historical record when it comes to reading liberalism and its relation to the novel and to aesthetics.
To begin this corrective work, Anderson turns to political philosophy to demonstrate why liberalism is indeed bleak, its view of the world always a “dual stance” in which “bleak prospects and reduced expectations” coexist with “the absolute necessity of defending basic liberal principles, programs, and institutions” (25). For Anderson, neither side cancels out the other; the disavowal of liberalism follows when its recognition of “bleak prospects and reduced expectations” is neglected or ignored. Such one-sided views of liberalism equate it with an unquestioned progressive optimism. From here it is then a short step to condemning liberalism as conservative—or worse, as she notes of radical Left critiques of liberalism, which not only associate liberalism with the status quo, but also with its legitimation. Twentieth-century liberals, Anderson underscores, reject this progressive view while nonetheless maintaining a commitment to liberal democratic ideals. The history of the Cold War era provides a crucial case study for Anderson insofar as it highlights how situated liberal politics always are: in the face of the experience of Soviet communism or totalitarianism more broadly, “bleak liberals, of the cold war era … strongly emphasized the need for a historically responsive sense of restraint” (28). Their feet firmly on the ground, the New York intellectuals remained fully committed to a pragmatic politics and equally aware of the “fragility” of this project. Crucially for Anderson this same bleakness was shared by writers and artists, thereby unsettling the assumed alliance between a cheery, progressive liberalism and a naive realism, as opposed to the bleakness of modernism and aesthetics more generally.
Lionel Trilling's The Liberal Imagination (1950) captures the nuances and uncertainties of such a bleak liberalism in politics and literature alike; importantly, literature, in his view, is especially well suited to challenging rationalist or progressivist political theory. Hardly a mindless reproduction of the given, the liberal imagination has the power to disrupt social and political verities, including liberalism itself: although Anderson concedes that “it is possible … to see Trilling as ultimately in thrall to a vision, and more specifically an art that would simply register the complexities [of human experience],” she clarifies that “his point is that the complexities of powerful artistic visions should ideally be brought to bear on the political formation of liberalism” (31). Here, too, the value of liberalism's emphasis on moral judgment is clear: Trilling's demand, Anderson writes, “is of a piece with the insistence on differentiated moral judgment in novelistic representations—there is a difference between mere complexity and the complex demands of moral judgment” (31). Only once we grapple with these complexities, fully part of rather than beyond the contours of liberal thought, can we take seriously the project of liberalism and, by extension, its place within literary history.
In her subsequent chapters on the relationship between liberalism and literary theory, Anderson addresses a range of writers in order to undercut the assertion of “a restrictive ideological alliance between liberalism and realism” and to show how a liberal aesthetic, far from repeated claims about it, promotes a critical and engaged view of the world able to address systemic inequality and violence and individual moral agency without giving short shrift to either (47). With its double narrative, Charles Dickens's Bleak House beautifully dramatizes the twin pressures of the moral and the sociological that are part and parcel of liberalism for Anderson: the mediation between the first- and third-person narratives illustrates the lived experience of bleak conditions, in which neither lived experience nor its bleak conditions is slighted. In an analysis of Allan Woodcourt's role in the novel that vitiates readings of him as the dull, middle-class voice of moderation, Anderson argues that he “embodies a morally charged sociology that can understand and respond to wretchedness, in contrast to the often cold assessments of the third-person narration, trained on complex games of power or larger social dynamics” (52–53). His final position as a “medical attendant on the poor” also counters readings of the novel that would read his marriage to Esther as a retreat away from social, systemic concerns (treated in the third-person narration) into the realm of the domestic private sphere and the world of individual work.
For Anderson, the kind of work Bleak House performs by bringing together “critical diagnosis and emphasis on local response” precisely “[constitutes] the very kind of liberalism this project aims to reconstruct” (51). What is less clear, however, is how Woodcourt's “local response” may or may not address the larger, systemic structures that undergird and perpetuate poverty, or keep the poor poor. Anderson acknowledges at the outset of Bleak Liberalism that there are “very real ideological differences and political commitments … between the radical Left and the liberal Left and between conservatism and liberalism, both within and outside the academy” (1–2); she is thus hardly unprepared for such a response. She goes on to say that “liberalism has a more complex and ‘thick’ array of attitudinal stances, affective dispositions, and political objectives than the conventional contrasts admit” (2), but, that said, liberalism nonetheless remains essentially ameliorative as long as it stops short of an economic analysis.Footnote 11 This is not to say that her account of liberalism doesn't make it a far richer and more complex body of thought, especially in its wide-ranging, varied, and ongoing literary expressions, but it does suggest the need, I think, to distinguish between the sociological and the economic, a division that is never quite addressed in Anderson's account.
In readings of Anthony Trollope's The Way We Live Now and George Eliot's Middlemarch Anderson highlights well the social aspects of “attitudinal stances” and “affective dispositions” that otherwise have been discounted as part of liberalism's individualist bias. In her depictions of Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch, Eliot unsettles the relationship between individual, moral character, and political reform. Hardly exemplary, Will's instrumental attitude toward politics should prompt us to “consider the ways political life does not fit the novel's centrally dramatized experience of ethico-political life” (76). In this reading, the frustration that readers have long felt with Will's character is seen rather as a provocation to rethink the political and specifically to cleave it from the ethical. Unlike Dorothea and Daniel Deronda, who envision self-actualization and politics going hand in hand, Will “may be a symptom of the unsettled apprehension that politics must cultivate a certain indifference to the seduction of exemplary character if it is to remain focused on its distinctive and fundamentally impersonal, aspirations” (76–77).
Anderson also hopes to revivify the “political novel” as a site that showcases a keystone of liberal thought: the productiveness of deliberative debate. Shifting our attention to the importance of dialogues between characters within novels such as Hard Times, North and South, and Howard's End, Anderson highlights how it is here rather than in the stated claims of the narrator, the plot, or the ending that fulsome argument and powerful challenges to oppressive institutional forces and social conditions takes place. She makes a good case for Hard Times being not only more politically but more formally interesting when seen in this light; North and South, too, gains new force when viewed through the lens of deliberation and debate: “If everything will be decided by ongoing deliberation, as the novel insists, then one cannot freeze the ideological content of the storyworld” (93). As a result, debate will necessarily continue, both within the factory and throughout the social world, providing a vision of “collective political effort as a way of life, grounded in the ongoing present of everyday engagement and future-directed in a way the immediacy of the domestic is not” (94). With this formulation, Anderson effectively undoes the division between the political and the domestic that early analyses of the novel such as Raymond Williams's created. Moreover, these everyday engagements and the politics debated within them are in no way naively embraced as ends in themselves; the “existential density of novelistic renderings of political life,” as Anderson recognizes, “includes registering, in various ways, the limits of politics, including the limits of political argument” (98).
In the final chapters, Anderson first turns to the liberal aesthetic in postwar liberalism, comparing Trilling's and Theodor Adorno's aesthetics in order to highlight the similarities between them—when both are considered as “a response to catastrophe” (102)—and how their differences offer an illuminating new perspective on liberal aesthetics. She then extends her analysis to two modernist novels, Doris Lessing's The Golden Notebook and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, which, along with Trilling's liberal aesthetic, experiment with forms of “existential realism” (104). Anderson's aim in examining Trilling and Adorno together is twofold: on the one hand, to illuminate a shared bleakness within the liberal and radical Left and hence disable the “tendency for liberals and radicals to define themselves against each other … without obliterating the real differences that do exist” (114); and, on the other hand, to use Trilling's 1947 novel, The Middle of the Journey, to tease out the complexities of Trilling's own liberalism and its twin emphases on “the value of embedded social existence” and a dialectical negation most often associated with Adorno and bleak radicalism (107). As with the key questions raised in Forster's Where Angels Fear to Tread, essential to Anderson's account of liberalism is its lack of easy answers. As it grapples with formidable problems, the liberal Left, here more like rather than unlike the radical Left, “[seeks] to come to terms with human suffering and human violence”; in doing so, both traditions, in Anderson's rendering, “express in varying ways a bleak view of their own political projects” (114). Trilling is thus centrally important to the history of liberal thought, exemplifying “liberalism's ongoing embrace of difficulty in both politics and art” (114); he is also indispensable to Anderson's larger critique of contemporary theory and its allegiance to radicalism at the expense of liberalism.
Since the polarized nature of this debate parallels the division between liberalism and radicalism Anderson hopes to trouble, it makes perfect sense, then, that Bleak Liberalism ends with the realism/modernism debate—a debate that also occupies the works of Isobel Armstrong and Goodlad. In her reading of Invisible Man, Anderson assesses the series of betrayals and humiliations suffered by the narrator as successive thwartings of the liberal ideals that are present in the novel only by way of their negation. Self-actualization, sincerity, debate, and democratic procedure: all are shown to be thwarted, whether in the narrator's debasement in the battle royal that opens the novel, or the narrator's disillusionment with the Brotherhood. But, as Anderson argues, the fact that these ideals remain unrealized in no way lessens their force or power within the novel—or the power of liberalism itself. Also experimental in its form and deeply engaged with the failures of the Left, The Golden Notebook serves as a fitting conclusion to Bleak Liberalism, aiming as it does “to come to terms with what sort of politics, and what relation between aesthetics and politics, will be adequate to the bleak conditions of the contemporary era” (129). Reworking nineteenth-century forms of moral realism in the context of twentieth-century political realities—new sexual and gender relations, colonialism, socialist politics—Lessing's novel suggests the range of the liberal aesthetic and the variety of forms it can take.
Overall, then, the supreme value of liberalism for Anderson rests in its capacity to give proper or equal weight to “critical detachment” and “lived commitments.” Against critiques of liberalism as individualist, Anderson's analysis attempts to right the record by stressing the adeptness of the liberal aesthetic to provide a systems perspective, or critique, without losing sight of the lived experience of individuals. Political responsibility, for her, rests in the textured relations between individuals and between individuals and systems that then form the basis for scaling up, as it were, from the micro to the macro level of a global geopolitics. Notably absent, however, is any sustained attention to how fundamentally uneven the playing field is to begin with: the British empire and imperial politics from the nineteenth century to the present get very scant attention and liberalism's recognition of “bleak prospects and reduced expectations” tends to stand in for structural inequalities and the violence attending them. The constitutive violence of capitalism in particular can seem nonexistent in Anderson's account, in part because of her emphasis on the “existential dimensions” to which she sees liberal thought rightly attending (21). Significantly, the position of existentialism defines the core distinction between Trilling and Adorno for Anderson, and, by extension, between the groundedness of liberal thought and aesthetics in the specificities of lived experience and the relentless and detached “tarrying with the negative” in Marxist and radical Left theory and aesthetics. In her comparison of Trilling's and Adorno's readings of Franz Kafka, Anderson writes that “for Trilling, the world of Kafka that Adorno admires for its uncompromising deprivations is a world false to the embedded particularities of living persons” (106). It is hard to reconcile this Adorno with the author of Minima Moralia and that work's insistence on the dialectical relations between individuals and the social, the most quotidian of actions and the larger structures within which such actions are circumscribed. It can also be hard to see the structuring realities—whether economic, racial, imperial, etc.—within which both the “deprivations” and “embedded particularities of living persons” exist, given how intent Anderson is in her recovery work; despite the obvious failures of liberalism historically to address these realities, Anderson seems wedded to the battle between liberalism and various forms of the radical Left and thus to defending at all costs the benefits of liberalism.Footnote 12 But the issue her defense raises, which remains as salient as ever, and which Armstrong and Goodlad also tackle, seems to me to be whether embedded particularities can in fact be scaled up to define a global politics, under the name of cosmopolitanism, or some other variant of globalization, such as the “democratic imagination” or a geopolitical aesthetic. In this respect, Anderson's reading of what Will Ladislaw might tell us about politics seems especially provocative: recall that he may signal “that politics must cultivate a certain indifference to the seduction of exemplary character if it is to remain focused on its distinctive, and fundamentally impersonal, aspirations” (76–77). This linking of the impersonal and the political would seem to hail a very different project, potentially, than a liberal politics grounded in embedded particularities writ large as the means of mediation between the individual and the world—a project, moreover, that might undercut or extend beyond liberalism rather than affirm its political efficacy.
Isobel Armstrong's Novel Politics also wants to revive older concepts and categories, including realism, democracy, and, notably in the current theoretical moment, close reading. There are clear affinities between Armstrong's analysis, which locates a vibrant “democratic imagination” within Victorian novels too often reduced to reproducing the status quo, and Anderson's stress on the democratic ideals that form the central tenets of liberalism and liberal aesthetics. In their shared emphasis on debate and dialogism as key aspects of the nineteenth-century realist novel (and beyond, in Anderson's case), both critics, too, hope to reanimate realism as a project by prising apart the association between nineteenth-century realism and capitalist ideology. Unlike Anderson, however, Armstrong wants to reclaim for Victorian realism a distinctly radical politics. To uncover that radicalism, Armstrong proposes an alternative set of reading practices or principles “that can be identified if we do not read for hegemony.”Footnote 13 The four principles are as follows: 1) to read novels as forms of “Inquiry” motivated by “questioning not finite problem solving or dogma” (84; 2) to consider the poetics of form within realist narrative, which in turn, exposes realism “as a mode” or convention rather than a lifeless reproduction of the “real” (86, emphasis original; 3) to examine the construction of space as a site within the novel where the constitution of novelistic subjects are articulated and critiqued; and 4) to attend to instances of aesthetic representation within novels, which become potent “[matrices] of radical thinking” (93). These four principles “work not to be a symptom of but to create history” (94, emphasis original). Against readings of realism as a form doomed merely to represent or repeat the present, then, realism in Armstrong's version of it is future-oriented, a mode of thinking and inquiry able to “imagine otherwise” and to “[replace] an accepted real with a new ‘real’” (79, 85).
Illegitimacy serves as a “heuristic device” for Armstrong given its “challenge to cultural norms, exclusion, social abjection, and perceived inequity” (4). Centrally concerned with questions of origins and identity, and positioned as the other to family, narratives of illegitimacy address the breaching of genealogical boundaries and, by extension, social, spatial, and (bio)political boundaries. In fact, genealogy is the site within which the democratic imagination is to be found precisely because it involves “the law of exclusion.” Key, for Armstrong, is the always constructed nature of genealogies and how novels not only reveal that constructedness but also question such origins by dint of exposing their fictiveness. The opening of Thomas Hardy's Tess of the d'Urbervilles offers but one apt example of this process. “To question genealogy,” Armstrong argues, “is to question the law, the lex on which it is founded, and thus a whole value system and relations of power” (8). Ultimately at stake is the very nature of what constitutes subjects as human. For Armstrong, nineteenth-century debates about democracy, the working class, education, equality, etc., are “the epiphenomena” of the larger “underlying project of the long nineteenth century” (65), namely the biopolitical project determining who counts as human and why. G. W. F. Hegel's articulation of the “politics of recognition,” most famously referred to as the “master-slave dialectic,” forms the basis of Armstrong's study and what she calls the “deficit subject, the subject in and of need and lack” who, outside the sphere of recognition, lacks the “freedom-to-be-human” (67). The realist novel translates this politics of need and its construction of the deficit subject within its narratives and, most importantly, challenges it. Herein lies the novel's radical politics.
Part 1 of Novel Politics also establishes two other key aspects of Armstrong's theory of the novel: 1) the importance of nineteenth-century print culture as the context for debates about democracy and politics more generally; and 2) the idea that the politics of the novel are not to be found in political novels per se. In her analysis of print culture, Armstrong is at pains to show that no single voice or viewpoint dominated political debates of the day; contrary to how univocal political thought can seem when John Stuart Mill's political views are given center stage habitually—a tendency Armstrong identifies with readings of the novel as hegemonic—a look at specific debates reveals how varied and dialogic they in fact were. Two key moments, in 1848 and in the 1860s, exemplify the vigor and vibrancy of nineteenth-century debates. In 1848, Thomas Babington Macauley and G. W. M. Reynolds fiercely argue about the franchise, with Macauley essentially naturalizing class inequalities in his arguments against extending the vote to the working class, while Reynolds, in support of the Chartists, castigates the divide between rich and poor and supports a universal franchise. In the 1860s, as well, divergent views of the working class are debated, both between Richard Cobden and Matthew Arnold, and Mill and John Bright. Armstrong's point here is to demonstrate how bifurcated and contentious print culture was; the polarities of opinion are what matter, including those voiced in more ephemeral forms such as speeches, since they form the world of debate within which novelists were writing. Also at the center of nineteenth-century print culture are the specific issues around democracy that help fuel the novel's democratic imagination. Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America is especially important for Armstrong for its treatment of republican democracy—and political forms, more broadly—as “not given but made” (65).
Democratic questions animate the novel and find expression in its poetics rather than in an explicit or stated politics or in political novels as such. In the current theoretical climate, this is a bold proposal on Armstrong's part insofar as it militates against any claim to the transparency of a novel's surface or other forms of empiricist reading. Armstrong unearths a distinctly dialectical imagination in the novel: “The novel was often resilient enough to see round dominant tenets, to intuit ‘what cannot be said’ as the dialectical content of what can be said. This was a historical act” (52). She also affirms the ongoing necessity of close reading against calls for distant reading or data-driven analyses of texts. Specifically addressing Franco Moretti's appeal to quantitative analysis as the means by which to better understand cultural forms, Armstrong counters that “literary texts are never about averages but about imagined specificities … a post-postmodern account of knowledge as data falls silent before the attempt to gauge the modulation of tone, the image, the subtextual, the implied, the unsaid that hovers dialectically with the said” (101). These latter resources, she concludes, are precisely those “mobilized by a democratic imagination” (101).Footnote 14 Finally, then, the novel for Armstrong is active rather than passive. It neither functions as a symptom of history nor as a reproduction or perpetuation of the dominant order; it is not separate from politics. A form of praxis, the novel is simultaneously experimental and purposeful, its “radical thinking” attributable to a “writing subject” rather than “the structural quality of language on autopilot” (79).
In Part 2, Armstrong turns to a range of novels about illegitimacy neatly organized around three novels about illegitimate mothers and three novels about illegitimate children. Narratives about illegitimate mothers coalesce around questions of representation, violence, and social versus individual solutions to illegitimacy, which, in turn, involve new conceptions of the social order itself. Jeanie Dean, the heroine of Walter Scott's novel, speaks for her sister Effie, accused of killing her illegitimate child. Jeanie “constantly puts pressure on the meaning of enfranchisement, offering as it does the double meaning of inclusion in civic process and the act of setting free, putting at large, an act that does not have calculable consequences. Enfranchisement can equally lead to inclusion in civic process or freedom from it” (111). By way of generic disruptions, including the addition of border ballads and the Dionysian energies brought into the text by Madge and her mother, Scott ultimately “establishes an ongoing dialectic” between these various forms of politics and expressions of a popular imagination. The novel's democratic imagination emerges from its twinning of a rational and a dreamwork text, which work to “repudiate the will to purity. … Monological narrative, like monoethnicity, is impossible” (107). Elizabeth Gaskell's Ruth also highlights the violence of illegitimacy; like Anderson's account of Gaskell's North and South, “debate, dialogism and critique” constitute the novel's politics for Armstrong and allow for a provocative questioning of the exclusions—at the level of the family and the community—that structure Ruth's existence as an illegitimate mother (129). In a moving reading of how these exclusions are resisted without in any way diminishing the violence inflicted on Ruth, Armstrong emphasizes Ruth's joyful response to the birth of her son, Leonard—“Oh, my god, I thank Thee!” (120)— as a daring instance of the politics of recognition. Likewise, Ruth's death at the end should be seen less as a punishing moral lesson and more as an acknowledgment that the “novel's optimistic reading of the elastic boundaries of the social” is yet to be realized within the world beyond the novel. Rather “the critical imagination exists, but cannot come to fruition” (131). Significantly, however, Ruth's death is caused by her lover Bellingham/Donne's disease, making him the carrier of her demise. As Armstrong concludes powerfully: “To give birth to an illegitimate child is not a fate worse than death, actual death is the worst fate” (131). As these readings illustrate, political, social, and formal matters all come into play within these different articulations of a democratic imagination. New formal strategies challenge “the logic of power and unfreedom, systemic inequity in family, civil society, and community” and simultaneously enact a “reimagining of the conditions of freedom and the social order” (140). Equally attentive to the texture of these narratives and to the larger political issues at stake in them, Armstrong effectively opens up these novels to new readings and to the new ways of reading she is encouraging.
The same can be said for her analyses of novels centered on illegitimate children, which usefully employ the figure of peripeteia in order to capture the upheavals and reversals that illegitimate children within these narratives provoke. As with the politics of recognition in narratives of illegitimate mothers, recognition or “re-cognition” (142) accompanies the threat to the social order illegitimacy represents. Peripeteia “makes for uncomfortable questions about whether we are defined through the arbitrary status of birth and class” and, in the process, “images formally the possibility of a total re-reading of events, the reappraisal of what appeared inevitable. … The total upheaval of social conditions is possible” (144, 142). The complications that these reversals entail is perhaps best captured in Armstrong's multilayered reading of Daniel Deronda, two aspects of which include how the meanings circulating around “blood” in the novel work to undo “the orthodoxies of legitimacy and of racial contempt” (174); and how we can attend to the knotty issues regarding the end of the novel and Mordecai's messianism in relation to Daniel's and Eliot's projects. Armstrong sees Eliot's novel as “resignifying blood by making Mordecai reverse its elite associations, transforming it into democratic and republican consanguinity: ‘The heritage of Israel is beating in the pulses of millions’” (175). Crucially, as well, Mordecai's messianic vision is countered by the more pragmatic and dialogic politics seen to be at work in the Hand and Banner, where a racially diverse group debates and constitutes, for Armstrong, “the most challenging democratic mode of civil society explored in the novel” (178). Counterposed to “privilege's mannered airy air” and the violence that subtends it (164), this instantiation of democracy is “in plain sight, but unnoticed. It constitutes the quiet peripeteia of the episode” (178). Finally, if we recall Armstrong's emphasis on the open-ended, inquiry-based nature of the novel, we can also resituate Daniel's project; rather than assuming it is one with Mordecai's or Eliot's project, we might instead see it as the beginning of a new set of questions that prompt the novel's readers “to imagine otherwise, for what Eliot engages us with is the “production of history, not a reliance on it” (178).
The violence and destitution that subtend the social order are also revealed in the spatial politics of the long nineteenth-century novel. In compelling readings in which she returns to Ruth, as well as to Wilkie Collins's No Name and George Moore's Esther Waters, Armstrong ties species-being or the freedom-to-be-human of which Hegel speaks to a collective life or “fully social state” that is precisely what characters like Ruth are refused—a refusal often figured spatially, with “illegitimate” characters shown wandering heaths and moors, dispossessed and destitute, consigned to “bare life” (70). Jane Eyre serves as a precursor for these texts. Charlotte Brontë’s novel instructively represents the heath as “the junction of existential space and dominated space … a heterotopia, the space of exile” (184), which is then turned to different accounts in its successors. To stay with Jane Eyre for a moment, this may be one place where the limits of Armstrong's sanguine embrace of the nineteenth-century novel's democratic imagination are on view. Armstrong works to draw parallels between Jane and Bertha Mason as a way of countering readings like Gayatri Spivak's that locate a racial politics in which Jane's freedom is bought at the expense of Bertha's. In Armstrong's account, “The novel's Inquiry seems to be trying to calibrate names: Jane Eyre, or ‘heir’, ultimately a woman with an inheritance from white society, is put into relation with a woman who, if named at all, is only given a first name” (188). Moreover, both women are incarcerated at almost the same time: Jane in the red-room and Bertha at Thornfield. Through this kinship, the status of race and the status of women are raised as questions in Armstrong's view, without their different fates seeming to signify any sort of novelistic perspective on them at all. At moments like this, it can feel like Armstrong is so invested in her own principles of reading—in the novel as a mode of Inquiry, in the presence of the democratic imagination—that the history of and in these novels (or, more accurately, perhaps, the history that is not only created by these novels but also outside them) disappears. This is not to suggest that that history isn't itself riven with contradictions about race and so on, as Goodlad's book powerfully showcases, but it does mean, I think, that not all novelistic imaginings are, in the end, equally democratic.
In her final discussion of aesthetics and bodies, Armstrong works to unsettle the association between aesthetics and reproduction, which is, in turn, connected to her arguments about realism as something more than simple mimesis. The presence of aesthetics within the novel—be it in the form of an imagined landscape in Emma, the ballad in The Heart of Midlothian, or the contrasting views of Mordecai and Daniel at Blackfriar's Bridge in Daniel Deronda—arouse questions in Armstrong's account by producing a gap within representation, revealing works of art, as Lessing argued, as the “product[s] of an idea, an act of mind” (218): “the capacity of art to think seeing released democratic questioning, for thought leaves a space for interpretation” (217). The emancipatory potential of different aesthetic forms vary, and not all aesthetics take the form of so-called high art. About Esther Waters, for instance, Armstrong writes, “In the perverse democracy of the pub there is no art form, but there is the aesthetics of everyday life, sociality, and pleasure” (252).
The mention of pleasure in the final pages of Novel Politics is fitting. In a recent talk, Armstrong begins by saying that the book was prompted by what she sees as the “discrepancy between teaching the novel and reading criticism of it.”Footnote 15 In short, she wanted to “read with students,” by which she means to read with “narrative excitement and experiment, to encounter a literary form of sophistication, subtlety, social depth and political alertness.”Footnote 16 In contrast, “to turn to criticism is to feel the atmosphere grow heavy,” rife as it is in her view with “ideological pessimism,” a refrain that all three of the books under review repeat—although Goodlad, as we will see, usefully puts pressure on this reflexive move and its assumption that we are all still performing thick Foucauldian or Marxist readings from the 1980s in the mode of D. A. Miller's The Novel and The Police or Fredric Jameson's The Political Unconscious. For now, suffice it to say that Armstrong, along with other critics attempting to free realism from its association with capitalist ideology or the status quo, have a tendency both to overstate critiques of realism such as Jameson's and the dire state of criticism more broadly. That said, Armstrong, along with Anderson and Goodlad, productively questions the epistemological break between realism and modernism that modernist writers such as Virginia Woolf so effectively established, and repositions the Victorian period from 1848 to the 1860s and beyond as a far messier and more interesting political time than has at times been allowed. That the novel was in the thick of things, that it was critically self-conscious and actively questioning the biggest and most difficult social and political issues of the day, seems spot on. By allowing us to see some of its most exciting and experimental inquiries and imaginings, Armstrong's book succeeds in doing what she says she hopes it will do—namely, help “to restore energy and pleasure to analysis.”Footnote 17
Of the three books under review here, Goodlad's The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic most concretely brings to the fore the international contours of nineteenth-century British politics in its emphasis on the fundamentally geopolitical nature of these politics. Sharing Anderson's and Armstrong's concern to give due weight to individual experience and the larger structures within which that experience occurs, Goodlad envisions her own critical practice as one that would “integrate the geohistorical as well as aesthetic dimensions of literature's globality, exploring the manifold intersections of embodied ethics, embedding structures and experimental forms.”Footnote 18 Like Armstrong she argues for an explicitly dialectical relationship between these “embodied ethics” and “embedding structures”; the challenge then becomes how to “theorize standpoint, agency, singularity, and aesthetic form in light of long-evolving structures and ongoing processes” (27). This task is undoubtedly a formidable one: if, following Jameson, imperialism marks a new historical stage in which there is a “growing contradiction between lived experience and structure, or between a phenomenological description of the life of an individual and a more properly structural model of the conditions of existence of that experience,” then the ability to see or represent these two registers becomes a significant “problem of figuration”—especially when, as Jameson puts it, the “structural coordinates” of the British empire are both determining and “no longer accessible to immediate lived experience and are not even conceptualizable for most people.”Footnote 19 Now, Goodlad certainly wants to dispute the dating of this shift, as the very title of her book makes clear. The complications Jameson identifies with modernism, she identifies with the period from 1848–76, years that included the so-called Indian Mutiny, the Jamaica Rebellion, the Governor Eyre controversy, Mysore, Italian unification, and the Crimean War, to name some of the key events Goodlad addresses. But her deep engagement with Jameson's work and his development in particular of the “geopolitical aesthetic” as a concept also sets her apart. In the various critiques of critique, Jameson stands in as a capital offender (along with Foucault). His claims about the necessity of a Marxist hermeneutic are the very kind of “depth model” under attack today. To her credit, Goodlad shows how supple and expansive the geopolitical aesthetic is, both as a mode of reading the multifarious processes of globalization and as a means of “[working] against the critical stalemate that pits a surface-focused ethics of reading against a depth-focused politics of reading” (16). Throughout The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic, Goodlad, like Anderson, makes clear that ethics and politics coexist and that criticism must work to understand how and to what ends. Like Anderson as well, Goodlad treats liberalism as “conceptually protean—a moving target that is notoriously difficult to historicize” and that gives the lie to singular claims about it (3), or the larger processes of nineteenth-century globalization of which it was a part.
Given the critical necessity of moving between history and texts and a range of other short- and long-term developments, Goodlad also defends historicism against recent criticism, exemplified by Rita Felski's current appeal to jettison contextualization for “what is in plain view” (16), as well as other calls for various forms of presentism. She argues for an attentiveness to synchronic and diachronic registers, and she stresses that the latter “would be invisible to an anti-historicist post-hermeneutics [such as Felski's] that focused on synchronic assemblage alone,” a case she makes most compellingly over the course of her book as she traces the “serialized naturalistic narrative of capitalist globalization” from Trollope and Madame Bovary to Mad Men (16). Able to capture what Fernand Braudel coined the longue durée and the specificities and smaller transformations occurring on the ground, genres like the naturalistic narrative highlight the continuing value of historicism “as a constitutive condition of the critical enterprise,” urging us “to recognize the dialectic of depth and surface, structure and aesthetics, ethics and geopolitics, close and distant reading, and synchronic and diachronic time frames, as the daunting, humbling, and oh-so-inviting challenge of the way we read now” (17).
As the longue durée of the naturalistic narrative of globalization suggests, Goodlad's book covers a lot of ground. It is a fine balancing act, detailing the minute particulars of historical events while also attending to a range of substantial Victorian fiction, from Trollope's none too short series of novels—with close readings of The Eustace Diamonds, The Prime Minister, Trollope's travel writing, and The Way We Live Now—to Collins's Armadale and The Moonstone, Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary, Eliot's Romola, and Forster's Where Angels Fear to Tread. Trollope is central to her argument and forms the focus of her early chapters; Britain's status as a global and growing empire sets the stage for Trollope's novels and travel writing. In particular, Mysore becomes a touchstone for the relations between imperial policies and practices and domestic politics; Britain's role there elucidates the contradictions between a liberal representative English government and the development of a mass democracy at home and the exercise of military might and crude imperial domination abroad. How, in other words, to reconcile forms of neofeudalism and liberal rule, and democratic claims to equal representation for all with the refusal of such rights to Britain's colonial subjects? At the heart of these debates are notions of right and expediency, which, as Goodlad argues, find expression in Trollope's novelistic world, and with particular potency in The Eustace Diamonds; as with the debate around Mysore, the Sawab's case matters in the novel less for what it tells us about India or the Sawab and more for “the Parliament that decides his case: a metropolitan institution enmeshed in the moral fog of a territorial empire” (100).
More generally, the issue of sovereignty within and beyond England's borders is the lens through which Goodlad views historical, political, and social developments across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If colonial policies in India strain domestic relations by calling into question the liberal principle of representative government, a representation denied Britain's colonial subjects, the later ideology of “Greater Britishness” expounded by Godwin Smith and others attempts to square the circle in its vision of an all-white settler colonialism founded on Anglo-Saxon blood. Again, these debates find their way into Trollope's writing directly and indirectly, in what Goodlad refers to as Trollope's “two-part foreign policy” (80)—namely, the different articulations of sovereignty that comprise his Barsetshire novels and his travel writing: whereas the novels depict a rooted or “heirloom” sovereignty built on an established class hierarchy, his colonial travels “imagine ‘race’ as the warrant for a very different, and, yet, geopolitically necessary project of colonial expansion and class mobility” (77).Footnote 20 Trollope's relationship to colonial expansion and the possessive individualism driving global capitalism is thus deeply ambivalent; managed as a two-part policy in his early novels and travel accounts, Trollope's ambivalence takes new shape in the later “naturalistic narratives of capitalist globalization” (82), Goodlad's term for The Prime Minister, The Eustace Diamonds, and The Way We Live Now. Here, the evils of capitalism and the destabilizing effects of an unrooted cosmopolitanism are isolated and located in the figure of the Jew. Breached sovereignty and the loss of all values other than money and power define this world; characters like Lopez in The Prime Minister, as the outsider alien, shore up England's borders by way of an explicitly racial discourse, a “discourse of blood without roots, capitalism's blood—the blood of Jews” (83). For Goodlad there is a certain irony, however, in these representations, since “the closer Trollope comes to visualizing England's social structure in terms of blood rather than place—the language of transportable rather than heirloom roots—the more he seems to realize that capitalism's contradictions are untenable and require the production of scapegoats,” as we see when Lopez's condition is likened to the modern condition tout court (84). Goodlad concludes her reading of Trollopian foreign policy by emphasizing how these issues are still very much with us. The nature and status of a global, transnational world and what it means to be a citizen of such a world continues to define debates around cosmopolitan theory today, “since the heterogeneity of transnational experience does not in itself ensure justice or democracy” (86).
In keeping with Armstrong's efforts to sever the link between realism and the status quo, Goodlad is keen to counter the idea that Trollope's realism “confirms things as they are” (88), as George Levine writes. Drawing on Georg Lukács's and Jameson's language, The Eustace Diamonds for her “aspires to that ‘objective’ historical gap that, for Lukács, vivifies an otherwise random play of objects and psychological effects and, for Jameson, maps the spatial disjunction that confounds lived experience” (90). Rather than merely reproducing the given, as critiques of realism suggest, it instead captures an emerging geopolitics. The embodiment of the ethos of the New Imperialism, Lizzie Eustace “figures an emerging fusion between imperial expropriation and hyper-romantic aesthetics” (105). More akin to Disraeli than Palliser, and profoundly antirealist in her performativity, Lizzie denaturalizes the ordinary and the normative, thereby stretching the limits of sociological realism and signaling Trollope's “power to stretch sociological form beyond the crude anti-realism of the anti-Semitic scapegoat” (109).
While it might seem a long way from Trollope's realism to Collins's sensation fiction, both share, in Goodlad's view, a transnational vision. While the early Armadale narrates an “uncanny Atlantic imaginary” that maps the transnational “routes” that upset rootedness to place, but ultimately fails to see its “archaeological aesthetic” through to its end (115, 129), The Moonstone resists the impulse to shift registers and repress its history of imperialism and globalization—most notably in its identification of the history of the famous diamond, the Koh-i-Noor, with the scapegoating of Jews. “What is most remarkable about The Moonstone,” Goodlad argues, “is its refusal of this structure of feeling” (141). Completely reversing racial divisions, the novel's villain, Godfrey Ablewhite, is a typically handsome Englishman who disguises himself as “swarthy.” The form of the novel, too, contributes to Collins's particular geopolitical aesthetic: a compilation of different reports, and narratives, all of which reflect only what their respective authors have personally experienced, the novel experiments with the limitations of lived experience. In so doing, The Moonstone, contra critical readings that cede the novel's floor to its professionals, in fact undercuts such authority, as the case of Cuff suggests. In its place, The Moonstone gives us a “multi-sited sovereignty” (153), which, in its final turn toward the future—after all, it asks and leaves unanswered the question, “What will be the next adventures of the Moonstone?”—can ultimately be read as gesturing toward nothing less than “the world-historical process that we today call decolonization” (159).
Eliot's historical novel, Romola, and Forster's Where Angels Fear to Tread (1905) present different variations on the Victorian geopolitical aesthetic in their respective articulations of a specifically “adulterous” geopolitical aesthetic and a queer internationalism, both of which bring issues of gender and sexuality to the fore. Romola, Goodlad asserts, needs to be seen in dynamic relation with Flaubert's Madame Bovary, as one of the three genres the novel mobilizes to tell Romola's story, and key in its depiction of female adultery: “For while the adulterous geopolitical aesthetic recognizes sovereign breach as a universal condition, nineteenth-century morality constructed the sin of adultery as archetypally female” (191). Romola and Emma Bovary share an “existential estrangement” (203), epitomized in Romola when she “drifts away” in chapter 61 and ends up in a plague-ridden village where she administers to its marooned Jews. The dislocations Romola suffers are equated with those “triggered by adulterous sex” in Madame Bovary (204), an association that, at times, feels somewhat strained insofar as the category of adultery expands to become something of a catch-all for all kinds of dislocations or experiences of disorientation, all assembled under the broader category of breached sovereignty.
In this regard, Goodlad's analysis of Forster feels less strained. Unlike the later Howard's End, Forster's first novel challenges liberal tenets in the glimpses it offers of “an ethic of care in the act of breaking loose from its customary precincts in femininity, domesticity, and ‘Southernness’” (218). Less pliant than Anderson would have it, liberalism is limited in its ability to deal with the messiness of affective relations and notions of care that Forster's novel unearths in its queer internationalism. A damning critique of the normative assumptions of family relationships and their extension in Britain's civilizing mission—exemplified in Mrs. Herriton's response to Lilia's baby and Gino's care of him with which we began—Where Angels Fear to Tread gestures toward a notion of ethical care “informed by view” (213). In other words, the novel resists privileging the affective in and of itself, fully aware that “affective relations will often be narrow, undemocratic, reactionary, violent, sexist, or simply selfish” and equally aware that “view is never monological or abstract, but always situated and concrete” (231). As an ethos based on embodied affiliations, the recognition of difference, and contingency, Forster's queer internationalism resists easy solutions. Caroline Abbott and Philip Herriton are changed by their encounters with Italy and Gino, but the “civilizing mission” that brought them there is hardly done away with, and, of course, their ethical awakening comes with the death of the baby. Despite or, rather, because of this, Forster's view is a provocation that is as pressing, if not more so, today than it was then: for “what is ethically bracing in the notion of care is not to do with close ties to those ‘like us’ [as Richard Rorty would have it] but, rather, with epistemological revision: with the transfiguring view that an engaged attention to otherness can, at least momentarily, spark” (238). Goodlad describes this kind of encounter with otherness as a recognition of “infinite responsibility” (237), which in Philip's case comes too late, as he holds the dead baby killed under his care.
Historicism, as these theoretically intricate and historically detailed readings of the Victorian geopolitical aesthetic attest, is in Goodlad's hands never a form of antiquarianism. The relationship between past and present is a pressing one throughout her book; the longue durée of the history of capitalist globalization and the various efforts on the part of nineteenth-century writers to capture the particularities of their own moment in that history by their nature require that criticism attend to both, that its tools be as nimble and discerning as the texts themselves, able to see “the ‘landscapes and forces’ [Jameson's phrase] shaping experience on a transnational scale” (113). Goodlad's analyses also further Jameson's commitment to the pedagogical value of aesthetics, although she does not explicitly emphasize this aspect of his account. Throughout, Goodlad reads the Victorian novel as a “vital resource” (241), its lessons ongoing, its reach still very much felt today, as her turn at the end of The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic to the television show Mad Men exemplifies. A contemporary naturalistic narrative of capitalist globalization—whose main character, the “secret Jew” Don Draper, recalls the “outsider” Lopez in Trollope's The Prime Minister—Mad Men grapples with the neoliberal permutations of global capital today. It also showcases the serial form as particularly well suited to the longue durée and our ongoing need to make sense of our own place within a world system that seems to elude our grasp. This project, as Goodlad emphasizes in the coda to her book, subtitled “The Way We Historicize Now” and thus reprising the emphasis on “now” with which we began, is badly mischaracterized in critiques of suspicious reading: “To the contrary, it endows literature and art with a crucial capacity to articulate structures that elude ordinary cognition” and positions “historicization” as the means by which “to elucidate what texts do see” (271)—a claim, I would add, that all three of the books under review bring to light.
In their respective attempts to reinvigorate how we read nineteenth century novels, Anderson, Armstrong, and Goodlad all succeed in showing that more rather than less critical work is in order. None of these critics argue that everything is easily at hand or on the surface, as the textured richness of their analyses makes clear: complex, multilayered, and finely nuanced, their explanatory power resides in their ability to tease out the challenging questions nineteenth-century novels raise, without either assuming the answers to these questions in advance, or even assuming that answers are what novels (need to) provide. Implacable problems, contradictory or conflictual viewpoints, open and pressing social and political issues are the order of the day—both in the novels and in our response to them. As resourceful archives rather than depleted or moribund narratives, nineteenth-century texts and the larger histories of which they are a part offer the means not only to think about the Victorian present but its many possible futures, including emancipatory possibilities still on the horizon today. Against prevailing accounts of the death knell of good, political Victorian criticism, all three critics show just how rich, varied, vibrant, and relevant to our contemporary moment nineteenth-century literature and culture remain. They do so without throwing out the baby with the bathwater: they all make strong cases for the ongoing need for complex and critical ways of understanding the multiple scales within which we live, which, as they powerfully demonstrate, in turn require better models of mediation between individuals and the social and new ways of reading the past and its relationship to our present and future. In short, collectively, they prove that critique has not run out of steam.
